History Education and the Security Community Building in the Western Balkans: A Critical View

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Abstract: Definitional properties of the security community's "dependable expectations of peaceful change" exist whenever neither side makes further violence unimaginable. School education in the Western Balkans intensifies the thinking that hostility and conflicts are natural and immutable and makes understanding of war as something inevitable and justified. In this article I draw on Pinar Bilgin's claim that unfulfilled potential in terms of knowledge and ideas that already exist in the region could help popularize the cause for a security community and facilitate its creation. By adopting *immanent critique*, a methodological orientation of the Welsh School, in the analysis of the Balkan Conferences (1930–1933) I demonstrate that factual manipulation of history has historically been frequently adopted by Balkan state elites in their permanent desire to build hegemony around ethno-centrism. It was briefly proposed at the Second and Third Conferences that new history textbooks that would overcome ethnocentrism and deepen the trust between the Balkan populations should be introduced in order to achieve rapprochement. In this article I argue that community-minded emancipatory education which adopts multi-perspective methodology and reflective pedagogy harbor crucial potential for further promotion of sustainable peace, facilitating trust in the Western Balkans and inducing the citizens to think of themselves as belonging to a single region.

Keywords: security community, Welsh School, Balkan conferences, EU, hegemony, peace education, civil society.

Introduction

Rebuilding of the security community as a peace-order began in the Western Balkans as a result of power of socialization of the European Union. It has been an effort to create institutional arrangements that have the ability to maintain both the compliance of state elites and the capacity to ensure that their decision-making follows peaceful and non-belligerent foreign-policy choices.[1] We can view the term "Western Balkans" as a cognitive region produced by political engineering of the EU in 1999 that helps constitute the interests and practices of their members: Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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1   Kavalski 2007, 39.

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Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (including Kosovo).[2] The activation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in Sarajevo in 1999 signaled a shift towards broader and better understanding of the region as one which belongs to Europe.[3] The Pact also marked the beginning of overcoming of Balkanism.

However, local trust remains rather weak, while entirely external efforts of the EU to socialize (Europeanize) the region are limited.[4] Western Balkan societies are caught in a cognitive state of insecurity despite the fact that governments regard full EU membership as their strategic goal. But who has held control over the facts that define politics? The so-called historical facts, as traditionally taught in the schools of the region, represent just one measure of controlling the images of the real world in order to engender patriotic sentiments and social stability, advancing merely the interests of political elites.[5] The politically fabricated image of neighbors as hostile and irreversibly invidious are passed on by way of education to generations in the Balkans, mainly due to a lack of in-depth historical research. Region's history education far from being a tool for social cohesion and security community building, continues to be an instrument of political othering, ethnification and community destruction.[6] It is generally acknowledged that school textbooks cultivate attitudes and transmit values and models of behavior associated with the emotional side of personality in a systematic and integrative way and thus influence views, convictions and choices as well as behavior throughout life.[7]

The dominant approach to regional security (Kavalski 2007; Bechev 2011) mainly perceives Balkan relations as given. It only tries to examine how the EU can bring Western Balkans countries to reform around European-prescribed norms, without looking how Balkan interrelations are reproduced and what underlies them. It lacks prescriptive elements that are truly attuned to assuaging the lack of trust among Western Balkan states.[8] A distinguishing feature of this conception of regional security is its top-down character that views security in the Western Balkans from the perspective of extra-regional actors. External actors such as the EU could have potential to reinforce and encourage the seeds of regional security community, but cannot in and of themselves create a security community. Moreover, security community that depends heavily on external enforcement is probably not a security community.[9] The Welsh School calls for politicizing security to 'drawing up' of security agendas, to open up space to include other issues identified by

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2   Iver Neumann claims that regions are invented by political actors as a political program (see: Bechev 2011,64). Accordingly, Emanuel Adler argues that regions represent cognitive regions or cognitive structures within which the people may acquire mutual responsiveness (Adler 2007,343–344).

3   Vučetić 2001,112.

4   In Grillot, Cruise and D'Erman 2010.

5   Booth and Vale 1997, 331.

6   Subotić 2012,111.

7   Bonidis and Zarifis 2006, 330.

8   Grillot, Cruise and D'Erman 2010.

9   Adler and Barnett 1998, 50.

myriad actors in order to de-center the statist concerns of some by highlighting human insecurities (including poor education).[10] In the end, the task is to present alternative readings of the past and to account for choices that were made-or were obscured due to the way security agendas were set up by keeping certain issues out.[11] For the future of the Western Balkans constellations of forces identified as actors in the emancipatory sense are committed group of academics who formed a regional network promoting new educational tools needed for sustainable peace.

The process of imagining, creating and nurturing security community has a potential to be an emancipatory practice for the Western Balkans. My central claim is that a more mature security community in the Western Balkans needs to be a process of building on two tiers: first, improving the sphere in which human beings are culturally reproduced where currently there is a lack of "normative prohibitions against states setting their disputes through military means as a distinctive feature of security community".[12] Western Balkan states have exerted influence over the activities and the process of socialization with social effects on the understanding of war as something inevitable and justified thus facilitating conditions of mistrust. Trust is indispensable between the populations because it makes it possible to achieve certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence, and because it improves the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated actions.[13] Overall, trust is required to sustain cooperation.[14] Secondly, regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is spurred by the EU with aim to enhance "we-ness" of the parties involved, but it is sluggish and shows lack of coordination and often unclear priorities. Development of a more mature security community suggests that states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust, but do so through knowledge and beliefs about one another.[15] Establishment of a new system of governance in terms of "Western Balkan Council" where governments could cooperate more closely would probably elevate cooperation to a qualitatively higher level and promote the diffusion of meanings which could lead to a transformation of reality by changing the beliefs of the social world. The sequenced and causal relationship between these two tiers would be responsible for the production of definitional property of security community – dependable expectations of peaceful change.

In first section I will provide definitional framework of security community and highlight factors that facilitated the emergence and nascent development of security community in the Western Balkans. The second section deals with theoretical approach of the Welsh School that could help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics as a

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10 Bilgin 2008.

11 Ibid, 99.

12 Adler and Barnett 1998, 35.

13 Putnam 1994, 167.

14 Ibid, 171.

15 Adler and Barnett 1998, 46.

force for change by suggesting methods, agents, politics and sites of change. Ideas that might promote emancipation of the Western Balkan peoples from structural wrongs can be accomplished by employing its methodological standpoint of *immanent critique*. Immanent potentials for a more mature security community building in the Western Balkans can be uncovered by turning to the neglected moments in history harboring such potential, for example, the Balkan Conferences held between 1930 and 1933. During the conferences education was recognized as the central obstacle to rapprochement of Balkan societies. The third section deals with current climate in educational system and pedagogy that may lead societies away from endemic violence and stereotypes to intolerant behavior. The section concludes with the potential role of elements of civil society regarding new educational tools in advancing alternative conceptions of security in order to achieve emancipatory change.

Security Community Building in the Western Balkans

Security communities that are most advanced are pluralistic security communities. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett define a pluralistic security community as a "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change".[16] Dependable expectations of peaceful change exist whenever the states are not undertaking or considering security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as threatening.[17] Furthermore, states gain the ability to manage conflicts within the group in a peaceful way or, rather, to learn that the use of force has no place in long-term management of relations among members of a security community. [18]

Adler and Barnett argued that there are three groups of factors that facilitate the emergence and development of pluralistic security communities, highlighting the factors leading to community development. The first tier, consisting of "precipitating conditions", includes those factors that might induce the states to begin to re-orient their perception about social reality. The second tier reflects factors conducive to development of mutual trust and collective identity, and these factors are categorized under structure (power and knowledge) and process (transactions, organizations and social learning). In terms of power, third parties (non-members) could play significant roles in creating a magnetic effect for security community building,while knowledge refers to various ideas and unfulfilled potentials that facilitate the creation of a sense of community. The third tier includes the necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change that involve mutual trust and collective identity. At this level, states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust, but do so through knowledge and beliefs about one another. According to these three tiers and the degree of dependable

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16   Adler and Barnett 1998, 30

17   Ibid, 35.

18   Acharya 2001, 20.

expectations of peaceful change, a security community develops in three phases: nascent, ascendant and mature.[19]

Emanuel Adler particularly highlights the "learning" processes involved in the creation and enhancement of security communities, suggesting that members must learn and be socialized into the "we-feeling" of the community. Security communities are therefore constructed of norms, attitudes, practices and habits of cooperation.

The social construction of pluralistic security communities greatly facilitates security community-building institutions. By creating normative and sometimes causal frames of reference, these types of institutions, according to Adler, may:

> Play critical role in diffusion and institutionalization of values, norms and shared understanding. Finally, by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms, all of which encourage, and also depend on, mutual responsiveness and trust, security community-building institutions may help shape the practices of states that make possible emergence of security communities.[20]

Therefore, in their initial stages, security communities have been identified as peace orders initiated through the exercise of socialization powers of external agents.[21]

Security community building in the Western Balkans began as a type of socialization characterized by the power of the EU to create an environment that will enable local actors to choose a specific set of policy choices, rather than the rival one based mostly on ethno nationalism.[22] The socializing power of the EU is manifested in compliance of elites to prescribed standards, attitudes and habits that are expected to facilitate development of predictable policy-making. [23]

After the wars in former Yugoslavia and the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, the EU launched the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) at the Sarajevo Summitin 1999. The SP established a regional forum for political, economic and social dialogue and emerged as a much-needed entry strategy, an attempt to Europeanize and de-Balkanize the Balkans.[24] Furthermore, the SP constructed a nascent security community. After the EU–Western Balkan Summit in Zagreb in November 2000, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) became the EU's leading strategy towards the Western Balkans. SAP conditionality became a major EU integration vehicle, while the SP facilitated implementation of the regional dimension of the EU policy and maintained some sort

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19   Adler and Barnett 1998, 38–48

20   Adler 2007, 354.

21   Kavalski 2007, 61.

22   Ibid.

23   Ibid.

24   Vučetić 2001, 109.

of institutional link.[25] Through SAP, states in the region are voluntarily adapting to the EU acquis communautaire, entailing a profound change of institutional framework as well as a change in perceptions of norms, accountability and legitimacy.[26] Besides formal legal transposition of rules into domestic spheres, it entails a shift of utility-maximizing behavior (logic of consequences) to the norm-following one (logic of appropriateness), which leads to the internalization of the norm of peaceful foreign policy and group-community norms. This substantive Europeanization of the Western Balkans has been noticed for some time because elements of EU policy-making became mostly a cognitive and normative frame of reference and both the logic of action and the logic of meaning are guided by Europe in all Western Balkans countries.[27]

The most important part of the EU's normative set is regional cooperation as a norm, in the sense of proscribed appropriate behavior regarding the achievement of peace, economic and political stability for the purpose of becoming a member of the EU. Regional cooperation is an essential element of the SAP and even more than that – it is a cornerstone of European integration with aim to enhance "we-ness" of the parties involved. But it has been the EU-rope so far which has constructed a regional grouping of the Balkan countries and "legitimized nascent forms of multilateral cooperation, through normative discourse on European standards".[28] Although external incentive regional cooperation does exist in the Western Balkans, it is still sluggish and showing lack of coordination and often unclear priorities.[29] It brings to the crossroads that necessitate search for a new institutional formation in which the governments could adopt common and more uniform policies and open up the process of developing regional identity as a pivotal element for success of regional cooperation.[30] So far there is certainly no common regional identity that could serve as a basis for more comprehensive regional cooperation.[31] Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is often viewed in instrumental terms as without value per se, since it only brings states closer to the EU and therefore does not provide regional identity as region itself, due to historical divisions and political fragmentation, is not seen as a natural social whole.

Security community comes into existence when it becomes increasingly difficult for the members of the "region" to think only in instrumental ways.[32] The establishment of a new system of governance in terms of the "Western Balkan Council", where governments

25   Bechev 2006, 38.

26   Vučetić 2001, 118.

27   About Europeanization, see: Radaelli 2004,10.

28   Bechev 2011, 80.

29   Koneska 2007, 83; Teokarević 2011.

30   Stability Pact was transformed into its successor organisation, the Regional Co-operation Council in 2008 as a new framework for continuous and immediate cooperation in numerous areas. However, regional ownership still remains insufficient.

31   Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilović 2002, 40.

32   Adler and Barnett 1998, 55.

would be able to cooperate more closely within a common adopted policy covering various areas of life, would probably elevate cooperation to a qualitatively higher level. More importantly, it would promote the diffusion of meanings, which could lead to a transformation of reality by changing the beliefs of the social world, consequently leading to the emergence of regional identity and, hence, more mature security building.[33]

Western Balkan countries have never associated EU membership with regional trust, because local trust remains rather weak as countries see their neighbors as enemies rather than "given allies". For example, Albanians attach less importance to their relations with neighbors than to their relations with other Western countries and alliances. A survey conducted in 2011 shows that 51.6 percent of respondents considered neighboring Serbia to be the major threat to the security of Albania.[34] The lack of trust is also reflected in Serbia, where only 21.2 percent of the population feels secure as a result of living in an "amicable" regional environment.[35] In order to generate stable expectations of peaceful change it is necessary to dismantle previously unidentified factors which create cognitive divides and probably legitimate conflict. It is possible to do so by transforming knowledge and beliefs about the "other". The current strategic rationality, the one that permitted the Balkan governments to destabilize the region in the past, is also a result of educational systems that depict neighbors as enemies. When discriminatory attitudes and symptoms exist in the community –they probably exist in the schools as well, and vice versa, as the schools are not separate from the "real world" but are one facet of a person's overall socialization and experience.[36]

Therefore it is necessary to establish conditions for achieving deeper confidence among the societies, in order to strengthen mutual trust as a central element of security community and a factor contributing to long-term de-legitimization of the use of force in relations among members of a community. Moreover, trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing and a necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change,[37] although mutual identification here does not imply an affective manner of feeling and emotion, but a socially constructed socio-cognitive process.[38] The state's normative discourse and actions reflected in the language of the community, particularly in educational institutions, can be an indicator that points to a high degree of trust, a shared identity and future.[39]

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33 Strong regional identity and structural cooperation are achieved in the examples of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordic Council and the Visegrad Group.

34 Greece comes second with 47.9 percent. Survey conducted by the Albanian Institute for International Studies (See: Rakipi 2012, 21).

35 Survey conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCBP 2011, 31).

36 Reardon 1998, 20.

37 About factors that are prone to create dependable expectations of peaceful change, see in: Adler and Barnett 1998, 38.

38 Adler 1998, 177.

39 Adler and Barnett 1998,55–56.

In order to improve our overall observations, I will use the Critical Theory of Security, namely the Welsh School, as a theoretical framework to investigate what security might mean in practice from the standpoint of politics of a different political, philosophical and historical context, i.e. different than the politics associated with state-centric and nationalistic interests. Critical Theory could help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics as a force for change by suggesting methods, agents, politics and sites of change, in order to help the regional population move away from its structural wrongs.

Critical Theory of Security: Utopian Realism for the Western Balkans

The Critical Theory of Security mostly known as the Welsh School „is a theoretical commitment that embraces a set of ideas engaging in critical and permanent exploration of ontology, epistemology and praxis of security, community and emancipation in world politics."[40] Moreover, as political orientation „it is informed by the aim of enhancing security through emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels, including the potential community of communities – common humanity".[41] The theory only needs to act as a force that will in certain situations stimulate change and affirm progressive alternatives that promote emancipation.[42]

This theory-practice nexus mostly indicates the role of civil society organizations and intellectuals as holders of emancipator politics. Proponents of the Welsh School have taken seriously Karl Marx's admonition not to only think about the world but to change it as well and Antonio Gramsci focused on *praxis* (theory and practice are inextricably intertwined) and the potential role of elements of the civil society in advancing alternative conceptions of security in order to achieve emancipatory change.[43] Civil society is a true source and theatre of all history that embraces the entire material intercourse of individuals transcending the state and the nation.[44] Its constituting forces (NGOs, movements, etc.) are thus "shapers", representing agents of stabilization and reproduction and potential agents of transformation (emancipation).[45] Among its various definitions, emancipation within this tradition means "securing of freedom from unacknowledged constraints and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny people the capacity to make their own future in full will and consciousness".[46]

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40   Booth 2005, 268.

41   Ibid, 268.

42   Daly 2006, 32.

43   Peoples and Vaugham Williams 2010, 26; Wyn Jones 1999.

44   Marx, quoted in Bobbio 1979, 30.

45   Cox 1999.

46   Devetak 2005, 145.

Emancipation requires a true foundation for securing freedom. Andrew Linklater sees in a security community a true foundation of security of people as it makes a shift from strategic to communicative orientations with regard to others. In such „domain of morality", as Linklater noticed, actors reach a mutual understanding which softens egos of national differences and in which desire for peaceful change has abolished the use of force.[47] There is no doubt therefore that security is inextricably linked with community and emancipation.[48] According to Ken Booth's critical thinking, emancipation is theoretically security,[49] and community is the site of security.[50] Therefore the process of imagining, creating and nurturing security communities has a potential to be emancipatory practice.[51] This theoretical consideration should be in the spotlight of research into the regional (in) security in the Western Balkans.

It encapsulates the replacement of adversarial relations with reciprocity, trust and peaceful change and proposes that good international citizenship requires a skillful blend of elements of realism and idealism.[52] Quite often, however, one hears that such a picture of the Western Balkans represents a utopian mode of thinking. The Critical Theory of Security, as "utopian realism",[53] attempts to bring together the normative and the empirical as well as "where we are" and "where we want to go" (a harmonious human community with enhanced world security).[54] *The methodological* focus on utopia does not mean an unrealistic vision of the future in accordance with some schematic plan (blueprint). It is critical examination of what is believed to be the reality and hence exploration of unfulfilled immanent potential in the Balkans in order to provide ideas that might promote the emancipation of the Western Balkan peoples from structures which prevent them from reaching mutual understanding and trust.

The objective of promoting "utopian" emancipatory politics can be accomplished by employing the method of *immanent critique.* The role of *immanent critique* as a philosophical strategy and a methodological standpoint of critical theory is to criticize the present political order in terms of principles presupposed by and embedded in its own political history.[55] The method searches for unfulfilled potential for emancipatory possibilities that already exists within the society, and subsequently employs politics to recover and strengthen them.[56] When dealing with events from the past, *immanent*

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47   Linklater 2005, 126.

48   Ibid, 114.

49   Booth 1991a, 319.

50   Booth 2007, 278.

51   Bilgin 2005, 178.

52   Linklater 2007, 69.

53   Booth 1991b.

54   Booth 2005, 273.

55   Devetak 2005, 144.

56   Booth 2007, 250.

critique tries to establish the meaning that is relevant to contemporary times. *Immanent critique* seeks to recognize the living emancipatory value of a historical event, the sense in which the event itself is like a man's awareness about the unjust world in which we live today. Michael Foucault also claims that each confrontation with the past is in fact search for an interpretation of the present, because what matters today has roots in the past.[57] Unfulfilled potentials in terms of knowledge and ideas which already exist in the region, as Pinar Bilgin claims, could more help popularize the cause for a security community and facilitate its creation.[58] Immanent potentials for a different future in the Balkans (a mature security community), implying that all people live in harmony and stability and that there is decline in importance of territories and of conflicts, can be uncovered by turning to neglected moments in history harboring such potential, for example, the Balkan Conferences held between 1930 and 1933.

The Balkan Conferences as a "History of the Present"

Michael Foucault's "history of the present" is a productive space for critical thinking with a political reach. The game is to try to detect those things which have not yet been talked about, those things that, at the present time, introduce, show, and give some more or less indications.[59] The Balkan Conferences represent "history of the present" in line with my approach, exploring the possibilities for transformation of contemporary regional political order. The central goal of the Conferences[60] was to accustom the people to the idea of co-habitation and prevent their hypnotic focus on moral, political and economic barriers that had divided up the region.[61] Participants were offered what in current theoretical language would be termed normative and praxeological critique of the state-centric order of the Balkans, with aim to create a Balkan Union – an agreement (pact) of collaboration, mutual assistance, friendship and pacific settlement – conductive to liberal vision of peace, trust and understanding.[62] Idea of the Balkan Union was primarily influenced by numerous initiatives launched after the First World War which were aimed to eliminate the danger of war and unify European countries under the Briand Plan for the European federation in 1929.[63] Similar to contemporary efforts of the EU to de-balkanise the Balkans, Balkan states assembled in the early 1930s for the first time in history to cement a durable and solid understanding amongst themselves and committed their efforts to overturning the bleak international reputation of the Balkans as the powder-keg of Europe.[64]

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57   Roth 1981.

58   Bilgin 2005, 186.

59   Roth 1981, 36.

60   Following countries took part in the work of the Conferences: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

61   Hatzopoulos 2008, 104.

62   Lubotskaya 2006, 36.

63   Lopandić and Kronja 2010, 35.

64   Hatzopoulos 2008, 101.

The Conferences proposed introducing a veritable web of new institutions which envisaged a new system of governance that could complement traditional state methods and create conditions for a change toward the suppression of national egoisms. The road to the development of the region was found particularly in the establishment of new integrative organizations as a cooperative measure that would generally smooth interstate relations necessary for the expansion of a novel web of social formations covering all the areas of social life.[65] According to the language of Adler and Barnett, it would be an organization that offers a new social reality, with governance linked to dependable expectations of peaceful change, expanding "the role of the state as it becomes an agent that furthers the various wants of the community".[66] Accordingly, the Balkan Conferences envisioned the creation of multiple flows inducing close cooperation that would successively mushroom into a web of relations, and the introduction of concrete social practices and symbols striving to create a Balkan consciousness: Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Balkan Labor Office, Balkan Tourist Federation, Balkan Press Association, Balkan Postal Union, Celebration of the Balkan Week, Balkan flag and annual Balkan sports games, etc.[67] In most cases, "one of the principal objectives was said to be the proliferation of other, more focused, associations that would promote Balkan cooperation in increasingly more subfields".[68] The Balkan Conferences may therefore supply the modern thinking of security community building in the Western Balkans with proposals regarding the organization and the process of social learning as factors that are compatible with development of mutual trust and collective identity, as it is indicated that contemporary regional cooperation is sluggish due to the lack of regional identity.

For Čedomir Đorđević, head of Yugoslav delegation at the First Balkan Conference held between October 5 and 12, 1930 in Athens, the way to advance the process towards close cooperation was to "depoliticize the Balkans" given that the roots of political destabilization in the Balkans have always been national problems.[69] In particular, education was pointed out as the site where nationalist ideology was reproduced and cognitive barriers formed as the main source of distortion and seeds of misunderstanding among the Balkan peoples, causing an unstable regional system. At the Second Balkan Conference in Istanbul held on October 20–26, 1931, education was ultimately recognized as central to the constitution of subjects but, regrettably, it was also established that it was dominated by the overt propagation of nationalist views, mounting an obstacle to rapprochement.[70] Education was analyzed as an open site of potential struggle between the competing nationalist and liberal internationalist interpellations, while the teaching of history was carefully studied as well, since it was considered a test case for struggle against

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65   Hatzopoulos 2008 110–112.

66   Adler and Barnett 1998, 36.

67   Hatzopoulos 2008, 109.

68   Ibid, 109.

69   Hatzopoulos 2008, 212.

70   Ibid, 114.

nationalist ideology.[71] It was briefly proposed during the Second and Third Conferences to introduce new history textbooks that would overcome ethnocentrism. Particularly interesting among the various proposals that have been put forward in order to bring the Balkan peoples closer together, was the one propounded at the Third Conference– to create new historical textbooks, "manuals that would devote more room to the history of other Balkan peoples and highlight their common stake for peace, taking into account the progress made by the science of history."[72] It was meant to emphasize the need to pay attention to "individual and social education: create healthy political ideas, introduce appropriate curriculum in schools, cultivate sentiments of toleration, mutual respect, confidence and finally respect."[73]

The reconstruction of the Balkan Conferences and their final ideal of the Union works as a retrospective intelligible justification of the present thinking about security community building. A finding from the Second Balkan Conference, that education is central to the constitution of subjects, and the proposal made at the Third Conference to create new history textbooksin order to facilitate the creation of a Balkan Union-pact of collaboration, mutual assistance and pacific settlement should also represent a foundation of contemporary building of a more mature security community in the Western Balkans -dependable expectations of peaceful change (mutual trust)– because of the conceptual commensurability between the former ideal of the Balkan Union and the security community.

Education as a Tool of Regional Trust Building: Emancipatory Role of Civil Society

The starting point of becoming a member of a society is internalization:

> The immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning, that is, as a manifestation of another's subjective processes which thereby becomes subjectively meaningful to myself as individuals 'taking over' the world in which others already live.[74]

A human being does not internalize that world as one of many possible worlds, he internalizes it as *the* world, the only existent and the only conceivable world, firmly entrenched in consciousness.[75] The formation within the consciousness implies the internalization of society as such and of objective reality established therein, and, at the same time, *the subjective establishment of a coherent and continuous identity*.[76]

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71   Hatzopoulos 2008, 114.

72   Ibid, 212.

73   Ibid, 116.

74   Berger and Luckmann 1966, 149.

75   Ibid, 154.

76   Ibid, 153.

After the wars in Yugoslavia and the conflict in Kosovo, the nationalist leaderships of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and FR Yugoslavia managed to remain in power by feeding the nationalist sentiment through the ownership of most important national resources, by controlling information, education and the media. Therefore, primary socialization has been taking place by internalization of the Manichean image of the region through the expression of negative opinions about the neighboring countries. The continuity in holding such an image of the world has remained in state institutions and school education, where "internalization of institutional or institution-based 'sub-worlds' and acquisition of role specific knowledge structuring routine interpretations" occurs.[77] The school, as the strongest socializing agent and usually controlled by the ruling forces in the society, systematically develops intellectual, emotional, and social aspects of an individual personality.[78] It is an important lever of power, through which the state transmits desirable models of "belief" and the prescribed truth, which governments expect the people to accept.

In contemporary Western Balkans, education is among the most important tools that serve to shape national awareness and identity. School systems employ extremely traditional pedagogical instruction methods which do not allow dialogue. Socialization effects of this method of instruction contribute to the homogenization of the minds and deprive students of responsibility for their actions; they are thus socialized to accept conformity as a virtue, follow directives unquestioningly, and accept biases obediently.[79] In this sense, formal (state) history education is allowed to disseminate a number of value-driven statements regarding the national myths and ethnic stereotypes which are very negatively specified for each ethnic group in the Balkans.[80] In most countries of the region the created image conjures historical correctness of their own nation, and historical events in textbooks are interpreted in a way that gives an impression that most neighboring peoples have territorial aspirations.[81] Textbooks assume a positivist, traditional approach to history as the sum of a number of terrifying facts. Factual history presents the past only as a string of conflicts, mistrust and crimes, intensifying a feeling that hostility and conflicts are natural and immutable.[82]

The induced mentality of 'us-them' and early hostile patriotism contribute to making the students in susceptible to negative images of their own country, consequently playing a

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77   Berger and Luckmann 1966, 158. They argue that 'sub-worlds' internalized in secondary socialization (school) are generally partial realities in contrast to the 'base-world' acquired in primary socialization (family unit), but yet they, too, are more or less cohesive realities, characterized by normative and affective as well as cognitive components.

78   Rot 2006, 128.

79   Rosandic 2000, 16.

80   In history textbooks for early school age there are already ideas about state enemies. (Vasović 2007, 141).

81   Stojanović 2010.

82   Stojanović 2010, 89.

special role in the understanding of war as something inevitable and justified.[83] Such a model of national awareness and historical memory creates a specific type of socialization of young people that in the future can lead more easily to conflicts among the neighboring nations than to peaceful settlement. Consequently, the polities and societies in Western Balkans countries are more often connected with the lack of or limited 'social' and 'human' capital, important prerequisites for the establishment of trust and consequently development of regional cooperation.[84] Therefore there is a need for emancipation of the entire region from the constraints and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny people the capacity to create their own future in full will and consciousness.

History contributes to peace by providing a more salutary perception of the "other" through accurate analysis of the "other's" motives.[85] A change in the method of teaching history can have a long-term effect on the way the neighboring peoples perceive one another. New history textbooks need not represent a new construction which would replace national histories, but rather a new interpretation of national pasts based more on common Balkan cultural and institutional heritage and providing more room for narratives of cooperation. The concept of multi-perspectivity is central to that kind of innovative pedagogy and critical historiography. Simply put, multi-perspectivity is a way of viewing, and a predisposition to view, historical events, personalities, developments, cultures and societies from different perspectives by drawing on procedures and processes which are fundamental to history as a discipline.[86]It would become more apparent that major public issues that we face are complex and many-sided. This will consequently enable people to understand that war and other forms of violence are not inevitable eventualities – quite the contrary, they are the consequence of human will and intent and can be avoided, entirely even eliminated, if human will and intent so desire.[87] Contrary to the instruction methods, general methodological orientation of such reflective pedagogy is the nurturing and development of human curiosity and wonderment toward the achievement of the self and of socially relevant knowledge, skills and values that enhance humanity.[88]

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83   Vasović 2007, 145. For example, although Croatia became a member of the European Union, its education still retains its firm ethno-nationalist axis: "Authors of Croatian textbooks raise awareness about Serbs as genocidal people and worst enemies. Such indoctrination creates a general antipathy against Serbs. In addition, by constant referring to the Bay of Kotor, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Srem as Croatian lands, history textbooks express pretensions to the territories of neighboring states. This creates the perception that potential conflict around, for example, Srem of the Republic of Serbia or Bosnia would not be an act of aggression against someone else, but a legitimate struggle for the liberation of their own lands." (Latinović 2006).

84   Anastasakis and Bojicic-Dzelilović 2002, 12.

85   Alpargu, Sahin and Yazici 2009, 207.

86   Johnson 2012, 2.

87   Reardon 1988, 27–37.

88   Reardon and Snauwaert 2011, 6.

Historical knowledge and history are abused and turned into a political battlefield, in order to have direct effect on the human ego and social identity.[89] Through education, states and their elites have established a hegemony which Antonio Gramsci explains as "persuading the ruled to accept the system of beliefs of the ruling class and share their social and cultural values".[90] History education's intellectual attraction has been that it is offered a plausible explanations of war and power politics in general, which seem to work for persistence of the state elites. As Gramsci also argues that every hegemonic relationship is necessarily also a pedagogic relationship, the main objective of our approach is to contest the legitimacy of common sense within the historic bloc by exposing its ideological weaknesses – the authoritarian concept and the closed system of history which becomes a reliable base of undemocratic society.[91] Gramsci metaphorically used the term "war of position" to describe an ideological attack on the legitimacy of the complex form of societal consensus that binds the entire social order. A great role must presently be granted to emancipatory civil society organizations and their organic intellectuals as agents of emancipatory politics who are able to "free people from human constraints such us war and threat of war and from poor education which prevents them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do".[92] A possibility of emancipatory debate on the legitimacy of one's own and others' views regarding common historical events was opened up in 1998 with Joint History Project (JHP), launched by The *Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (*CDRSEE)*. The Center and its History Education Committee as a civil society actor, belong in the Gramscian sense to the realm in which cultural change is bound to take place and in which counter-hegemony of emancipatory forces is constituted, eroding the legitimacy of the ruling detrimental historic bloc of ethno-centrism.[93] Through its History Education Committee consisting of a committed group of academics who promotes multi-perspective views of history in Southeast Europe, the CDRSEE has started to create new innovative educational tools as practice and transformational potential from which emanate ethics that may enable historically conditioned communities of people in the Western Balkans to cope with their environment in the spirit of solidarity. In the long run, the JHP project aims to revise the ethnocentric history teaching in schools by avoiding stereotypes, identifying attitudes that encourage conflict, suggesting alternative teaching methods and promoting the idea of multiple interpretations in history textbooks as alternative teaching materials.

These interventions to change people's conceptions of groups is called recategorization strategy within Common In-group Identity Model as an integrative theoretical framework to explain how intergroup contact (e.g. regional) psychologically operates to reduce bias

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89   Alpargu, Sahin and Yazici, 2009, 201.

90   Joll 1977, 8.

91   More about system of history education, in Stojanović 2004, 338.

92   Booth 1991a, 319.

93   On transformatory potentials of civil society see in Cox 2002, 102.

and improve intergroup relations.[94] Substantiation of recategorization by "educational and attitude-change technique" based on multi-perspective methodology with aim to alter the perception of intergroup boundaries would lead to reduction of cognitive, affective, and behavioral biases by extending the benefits of ethno-centric favoritism to out-group members (neighbor countries), making attitudes and behavior toward these out-group members more favorable.[95] Strategy in general emphasizes that members of different groups are than induced to conceive of themselves as a single, more inclusive superordinate group through interventions of changing cognitive representations of the others who were previously seen in terms of enmity.[96] It may mean remolding of existing identity (national, ethnic) by inscribing common identity which all people in the Western Balkan region share naturally and historically as across the Balkan tier prevail remarkable intraregional confluences of cultures whose eclectic interweaving suggests a shared history and intercultural exchange that thus serves as the basis for a permanent traffic in ideas of peoplehood.[97] Consequently, it would ultimately facilitate overcoming "intersubjective structuring of country's Balkan identity as a function of how the national Self is positioned *vis-à-vis* Europe and the West".[98] In security communities it is ordinary that cognitive distance between its members is shorter and identities of the people who exist within them no longer derives from the international environment or from self-contained nation.[99]

Conclusion

The practice of a security community building is imported into the Balkans, promoted by imperatives of dominant actors of the European zone of peace.[100] Definitional properties of security community's "dependable expectations of peaceful change" exists at nearly any moment that both sides do not fear war or prepare for it.[101] However, in the Western Balkans, school education intensifies consciousness that hostility and conflicts are natural and immutable and makes understanding of war as something inevitable and justified.

Education as a social enterprise conducted for realization of social values is an intentional activity and as such, it is value-driven, a moral and political consideration involving choices about a way of life that both individuals and society must make.[102] In the Western Balkans, history education in particular requires ethical justification in terms of values

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94   Dovidio and Gaertner 1999, 103.

95   Ibid, 104.

96   Dovidio, Gaertner and Saguy 2009, 6.

97   Buchanan 2007, xviii–xxi.

98   Bechev 2011, 69.

99   Adler and Barnett 1998, 48.

100   Kavalski 2007, 53.

101   Adler and Barnet 1998, 35.

102   Snauwaert 2011, 316.

of critical historiography/multi-perspectivity aiming towards liberation of people from factual manipulation of political history imbued with the fears of an "eternal" enemy and a consciousness that conflict among neighboring states is immutable. A reform of education and inclusion of new manuals adopting multi-perspective methodological orientation would mean depoliticization of Balkan societies, enabling emergence of trust which consequently leads to real assurance that dependable expectations of peaceful change exist among neighboring states in the region characterized by past destructive wars. The development of trust can strengthen mutual identification as the key constitutive factor of a security community. On the other hand, establishment of a new system of governance in order to advance sluggish regional cooperation will enable Western Balkan countries to identify a common cause for which to work and take their future into their own hands as well.

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