

**Milovan Trbojević\***

*Faculty of Security Studies, Educons University,  
Sremska Kamenica, Republic of Serbia*

**Branislav Svirčević\*\***

*Faculty of Security Studies, Educons University,  
Sremska Kamenica, Republic of Serbia*

## **THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES IN PREVENTING POLITICAL COUPS**

### **Abstract**

States achieve their foreign policy goals and intentions in different ways, including methods contrary to the norms of international law. Namely, suppose one wants to destabilize a country's economic, political, security and social-social system to implement one's own will, intentions, and interests. In that case, subversive activity is one of the most effective mechanisms. Such activities often cause and maintain various crises, including coups, which aim to impose one's own will on other countries and direct their socio-political flows according to national interests. Countries that carry out coups and other secret actions implement them through their intelligence institutions, which is why the target countries must have strong security and counterintelligence organizations which will prevent such activities. States that seek to maintain their sovereign domestic and foreign policies often become the target of coups and other subversive activities. Therefore, their security apparatus must continuously detect and stop such activities with preventive and repressive methods. Accordingly, the security services have always been a decisive support

---

\* E-mail address: trbojevicmilovan1@gmail.com; ORCID: /.

\*\* E-mail address: svircevic1995@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-2449-3228.

factor in realising internal political goals and protecting the holders and institutions of state power. Bearing that in mind, the subject of this paper is the research and analysis of the role of the security service as an important segment of the state's security-intelligence system in opposing subversive activity towards the home state with an emphasis on preventing a political coup. The paper examines the ways and means of the security services that oppose political coups.

**Keywords:** security services, counterintelligence services, political coups, national values and interests

## INTRODUCTION

States try to obtain their own foreign policy goals and intentions differently. If the goal is destabilising the constitutional order in a country to implement one's own will, intentions, and interests, one of the most effective mechanisms is certainly subversive activity. These activities often cause and maintain various crises, where coups are included. The goal of the coup is to impose one's own will on other countries and direct their socio-political flows according to their national interests. Countries that carry out coups and other secret actions implement them through their intelligence institutions, which is why the target countries must have strong security and counter-intelligence organizations which will prevent this type of activity.

The dynamics of the emergence of modern challenges, risks and threats impose a demand for developing the security services' methodological, technological and personnel capacities, which will be ready to respond to the increasingly numerous and increasingly dangerous forms of threats. Also, the dynamics of the emergence and development of modern challenges, risks and threats, as well as global socio-social, political and security events, led to the reorganization of the security system in most countries of the world so that a new structure of intelligence and security services was established, as well as authorities in charge of coordination, control and direction of services, whose task is primarily to fight against non-military threats. Capacity development is not only related to the need to protect institutions and holders of the highest instances of state power but also requires greater engagement

in protecting the most important, vital values of the state and society, which are directly threatened by subversive activities.

## **DEFINITION AND ROLE OF SECURITY SERVICES**

Security services are part of every security intelligence system of the state, which is most generally defined as a normative, organizational, structural and functional unit of interrelated and dependent elements whose task is to follow the strategic guidelines and instructions of the highest authorities of the state, to ensure the conditions for the realization of political, security, economic, technical-technological and energy interests and goals, to provide timely, relevant and accurate security-intelligence knowledge and to create and maintain an affirmative security regime while acting by the positive legal order of the state.

Observing the security services through the prism of the organization and position of state institutions, the security services represent state administration institutions with the status of a legal entity, whose activity is the most interesting and sensitive part of the state administration, with secrecy as one of its main principles of work, which is why it is imperative that the security services by this nature of work, they ensure respect for the principles of transparency and publicity of their work, through regulatory mechanisms of internal and external monitoring, whereby administrative activity is of particular importance (Labović 2019, 106).

The security services have the task of preventing security-threatening phenomena, which threaten the constitutional order, national security, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, and providing security and counter-intelligence protection to the most important state institutions. When talking about threatening phenomena, the greatest danger is represented by organized crime and more serious forms of crime, cybercrime, subversion, diversion, sabotage, terrorism, violent extremism, assassinations, political murders, political coups and anti-constitutional conspiratorial activities. Security services, as a broader term, include counterintelligence services, which use specific means and methods to deal with opposing foreign intelligence services. Specifically, counterintelligence activity represents planned and controlled activity of counterintelligence and other state authorities to detect, warn and cut intelligence and subversive activities of foreign services, organizations and persons (Ronin 2009, 13).

The security services aim to collect timely, accurate, reliable, credible, complete and expedient information using various forms for the services of characteristic techniques and methods. One of the most frequently applied methods, which the services rely on the most, is the collection of data from human sources. These sources are not sufficient in terms of data collection. However, the information provision must be based on other methods to create a comprehensive picture and to know the merit of the research object. In this connection, data collection methods from public sources (*OpenSource Intelligence – OSINT*) mainly include official documents from state and public institutions and private entities. Modern information systems are a significant public information source, among which the Internet stands out. Information is also collected using technical means (*Sigint, Comint*), that is, listening to radio communications, mobile/landline phones, and other communication channels and means. The secret monitoring method stands out among the unique methods, where a stationary object is observed, or an individual or a group is monitored. In these situations, operational technical means are also applied as secret eavesdropping on conversations (Ronin 2009, 29–56). Often in use is the method of cooperation with foreign services. In this way, they get information of importance for the security of the state and society and their political interests and intentions.

## POLITICAL COUPS

Political coups are a no-go zone in almost all world legislation, and preparatory actions for their execution are also punishable. Political coups are a field of illegal political struggle and can manifest in many different forms; due to their highly complex structure, some coups cannot be fully defined precisely because, in their being, they contain several different elements that constitute them so that they are not only that, instead, they represent a certain sublimite of illegal political activities (Parezanović and Željčki 2019, 412). Even though we do not have a universal and generally accepted definition of the term political coup and its manifestations, there is a relatively broad academic consensus on what these terms represent. The terms, however, are widely used outside academic circles. To a certain extent, they are controversial both because of their political abuses and because of many normative and practical implications (Marsteintredet and Malamud 2019, 11).

A coup is an illegal change of the existing law, which results in a change of political power. It is a complex form of politically motivated violence, which does not necessarily include the use of force. In contrast, the mere presence of force, even if it is a last resort, is a *conditio sine qua non* for successfully ending the coup. The most common forms of coup are *coup d'état* and *putsch*. In the case of a *coup d'état*, the change is carried out by the head of state or persons at the top of the state government, and in the case of a *putsch*, persons in lower positions in the state organization or even outside it (Parezanović 2013, 117).

*Coup d'état* is spatially narrow, on the center of political power, that is, on the seat of power, a limited, violent, conspiratorial, military-political action, which is carried out by a sudden unconstitutional, totally aberrant change in the position of the holders of supreme executive power in a country, carefully planned and in a very short period, it is carried out by a limited number of selected actors from the ranks of state power holders, without the actual participation of the masses, and with a pronounced tendency to survive the revolutionary action within the framework of the existing socio-political association, and even its protection despite regime changes (Simeunović 2009, 111). The word *putsch* is believed to be a German word meaning „blow”. It is a particularly militant form of *coup d'état* carried out, not by foreign interventionist or mercenary troops but by the national armed forces (Simeunović 2009).

A *coup d'état* and *putsch* are characterized by a conspiracy (Simeunović 2002, 174). The conspiracy stems from the nature of political coups, that they are planned and organized in strict secrecy and carried out with lightning speed to achieve the effect of surprise. *Coups* necessarily include a conspiracy core, which makes the most important decisions related to the planning, preparation and implementation of the coup, as well as those concerning establishing a new socio-political order if the coup itself is successfully carried out. The core is tasked with finding solid and reliable positions among members of the military, political, economic and security-intelligence institutions necessary to implement the coup successfully. The core also prepares a psychological and propaganda basis for recruiting a critical mass, which the coup apologists later use to gain broader social support. Foreign intelligence services, whose goal is to carry out a coup, most often form their agents among the members of the conspiracy core. In such circumstances, foreign intelligence services provide the core with the necessary personnel, material-financial, technical-technological and advisory support.

Accordingly, the possible causes of the appearance of political violence, which can certainly increase in intensity and favorably influence the creation of suitable conditions for the execution of a political coup, are: 1) sharp opposition, insufficient realization or impossibility of authentic expression of the interests of large social groups; 2) insufficient ability to affirmatively organize and exercise power; 3) insufficient organization of the economic system; 4) pronounced social differences; 5) prevalence and semi-legality of socially harmful phenomena, such as corruption, relationships, etc.; 6) non-repression, impunity and toleration of negative phenomena (it necessarily encourages the manipulation of one, and reduces faith in the system among others); 7) the possibility of public and permanent action of anti-systemic forces; 8) existence of strong anti-systemic organizations or institutions; 9) constant and strong political, material or military support from outside to opponents of the system, located in the country; 10) diverse, economic, political and military-security undermining of the system from the outside from several directions; 11) conflicts between the political elite and interest groups at the top of the political apparatus of a country; 12) military forces and security structures that are uncontrolled, insufficiently reliable or insufficiently loyal to the political elite (Simeunović 1989, 61).

Therefore, every political coup negates the positive legal order because it always appears as an illegal and illegitimate means of struggle, attempting to overthrow the current and enthrone a new set of authorities. As a negation of the legal system and order, the political coup is defined in every legal system as an unlawful act, often a criminal offence. The above represents a connection between criminal law and national security policy, which can be viewed in the broader context of the relationship between means and ends. Suppose the security of the state and society is designated as national security policy priorities within the strategic-doctrinal and normative documents framework. In that case, the connection between the state as an expression of the „general interest” and criminal law, i.e., legal provisions on political criminal offences, can be viewed through the hypothesis of criminal law as a means, i.e., an instrument of the state’s reaction to political criminality (Bodrožić 2024, 32).

They are most often anti-democratic in their orientation (the coup of General Franco in 1939 in Spain or General Pinochet in 1973 in Chile), but sometimes they can also be democratic in orientation (the coup of General Ataturk in 1919 in Turkey, General Nagib in 1952 in Egypt or the colonel in Portugal in 1974) (Mitrović 2013, 38). The theory

of democratically oriented coups is supplemented by the hypothesis that successful coups within authoritarian regimes should increase the likelihood of democratization (Thyne and Powell 2016, 199). The aforementioned hypothesis is often subject to political manipulation and relativization, and therefore, in a specific socio-political environment and specific example, it is often taken only as a justification for achieving foreign policy goals by causing coups in other countries.

## THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY SERVICE IN PREVENTING POLITICAL COUPS

From the perspective of protecting vital national values and interests, every state seeks to detect and prevent any activity that could lead to the organization of a *coup d'état*. Therefore, one important question is how coups can be prevented and blocked (Sharp and Jenkins 2008, 19). Political coups remain a pressing concern for governments worldwide, and the mechanisms through which coup prevention works are still not sufficiently researched and theorized (Bruin 2017). Security services, accordingly, have the task of systematically, comprehensively and in as much detail as possible studying each case and each attempt to implement political coups, given the multidimensionality of this phenomenon. The influence and ability of security services to prevent a political coup crucially depends on the power and influence of the coup core and the logistical and material-technical support that the coup plotters have (Kim and Sudduth 2021). Also, success in preventing political coups depends on the financial-technical, personnel and experiential factors that the security services have and on the strategic directions that the services take from strategic-doctrinal acts and positive legal norms.

Intelligence and security institutions also play a role in political upheavals, which have frequently occurred in international processes and movements in the last few decades. Thus, the role of intelligence and security services should be viewed from two angles: internal intelligence and security institutions and the role of foreign intelligence and security services. Internal intelligence and security services protect the constitutional order and security of the state and society from subversive actions through timely detection, documentation and prevention of threatening activities, whether outside or within the state. On the other hand, internal intelligence and security institutions have, in specific historical examples, played an important role in the realization of the coup

processes themselves, i.e., thanks to the capacities, subjects and forces of the intelligence and security services, which joined unconstitutional activities, the successful realization of political coups was made possible (Parezanović 2013, 277–280).

In every state, security services are among the most important bodies tasked with creating and maintaining the foundations for the smooth functioning of its most important vital functions. Their position in the state administration, their powers and legally defined tasks represent the foundation of successful functioning to protect the government from political coups. Any obstruction of the lawful work of these bodies can lead to poor functioning of the state and, consequently, to failure to fulfil legally defined tasks (Konarski 2017, 49).

Political upheavals often come suddenly and latently, and the resulting uncertainty leaves very little room for security services to react. Consequently, the task of security services is to use unique methods and means, analyze information and knowledge, to timely recognize the intentions and goals of potential coup forces, about which they immediately, clearly, reliably and precisely inform political decision-makers, thereby creating the conditions for a timely response by the political leadership. Any untimely action or information by security services brings the coup forces one step closer to their goal (Abrams 2024).

A crisis is caused by the organized activities of political opponents (most often directed and led by the intelligence services of the aggressor states) using internal objective difficulties and subjective weaknesses, aiming to destroy the existing constitutional order. In order to cause a crisis, it is necessary that there are organized enemy forces in the country – the victim of aggression, and that the existing circumstances in it are conducive to causing a crisis. In the attacked country, there must be organized (or can be organized) political forces under the leadership of the foreign intelligence service of the aggressor state. Forces organized in this way try to cause a crisis, using even some banal excess as an excuse. The aggressor state's intelligence service manages the crisis's development and directs it in the direction of its exacerbation and approaching the goal (Parezanović 2011).

A unique challenge for security services is counter-coups, which will be done using artificial intelligence. Although this topic has not received significant attention in scientific research due to the still uncertain role of artificial intelligence in implementing political coups, it is clear that artificial intelligence can design and conduct psychological and propaganda



operations. Attacked states will sooner or later defend themselves and will have to rely on the services of artificial intelligence. States (primarily great powers) will participate in these hybrid wars, beginning in the digital space. Due to their capacity and right to legislatively restrict specific actions, states will remain the most important actors in international relations and, generally speaking, in political processes (Proroković and Parezanović 2023, 27).

The role of counterintelligence and security services in preventing political coups is very intertwined, and in many cases, we cannot determine a clear and precise distinction between their competencies. Usually these are services that have both security and counterintelligence components present in their organizational structure. On the other hand, if they exist as separate organizational units, the fight against political coups requires their close cooperation, exchange of information and coordination of joint efforts by the competent state bodies.

### **The role of counterintelligence services**

As for the role of the counter-intelligence service in preventing political coups mainly refers to opposing the intelligence and non-intelligence activities of foreign intelligence services, which are aimed at fulfilling the regional or global goals of their state. Most often, as already mentioned, the intelligence services participate in their implementation through their strategic positions, that is, strategic agencies. A key role is played by agents of influence who are in the highest structures of state or political power or represent persons of high public reputation and influence in the armed forces, leadership of intelligence or counter-intelligence services. It is a fact that intelligence services do not have many footholds in terms of quality and level because it is challenging to reach the right people and create influential agency positions in their country (Bajagić 2015, 458).

Bearing in mind the consequences that these events can cause, the state's actions should be proactive to prevent "color revolutions" because they are a more discreet type of *coup d'état*. When we say proactive action, we mean monitoring and registering the activities of foreign intelligence services, their activities on the ground and recruiting both people outside the state system, especially those within it; special emphasis should be placed on non-governmental organizations, media and universities. Knowing that subversive groups cannot achieve their

goals and operate on the ground without large amounts of money, the first segment of counterintelligence protection should monitor the money flows of extremist groups whose goal is to overthrow the regime (Đurković 2020).

Counterintelligence works continuously to prevent intelligence services, political movements and foreign-controlled groups, often supported by intelligence services, from infiltrating state institutions, the armed forces, and civilian security and political departments to engage in espionage, subversion or sabotage. In this regard, counterintelligence activity consists of offensive and defensive protection measures. Defensive measures are the examination and verification of one's civil servants and officials through investigations, monitoring of known or suspected agents and surveillance activities to detect and neutralize the presence of foreign intelligence services. Offensive measures are carried out by the counterintelligence service by comparing information about foreign intelligence services and their *modus operandi*, by recruiting agents and launching operations to penetrate, disrupt, deceive and manipulate for their benefit (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 2003, 16).

In order to realise political coups as successfully as possible, the intelligence services want to establish control over important information systems for marketing propaganda and indoctrination content, regardless of whether it is in traditional or digital forms. Information systems are used to consolidate and gain new support and exchange information and instructions among coup members. In addition to the mentioned information and propaganda activities, there are other forms of non-intelligence activities of the intelligence services that are used to support political coups: political operations, economic operations, paramilitary operations (Trbojević 2017, 327), and where cooperation is necessary and where the responsibilities of security and counterintelligence elements, or services, overlap.

The task of the counter-intelligence services is to use specific methods. It means to detect and monitor the activities of the intelligence network members who are directly or indirectly involved in subversive activities. More specifically, through methods and means such as secret escort, secret surveillance of communications or secret surveillance and inspection of the interior of counterintelligence facilities, they can obtain information about the foreign intelligence agents who form the network, about the persons engaged as collaborators and the nature of

their engagement, and about potential targets in the structures of state power or administration. Once counterintelligence services have reliably identified the members of an intelligence network and its creators, they choose different counterintelligence tactics, most often opting to disrupt subversive activity and prosecute the actors.

According to specific theories, activities that lead to the destabilization of the state or the overthrow of the government in it to establish a new, changed state that disrupts the established balance of power in international relations in order to achieve one's interests are directed at the organs and bearers of state power (Lind et al. 1989, 26). By the above, counterintelligence services in the context of the fight against political coups also protect the highest organs of state power, other state institutions and important information stations (Đurković 2020, 323).

### **The role of security services**

An external factor as a participant in political coups can be a generator or catalyst of subversive and psychological propaganda actions against political, economic, security and judicial institutions, where the goal is to cause social tensions, destabilization of the economic, energy, security and public-administrative system, as well as political and legal uncertainty. The security services have the task of timely detecting and preventing these forms of threatening activities, in order to preserve peace and political stability in the country and protect the most important values of society and the state.

Security services are increasingly paying attention to cyber security threats as a new field of preventive combat against coups. Exploiting social media by subversives represents one of the most significant challenges in cyberspace, as the most damaging and divisive disinformation campaigns are often aided and amplified by social media platforms (Cunningham 2021). Therefore, in the modern intelligence and security system, it is difficult to imagine the successful and efficient functioning of preventive security apparatuses without a security service specialising in combating cyber threats or at least one organizational unit within the service which will be engaged in these tasks. Security services, following cyberspace, analyse and evaluate the intentions and future actions of the participants of the political coup, thereby creating a basis for timely action. Also, many security services about cyber threats have developed mechanisms for responding to an incident in the form of a cyber-attack, where in addition

to their capacities and forces, they often provide security protection for the following systems: 1. the highest state authorities and other institutions of state administration, 2. elements of critical infrastructure: national information and telecommunication networks, national traffic infrastructure, energy systems, electricity, water, etc.

Security services protect organs and institutions vital for the state's functioning and are often the target of political coups. Security protection consists of measures and activities to ensure timely and preventive action if members of subversive groups or persons associated with them initiate threatening activity against persons and objects that are the subject of protection.

Security services focus their interest in the context of the fight against political coups with unique methods and means to collect, analyze, and evaluate information about coup activity. Information is of key importance for preventive action and can relate to the intentions of the coup plotters, available forces, organizational structure, influence of foreign factors, etc. Collecting information about financial flows is also important, especially foreign ones. Money can be delivered to the country legally and illegally. Therefore, constant and coordinated activity of state authorities is necessary to prevent this. We live in the age of digitization; it is common knowledge how much the Internet and social networks play in daily information. They can serve revolutionary groups to mobilise, coordinate and connect them in the field, making this information more important than the classic ways of informing through printed newspapers and TV. That is why monitoring the Internet becomes an important segment of security protection, and if it is necessary to temporarily shut down certain services on the Internet, as China, Russia, and Turkey do. It is known that during the elections in Montenegro in 2016, the "Viber" application was shut down as one of the most popular communication applications (Đurković 2020).

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

States strive to protect themselves from possible threats, including political coups, with all available mechanisms. Therefore, political coups are part of every criminal legislation as a specific incriminating activity. The problem that the legislator has in this case is the inability to foresee all the manifest forms of this threatening phenomenon. From a security perspective, the problem of recognizing the manifest forms of political

coups, no matter how pronounced, is the responsibility and task of the security services, to which the holders of political power give very little room for error. The role of security services in preventing political coups is primarily focused on preventive action, where security services, using unique means and methods, observe all security-interesting factors, circumstances and phenomena to respond promptly. The initiators and direct perpetrators of political coups seek to create a political and security environment that will enable them to replace the ruling party or change the constitutional order. This is why counterintelligence and security services have a wide field of action and increasingly broad tactical and strategic directions. Although the roles of security and counterintelligence services in preventing coups can be viewed as separate categories in actual circumstances, and due to the influence of numerous inclusive carriers and forms of threat, preventing political coups is not possible without the synergy of these two security segments.

Security and counterintelligence services are also complicated by the increasing role of modern information and communication technologies in the preparation phase of political coups and their implementation. Therefore, security services must monitor and prevent all activities in this area, regardless of whether information technologies are used for cyber-attacks and disruption of essential functions of society and the state or to spread propaganda content and recruit new supporters of the coup. Cyber threats, as an important support for political coups, are becoming increasingly sophisticated and destructive, and their application is increasingly intensive and widespread, this area of security services requires permanent organizational, personnel and planning adjustments.

## REFERENCES

- Abrams, Eliot. 2024. "What to Do About Coups." *Council on Foreign Relations*. 11 January 2024. <https://www.cfr.org/article/what-do-about-coups>.
- Bajagić, Mladen. 2015. *Metodika obaveštajnog rada*. Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska akademija.
- Bodrožić, Ivana. 2024. „Načelne i pojedine nomotehničke osobenosti krivičnih dela protiv ustavnog uređenja i bezbednosti Republike Srbije.” *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* 27 (2): 31–52. DOI: 10.5937/pnb27-53357.

- Bruin, De Erica. 2017. "Preventing Coups d'état: Hot Counterbalancing Works." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (7): 1433–1458. DOI: 10.1177/0022002717692652.
- Cunningham, Alan. 2021. "Counterintelligence in The 21st Century: The Need for Integration." *War Room Online Journal*. 17 March 2021. <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/ci-integration/>.
- Đurković, Miša. 2020. „Obojene revolucije kao deo hibridnog rata.” *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke* 71 (175): 309–327. DOI: 10.2298/ZMSDN2075309D.
- Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF]. 2003. *Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight – A Practitioner's View: DCAF Intelligence Working Group*. Geneva: DCAF Intelligence Working Group. Last accessed 20 January 2025. [https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/op03\\_intelligence-practice.pdf](https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/op03_intelligence-practice.pdf).
- Kim, Nam Kyu, and Jun Koga Sudduth. 2021. "Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (9): 1597–1628. DOI: 10.1177/0010414021997161.
- Konarski, Marcin. 2017. "Legal Security and Coup Detat – Historical and Modern Perspectives." *Review of European and Comparative Law* 30 (3): 29–54. DOI: 10.31743/recl.4165.
- Labović, Dejan. 2019. „Upravna kontrola Vojnobezbednosne agencije Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije – normativni aspekt.” *Savremena uprava: časopis za praktična i teorijska pitanja javne uprave* 2 (2): 105–113.
- Lind, Wiliam, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, and Gary Wilson. 1989. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette*. <https://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html>.
- Marsteintredet, Leiv, and Andres Malamud. 2019. "Coups with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research?" *Political Studies* 68 (4): 1014–1035. DOI: 10.1177/0032321719888857.
- Mitrović, Dragan. 2013. *Uvod u pravo*. Beograd: Pravni fakultet univerziteta u Beogradu.
- Parezanović, Marko. 2011. „Značaj i uloga društvenih mreža u političkom prevratu.” *Telekomunikacije*. Poslednji pristup 20. januar 2025. [http://www.telekomunikacije.rs/arhiva\\_brojeva/deveti\\_broj/dr\\_marko\\_parezanovic\\_znacaj\\_i\\_uloga\\_drustvenih\\_mredja\\_u\\_politickom\\_prevratu.432.html](http://www.telekomunikacije.rs/arhiva_brojeva/deveti_broj/dr_marko_parezanovic_znacaj_i_uloga_drustvenih_mredja_u_politickom_prevratu.432.html).

- Parezanović, Marko. 2013. *Politički prevrat: savremeni pristup*. Beograd: Nova srpska politička misao.
- Parezanović, Marko, i Relja Željki. 2019. „Uloga propagandnih aktivnosti u političkim prevratima.” *Srpska politička misao* 65 (3): 409–426. DOI: 10.22182/spm.6532019.18.
- Proroković, Dušan, i Marko Parezanović. 2023. “Artificial intelligence and psychological-propaganda operations in the context of national security treat.” *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* 25 (2): 13–32. DOI: 10.5937/pnb25-46741.
- Ronin, Roman. 2009. *Obaveštajni rad*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik; Fakultet bezbednosti Univerzitet u Beogradu.
- Sharp, Gene, and Bruce Jenkins. 2008. “The Anti-Coup.” *Arellano Law and Policy Review* 9 (1): 13–75.
- Simeunović, Dragan. 1989. *Političko nasilje*. Beograd: Radnička štampa.
- Simeunović, Dragan. 2002. *Teorija politike. Rider, I deo*. Beograd: Udruženje „Nauka i društvo”.
- Simeunović, Dragan. 2009. *Uvod u političku teoriju*. Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Thyne, Clayton, and Jonathan Powell. 2016. “Coup d’état or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12 (2): 192–213. DOI: 10.1111/fpa.12046.
- Trbojević, Milovan. 2017. „Neobaveštajni oblik delovanja obaveštajnih službi.” *Srpska politička misao* 58 (4): 319–334. DOI: 10.22182/spm.5842017.17.

**Милован Трбојевић\***

*Факултет за студује безбедности,  
Универзитет Едуконс, Сремска Каменица, Република Србија*

**Бранислав Свирчевић\*\***

*Факултет за студује безбедности,  
Универзитет Едуконс, Сремска Каменица, Република Србија*

## **УЛОГА СЛУЖБИ БЕЗБЕДНОСТИ У СПРЕЧАВАЊУ ПОЛИТИЧКИХ ПРЕВРАТА**

### **Резиме**

Државе спољнополитичке циљеве и интенције остварују на различите начине, између осталог и методама супротним нормама међународног права. Наиме, уколико се жели дестабилисати економски, политички, безбедносни и социјално-друштвени систем у једној земљи, ради спровођења сопствене воље и сопствених намера и интереса, један од најделотворнијих механизма свакако јесте субверзивна делатност. Оваквим активностима најчешће се изазивају и одржавају разни облици криза, у које се свакако убрајају и политички преврати, чији је циљ наметање сопствене воље држави и усмеравање друштвено-политичких токова, сходно сопственим националним интересима. Због тога безбедносни апарат мора непрекидно радити на откривању и спрачавању таквих активности превентивним и репресивним методама. Дакле, безбедносне службе су одувек биле моћан фактор подршке како у реализацији унутрашњих политичких циљева, тако и у заштити носиоца и институција државне власти. Имајући то у виду, циљ овог рада јесте да се у оквиру безбедносних теорија и обавештајно-безбедносних студија истражи и анализира улога безбедносних служби, као значајног сегмента безбедносно-обавештајног система државе, у супростављању субверзивној делатности према матичној држави са акцентом на спречавање политичког преврата. У раду су изложени начини и средства безбедносних служби којима се супротстављају политичким

\* Имејл адреса: trbojevicmilovan1@gmail.com; ORCID: /.

\*\* Имејл адреса: svircevic1995@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-2449-3228.



превратима, сагледани применом аналитичких и синтетичких метода, од којих је анализа садржаја најважнији и најчешће примењени метод прикупљања и обраде података.

**Кључне речи:** безбедносне службе, контраобавештајне службе, политички преврати, националне вредности и интереси

---

\* Овај рад је примљен 13. маја 2024. године, а прихваћен за штампу на састанку Редакције 12. фебруара 2025. године.