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SERBIA AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE: EXPERIENCES AND ROADMAPS

Abstract

The strategic concept of extended deterrence emerged in the post-Cold War period by expanding the content of the Cold War concept of nuclear deterrence of the allies of great powers. Therefore, modern extended deterrence implies the use of all instruments of national power to deter rivals from taking malicious steps against allies or partners. This paper deals with the consideration of the historical experience of the Serbs in the application of this concept, but also with the analysis of the foreign policy means used and the outcomes of their application. The basic hypothesis of the paper is that during the existence of an independent state, the Serbs applied extended deterrence with support from the diaspora and that this concept should be applied in the future but with an emphasis on so-called soft deterrence. It will examine certain events and processes during the Crimean War (Serbia as a vassal principality), the Chetnik movement and method of warfare (Kingdom of Serbia), and the strategic actions of the Serbs during the wars for the Yugoslav succession, in which patterns of Serbian extended deterrence are characteristic.

Keywords: deterrence strategy, extended deterrence, Serbia, strategic environment, international relations, security

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INTRODUCTION

Extended deterrence during the Cold War was primarily related to nuclear deterrence. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR led to a radical reduction in the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and the most significant challenge was preventing "rogue" states and transnational terrorist organizations from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Extended deterrence is a strategic concept applied in international politics and military strategy and is implemented primarily through political and military means. It refers to the ability of a state to deter potential adversaries from attacking its allies or partners by threatening to use its military capabilities in defense of those allies. Essentially, it involves extending the security umbrella of a great power's military power beyond its borders to protect its allies or other states of strategic interest (Dorondo and Stivenson 2019).

However, the modern concept of extended deterrence, in addition to security and military guarantees and cooperation, has also been extended to the economic, information and technical-technological sectors so that security guarantees are extended to the overall development of the power potential of allies or partners. In this way, the protecting powers seek to increase the capabilities of smaller allies or partners to independently increase strategic resilience, further strengthening the alliance and increasing the credibility of the allies. In this way, general deterrence is implemented, which does not fall within the scope of crisis deterrence but instead creates conditions to reduce the conditions for taking immediate deterrence measures against a specific potential aggressor (Mazarr 2018, 3–5). On the other hand, "client" states, in addition to security guarantees, provide better conditions for economic and social development and an overall position in the regional order. These commitments can be and have been both nuclear and conventional in nature. They involve common security challenges and political and operational coordination between the deterrent force, its allies, and/or partners (Dorondo and Stivenson 2019).

The strategic concept of extended deterrence is, as a rule, "reserved" for great powers, including regional ones, but the consequences of its application are of global importance. However, contemporary

international relations are characterized by the emergence of challengers to worldwide hegemony and the relative decline of the power of the United States. Namely, in the era of the undisputed unipolar "moment", most subjects of international relations with low power potential essentially did not even have the alternative of "choosing" between two or more great powers that would emerge as a force protecting their interests, because the hegemon had undisputed power potential so that other powers did not have the opportunity to implement extended deterrence credibly. Although the global hegemon is still the only power with international reach, actors with the economic, technological, and even military potential for extended deterrence are emerging, most often within regional frameworks, and some have enough potential to position themselves on other continents.

In such a global strategic environment, conditions are created for "small and medium-sized" states not only to choose which force they will rely on for deterrence but also to think strategically in the direction of independent extended deterrence, of course by their power potential. Milan Igrutinović states that there is no doubt that the aforementioned states are, in principle, not in a position to implement extended deterrence by relying primarily on complex factors of power but on so-called soft deterrence (Igrutinović 2022, 39–56). Since the conditions in the strategic situation and the military neutrality of Serbia inevitably create the imperative of relying on their potential, Serbia and Serbs must necessarily review their own experiences in applying the concept of extended deterrence and strive to use them by the contemporary regional and global environment (Subotić 2024, 113–115). This process, of course, does not exclude studying the experiences of other states, especially those with similar power potentials. However, our experiences should still be prioritised because they are the product of Serbian strategic culture. Precisely because of this fact, the experiences of the First and Second Yugoslavia in applying the concept of extended deterrence will not be considered because they are the product of a state in which, to a greater or smaller extent, they were the product of compromises between the peoples that made it up and not the Serbian one.

Therefore, we will strive to analyze the application of extended deterrence by the Principality of Serbia in the Crimean War, then by

the Kingdom of Serbia in the experiences of the war in Old Serbia and Macedonia from the beginning of the 20th century, and, finally, Serbia's expertise in applying the concept of extended deterrence during the wars for the Yugoslav heritage. Understanding each case's context will offer certain conclusions that should be understood as a roadmap for future action in extended deterrence. We should not only notice the continuity in the application of the concept of extended deterrence but also objectively look at the discontinuities in terms of the characteristics of Serbian society, the efficiency of state institutions and its position in the international order since the efficiency of the entire concept is based on the perception and theory of rational decision-making.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF SERBIA IN (EXTENDED) DEFLECTION DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR

International politics in the 19th century was Eurocentric and essentially tied to the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, which created the Holy Alliance. The global order of that time was essentially based on the concept of a balance of power between the great powers of that time: Britain, Habsburg Monarchy, Prussia, Russia and France. Britain represented a "balancer" of the continental powers with a crucial allied potential for preserving the European status quo, which enabled them to dominate. However, power is no guarantee of long-lasting peace. Still, it was necessary to agree on shared values, which would suppress the desire to overthrow the established order and give it legitimacy (Kisindžer 1999, 57). The Great Powers pledged to help each other suppress revolutionary movements, confirmed as credible in 1848 when the "bugbear of revolution" spread unsuccessfully across Europe. Europe then had a stable order and no major military conflicts until the beginning of the Great War, except the Crimean War of 1853–1856 the following countries fought against Russia: Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and Piedmont. The absence of Habsburg Monarchy and Prussian support for Russia resulted in its defeat. Piedmont's participation on the side of the alliance in the Crimean War enabled it to position itself better internationally, creating conditions for the unification and formation of the Italian state under the Savoy dynasty a little later. A similar thing happened with the Unification of the German

principalities into the German Empire, led by the famous Bismarck (Loh 2014, 127–130). The behavior of many nations regarding the Crimean War would influence their future "destiny." It was a similar case with the Serbs, who reluctantly agreed to be neutral in this conflict.

The vassal Serbian principality was "squeezed" between the two great land powers of the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy in the mid-19th century. The "Sick Man of the Bosphorus" was wary of the ambitions of Russia, which had the role of protector of the Christian Slavs, especially the Serbs, after the Second Serbian Uprising. On the other hand, imperial Vienna was wary of Serbia, a kind of Piedmont for all the Slavs who inhabited the Monarchy, especially those in the Balkans.

To improve its position among Christians, Britain launched an initiative towards the Ottoman Empire for their protection. In 1853, Istanbul confirmed all the privileges it had acquired for Christians, with the strategic calculation that the Crimean War would stop the imminent threat that, according to them, came from Russia. The Sultan confirmed the privileges granted to Serbia and declared them permanent. Although these were minor diplomatic concessions, Serbia was forced to agree to declare neutrality about the Crimean War. Regardless of the declared neutrality, Serbia was under military threat from the Habsburg Monarchy and was forced to make preparations for armed conflict.

At that time, the Habsburg Monarchy had 50,000 soldiers deployed on the border with the Principality of Serbia. Serbia took almost all measures in the field of deterrence. It activated its military potential in the face of this immediate danger, which involved registering all men aged 18 to 45 in the military records. It is estimated that Serbia mobilized between 80,000 and 110,000 soldiers into the People's Army (Đorđević 1984, 14–15). Therefore, the ratio of forces between the potential aggressor and the Serbian army was two to one in Serbia's favour, which indicates the credibility of direct deterrence. However, this kind of deterrence formula did not include extended deterrence, which Serbia implemented to a reasonable extent. Namely, in the strategic calculation of a possible armed conflict in the Balkans, Vienna had to count on a significant Serbian factor in its military formations and the unreliability of other Slavic peoples under its rule who were dissatisfied with their status. Thus, the Habsburg Monarchy gave up

on aggression against Serbia, which seemed to be a rational decision to avoid a war on two fronts, of which the essentially weaker opponent represented, paradoxically, a greater risk to the security of the Empire.

The Crimean War ended with the defeat of Russia and was followed by the signing of the peace treaty in Paris in 1856, which confirmed Serbia's vassal status. Still, all signatory states appeared as protecting powers (Blagojević 2022, 86–87). After this "episode" with the Habsburg Monarchy, the Serbs learned the strategic lesson that they had to develop their armed forces because a decade earlier, the Defenders of the Constitution had reduced the army to the smallest possible size and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Pršić 1997, 33).

CHETNIK ACTIVITIES DURING THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

From the beginning of the 19th century, there were Chetnik groups and entire companies in Old Serbia and Macedonia,[1] Which fought against the Turkish and Albanian oppressors of Christians. The Chetnik movement was influential during the Russo-Turkish and Serbian-Turkish wars of 1878 when Chetniks from these areas requested weapons and ammunition to fight against the Turks and Albanians. The Serbian military authorities regularly met their demands, and at their request, they sent their officers and non-commissioned officers. The Chetniks fought with varying effectiveness, but Christians' vengeful and rebellious spirit in these areas of the Ottoman Empire was unwavering (Hadži Vasiljević 1928, 5–16).

Since the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, Bulgarian prestige has grown, and their Komitas actions have intensified. They have taken over most of the institutions founded by Serbs in Old Serbia and Macedonia and persecuted and killed prominent Serbian figures. The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the Ilinden Uprising, led by Pita Guli and Goce Delcev with the support of Bulgaria, to raise the issue of these areas among Europeans and force the Porte to annex these territories to Bulgaria. The uprising was bloodily suppressed, and the

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[1] These are the old names for the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and present-day North Macedonia.

defeated Komitas companies could not return to Bulgaria due to the blockades of the Turkish army, so they fled to Serbia and Montenegro, where they were welcomed fraternally. Some of the aforementioned Komitas returned to Old Serbia and Macedonia with Serbian Chetniks. The Serbian government did not react to those events, but a private initiative was launched to protect Christians in those areas. The initiative was launched by the doctor Milorad Djodjevic, the head of the Belgrade medical service. It was soon joined by General Jovan Atanacković and the merchant Luka Ćelović, and a little later by the wealthy Belgrade merchant Nikola Spasić, Ljuba Kovačević, Major Petar Pešić, as well as Captain Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis and others. The executive committee of this initiative was formed in Vranje and operated until the beginning of the Balkan Wars. Soon after the establishment of this organization, other private societies were formed in Serbia to help the brothers in the Ottoman Empire, such as the Circle of Serbian Sisters, the Serbian Brothers, the Society of Saint Sava, the Belgrade Cooperatives and others (Vasiljević 1928, 5–16).

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 caused general discontent in Serbian society, which only served to further the militantly oriented structures in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which saw in this situation another argument for the inevitability of war with Serbia (Hamilton and Herwig 2010, 76). The famous Chetnik commander (major) Vojislav Tankosić formed a Chetnik school in Prokuplje, where volunteers were trained for special tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, recruitment centres of sorts were established throughout Serbia, where volunteers applied for the Chetnik service.[2] Although war seemed inevitable, Russia was incapable of a new military conflict because Japan had catastrophically defeated it in 1905 and was burdened by internal political instability. Therefore, Russia was forced to adopt a defensive attitude, which it also recommended to Serbia. Aware of the possible consequences of Serbia's extended deterrence, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy demanded public guarantees from Belgrade that the annexation would not negatively affect its national interests. Belgrade publicly declared that the annexation did not harm Serbian interests. Serbia was forced to agree to this initiative because it had

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[2] It is estimated that around 5,000 volunteers in Serbia have been registered in this way.

no ally whose support it could count on (Popov 2010, 288–289). The aforementioned historical episode in relations between Vienna and Belgrade indicates that the Kingdom of Serbia acted in foreign policy by realistically assessing the strategic environment. However, it did not give up on realising its goals.

There is no better and more evident proof of the importance of a society's resilience for credible extended deterrence and the likelihood of its transition to resistance in the event of aggression than the formalization of its positive achievements in official state documents. This is precisely the case with the Kingdom of Serbia, which, in terms of Chetnik activity, demonstrated the use of the most effective and reliable means of extended deterrence known at that time. This is the fact that in 1911, the War Service was adopted, which, in addition to basic operational-tactical operations and procedures, regulates in Part 7 (chapter) entitled "Chetnik Warfare" the principles of action of Chetnik formations behind enemy lines, in their rear, on the march and in other special tasks (Ministarstvo vojno 1911, 459–473).

Furthermore, it is essential to note that there was a developed strategic thought and activity of state bodies and the entire society in the Kingdom of Serbia. It is well known that the strategy is not implemented only by state bodies, but its implementation requires the engagement of the entire society. This is especially important for the so-called. Small states with a relatively small potential for power, such as Serbia, bordered on great powers with opposing interests and were in constant danger of threatening territorial integrity. Therefore, a constant in strategic performance, with a clearly defined desired end state, with continuous strengthening of military and economic potentials and reliable diplomacy can effectively apply the strategic concept of direct deterrence, which is further strengthened by the idea of extended deterrence to an extent that further complicates the assessments of potential aggressors. Strengthening cohesive ties with Serbs outside the homeland was an obligation of the competent state authorities but also a practice accepted by the broader social community; it was engaged in by artists, successful entrepreneurs, the academic community, education, healthcare and other areas of social life, without significant interference from the state, which, with its normative measures, only directed and gave dynamics to social processes depending on the

situation in the strategic environment. However, one cannot speak of effective or extended deterrence without strong and professional state institutions, a stable economy, efficient diplomacy and military forces.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SFR YUGOSLAVIA IN THE CONTEXT OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE[3]

The geopolitical upheavals of a tectonic nature caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USSR and its camps, and the historical discrediting of the socialist concept of the organization of power acquired a particularly destructive force in the Balkans, changing the basis of the political, value and cultural foundations of the SFR Yugoslavia. In short, the Second Yugoslavia was formed on a communist ideological basis and with the disappearance of the one-party system, it disappeared. It emerged at the beginning of the Cold War, in which it had a more significant role on the international stage than its potential power would have allowed, and by the end of the Cold War, "buffer" states such as the SFRY had ceased to exist. The leaders of the socialist republics were unable to agree on the future structure of the federal multi-party state, which was burdened by a poor economic situation and growing nationalisms, among which the efforts of the Albanians to win the status of a republic for SAP Kosovo were particularly emphasized (Petranović 1988, 357–470).

Crowned with the halo of a victor in World War II, Josip Broz Tito established a one-party political system with elements of autocracy, similar to King Aleksandar Karađorđević. Some American authors considered Tito the "last Habsburg", referring to his skill in conducting foreign policy and the multiethnicity of the state he led for decades. He controlled the most critical processes in the country through the Marshalate. This institution was military and outside the political system and the Constitution, but with multiple implications for political and social movements in the country. King Aleksandar Karađorđević

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[3] The term "break-up" essentially implies an amalgam of various external and internal factors that contributed to the Yugoslav crisis ending in a major armed conflict with significant consequences for the peoples who lived in the aforementioned territory. This term was introduced into our political science by our famous publicist Miloš Knežević (Stepić 2023, 378–379).

and his Guard with specific powers had a similar character of power (Terzić 2005). After Tito's death, the Marshalate ceased to exist, thus abolishing the most important authority of the centralized management of the Federation and enabling more efficient secessionist action. The communist elite systematically worked to dismantle the Serbian ethos, linking national identities to republican ones, while trying to create a "Montenegrin identity" by insisting on the peculiarities of the Muslim population of Serbian nationality in Bosnia and Herzegovina and favoring them at the expense of the interests of the Serbian population, and it was similar in other republics. Furthermore, Serbia alone had two autonomous provinces, which the 1975 Constitution granted even more extraordinary powers. It can be said that the Yugoslav crisis only highlighted the suppression of Serbs that they had suffered for decades within the republican and provincial borders for the sake of the survival of the standard state. When the crisis escalated, Serb resistance emerged within the administrative boundaries of the former republics, which essentially confirmed the communists' erroneous approach to the national question and the vitality of the Serbian nation, which had resisted systematic suppression for decades (Blagojević 2019a, 112). In the Yugoslavian National Army – JNA, by inertia and tradition, most officers and non-commissioned officers were recruited from the Serbian ethnic corps. However, there was positive discrimination for other people (Bjelajac 1999).

The events that led to the collapse of the former SFRY more than confirm that the national question in that country was not resolved adequately, as evidenced by the results of the first multi-party elections in the republics of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the second Yugoslavia fell apart along "administrative seams" that had been claimed for decades to be of no significance. Since the new and "democratically" elected republican leaders did not show sufficient political will to compromise and preserve the federal state, its collapse was inevitable (Krempton 2003, 319–406). The question remained whether this would happen peacefully or violently. The involvement of external factors in the crisis in the territory of the former SFRY became more intense only after the different positions of the republican leaders became differentiated. The military leadership, which had been communist-indoctrinated since the creation of the JNA, was for the first time left

without a strong foothold in federal institutions, where representatives of other political persuasions were mostly present (Nikolić 1989). At the same time, they were deeply aware that they were at the head of multinational armed forces, which made it very difficult to engage in a crisis within the national territory.

This situation forced the Serbian leadership to opt for the strategic concept of extended deterrence, which essentially seemed to be the only possible one in conditions in which only the Serbian factor in that country was interested in its preservation. However, the implementation of this concept itself began to be applied inconsistently from the first engagement of the JNA in protecting the external borders in Slovenia, where it was necessary to carry out much better intelligence preparation for the operation and to implement it more energetically. Belgrade's abandonment of the unitary state in Slovenia essentially opened a "Pandora's box" that history recorded as the bloody collapse of the SFRY. Soon, the crisis spilt over to Croatia, which was supported from the outside, especially by Germany. With a significantly larger Serbian population, extended deterrence was implemented with the maxim "Serbia defends itself in Knin", with the desired end state of stopping the disintegration of the Serbian national ethos along the republican seams. There were many shortcomings in the implementation of this concept. Still, we will focus only on the basics, and this is the lack of broader diplomatic engagement to secure powerful and reliable allies, which the secessionist republics understood long before Serbia and presented to the West in the light of a regional hegemon and a supporter of communism. In these conditions, with limited power potential and without a significant ally, the credibility of extended deterrence did not yield results. It turned out that time worked for the secessionists in Croatia. After the rejection of the "Z–4" plan, there was a military collapse of Serbian forces in Croatia and an exodus of Serbs from the area where they had lived for centuries.

Shortly after the beginning of the crisis in Croatia, an attempt at a soft, widespread deterrence against Bosnian Muslims, who were offered an agreement on coexistence with the Serbs, failed. Izetbegović hesitated, but after receiving support from the West and some Islamic centres of power, he nevertheless decided to confront the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina

was in a more favorable position than Croatia, not only because of its larger population but also because of its better understanding of the strategic situation in which it found itself, mainly after NATO used aviation against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to prevent "ethnic cleansing" (Karloš 2019; Cigar 1995; Blagojević 2019b, 371–372). Extended deterrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina produced some results, which the Dayton Agreement verified, and the Serbian factor recognized the momentum when it was necessary to negotiate, unlike Croatia, where that chance was missed. Therefore, extended deterrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in the creation of the Republika Srpska, the highest possible degree of realization of national interests. The key guarantee Milošević intended to ensure by signing the Dayton Agreement, in addition to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was ensuring the territorial integrity of Serbia about Kosovo. By insisting on such positions, he observes the continuity of efforts to implement the concept of extended deterrence, but with significant shortcomings for its effective implementation. Namely, the Serbian factor did not have the power potential that would make deterrence effective because public opinion among the most influential world powers had already decided against its efforts, and it did not have nearly enough power potential to implement extended deterrence independently. Thus, the implementation of extended deterrence was perceived in world power centers as a policy based on the model of "weaponising local Serbs seeking autonomy", which was unacceptable to them for many reasons, the key of which was the negative perception imposed by the secessionist republics at the beginning of the crisis.

The significant shortcomings of the Serbian implementation of the strategic concept of extended deterrence in the wars for the Yugoslav heritage experienced their greatest debacle in Kosovo in 1998 and the NATO military intervention in 1999. Direct deterrence of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija did not yield results because, as in the case of the Slovenes, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they could count on the support of world power centres, unlike the Serbs, who had no allies. The rebellion in Kosovo will not be analyzed here because it falls within the domain of direct deterrence. However, it is an undoubted consequence of unsuccessful extended deterrence, but

the consequences of those events are still felt today (see Ćurčić and Dinić 2024, 160–167; Stepić 2020, 7–30).

CONCLUSION

The modern strategic concept of extended deterrence has expanded to conventional deterrence and the application of economic, technical-technological, informational, cultural and other instruments and means, enabling even "small and medium-sized" states to strive to apply them effectively in regional frameworks. For Serbia, the concept of extended deterrence is a necessary commitment as a consequential consequence of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, given that our capacity for power in modern geopolitical circumstances allows for the so-called soft deterrence, which is based on caring for the diaspora in the region and protecting their identity, but also preserving the Republika Srpska with its Dayton jurisdictions. The second, no less critical, necessity for extended deterrence is the preservation of Kosovo and Metohija within the constitutional framework of Serbia because the said territory is under international administration according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and our institutions have no jurisdiction over that territory. The third, somewhat more hidden, need for extended deterrence lies in the fact that this strategic concept, which is defensive in nature, is quite suitable to prevent further disintegration of national territory and aspirations of regional actors due to inertia from the 1990s.

Of course, in the era of globalization, perception is essential for credible and reliable deterrence, which requires robust and reliable allies who would ultimately guarantee the credibility of the so-called soft extended deterrence of "small and medium-sized" states. There are significant examples of efficient and effective soft extended deterrence in Serbian history, as analyzed in the paper on the examples of Austria's extended deterrence during the Crimean War of 1853–1856 and the Chetnik way of war in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and many others. They have in common that the entire Serbian society was engaged in its implementation. In contrast, the state apparatus was involved in this process only to direct it by the strategic environment and realistic assessments.

Although the use of extended deterrence during the wars for the Yugoslav heritage can and must be criticized for many things, given their outcomes, it must still be stated that in conditions without a significant ally, the Serbian factor managed to provide opposition to world powers for almost a decade, of course with substantial losses, but preserving national identity and independence. However, the consequences of such a strategic approach are still visible today. The state of contemporary social cohesion, if not the "condition" and the level of professionalism of members of state institutions for effective and credible extended deterrence, is questionable, especially since it is most often implemented by high-ranking state officials and not by the entire society, as was done during the period of independent Serbian statehood.

Another constant in the pattern of Serbian extended deterrence is the reliance on Serbs in the region and in the wider diaspora, which is natural and logical for ethnic, cultural and traditional reasons. Here, functional ties with the broader diaspora are much more problematic because there has been a discontinuity in Serbia's strategic orientations over the last three decades and many unfulfilled promises, which potentially jeopardize the use of this resource in the function of extended deterrence.

The answers to these questions are in front of the Serbian strategic community and political elite. At the same time, achieving social consensus around key strategic decisions and their implementation, in which the entire society participates, is even more complex and arduous. This can only be realized by a society led by proper authorities, born from a political debate on key strategic development issues, and a society that has formed strong institutions of government, which base their engagement on the postulates of professionalism.

As we have had the opportunity to see, Serbian society has had an educational and upbringing process in its history to raise generations that respected the institutions of state power that professionally, impartially and to a large extent reliably conducted state affairs in the right way and were capable of effectively implementing complex strategic concepts such as extended deterrence in an environment no less hostile than the current one. For such a thing, it is necessary to have military and economic power and a justly organized society worth defending and

sacrificing one's life. For the effective implementation of extended deterrence, ensuring an undoubted perception of the population, allies and potential rivals is necessary.

To achieve those goals, it is, therefore, necessary to have an efficient and professional diplomatic service to ensure reliable alliances between great powers, practical and goal-oriented rational communication with potential adversaries, and a professional intelligence service.

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