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БЕЗБЕДНОСТИ

Кина и тајванско питање

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China and the Taiwan Question



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Telephone: 011/3349 203; 011/3349 204; 011/3349 205

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THE POLICY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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FOREWORD

Dear readers,

We are witnessing that security issues are becoming more and more complicated, both at the national and regional level, as well as at the wider, international level. In addition to the war in Ukraine, which directly affects all international entities, another sensitive security issue is emerging, which could have negative consequences for the entire world. It is the so-called Taiwan issue, which represents a “neuralgic point” for the People’s Republic of China due to the violation of its territorial integrity.

If the issue of Taiwan intensifies, it can become not only a “Chinese problem”, but also a problem of the whole world, bearing in mind that there would be a (latent or manifest) confrontation between the US and China. If we take into account the bond between China and Taiwan regarding the production of microchips and in general the level of economic relations between China and the rest of the world, it can be imagined what problem modern humanity would find itself. This is exactly why we decided to dedicate this issue to China, with special reference to the Taiwan question. We gathered experts from the country and abroad, to get an objective view of the topic covered in this issue. In addition to the analysis of “one country, two systems”, our authors also dealt with realpolitik security challenges such as the conflict in Ukraine, which affects domestic and foreign policy of China. As the USA is important for the development of relations between China and Taiwan, its role in this relationship before and after the conflict in Ukraine was also investigated. Repercussions that could arise in the East Asian region from the eventual independence of Taiwan were also examined. Our authors also analyzed the broader security context of China, and another focal point in China was investigated, which concerns potential extremism and terrorism in the province of Xinjiang. This is just a little overview of the current events that are related to the so-called Taiwan question, and we hope that the Far East will remain calm and that we will not have to deal with this topic in the future.

In addition to the main topic, in this number, we included two papers that deal with contemporary issues, such as the safety of children on the Internet and the strategic control of the Arctic, which could eventually cause a conflict between the great powers. In the hope that by the next issue, we will have as few security problems as possible and more and more constructive solutions for international conflicts, I greet you on behalf of the entire editorial staff.

Editor-in-Chief,
Prof. Dr Marija Đorić

УВОДНИК

Поштовани читаоци,

Сведоци смо да се све више усложњавају безбедносна питања, како на националном и регионалном нивоу, тако и на ширем, међународном плану. Поред рата у Украјини који на директан начин погађа све међународне субјекте, отвара се још једно осетљиво безбедносно питање које би могло оставити негативне консеквенце на читав свет. Реч је о тајванском питању које представља „неуралгичну тачку” за НР Кину, због нарушавања њеног територијалног интегритета.

Уколико се питање Тајвана буде интензивирало, оно може постати не само „кинески проблем”, већ и проблем читавог света, имајући у виду да би дошло до (латентне или манифестне) конфронтације између САД и Кине. Будемо ли узели у обзир повезаност Кине и Тајвана нпр. у погледу производње микрочипова и уопште ниво економске повезаности коју Кина остварује са остатком света, може се закључити у ком проблему би се нашло савремено човечанство. Управо због тога смо одлучили да овај број посветимо Кини, са посебним освртом на тајванско питање. Окупили смо стручњаке из земље и иностранства, како бисмо добили објективан поглед на тему која се обрађује у овом броју. Поред анализе постојећег стања „једна земља – два система”, наши аутори су се бавили и реалполитичким безбедносним изазовима као што је сукоб у Украјини, који се дефинитивно одражава на унутрашњу и спољну политику Кине. Како су САД значајне за развој односа Кине и Тајвана, истраживана је и њихова улога на овој релацији пре и после сукоба у Украјини. Испитиване су и реперкусије које би настале у региону Источне Азије, потезањем евентуалне тајванске независности. Наши аутори су анализирали и шири безбедносни контекст Кине, те је истражено још једно жариште у Кини које се тиче потенцијалног екстремизма и тероризма у покрајини Синђијанг. Ово је само један мали осврт на тренутне догађаје који кореспондирају са тајванским питањем, у нади да ће далеки Исток остати миран и да овом темом нећемо морати да се бавимо у будућности.

Поред главне теме, у овом броју смо оставили места за два рада која се баве актуелним темама, попут безбедности деце на интернету и стратешке контроле Арктика, која би евентуално могла изазвати сукоб великих сила. У нади да ћемо до следећег броја имати што мање безбедносних проблема, а све више конструктивних решења за међународне тензије, поздрављам вас у име целе редакције нашег часописа.

Главни и одговорни уредник,
Проф. др Марија Ђорић

**CHINA AND THE TAIWAN
QUESTION**

Duško Tomić*

American University in the Emirates, Dubai

Eldar Šaljić**

American University in the Emirates, Dubai

Mohamed Badine El Yattioui***

American University in the Emirates, Dubai

ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN: AMBITIONS AND REALPOLITIK

Resume

The main ambition of this paper is to explain and analyze the difficult relations between China and Taiwan and its possible consequences for the regional and international security. The role of the United States is considered as a key actor. It permits to understand the strategies of the different actors due to the strong support given by Washington to Taiwan. The economic relations between the two neighbors are also interesting, to show how the topic is complex and sensitive. Our goal is to propose an analysis mentioning the ambitions of the different sides and their limits due to the realpolitik.

Keywords: China, Taiwan, the United States, Strategy, Security, Economy, tensions

* Contact: dusko.tomic@aue.ae

** eldar.saljic@aue.ae

*** mohamed.yattioui@aue.ae

INTRODUCTION

During the last few years, in addition to numerous neuralgic points in the world, it was also marked by the presence of a large number of Chinese combat aircraft and over a hundred overflights over the strait that divides the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The increasingly aggressive pressures of the official Beijing and the rise of tensions in this part of the world have thus led to the further deterioration of the already unfavorable security situation (Tirpak 2023).

With the re-election of President Tsai in 2020, relations between Taiwan and China have further deteriorated, but unlike some earlier times, Taipei has times had strong support embodied in the United States of America (Maizland 2023). The cooperation between Washington and Taipei enabled the island to receive assistance in the form of modern weapons and military equipment; on the one hand, while on the other hand, the USA gained an extremely important strategic position and a good foothold for monitoring and controlling Chinese activities. In September 2020, for the first time in decades, a meeting was held between the president of Taiwan and US officials, and in response to that, Beijing, in addition to a large number of criticisms at the time of the meeting, held a military exercise in the waters that separate mainland China from the islands. It was one of the first signs that, officially Beijing was no longer ready to compromise and did not want to give in, despite the support and aid that Taiwan receives from the US.

THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL THREATS

Although at first glance it seems that the eventual secession of Taiwan would solve a large number of problems and contribute to the reduction of tensions, the connection between these two territories is extremely strong, and its termination would inevitably lead to unpredictable consequences for the region. China and Taiwan have strong economic ties, which are the result of Taiwanese companies investing in Chinese factories. This is supported by the fact that the value of such investments reached a figure of almost 200 billion dollars between 1991 and 2021 (Taiwan.gov 2023), as well as the fact that almost a million Taiwanese live and work in the mentioned factories in China. For this reason, the Taiwanese worry that their economy is heavily dependent on China and that this further complicates an already unstable situation. In addition,

the very basis of the conflict comes from the fact that China considers Taiwan its province, while Taiwan wants independence and justifies it with its Constitution, the fact that it has a democratically elected government and an active military that numbers around 300,000 soldiers (BBC 2021).

Although despite the fact that Taiwan poses almost no security threat to China, Beijing has long wanted to use the island's appropriation as a symbol of strong and legitimate rule. On the other hand, it is almost certain that no president in China would survive if he allowed a successful declaration of independence by Taiwan.

Nevertheless, what causes the biggest dilemmas and leads to numerous discussions in the public is the absence of a realistic prediction of the consequences of a potential invasion of Taiwan by China. This action could affect both the region and the entire world. As far as weapons are concerned, the main problem for Taiwan is Chinese long-range missiles, including the DF-21D, known in slang as "carrier killers", but also potential supersonic weapons. With such an arsenal, it is believed that China can destroy almost all bases, airports and military installations on the island in just a few hours. Although China can hit and destroy Taiwanese targets with airstrikes, and to use naval and cyber-attacks to cut off Taiwan from the rest of the world, the question is whether Beijing is ready to launch an all-out amphibious assault on the island (Johnson 2017). According to certain estimates, such an operation would result in casualties on both sides, which calls into question the usefulness of such a move. Also, the uncertainty and unknown about what the US would do in that case and what their move would be, whether they would provide support to Taiwan, makes this scenario even more risky. Over the past year, heighten tensions in the region and bring China and Taiwan closer to a potential military conflict. This is supported by the fact that only at the beginning of October last year; more than 71 fighter planes violated Taiwan's airspace which is a confirmation of Beijing's effort to ensure its dominance on the island and ensure the long-awaited unification of the island (Arslan, Lee and Blanchard 2023).

However, it seems as if we are getting closer to a military invasion because of the decades-long conflict, the aforementioned doubts about the potential outcome are a big obstacle for China to make such a move. First, the fear of an outbreak, that is, of an invasion turning into a nuclear conflict, means that China must carefully review all possible options and provide the best solution. On the other hand, Taipei fears that in the coming years, China could use its great influence on the Taiwanese economy

and win over the island's population to ensure unification. Nevertheless, it is almost certain that as long as one side wants unification and the other wants independence, tensions will grow. Such an analysis would be one-sided; therefore, in the overall perspective of the relationship, the analysis of the relationship in the South China Sea must be observed, as well as the economic relationship between China and the USA, in this case the mentor of Taiwan.

The relevance of the relationship between China and Taiwan should be viewed from several dimensions. This complex approach takes into account several different starting points. One of those starting points is the attitude towards the South China Sea. The basis of the problem of the South China Sea begins with its complex geographical location and positioning between the coasts of ten Asian countries. Such a position, the economic and geostrategic importance of this sea resulted in numerous and frequent conflicts that broke out between coastal states since the middle of the 20th century. In addition, several researches conducted in the past years have shown that beneath this area lie rich deposits of oil and natural gas, which made the disputed region even more important. Especially in the relations between China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Taiwan.

The core of the mentioned problem is represented by the Spratly and Paracel coral islands, located almost in the very center of the sea. China, citing its historical right and the "nine-dash line", claims control over about 90% of the South China Sea, despite the fact that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (which China does not respect), clearly defines the boundaries of the Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone. According to the aforementioned Convention, China's rights to these waters are much smaller, which was even confirmed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in its final decision in 2016, ruling in the dispute with the Philippines that China has no historical rights to supremacy in this sea. Still, despite the exceptional importance of the said arbitration, China refused to participate in the process and accept the final opinion of the court (Jakhar 2021).

Still, this is not just about China. All the surrounding countries hoped that their control over these two island archipelagos would give them an economic monopoly in the region. Nevertheless, the problem is the aforementioned Convention, which guarantees the Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone only to natural islands. Since the Spratly and Paracel Islands are considered only rocks and reefs, control over them

by a given state could only bring a Territorial Zone. That is why many states, in an attempt to change this situation, settled people on disputed islands trying to artificially create life and prove their legitimacy. Some of them went a step further and built large artificial islands out of rocks and reefs. Among them, China did the most, which in a relatively short period, not only expanded the existing reefs and islands under its control, but also began the adaptation and installation of military infrastructure. Other countries in the region realized the seriousness and intentions of the imperial Beijing, so they asked for help from the international community, which quickly spoke out on the matter.

THE AMBIGUITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRISIS

Although the most significant criticism of China's claims came from Washington. The main reason for the American presence in this part of the world can be found in geostrategic and economic interests.¹ If China, as the main economic rival of the USA, succeeds in realizing its pretensions at sea, it seems that it would be a big blow for the American government, whose goal is to deny Beijing the ability to dominate these waters and thus ensure a free and open maritime route. Therefore, Washington seeks to maintain trade ties in the region and stop China's growing power, paying particular attention to strengthening defense ties with allies and partners in this part of the world. It is supported by the official statement of the US Department of Defense, in which the main goals are the protection of freedom of navigation for maritime vessels, which is recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, deterring conflicts and coercion, and encouraging states to respect international law. True, the United States of America initially tried not to participate openly in these disputes, and their response was absent even after the arbitration verdict was passed in 2016 in favor of the Philippines (Hall 2017).

On the other side, it should remind that in 2011, the administration of Barack Obama introduced a new strategy in relations with Asia, called "Asia pivot strategy" (Lieberthal 2011). The main goal of that strategy was to position the USA as a leading power in that part of the world, and its implementation continued even during the term of office

¹ See: Jevtić, Miloš. 2019. „Odnosi SAD i NR Kine kroz projekat „jedan pojas, jedan put“. *Diplomatija i bezbednost* 2(2): 155-169.

of Donald Trump. His administration intensified the pressure on China, which spread from the framework of the diplomatic and media struggle to other spheres. The United States has begun conducting freedom of navigation operations in these waters, increased its naval presence in the region and introduced targeted economic sanctions aimed at Chinese companies involved in the construction and militarization of artificial islands. Thus, during the Trump mandate, the USA sent an open and clear message to Beijing that they are not only interested, but also present in this part of the world. This was followed by regular sailings through the territorial zones that China considers its own, and even the performance of military exercises in disputed waters. China's responses were sporadic, and there were several incidents, the most significant of which was when China fired warning shots after the arrival of the US Navy. Although disputes and quarrels between Beijing and Washington resemble a game of cat and mouse, it is clear that they are becoming more frequent and regular.² Additionally, the coronavirus pandemic appears to have further stirred the already troubled waters of the South China Sea (Ford 2020).

Finally, other events and tensions in which China has been involved recently, such as the incidents with India and Taiwan, have certainly contributed to strengthening the positions of the United States of America and the course taken towards Beijing. Former US President Donald Trump will be remembered for many, perhaps not necessarily good but certainly impressive attitudes and actions. Among them, his attitude towards China stands out and ending the cooperation between American companies and Huawei is just one example (Gramer 2020). Therefore, it is not surprising that it was during his administration that the strategy in the conflict that took place between Washington and Beijing was tightened.

On January 20, 2021, there was a transition of power, and the new president of the United States of America became Joseph Biden, and one of the first questions that was asked was about what course his administration would take in the aforementioned dispute. After the departure of the Trump administration, the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, the weakening of the economy and the recent raid on the Capitol, it is clear that President Biden will have to devote himself to some other things, before it is China's turn. Therefore, it seems that the first place on the new president's agenda will be the issue of internal politics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that global tensions will subside

² See also: Pejić, Igor. 2022. "The development of the modern Chinese concept of conventional deterrence." *Vojno delo* 4: 15-27. doi:10.5937/vojdelo2203015P.

or that problems will be resolved and the status quo will change. For now, there is no sign of the US withdrawing from the disputed waters, but it is very likely that mutual provocations in this area will continue. Tensions will decrease or increase depending on how long it takes for the United States to remind China of its presence in the region.

On the other side, official Beijing will certainly not hesitate to respond in the same way to potential provocations. However, an open conflict in these waters would not suit either side, and retreat seems out of the question. So until solving this problem is on the agenda, tensions will continue at the same pace, which will undoubtedly affect smaller coastal states as well. Therefore, it is increasingly certain that the relations between the US and Vietnam will be further strengthened, as well as providing additional support to Taiwan. Washington needs an ally in these waters, and it seems that the new administration can provide just that.

On the other hand, if some diplomatic scandals can be expected from the Biden administration, this will not mention a reduction of the tensions with China and a resolution of the conflict at least for some time, although the possibility of taking the first step that could lead to negotiations should not be ruled out and diplomatic problem solving. We base our position on the fact that any economic decoupling of the West and China will certainly create losses, but in the capitals of the leading planetary powers, there is a growing belief that something far more valuable is gained: resistance, security, both for companies and for the state. Namely, the recognition of geopolitical competition as a new reality and the resulting “decoupling,” reflect the re-examination of national priorities and putting the interests of society represented through elected politicians ahead of the more traditional focus on the business elite.

THE CENTRAL PLACE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY FOR ALL THE ACTORS

This is certainly a negative tendency regarding the general well-being at the global level, as well as the standard of living of the average inhabitant of the planet, as indicated by numerous studies by reputable international institutions. We need to precise that the IMF suggests to the countries to embrace globalization. Especially considering that more than half of global companies have already reorganized their production in the last two years, and that as many as three quarters of them are

planning more “on shoring” and “re-shoring”, which will inevitably bring additional costs due to lower efficiency and higher prices. The assessment of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2023) is equally gloomy. Namely, a 100% increase in tariffs on all Chinese goods and services, along with a complete embargo on all technology and sectors related to national security, would reduce global GDP by 52.8 trillion dollars over the next 10 years (a cost equal to the “disappearance” of Japan from the global economy over a decade). The World Trade Organization has calculated that dividing the world into two trading blocs would reduce global GDP by 5%. The IMF, which focused on high-tech decoupling, estimated losses at 0.6%-3.9% of China’s and 0.4%-0.9% of US GDP (while total losses to the economy would the US could reach as much as 550 billion dollars per year). Alexander Sandkamp from the Kiel Institute showed that decoupling the EU from China would lead to a GDP loss of 0.8% in Europe and 0.9% in China (Glosserman 2023).

Over the decades, China has become critically important for European economies (German car manufacturers are a good example of this dependence), as evidenced by the strongly growing EU imports from that country. Recognizing all the risks of severing ties with Beijing, both Paris and Berlin are against decoupling with China, although they want to reduce dependence on it. In this context, the statement of the French President Emmanuel Macron (with which most officials of the European countries privately agree, and which caused anger in Washington) is indicative that the EU should avoid involvement in the American dispute with China (Stetter 2023). The attempt by Western leaders to “undo decades of globalization” is also complicated by the fact that Asian countries from Bangladesh and Indonesia to Malaysia and Thailand see China as central to their economic future.

In a way, we are faced with a double paradox. First, instead of linking developing countries more closely with the West, “decoupling” usually makes these same economies (especially in Southeast Asia) economically more dependent on China. Second, the change in supply chains, whose intention is to reduce the West’s dependence on China, is in fact only apparent because now the countries to which the facilities have been transferred import the necessary components from China. A clear sign that “decoupling” with Asia is not happening is the growth of Chinese exports to ten Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) of as much as 34% year-on-year in March 2023. Exports to India, whose factories depend on Chinese components and capital equipment, had

a similar pace, while its telecommunication companies predominantly use Chinese equipment. At the same time, exports to Brazil recorded a growth of 17%, doubling in the last three years. All this, together with China's strongly growing exports to Russia, as well as to most African countries, reflects the growing presence of second-world economies in the supply chains of developing countries, which is due in large part to Beijing's leadership in digital infrastructure. After nearly five years of open economic conflict, U.S.-China trade relations are beginning showing a general pattern of decoupling, even as broader globalization remains resilient (Goldman 2023).

On the other way, China's "pivot" away from American exports began along with the introduction of tariffs in response to Trump's trade war launched in 2018. Data for 2022 indicate that American exports are increasingly lagging behind foreign competitors in the Chinese market. The once large export of cars and airplanes (Boeing) has almost disappeared. Sales in the semiconductor sector fell, while exports of US services fell sharply during the pandemic and have yet to recover to previous levels. Although sales of US firms in the agrarian domain reached record values in 2022, worrying signs have emerged. Namely, a large part of the increase in exports of the agricultural sector is not the result of increased deliveries, but of higher prices associated with the growth of concerns about global food insecurity caused by the war between Russia and Ukraine (Bown and Wang, 2023).

Furthermore, Chinese buyers have diversified their imports towards other suppliers, while the US agricultural sector remains highly dependent on the Chinese market for its exports. If U.S. exports to China are viewed relative to their projected levels, assuming they grew at the same rate as China's total imports in 2018-22, taking inflation into account, it shows that in 2022 U.S. exports to China in 2022 for 23% lower than the trend and that the gap could increase over time. Still, the "decoupling" has only just begun, and the ban on chip exports to China is its most significant emanation. Therefore, despite the talk of "de-risking" and "increasing the resilience" of supply chains, there are no clear signs of decoupling in sectors that do not incorporate high-tech (although the very announcements of deteriorating relations are influencing companies' business decisions) (Bown and Wang 2023).

Western corporations are trying a "China+1" strategy, where they continue to make things in China, but also choose another manufacturing base (eg Malaysia) as a hedge. According to Kimura (2023), and based

on monthly data on international trade at the level of industrial branches as of the end of 2022, there are no clear signs of the separation of supply chains or drastic reorganization of production networks. When it comes to the exchange between Japan and China after the American targeting of Huawei in 2020, there has been a decline in Japanese exports to China. Namely, the analysis indicates a decrease in Japanese exports to China (especially components that intensively use semiconductors) by 3.3% in the period 2019-2022, with a visible “decoupling” when it comes to supply chains. Washington’s restrictive measures against Beijing, especially the ban on semiconductor exports to China from October 2022, will further disrupt supply chains in the semiconductor and supercomputer sectors.

However, globally, the decoupling of supply chains will only be partial, as evidenced by the fact that international production networks have remained active, as globalization has provided many private firms with enormous opportunities for profit. Although, given the political pressure, the expansion of trade controls seems inevitable; the “rest” of the economy outside of effective control could remain economically dynamic. In addition, Beijing from 2023 targets Western companies in the country more intensively. New sanctions were imposed on the American arms manufacturing companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. An investigation was launched on the American chip manufacturer Micron. A search was carried out at the American company Mintz (where part of the local staff was arrested), and the senior manager of the Japanese group Astellas Pharma was deprived of his liberty, while Deloitte will have to pay a record fine. China is currently considering restricting Western access to materials and technologies critical to the global automotive industry (like batteries), as well as restricting exports of key solar manufacturing technology (White and Inagaki 2023). The strategy is aimed at industries and companies that have no major potential to threaten China’s economic interests (Beijing refrains from actions against companies and industries that it considers important for the country’s economy).

Related to global finance, Wall Street remains bullish on China. A new wave of investment already began in 2020 after Beijing had lifted restrictions on foreign ownership of local funds in 2020. (Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and others have invested more than \$75 billion in China’s financial markets, while Blackrock, a giant American investment company, announced the establishment of a billion-dollar mutual fund, becoming the first foreign firm to be approved for such a wholly foreign-owned fund in China). Given Bloomberg’s estimates

offshore companies in tax havens are concealing an additional \$1.4 trillion in FDI in China (three times more than official figures), it is clear that business is preventing faster decoupling. Yet, eco-systems that include semiconductors, artificial intelligence, supercomputers, biotechnology, quantum science, continue to separate with the intensification of technological competition, or hybrid conflict, between Washington and Beijing. The result is an increasing fragmentation of the global technology sector. The U.S. embargo on semiconductor exports has already separated supply chains between U.S. and most Chinese technology companies. These include Huawei and ZTE (telecommunications); SMIC and YMTC (semiconductors); DJI (drones); Dahua, Megwii, SenseTime and HikVision (artificial intelligence, surveillance software, hardware). A looming problem is with dual-use products, where comprehensive export controls and sanctions by Washington could prevent many US firms from doing much of their business operations in China. Such a development could disable the operation of entire business sectors, including medical and pharmaceutical activities, mining, energy, agriculture and ecological (clean) technologies (Capri 2023).

Currently, Washington is in the process of introducing new controls for investment in China. A split was also detected in the domain of scientific research and the creation of separate national databases (as a result, the artificial intelligence of China and the West “learn” from their databases). FDI is subject to more intense controls, which will force private companies to separate operations into Chinese and non-Chinese divisions with “firewalls” that prevent the mixing of capital, people and ideas. While the US initiated the decoupling, China becomes an accomplice. Stanford University’s DigiChina project details Beijing’s vigorous imposition of trade controls, restrictions on data handling and cross-border data flows and encryption, supply chain security reviews, financial decoupling, travel and visa restrictions, website and app bans (and general efforts to reduce dependence on foreign countries) (Xiao and Dong, 2022). After all, China has long prioritized autonomy in science and technology, and the promotion of national champions was a pillar of its economic policy long before the trade war. Nevertheless, politics is conducted at the level of states, and the main role in determining the state of the world economy and planetary peace is played by the great powers.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that the US and China cannot agree, the issue of Taiwan will be interesting for the US, which has traditionally avoided providing such explicit security guarantees to Taiwan, with which it no longer has a mutual defense agreement. Instead, Washington maintains a policy of “strategic vagueness” about how far it is willing to go (Kuo, 2023).

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which governs U.S. relations with the island, does not require the U.S. to intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion, but mandates that Taiwan be provided with the resources to defend itself and prevent any unilateral changes to its status from side of Beijing. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou confirmed it (Kuo, 2023).

The European Union is looking for an appropriate way to position itself towards the People’s Republic of China. On the one hand, close trade ties and Europe’s dependence on Chinese raw materials characterize relations. On the other hand, there is a regular split when some European politicians accuse China of violating human rights. That is why it is said in Brussels that China is both a partner and a competitor and a systemic rival (Altmeyer, 2020). Trade with China certainly carries risks for the economic or national security of EU member states. As an example, the so-called “dual-use goods”, those that can be used for both civil and military purposes, as well as investments in China, and transfer of technology and knowledge. Therefore, Taiwan, after all the perturbations of the 20th century, enters a new cycle of tension, again caused by the convergence of external political factors. Beijing clearly still hopes for a peaceful reunification.

The return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese jurisdiction at the closure of the nineties of the last century strengthened Beijing’s faith in the possibility of a diplomatic return of the islands. Even so, Beijing realizes time is running out.

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Душко Томић

Амерички универзитет у Емиратима, Дубаи

Елдар Шалић

Амерички универзитет у Емиратима, Дубаи

Мохамед Бадин Ел Јатиуи

Амерички универзитет у Емиратима, Дубаи

АНАЛИЗА ОДНОСА КИНЕ И ТАЈВАНА: АМБИЦИЈЕ И РЕАЛПОЛИТИКА

Сажетак

Основни циљ овог рада је да објасни и анализира оптерећене односе Кине и Тајвана, као и могуће последице по регионалну и међународну безбедност. Улога Сједињених Држава се сматра кључном. Захваљујући томе се може схватити стратегија различитих актера у контексту снажне подршке коју Вашингтон пружа Тајвану. Занимљиви су и економски односи Кине и Тајвана, који указују на сложеност и осетљивост теме. Наш циљ је да пружимо анализу која би обухватала амбиције различитих страна, али и њихова ограничења услед присуства реалполитике.

Кључне речи: Кина, Тајван, САД, стратегија, безбедност, економија, тензије

*Aleksandar Mitić**

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

STATECRAFT REPERTOIRES OF CHINA AND THE U.S. BEFORE AND DURING THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE**

Resume

In pursuing strategic rivalry, the United States and China have used a wide array of instruments from their statecraft repertoire. Washington has worked on expanding alliances and strengthening bases in the Indo-Pacific, sanctioning Chinese economy and officials, as well as promoting a critical narrative on Beijing's rise. China has launched regional and global initiatives aimed at countering U.S. containment, promoting its economic interests and defending territorial integrity. Following Russia's military operation in Ukraine, the U.S. and China intensified their rivalry for influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Washington considerably reinforced its Beijing-containment military, economic and political alliances in the Pacific, while promoting the narrative of China's "authoritarian threat." Beijing refined its statecraft repertoire by enhancing instruments in reaction to threats around Taiwan. In expansion of its "interest and strategic frontiers" throughout the Global South, thus boosting the narrative of the rise of multipolarity at the expense of U.S. liberal hegemonism.

* Contact: aleksandar.mitic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

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Keywords: China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, Ukraine, statecraft, multipolarity

INTRODUCTION

Fully aware that the train of its unipolar global dominance had left the station towards multipolarity, the United States has understandably devoted remarkable attention and assets to confront key geopolitical challengers. Following a humiliating albeit logical retreat from Afghanistan in late August 2021, Washington demonstrated it was keeping both its Trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific eyes wide open. In a matter of two weeks, U.S President Joseph Biden sent two clear messages. First to Moscow, by hosting on September 1st Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky with the aim of concluding talks on the “U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership” (U.S. Department of State 2021). Second to Beijing, by signing on September 15th an agreement with the United Kingdom and Australia on the formation of the AUKUS strategic partnership aimed at containing the expansion of Chinese power in the Pacific. Biden reiterated his messaging at the December 2021 “Summit for Democracy”, during which he designated Moscow and Beijing as key “autocratic” challengers.

Following the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. decidedly focused on forging and maintaining a firm Trans-Atlantic alliance against Moscow. Nonetheless, Washington did not forget about its key competition in the Indo-Pacific. Neither did Beijing. Both countries were seemingly aware of each other’s repertoires of statecraft and had predicted their relentless pursuit, despite the expected focus on Ukraine and the continuing consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in China.

This paper seeks to discern the repertoires of statecraft used by the U.S. and China before and after the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, with the aim of detecting their continuity and potential enhancement.

A PANOPLY OF STATECRAFT REPERTOIRES

In international politics, states practice “statecraft” – “organized actions governments take to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of other states in particular to achieve the objectives set by policymakers” (Holsti 1976, 293). Combining military,

diplomatic, economic and cultural instruments of power with the strategic logics of their employment forms the tools of statecraft which “state leaders can employ to influence others in the international system – to make their friends and enemies behave in ways that they would have otherwise not” (Goddard, MacDonald & Nexon 2019, 306). Four types of instruments can be distinguished: (1) Military force: threat or direct use of weapons and violence, as well as arms sales, defense pacts and other tools of military power; (2) Economic instruments: translating economic capital into social power over others through incentives like financial assistance, regional trade agreements, currency unions or debt forgiveness, as well as punishments, such as trade sanctions or restrictions of capital flow; (3) Diplomatic instruments: use of social and political capital in cross-boundary interactions, including competitive or collaborative modes or the use of covert or secret diplomacy; (4) Cultural instruments: symbolic instruments affecting the distribution of status, like public diplomacy, propaganda and ideological persuasion (Goddard, MacDonald & Nexon 2019, 306).

While states have the option of using and mixing a broad range of tools in existence (use of force, alliances, sanctions, etc), statecraft can be seen as “a set of repertoires”, with “repertoires” consisting of “more limited toolkits in use, whether by particular states, in relations among specific states, or in specific settings” (Goddard, MacDonald & Nexon 2019, 310). Repertoires “involve not only what people do when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do” (Tarrow 2011, 39). Yet, they can also change depending on “major fluctuations of interests, opportunities and organizations” (Tarrow 2011, 39). They are also more strategic, as they are a “tool kit of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler 1986, 273). Since statecraft implies interaction between at least two actor-states, being strategic implies the adaptability of repertoires.

Raymond Cohen argues the international system is like a great stage on which states are, at one and the same time, both actors and the audience (Cohen 1987, 21). He uses “theatre as a metaphor for the repertoires of visual and symbolic tools used by diplomats and statesmen”: diplomatic communication seeks cross-cultural comprehensibility; it is a product of careful deliberation; and it “cannot escape from an insatiably inquisitive audience” (Jönsson 2022, 22).

Given that states use a myriad of statecraft repertoires, they need to employ strategic communication to legitimize their international status and leverage through political, military, economic or cultural might. Strategic communication, a concept of organized persuasion, represents a „system of coordinated communication activities implemented by organizations to advance their missions” (Author 2016, 9). In the process, organizations/states shape strategic narratives: „a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international relations to shape the opinions and behaviour of actors at home and overseas” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 248).

A BUILD-UP TO U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY

A few months before the 2020 elections, the office of U.S. President Donald Trump released the “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” (PRC) (White House 2020). In the document, the White House voiced both its disappointment with the effects of U.S. policy towards China since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979 and grave concern about the negative effects Beijing’s regional and global ambitions could have for U.S. interests. The U.S. hoped that “deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder”, but more than 40 years later, it had become evident the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules-based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favour” (White House 2020). Furthermore, the White House argued, “the CCP’s expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world” (White House 2020).

While some analysts argued that the arrival of a new president in the White House would spur change in Washington’s perception of China, these expectations did not fulfil. This was most clearly expressed when U.S. President Joseph Biden named Brookings Institute foreign policy expert Rush Doshi as National Security Council’s Director for China.

Doshi’s 2021 book “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order” offered a blueprint of Biden administration’s perceptive account of China’s rise and threat to U.S. interests, which did not diverge much from the one expressed by Trump, and thus (re)

confirmed a bipartisan view in Washington of the growing need to confront Beijing more decisively (Doshi 2021). In the book, Doshi argued that China aims to displace the U.S. position of hegemon short of war. In the regional and global order, a hegemon owes his position to three “forms of control used to regulate the behavior of other states: coercive capability (to force compliance), consensual inducements (to incentivize it), and legitimacy (to rightfully command it)” (Doshi 2021, 3). Indeed, the forms of control to which the U.S. statecraft repertoire had successfully contributed for decades. Yet, rising states, like China, apply strategies to displace the hegemon, and they pursue them in sequence. The first strategy is to “blunt the hegemon’s exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state”; the second is to “build forms of control over others”, particularly in the home region; and finally, when the first two are completed, the third strategy is “global expansion, which pursues both blunting and building at the global level to displace the hegemon from international leadership” (Doshi 2021, 4). Doshi argues that this template can be seen in China’s “strategies of displacement” of the U.S. which have evolved over time and in sequence. Its first strategy of displacement (1989-2008) aimed to blunt American power over China following Tienanmen Square, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second strategy (2008-2016) aimed to build the regional hegemony in Asia following the Global Financial Crisis and the diminishment of U.S. power. Finally, referring to Xi Jinping’s quotes about “great changes unseen in a century” (2018) and “time and momentum on our side” (2021), Doshi argued that — following Brexit, Donald Trump’s elections and the coronavirus pandemic — Beijing has launched a “third strategy of displacement, one that expands its blunting and building efforts worldwide to displace the United States as the global leader (Doshi 2021, 4).

China’s view is, understandably, different. Beijing’s foreign policy has traditionally relied on “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” from 1954, which refer to “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty” and non-interference in internal affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014). Throughout the Cold War, China was consistent and largely adhered to these principles (Harris, 2014). In the post-Cold War period, Beijing also viewed these principles as a great barrier to the Western “humanitarian intervention.” Indeed, it is the milestone in Western “humanitarian interventionism” – the 1999 NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – which

proved to be a key event in Beijing's strategic thinking. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which killed three Chinese journalists and wounded 20 employees, led to popular discontent in China, including demonstrations against the US embassy and Consulate, the strengthening of anti-Western sentiment, the awareness of the danger of the unipolar order for Chinese interests, but also to strategic foreign policy and security reflection. Lampton argued the bombing of the Embassy left a "scar of deep mistrust" between the US and China, "whose relationship has not fully recovered" (Lampton 2014, 118). Shortly after the NATO aggression, China adopted the "New Security Concept", which, according to Ghiselli, aimed to "improve the view towards a multipolar world order as a response to the US global dominance, especially after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 by the US aviation brought fear to the top of the Chinese civilian and military leadership of the onset of a new era of the US unilateralism" (Ghiselli 2021, 23). Gries argued that the Chinese, "alarmed by the Kosovo war and the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, began to reconsider their benevolent view of the international order" (Gries 2012, 306). According to him, "in post-Belgrade China" a "Manichean, black-and-white view of China-US relations" developed, and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy can be viewed as a "turning point in China-US relations" (Gries 2001, 26). After the NATO aggression, China became concerned about the establishment of "coalitions of the willing" and the consequences this could have for international interference in the issues of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang (Pang 2005, 88).

China's foreign policy has since progressively adapted to the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic changes, to which it undoubtedly also greatly contributed. Its first and foremost motive has remained the preservation of internal stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty. In this field, China faced constant and systemic pressure regarding Xinjiang, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet. Their separatist aspirations are portrayed and supported by the US and the EU as "struggle for freedom and human rights", while Beijing insists it will remain firm in the defence of its territorial integrity. In an attempt to break from the geostrategic constraints imposed by the impressive presence of U.S. forces in its immediate neighbourhood, China launched a number of initiatives spread towards Central Asia, Europe and Africa, but also Latin America. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, in just a decade, over 150 countries have

to various degrees joined the effort. Beyond economic development and financing, the BRI has also helped China establish a broad network of political partnerships. Thus, the expansion of Beijing's "interest frontiers" as "a geographical area that is defined (and constantly redefined) by the evolution of the Chinese interests and threats to them", which means the necessity of the transformation and expansion of foreign policy and security activities (Ghiselli 2021, 1).

U.S. DISPLAY OF CHINA-CONTAINMENT STATECRAFT REPERTOIRE

The expansion of Chinese statecraft in the regions outside of Asia-Pacific region, combined, among other processes, with the relative decline of US power, has contributed to an evolution from the "unipolar moment" towards multipolarity. It is thus not surprising that Washington has come to view Beijing as a strategic competitor whose power of expansion should be limited, thus opening an era of potential global rivalry. Washington had to implement a wide array of instruments from its statecraft repertoire aimed at containing China's rise.

(1) Military statecraft

(a) Strengthening military bases

Throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, the United States have developed hundreds of military installations in the Asia Pacific. Positioned in key geographical locations, they allow the U.S. military to "encircle China with a chain of air bases and military ports" (Reed 2013). In Japan, the United States Forces count 54,000 troops in 85 facilities located on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa (U.S. Forces Japan 2023). Okinawa alone accounts for 70 percent of all U.S. military bases in Japan (Siripala 2022). The U.S. increased its military presence in Guam, with up to 10,000 U.S. troops stationed on the Pacific Island (Youssef 2023). In South Korea, the U.S. deployed 28,000 troops in 73 military installations, including Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, which is the largest U.S. overseas military base (Shin and Lee 2021). In the Philippines, despite the fact that in the early 1990s Manila ended permanent U.S. military presence in the country, including two major bases, the U.S. maintained 500 military personnel with access to five bases (Mansoor and Shah 2023).

(b) Expanding military alliances and strategic dialogues
in the Asia-Pacific

In Asia-Pacific, the U.S. developed five regional treaty alliances: with Japan, Australia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines (White House 2022). It has also military relationships with a number of regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and New Zealand. The aim of the U.S. is to use these countries to blunt Chinese influence. Washington has also moved beyond bilateral relations and worked to build multilateral alliances and strategic dialogues. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), known as the “QUAD”, was created as a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the United States in 2007. It went into hiatus for eight years before reemerging in 2017 in the context of the China-containment policy. In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. announced the creation of AUKUS, an enhanced trilateral security partnership aimed at assisting Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, but essentially, again, at containing China’s rise.

(c) Increasing defense cooperation and arms
procurement with allies

Since the U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1979, Washington has maintained *de facto* diplomatic relations with Taipei. According to the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act, “the United States shall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity” (U.S. Congress 1979). From 1979 to 2020, 77 percent of major conventional arms imported by Taiwan were of U.S. origin, with a particularly high level of arms sales throughout the 2010s: the Obama administration notified Congress of more than 14 billion dollars in sales, while the Trump administration notified about sales worth 18 billion dollars (Forum on the Arms Trade 2023). Apart from M1A2 Abrams tanks and Stinger missiles, a particular high point has been the sale of 66 F-16V fighter jets for 8 billion dollars (Browne 2019).

(2) Economic statecraft

China’s economic rise from its opening up in the late 1970s, through the entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, led to its place as the world’s second economy and the most important trading

partner to the world's first economy – the United States. Yet, a rising U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China, together with complaints about China's unfair monetary and intellectual property practices, brought numerous economic measures aimed against Beijing.

(a) Imposition of tariffs for Chinese goods

Although the George W. Bush's and Barack Obama's administrations had already imposed quotas and tariffs on the Chinese textile, aluminium and steel production, by the time Donald Trump became U.S. President, it became clear the U.S. would pursue more radical economic measures against China. Several measures imposed by the Trump administration culminated in the "tariff war" following China's retaliatory measures. In early 2018, the U.S. imposed a 25-percent tariff on steel and 10 percent tariff on aluminium imports, before pursuing a few months later with a 25 percent tariff on 818 categories of goods imported from China worth 50 billion dollars (Fetzer and Schwarz 2020). Counting subsequent waves, the U.S. imposed tariffs on more than 360 billion dollars of Chinese goods – from washing machines to musical instruments.

(c) Bans and restrictions for Chinese high-tech equipment

Worried about Chinese rapid technological advances, the U.S. administration, particularly Trump's, adopted a number of bans and restrictions. In August 2018, the U.S. used security concerns to ban Huawei and ZTE equipment from being used by the government (U.S. Congress 2018). The following year, Huawei was put on a list of sanctions due to cooperation with Iran, which led to the freezing of its cooperation with numerous U.S. companies. The U.S. also persuaded several of its European allies – like Poland, the Baltic states and Romania – to follow the US 5G security initiative "Clean Network", with the objective of securing the networks from what it called "untrusted vendors" (Karaskova et al 2021).

(b) Multilateral economic partnerships

The U.S. initiated a number of activities aimed against China's rise and partnerships. One of them was Obama administration's Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the aim to bring Chinese neighbours closer to the U.S., but from which Trump withdrew in 2017. The U.S. firmly opposed the 2020 EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), lobbying hard against its acceptance in EU institutions. Furthermore, it

worked to counter the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in Europe, by urging Central and Eastern European countries to distance from cooperation with China under the cooperation format formerly known as “17+1”. In 2021, Washington proposed its own version of the BRI, the “Build Back Better World” (Widakuswara 2021).

(3) Political statecraft

(a) U.S. sanctions against Beijing officials

The United States has applied sanctions against China, its leadership, members of the CPC and the People’s Liberation Army. Most of these sanctions are linked with the accusations of human rights abuse. These have included visa restrictions and other means of publicly decrying actions considered by the U.S. as non-democratic. Particularly, in 2020, the U.S. sanctioned a number of Chinese officials for “gross violations of human rights” in Xinjiang, under its Uyghur Human Rights Policy. Also, in 2020, the U.S. imposed sanctions, first against Hong Kong officials, then also members of the National People’s Congress of China, for “undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy and restricting the freedom of expression or assembly of the citizens of Hong Kong” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2020).

(b) China-insulating initiatives in the Asia-Pacific

The U.S. has attempted influencing the works of the The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional grouping that aims to promote economic and security cooperation among its ten members. Washington wants to prevent China’s control over the access to the South China Sea. Particularly, it has tried exploiting the position of five ASEAN states (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam) which have maritime disputes with China. Furthermore, the U.S. has launched subregional initiatives, like the Mekong-U.S. partnership with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam on a number of policy issues. Created in 2020, its objective is to expand the work of the Lower Mekong Initiative, created in 2009 “to counter the spread of China’s influence down the river and into Southeast Asia” (Lintner 2021).

(c) Diplomatic support for Taiwan

Although it recognized the PRC and acknowledged the “One China” policy, Washington has a special relationship with Taiwan. In addition to

military and economic cooperation, the U.S. is also urging allies to boost relations and legitimize Taiwan. In November 2021, Lithuania allowed a representative office under the name “Taiwan” to be opened in Vilnius, which represents a fundamental difference from the representative office called “Taipei” that existed in other European cities. Beijing saw this move as a rather recognition of Taiwan, and it has lowered diplomatic relations with Vilnius, while stopping approvals of export permits for Lithuanian exporters (Author 2022a).

(3) Cultural statecraft

(a) Promoting the “China threat” strategic narrative

The U.S. government and its affiliated institutions have financed numerous critical think-tank, media and policymaking reports constructing a negative strategic narrative on China. This narrative is based on frames exploiting the crafted imagery of China’s “systemic ills” and “geopolitical ambitions”, with the objective of depicting China’s cooperation with international partners as toxic, undesirable and dangerous, thus encouraging repulsion of cooperation, fostering disappointment and facilitating crippling criticism (Author 2022b).

(b) Creating China-bashing international networks

The U.S. has funded a number of initiatives aimed at creating “China watchdog” networks of researchers, journalists and influencers with the objective of collaboration on analysis and exposure of implications of Chinese policies and activities in various fields – from private business, through academia and (dis)information, up to civil society and technology (Author 2022b). These efforts were particularly strong during the Covid-19 pandemic, when Chinese activities such as “mask and vaccine diplomacy” were portrayed as spreading “both the virus and its propaganda”, as well as during the 2021 “Summit for Democracy” which reflected “a prominent view within the Biden administration that assembling a global coalition of democracies can counter China’s rise” (Pepinsky 2021).

CHINA'S STATECRAFT REPERTOIRE OF RISE AND BREAKTHROUGH

Attempts by the U.S. to contain China's rise have been met with a wide array of statecraft instruments. Some of them, particularly belonging to military statecraft, were indeed a novelty.

(1) Military statecraft

(a) Activities in the South China Sea and the Taiwan straits

After U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed in a 2010 speech that the South China Sea was a matter of U.S. national interest, Beijing considered it an "attack on China" (Jones 2013, 57). This didn't surprise given the importance of the South China Sea for China's economy and security: nearly 40 percent of China's total trade in 2016 transited through the South China Sea (China Power Team 2017). The Spratly Islands could furthermore have important military significance in case of a war over Taiwan. The China-U.S. spat over the South China Sea escalated throughout the 2010s. China began its island building in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in 2013, and the speed of construction was met with strong criticism from Washington. Nevertheless, Beijing continued its construction, while the U.S. continued its freedom of navigation operations "that seek to challenge specific Chinese claims in the area" (Freund 2017). By 2022, China fully militarized at least three islands it built in the South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets (Associated Press 2022). China also drastically increased its presence around Taiwan, particularly in Taiwan's "Air's Defence zone" – with a peak of 56 incursions in a single day in October 2021 (Brown 2023). Furthermore, Beijing has also expanded its navy. In 2015, it surpassed the U.S. Navy in total size, and has continued its rapid growth since. Estimates in 2021 put the number of Chinese ships and submarines at 348, ahead of the U.S. Navy with 296 vessels (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2023).

(b) Expanding security frontiers

Following the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, and the expansion of China's "interest frontiers", Beijing adopted measures aimed at increasing their security. Following the 2008 Gulf of

Aden anti-piracy mission, it opened a military base in Djibouti in 2017 to protect Chinese economic interests and citizens (Heath et al 2021). Zhou Ping, advisor at the State Council of China, argued Beijing “must extend its ‘strategic frontiers’ to make them overlap with its interest frontiers by establishing a military presence there” (Ghiselli 2021, 2). Indeed, following the expansion of BRI-related China’s national interests, the People’s Liberation Army has pushed “farther away from China’s shores, broadening its strategic horizons, and enhancing its power-projection capabilities” (Rolland 2019, 2). This has led to U.S. analyses suggesting that China is “developing a network of strategic strongholds that can greatly increase the costs of any US military intervention and reduce the willingness of the Belt and Road members to provide the access or assistance to the US” (Russel and Berger 2020, 42)

(c) Increasing military partnerships

Throughout the 2010s, China has increased military drills with its key strategic partner, the Russian Federation, in pursuit of operational experience. This was a new feature of the China-Russian military cooperation, which for decades had thrived on Russian arms sales to Beijing. Russia’s “Vostok 2018” military exercises, in which the PLA took part for the first time, were considered a “milestone in the increasingly close defense relationship between the two countries” (Carlson 2018). The two countries participated in 78 joint military exercises between 2003 and 2022, more than half of these since 2016, and they have expanded them geographically up to the Baltic and Mediterranean seas (China Power Team 2022).

(2) Economic statecraft

(a) Launch of the BRI

Ever since Xi Jinping revealed in 2013 its global development strategy — the Belt and Road Initiative — China has worked to operationalize it and support it through various bilateral and multilateral partnerships. The engagement of the BRI until 2022 has been 962 billion dollars in 147 participating countries (Nedopil 2023). Such rapid development has raised substantial concern in Washington, which has come to regard the BRI “as an integral part of China’s grand strategy and is increasingly worried China will challenge and undermine US interests worldwide”, with the Initiative becoming “an important driving force for

the ‘threat inflation’ phenomenon when it comes to the US perception of China” (Minghao 2021).

(b) Launch of the AIIB

In parallel with the BRI, Xi proposed the creation of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which since 2016 has become the world’s second largest multilateral development institution, with 106 members, thus turning into a strategic competitor to the US-dominated International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Nguyen 2019). It received the AAA ratings from the top credit rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – and was granted Permanent Observer status in the deliberations of both the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2023). Ever since its creation, the AIIB was perceived as “another step towards the ‘de-dollarization’ that many expect to be the endgame of Chinese economic policy”, and a “direct threat to America’s ability effectively to set world interest rates and to create seemingly limitless fiat dollars without the need to finance them in free markets” (Browne 2015).

(1) Diplomatic statecraft

(a) De-recognition of Taiwan: China has intensified its work on the de-recognition of

Taiwan, and by the closure of 2021, the number of recognizing countries was reduced to 14. From 2017 to 2021, seven countries derecognized Taiwan – Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Panama and the Solomon Islands (Author 2022a).

(b) Signing strategic partnerships at global level

Beijing has drastically increased the number of its bilateral and multilateral partnerships at global level, often aiming to boost regional connectivity. They include countries and regions which have traditionally been dominated by U.S. influence. In Europe, Serbia signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China in 2016, Hungary a year later. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia in 2019 signed 30 economic agreements, boosting trade volume by 23 percent in a year (Chen 2020), while the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran worth 400 billion euros was signed in 2021 (Author 2022c). Also, in 2021, China boosted 30 years of relations with ASEAN by elevating ties to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Yu and Peng 2021).

(c) Boosting multilateral cooperation

China considerably boosted cooperation within BRICS and the Shanghai Security Cooperation (SCO). Beijing sought to increase the prominence of BRICS through summits and connectivity with other regional groupings, like the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the India-led Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Cooperation with South Africa boosted China-Africa relations through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Cooperation with Brazil further strengthened Beijing's appeal in South America, where China has become the leading trading partner. The SCO expanded in 2017 with the accession of India – a member of BRICS – and Pakistan – a key country for BRI connectivity. In 2021, China pushed for a green light to Iran's membership, while the SCO simultaneously offered the status of "dialogue partner" to Saudi Arabia – a process which ran almost in parallel with the signing of Beijing's strategic agreements with Teheran and Riyad. China has also expanded its influence through BRI-related summits, such as the "Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation" held in 2017 and 2019, or the summits of the China and Central and Eastern European Countries.

(1) Cultural statecraft

(a) Promoting soft power initiatives

China has used the BRI for the promotion of its narrative, critical of the Western liberal order. It has framed the Initiative as "win-win", "mutually-beneficial cooperation", "sharing the fruits of development", with the objective of building a "community of the shared future for mankind" (Xi Jinping, 2014 and 2016). The strategic narrative of the BRI rules against "Cold-War mentality", "zero-sum-games", "winner-takes-all", "unilateralism" and "law of the jungle" (Author 2022b). The BRI was logically promoted through "Silk Road" imagery (Stošić 2018). In this context, China deployed a number of channels to deploy its soft power, most notably the promotion of Chinese language and culture through the opening of over 500 Confucius centres in more than 160 countries.

(b) Mask and Vaccine diplomacy

The COVID-19 pandemic offered both an extreme challenge and opportunity for China. The Chinese government provided humanitarian assistance throughout the world, including in the United States, through

masks, protective gowns, testing, diagnostic and treatment equipment. The assistance, dubbed “mask diplomacy” – “hit two birds – restored its international reputation after being a hotbed for the virus and demonstrated its mature and strong stance in the international system” (Muratbekova 2020). Pursuing on this path, by early 2022 China provided more than two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to over 120 countries and international organizations (Xinhua 2022). China’s “vaccine diplomacy was (...) part of a broader strategy of reputational damage repair or an image makeover — both at home and in the world (Lee, Seow Ting 2021).

U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE

The beginning of Russian military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 brought unprecedented changes not only to the European and world security, but also to the economic and political map. The United States stood firmly as leading proponent of Trans-Atlantic unity in support of Ukraine, directing the pace of military aid and economic sanctioning of Russia. On the other side, weeks before the hostilities, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympic games and signed a joint declaration stating that “friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” (Reuters 2022). China, while continuing to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, put the blame for the outbreak of conflict on NATO expansion eastwards, refused to join any sanctions against Moscow, and opted instead for increasing cooperation with the Russian Federation in the trading and energy sectors.

Throughout the first year of conflict in Ukraine, Washington and Beijing pursued their strategic competition using a wide display of instruments from their statecraft repertoires.

- (1) U.S. statecraft repertoires during the conflict in Ukraine
 - (a) Military statecraft

The main instrument of the U.S. military statecraft repertoire has been the boosting of alliances and partnerships aimed at containing China, inspired by John Foster Dulles’ Korean war-era “island chain strategy.” Early 2023 witnessed a push of unprecedented intensity. Following Japan’s December 2022 historical commitment to a 60 percent spending increase

over the next five years, in January 2023 Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement boosting mobility for the 12th U.S. Marine Littoral Regiment on the island of Okinawa and improving anti-ship capabilities in case of Chinese attack in Taiwan. The agreement was signed despite criticism by Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki, who argued that currently “the possibility of China’s aggression into Taiwan is almost zero”, and that the risk of war comes mainly from a potential declaration of independence by Taipei (Oswald 2023). Simultaneously, Japan began the construction of an airfield on the island of Mageshima, which will house U.S. fighter jets relocated from Iwoto/Iwo Jima. Also in January 2023, the U.S. Marine Corps opened Camp Blaz, its base in 70 years in the U.S. Pacific Island of Guam, which is considered as a possible place of the outbreak of conflict with China (Lendon 2023). Simultaneously, the U.S. agreed with South Korea to increase the deployment of fighter jets and aircraft carriers, as well as to expand combined military exercises in the Korean Peninsula.

In February, Washington and Manila signed an extension for the U.S. access to four extra bases in the Philippines, under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which had already allowed for access to five of them with the aim of monitoring China’s activities in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Access was given to an air base on Balabac Island, near the South China Sea, as well as to the naval base and airport in the Cagayan province, some 250 km from Taiwan, despite public opposition by Cagayan Governor Manuel Mamba, who fears “jeopardising Chinese investment and becoming a target in a conflict over Taiwan” (Agence France-Presse 2023). In response, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning accused the U.S. of “an act that escalates tensions in the region and endangers regional peace and stability” (Westerman 2023).

In March, Australia, the UK and the U.S. unveiled the details of the AUKUS submarine deal designed to equip Canberra with nuclear-powered attack submarines. The deal also provides for U.S. and UK submarines to make rotational deployments to the Western Australia Stirling naval base, seen by analysts as key “from the standpoint of deterring Chinese aggression within the next ten years” (Townshend 2023).

The U.S. also continued its support to Taiwan. U.S. President Biden signed the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authorizing up to 10 billion dollars in military-purpose grants for Taiwan over five years, including one billion dollars worth of weapons and munitions annually. The bill was put by analysts in the context of the course of

the Ukrainian conflict, particularly regarding the “progress towards Taiwan embracing the asymmetric defence strategy Washington had been urging” (DeLisle 2023). Such decision didn’t surprise given that Biden repeatedly stated in the context of the conflict in Ukraine that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in case of China’s attack, a position which received praise from Taipei and harsh criticism from Beijing (Ni 2022).

(b) Economic statecraft

The U.S. also increased its economic and trade initiatives. In May 2002, the U.S. launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a major trade initiative aiming to expand Washington’s economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region. Seen as a U.S. attempt to go back to the objectives of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), from which the Trump administration withdrew in 2017, it was joined by 13 countries, including Australia, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan, and accounts for 40 percent of the global economy (Manak 2022). While U.S. officials dubbed it an “alternative to China’s approach”, Beijing media sharply criticized it, calling the initiative – “economic NATO” (Banerjee 2022). In the fall of 2022, the United States imposed new sanctions on Beijing by preventing the sales and service by American businesses to Chinese chip manufacturers. This was followed in February 2023 by the creation of the U.S.-led framework “Chip 4”, uniting Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, with the aim to ensure a stable supply of semiconductors and reduce Chinese involvement (Kyodo News 2023). At a meeting of the QUAD in New Delhi in March 2023, the foreign ministers of the U.S., India, Japan and South Korea took a “direct shot at China”, by underlying that they view with concern “challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the South and East China Sea.” (Lee, Matthew 2023).

(c) Diplomatic statecraft

The August 2022 visit to Taipei by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi prompted a tense diplomatic standoff between Washington and Beijing. China’s diplomatic reaction was harsh and accompanied by the dispatching of warships and aircraft, as well as firing ballistic missiles into the waters of the Taiwan Strait. Although it proved to be a headache for the White House as well, Pelosi’s visit embarrassed Beijing, which had to restrain itself, despite popular discontent and urge to disrupt

the visit. A few months later, at the G20 Summit in Bali, Xi and Biden had their first meeting since Biden took office in early 2021, and it was dubbed “constructively”, with calls for more “cooperation.” Yet, the diplomatic “détente” has been short-lived. In early 2023, the US House of Representatives voted in favor of forming a new Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party. Tensions further exacerbate the following the February 2023 “balloon incident”, implicating the spotting and shooting down of a Chinese-operated high-altitude balloon, which prompted Secretary of State Antony Blinken to postpone his diplomatic visit to Beijing.

U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region nevertheless gained an additional boost after the first bilateral summit of the leaders of its two key allies in the region, South Korea and Japan, which had worked on the resolution of disputes stemming from Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea. Although Washington was officially absent from the talks, analysts argued that “bringing Japan and South Korea closer together has long been a priority for the Biden Administration and that the “U.S. shuttle diplomacy between the two countries has been credited with helping to bring about the summit” (Aum and Galic 2023). Washington also reopened, after 30 years of closure, its embassy in the Solomon Islands — a country with which Beijing signed a security pact in 2022 — as an effort “to counter China’s growing influence in the region” (Baldor 2023).

(d) Culture repertoire

In parallel with other statecraft repertoire, the U.S. also launched several strategic communication initiatives, promoting the narrative of “China threat” and “China’s authoritarianism”, including at the second Summit for Democracy in March 2023. A particularly strong connection has been established with the narrative regarding Russian military operation in Ukraine. In fact, China was labelled as “Russian biggest backer” and its ally in the undermining of the “rules-based world order”, a euphemism for the U.S.-led liberal international order. Such discourse and narratives were promoted in international media, but also in Western multilateral fora, such as the G7. The U.S. also continued with a number of soft power initiatives aimed at competing with Chinese influence, such as in Central Asia, where Washington launched in the fall of 2022 the “Economic Resilience Initiative” aimed at “a long-term strategy to cement the English-speaking world as an avenue for future economic, social, political and cultural development” (Putz 2022).

(2) Chinese statecraft repertoires during the conflict in Ukraine

Following the outbreak of Russian military operation in Ukraine, China at first adopted a restrained position. Yet, as the conflict intensified, with global security, economic and diplomatic implications, Beijing recalibrated its statecraft instruments.

(a) Military statecraft

The visit of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in August 2022 set off unprecedented China's military drills in the Taiwan Strait, including first-ever test launches of ballistic missiles over Taipei. With the focus on testing land-strike and sea-assault capabilities, the drills showed Beijing's readiness to react militarily in case of Taipei's unilateral independence moves. Similar exercises, though smaller in scale, were carried in April 2023 and simulated sealing off Taiwan in response to the Taiwanese president's Tsai Ing-wen's trip to the U.S. In addition, Beijing has also broadened its aerial incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone.

Under pressure in the Taiwan Strait, China's navy pushed farther globally. In April 2022, China signed a bilateral security agreement with the Solomon Islands, a move perceived by the U.S. as a threat as it allows Beijing to replenish vessels to and potentially open a naval base extending military reach in the South Pacific (Zongyuan 2022). In February 2023, China's navy held joint drills with Russia and South Africa in the Indian Ocean, and in March 2023 with Russia and Iran in the Gulf of Oman.

(b) Economic statecraft

On the economic front, while fighting to end COVID-19 quarantines and its domestic repercussions, a housing crisis and problems with global supply chains, Beijing did not let aside its regional and global role. China worked hard for BRICS expansion, with Algeria, Iran and Argentina applying to join the organization, with a dozen more – including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – expressing their interest. China also worked on the start of de-dollarization, as it concluded agreements with Brazil, Pakistan, Kazakhstan and other countries to replace the U.S. dollar by the yuan for cross-border transactions. The renminbi replaced the dollar as the most foreign currency in Russia following Western sanctions against Moscow, while Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula

da Silva, on a visit to Beijing in April 2023, called on BRICS nations to “come up with an alternative to replace the dollar in foreign trade” (Iglesias 2023). Boosting energy exchange and trade have also been the hallmarks of China-Russian relations since the beginning of Moscow’s military operation in 2022. Despite harsh criticism from the West and threats of sanctions, Xi Jinping reinstated China’s commitment to strategic partnership with Russia following his trip to Moscow in March 2023.

(c) Diplomatic statecraft

Following a self-imposed diplomatic retreat due to the COVID-19 restrictions, Beijing pushed hard on the diplomatic front starting in the fall of 2022. After Xi Jinping’s September 2022 first visit abroad since the beginning of the pandemic, the Chinese president went on a furious diplomatic offensive meeting dozens of world leaders in the matter of months – from U.S. President Joseph Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin to German Chancellors Olaf Scholtz and French President Emmanuel Macron. China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang declared in April 2023 that “China’s diplomacy had pressed the ‘accelerator button’”, while the government expanded the diplomatic budget by 12.2 percent (Gan 2023).

In its campaign for the de-recognition of Taiwan, Beijing scored an additional success after the decision by Honduras in March 2023 to break off relations with Taipei.

Beijing started the operationalization of its “Global Security Initiative” (GSI), the promotion of its vision of a global security architecture urging “indivisible security”, against confrontation among alliances. The Initiative, first announced in April 2022 by Xi Jinping, was operationalized in February 2023, in the context of the conflict of Ukraine, as its primary objective is geared against the expansion of alliances such as NATO in Europe – against the national security of Russia, but also in Asia Pacific – against the national security of China. On the anniversary of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, Beijing unveiled its 12-point plan for the political resolution of the conflict, based on the principles of the GSI – including the respect for territorial integrity, but also against the expansion of alliances and unilateral sanctions, which was rejected by the U.S. (Kine 2023).

Two weeks later, Beijing reinforced its diplomatic credibility with the surprising deal brokering between regional opponents Iran and Saudi Arabia on the restoration of their diplomatic relations. The move was seen by analysts such as former Middle East policy advisor to the State

Department Aaron David Miller as demonstration that “U.S.’s influence and credibility in that region has diminished and that there is a new slightly international regional alignment taking place, which has empowered and given both Russia and China newfound influence and status” (Turak 2023). The move occurred in the context of wide geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman refused to bow to Biden’s pressure and sided with Vladimir Putin on cutting oil production by OPEC+. Beijing and Moscow also strengthened the SCO in the region, by officially granting dialogue partner status to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar, while giving a green light for the same status to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

(d) Cultural statecraft

At the outset of the conflict in Ukraine, Beijing reacted by incriminating Washington and regularly reminding about its military interventions, particularly during the U.S.-led unipolar momentum – from the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, to the invasion of Iraq and the bombings of Libya. It also launched its new Global Civilization Initiative in March 2023, calling for key soft power instruments, such as respect for diversity, inheritance and robust people-to-people exchange.

CONCLUSION

Despite global focus on the conflict in Ukraine and its ramifications, the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China has intensified since 2022. Analysis of statehood repertoires of the two global rivals before and after the beginning of the conflict points to several conclusions.

First, the U.S. has maintained its entire China-containing statecraft repertoire and has considerably boosted several instruments. Particularly unprecedented is the intensity of enhancement of its “island chain strategy” in early 2023, including robust military installments in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, but also installations in Guam and the military assistance to Taiwan. Given the level and time framework for promised assistance to Taipei, as well as to AUKUS, it is clear that the U.S. will continue to elevate its military presence in the Indo-Pacific in the years to come. Same can be said of its economic statecraft, with initiatives being reinvigorated (QUAD), reformulated (IPEF) or newly introduced (Chan4). Its diplomatic initiatives, such as support for agreement between Tokyo and Seoul, shows that it aims to strengthen unity with and among

allies, which is in line with the NATO 2022 Summit, where Indo-Pacific partners participated for the first time, as well as with the NATO 2030 Agenda. The activities of the U.S. Congress – Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, the creation of a new committee on “strategic competition” with China, promised assistance under the NDAA and reactions to the “Chinese balloon incident” – show a strong bipartisan approach in Washington aimed at resolute challenging of Beijing.

Second, while at first seemingly on the defensive at the international level following February 2022, Beijing refined its statecraft repertoire. Most instruments were enhanced – some in reaction to threats to territorial integrity (Taiwan), others in proactive operationalization of expansion of “strategic frontiers” (Solomon Islands). The strategic partnership with Russia passed an extremely difficult test. Organizations in which Beijing has a decisive voice – like BRICS and the SCO – expanded and their attractiveness grew throughout the Global South. This was particularly remarkable in the Middle East. The Riyadh-Teheran agreement masterminded by Beijing was a gem for China’s rising global diplomatic clout, particularly in the light of the operationalization of the GSI and the peace proposal for the conflict in Ukraine. China also avoided diplomatic decoupling from the European Union, one of its main trading partners, with key EU leaders heading to Beijing. On the other side, the trend of dedollarization intensified with important new bilateral agreements and support from BRICS partners. The outward-looking strategy was further accentuated with the launch of the Global Civilization Initiative.

Third, the analysis depicts both an existing and future epic rivalry of strategic narratives. For the U.S. this means the pursuit of the negative “China threat” narrative, which was further enhanced in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, with Beijing portrayed as part of an “aggressive” and “authoritarian” alliance aimed at dismantling the “rules-based world order.” China, on the other side, boasts the narrative of acceleration of multipolarity at the expense of U.S. liberal hegemonism. Strategic narratives are constructed through strategic communication, which attempts to align words with deeds arising from statecraft repertoires. Indeed, while strategic narratives can be seen as tools of statecraft, they can also glue together various sets of statecraft repertoires – military, economic, diplomatic and cultural. For the U.S. this means the pursuit of the negative “China threat” narrative, which was further enhanced in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, with Beijing portrayed as part of an “aggressive” and “authoritarian” alliance aimed at dismantling the “rules-based world order.”

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Александар Митић

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

ПОЛИТИЧКИ ОДНОСИ ДРЖАВНОГ ВРХА КИНЕ И САД ПРЕ И ТОКОМ СУКОБА У УКРАЈИНИ

Сажетак

У оквиру стратешког ривалства Сједињене Америчке Државе и Народна Република Кина користиле су широк опсег инструмената из свог политичког „репертоара”. Вашингтон је ширио алијансе и јачао базе у Индо-Пацифику, санкционисао кинеску економију и званичнике, те промовисао критички наратив о успону Кине. Пекинг је покренуо низ глобалних иницијатива усмерених ка супростављању америчкој политици зауздавања, ка промовисању економских интереса и одбрани територијалног интегритета. По отпочињању руске војне операције у Украјини, САД и Кина су интензивирале своје ривалство зарад утицаја у Индо-Пацифику и шире. Вашингтон је значајно ојачао своје војне, економске и политичке алијансе усмерене ка зауздавању Пекинга, промовишући истовремено наратив о Кини као „ауторитарној опасности”. Пекинг је јачао инструменте који одговарају на опасности у погледу Тајвана, као и у погледу експанзије својих „интересних и стратешких граница” широм Глобалног југа, оснажујући тиме наратив о расту мултиполарности на уштрб америчког либералног хегемонизма.

Кључне речи: Кина, САД, Индо-Пацифик, Украјина, државништво, мултиполарност

*Nenad Stekić**

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

CHINA'S GEOPOLITICAL DESIGN FOR EAST ASIA: TAIWANESE PIECE OF THE PUZZLE**

Resume

China's foreign and security policy preferences for East Asia are a multifaceted issue, with Taiwan playing a crucial role in this strategic puzzle. Beijing's claim over Taiwan as its integral part is a key component of its geopolitical strategy in East Asia and an important constituent of regional security dynamics. This paper aims to delve into China's patterns of such geopolitical design for East Asia, paying particular attention on Taiwan's place within the newly introduced Indo-Pacific and attempts at multilateral alignments in the region. Author offers arguments for China's East Asian "regionally tailored" policy and discusses potential strategic options ahead of Chinese leadership regarding US-led attempts to contain China geopolitically and militarily. In addition, the paper explores some Beijing's concrete military and foreign policy responses, including its military policy over the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone and consequences derived from recently adopted strategy titled Taiwan Issue and China's Unification in the New Era. Given Taiwan's pivotal geopolitical position in China's security policy, the paper assumes it will be one of the principal sites where the contest for the emerging world order will be waged between China and the United States. China's rise

* Contact: nenad.stekic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

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in the international system and the current politico-security tensions in the East Asian region as examples to argue that certain theoretical approaches, like the liberal Hegemonic Stability Theory, may no longer hold true. It is because international system is moving towards institutional separation into parallel entities, which could be a significant shift from the system that emerged after the Second World War.

Keywords: Taiwan, China's security policy, East Asian security, geopolitical design, Hegemonic Stability Theory

DEBATING CHINA'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS IN THE NEW POLITICAL CONSTRUCT OF INDO-PACIFIC

China's geopolitical design for East Asia is a complex and multi-layered, with Taiwan occupying a crucial position in this strategic puzzle. Such a claim constitutes the key issue of its strategic choices and alternatives. The Republic of China (ROC), also known as Taiwan, has been a source of tension between the People's Republic of China¹ and its neighbouring countries for many decades. In addition to oppress potential containment from the West, China's claim over Taiwan as an integral part of its territory constitutes a central component of its geopolitical strategy for East Asia. Inconsistency of some theoretical approaches (dominantly realist ones) and the latest intensifying occurrences in this part of the world, demand explanatory approach to what stands as a critical point of China's strategic choice when it comes to East Asian security space. This paper aims to delve into this issue, highlighting on Taiwan's central role in China's strategic design for the region of East Asia.

Global politics has become even more complex with Russia's intervention in Ukraine which after a year-long war has led to deeper fragmentation of the units within the system of international relations. In parallel, China's remarkable growth in all areas of societal development brought it to the top of strategic competition with the USA and peaked in its global foreign policy and security agenda prompting a battle for the next system's hegemon. It is why this paper aims to scrutinize some of the propositions of the liberal Hegemonic Stability Theory (hereinafter HST) in the context of China's professed "peaceful rise", particularly in

¹ The terms "PR China" and "China" will be used interchangeably in the text that follows.

light of the current global political fragmentation and growing Western efforts, spearheaded by the United States, to constrain China's ascent. Against this backdrop, this article offers an analysis of China's distinctive response to such challenges, informed by its geopolitical strategy towards East Asia. Notably, this approach places Taiwan, a pivotal geopolitical entity, at the forefront of its priorities. By means of this inquiry, the present study intends elucidating the ramifications of the Taiwan matter on regional security and stability, while underscoring the necessity of reasons that constrain and/or prompt China to undergo more assertive actions towards unification. Thus, the primary argument of this paper posits that Taiwan constitutes the absent element in China's overarching geopolitical blueprint amid the looming escalation of strategic rivalry between China and the United States. Similar analyses that involved Sino-American competition based on the HST principles especially taking into account East Asia (Goh 2019; Purwanti 2020; Loke 2021) could have compounded fewer variables in the past than they can now (Kim & Gates 2015; Kim 2019; Danner & Martín 2019). Chen Jian (2019) argues that the Sino-American rapprochement during the seventies stood as a crucial and influential event of the 20th century's China's policy, as its implications on East Asian and global politics were profound as it led to a significant realignment of power dynamics between the two Cold War superpowers. He believes that Washington's decision-makers were able to focus their strategic attention and resources on addressing the problems posed by the Soviet Union as a result of the opening of Sino-American relations. On the other hand, the former Soviet Union was constrained to confront both the West and China concurrently, leading to a serious depletion of its strength and power (Jian 2019).

During 1996, Gerald Segal published an important article that ushered the dichotomy of China and East Asia in terms of containing China in the last decade of the 20th century. Through application of fundamental theories of international relations, Sedal believed this region was a fruitful soil for the application of balancing theory. Namely, he systematically included demographic and economic-social variables such as population, exports, territory area, military power, as assumptions of the initial reference values in which China enters interactions with the countries of East Asia and made a premise on low level of China's resilience to respond to a potential containment or major dispute with the West (Sedal 1996). Similarly, the discussion around China's strategic orientations under the new contemporary conditions created by the

promotion of the “Indo-Pacific” as a region of a critical importance to global security is still modest as there are not many strategic alternatives ahead for Beijing, except taking a defensive and in parallel – proactive stance against “the spokes” (dominantly Japan and Taiwan) in its nearest geographical region.

The following text posits that China’s foreign policy toward East Asia represents a uniquely coherent and systemized approach among its contemporaries. The author goes into the key elements of China’s East Asian strategy by analysing its strategic relationships with Japan, South Korea and stance towards Taiwan, with a focus on the period of the post-pandemic era. The US-led efforts to preserve its dominant unipolar status in the global order through the containment of China constitute a significant driving force behind this intensification. In this context, the paper also analyses the implications of the newly introduced construct-region of Indo-Pacific on China’s foreign and security policy response. Finally, the central section of the study expounds upon the critical stakes of China’s geopolitical agenda for East Asia, through lenses of HST and China’s quest to achieve global hegemony.

CHINA’S REGIONALLY TAILORED SECURITY POLICY FOR EAST ASIA

As a relatively small part of the Asian land mass, East Asia typically compounds area of Mainland China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan.² Geographically speaking, East Asia is often referred to as the area that includes both the western Pacific Ocean islands, such as Japan and Taiwan and the eastern portion of the Asian continent. Encyclopaedia Britannica offers a more accurate geographic breakdown of East Asia, which includes the East Asian islands, Korea, continental component of the Russian Far East region of Siberia and eastern and north-eastern China (Britannica 2023). However, within the scope of many scientific geopolitical analyses only the Chinese coastline along with Taiwan, Japan and Korean peninsula is being interpreted as “East Asia” (Beeson 2009; Smith, 2009; Holcombe 2017). In addition, some

² While acknowledging that Taiwan is an integral part of China, it is pertinent to note that this article regards it as a distinct entity for the purposes of the case study examined herein. As such, Taiwan will be presented and analysed separately to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of its unique circumstances and implications in the context of the broader analysis.

wider distinctive areas were identified during the World War II, when the Japanese scholars coined the term “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere” (GEACPS) to describe their vision of a world order centered around East Asia and based on Eastern ideals, which they believed could replace the conflictual Eurocentric world order of territorial states (Watanabe 2018). In line with this paper’s aim, the following analysis will address the East Asia as the region compounding PR China (including Taiwan), Korean peninsula and Japan.

East Asia evolved on a foundation of the diverse region with a blend of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and other conventional religions over the course of its long history of cultural and economic exchange. Such influence consequently brought a region into permanent turmoil especially in an international context. Its economic growth has been powered by a mix of state involvement, market-oriented policies and technical advancement. In terms of international relations, the regional dynamic is shaped by intertwined processes of disputes between China on one side and Western-supported allies on another. China eroded as the most significant actor in the international politics over the last couple of years promoting its nearest geographical surrounding *volens-nolens* as the core of international security dynamics. Not only did this process lead to further evolution of China’s Grand Strategy, but had also paved the way to its regionally adapted foreign policy approach for East Asia. Ever since the Deng Xiaoping era, China sought to establish security prevalence in this region, but it lacked of assertiveness and was oriented to internal economic (and less political) development and consolidation (Yahuda 1993).

Some scholars have noted that the next era of China’s East Asian regional approach occurred during Jiang Zemin, whose main premise in terms of geopolitics was to provide a solid basis for establishing a strong armed forces for “further challenges” (Scobell 2000, 26). Andrew Scobell described in his paper published in 2000 that the consequences of a potential failed military strike for China in East Asia during Jiang’s era could be catastrophic, especially if the conflict involves Taiwan. This is because China is unlikely to accept defeat and abandon its efforts if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is defeated on the battlefield (Scobell 2000). According to Scobell’s arguments, if the PLA under Jiang Zemin would have suffered a loss, Beijing would likely need to redouble its efforts to rebuild its military strength and ensure success in future attempts (2000, 26). In the early 2010s, China aimed to maintain

its image as a *status quo* power, as noted by Cheng (2013). However, today this claim would be fiercely contested as China pursues a more assertive and visible strategy towards East Asia. China's approach to the region includes various elements, such as the use of soft power, the pursuit of great power ambitions, a hedging strategy towards East Asian states, the institutionalization of cooperation with the region and a more assertive regional approach (Cheng 2015).

Today, the key political and security rivals of China in East Asia are also some of its most important trading partners. In the context of Sino-Japanese economic relations, it is noteworthy that Japan ranks as China's fifth largest trading partner in terms of overall trade volume, third largest trading partner in terms of export and second largest trading partner in terms of import. Conversely, China holds the distinction of being Japan's largest trading partner, export destination and import source.³

Regarding the concrete security policy measures, China becomes more assertive than ever in the basin of East China Sea region. Military activities of official Beijing follow the increase of tensions in its nearest geographic surrounding which lasts for more than a decade now. On November 23, 2013, China declared its wider eastern coast a mandatory aircraft identification zone, more specifically – Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Officially known as the “East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ)”, this area encompasses the Senkaku Archipelago in the south and the Sokotra Rocks in the north and it extends nearly to Taiwan's northernmost city of Taipei. ECS ADIZ, unlike any other ADIZ-es in the region, has a significant overlap with the ones that South Korea, Japan and Taiwan have declared. As a response to that, South Korea has immediately widened its zone to the south to cover the

³ According to Chinese MFA, the magnitude of trade between these two East Asian nations are exemplified by the total trade volume of 357 billion USD in 2022. This figure represents a substantial flow of goods and services, with China exporting approximately 172.93 billion USD worth of commodities to Japan, while importing roughly 184.5 billion USD worth of goods and services from the island nation (Chinese MFA 2023). The numerical data under scrutiny evince a marked discrepancy between the trade dynamics characterizing Japan's economic ties with China and those linking Japan and the United States during the year 2022. Specifically, it is observed that the aggregate trade volume between Japan and the USA was valued at 228 billion USD, as per the US Census Bureau. Within this framework, Japan's exports to the USA amounted to 148 billion USD, while its imports from the USA stood at a relatively lower value of 80 billion dollars (US Census Bureau 2023).

Sokotra Rock (Rinehart & Bartholomew 2015, 24). This was the first time ever since the Korean War that Korean ADIZ was widened.

According to the Statement on Establishing the ECS ADIZ issued by the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, each aircraft should, report the flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of China.⁴ Practically all the countries of East Asia – including China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have declared their own ADIZ. Additionally, in the geographical macroregion of this area, the Philippines and the USA on Guam also have such zones. In addition, an important aspect of China's military presence and increased assertiveness in its own closest region – and what is especially manifested towards Taiwan, are the overflights of military combat and non-combat aircraft over the central demarcation line of the Taiwan Strait. Such flights have become more frequent in the last three years and take place on a daily basis. According to Taiwan's official stance, such sorties represent a violation of the airspace and ADIZ declared by Taiwan.

Foreign Policy Research Institute data show almost 98% of all sorties were carried out by aircraft based at bases in the Eastern and Southern Theatre Command of China (FPRI 2023). Although the South China Sea is an area where security tensions are manifested due to claiming rights to the waters, China has not yet established a "Southern ADIZ" for this airspace. Furthermore, what complicates the security environment is increase of the US military presence in the region. In 2022 alone, the USA deployed nearly 82.000 troops and maintained 74 military bases only in Japan and in South Korea (Heiduk 2022).

China takes a regionally tailored approach towards these countries as it would promote a coherent response to potential Western containment. This approach brings into play a new variable, namely the opposing factors and dynamics of the new (geo)political construct of the Indo-Pacific region, portraying the promotion of USA-led multilateral security arrangements. In the configuring security architecture of East Asia, over the last few years, several new processes that shape China's response, which can be generically labelled as pull factors, have been singled out. These are the construction of a new region as the significance of global

⁴ Furthermore, all aircraft entering the ECS ADIZ must provide flight plan identification, must maintain the two-way radio communications and respond in a timely manner. They also must be equipped with the secondary radar transponder and lastly must be identified with the clear logo and nationality in accordance with the international treaties.

security – the Indo-Pacific, then the revival of old and the creation of new multilateral security formats – QUAD and AUKUS. Taiwan occupies a central position in the foreign policy of the United States with regard to containing China and has the support of South Korea and Japan in this effort. The rivalry between the United States and China in global affairs has led to the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as a newly constructed region of a global interest. The traditional *Pax Americana* has given way to *Pax Sinica*, resulting in the formation of a San Francisco System, which was based on a “hub and spokes” system of regional security in Asia that involves various alliances established by the US (Heiduk 2022). While the US has traditionally served as the “hub”, in recent years, Australia and India have been directly included in multilateral security forums, providing additional support to the “spokes” of this system, which include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Felix Heiduk argues such a security arrangement would be highly hostile toward China and underscores the critical significance of the region in the coming years (Heiduk 2022).

However, security of the East Asia is much more complex issue. Mark Beeson (2009) believed that aftermath of the Global economic crisis in 2008, geopolitics took the primary role in East Asian “making of regions” which especially reflected in China’s openness towards the global markets (Beeson 2009). Contrary to his belief that US endeavours to “inhibit” the process of East Asian regionalisation not only in economic but in political terms would have been unsuccessful (2009, 512), it turned out that almost 15 years after, USA and its allies – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are determined more than ever to achieve maritime supremacy and contain China in this part of the world. The QUAD and AUKUS, two models of multilateral security association, are not explicitly mentioned but are seen as challenges by China’s latest Global Security Initiative. The initiative was first proposed by Xi Jinping at the BOAO Forum in April 2022 with an aim to “eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts for greater stability in a volatile and changing era and promote durable peace and development worldwide” (Chinese MFA 2023). According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2023, the initiative emphasizes “indivisible security” and stresses deeper bilateral and individual cooperation over multilateralism in security and defence arrangements.

CHINA'S GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE FOR EAST ASIA

Other than Taiwan, the axis between Beijing and Tokyo forms the core of East Asia (Sea) geopolitics. Modern relations between China and Japan are burdened by the ballast of the Second World War outcome, in which these two countries were opposing sides. A mild “warming” of relations was initiated by a series of bilateral agreements signed during the seventies of the last century. The first such document – “Japan-China Joint Communiqué” agreed to by both sides in 1972 paved the way for the two nations to normalize their diplomatic relations. It was the basis for the Sino-Japanese “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” which was signed in Beijing in 1978 and entered force the following year when ratification documents were exchanged in Tokyo (Japanese MFA 2023). The political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations was further strengthened by the subsequent publication of the “Joint Declaration on Building Partnership and Cooperation for Peace and Development” in 1998 and the Joint Declaration on “Mutually Beneficial Relations Based on Common Strategic Interests.” These four political documents form the basis of the ongoing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The 2008 Joint Statement outlined five pillars of Sino-Japanese cooperation, including enhancing mutual trust in the political sphere, fostering people-to-people and cross-cultural exchange, enhancing mutually beneficial cooperation for the sustainable growth of the global economy, contributing to the resolution of global issues and continuing to support the Asia-Pacific region (Japanese MFA 2023). Only one article in this text, which made reference to the Joint Communiqué that the two parties signed in 1972, addressed the Taiwanese issue. In that Communiqué, it was stated once more that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and that the Government of Japan firmly upheld its position in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation while fully understanding and respecting the position of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Joint Communiqué 1972, art. 3).⁵

⁵ Even today, the Potsdam Declaration, which was signed on July 26, 1945, plays a significant role in Sino-Japanese relations following post-World War II context. According to the Declaration, Japanese sovereignty stretched the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and any other minor islands that the parties decide upon shall be under Japanese control (Potsdam Declaration 1945).

Unlike with Japan, China and South Korea do not witness a long history of diplomatic relations. In 1991, China withdrew its objection to South Korea's inclusion in the United Nations and subsequently established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992. It could be said that modern post-pandemic China-South Korea relationship has been marked by both cooperation and tension. One area of cooperation has been in trade and investment, with China being South Korea's largest trading partner (Kim 2023). Bilateral trade volume between China and South Korea for the year 2022 was estimated to have reached US\$362.29 billion, indicating a slight year-on-year increase of 0.1% (Chinese MFA 2023a). A detailed analysis of the figures reveals the import value from South Korea is anticipated to decline by 6.5% and estimated to reach US\$199.67 billion, while China's export is expected to increase by 9.5% to US\$162.62 billion (Chinese MFA 2023a). As of June 2022, the actual investment from South Korea in China has reached a cumulative sum of US\$93.08 billion, whereas our actual investment in South Korea has reached US\$7.71 billion.⁶

Although it is not solely China's diplomatic initiative, it is noteworthy China, along with Japan and South Korea, participates in the multilateral format known as "ASEAN+3". This forum comprises a total of 10 countries dedicated to promoting cooperation in a wide range of areas, spanning Southeast to East Asia. Political cooperation, immigration, political security and transnational crime are three specific areas of focus for more concrete collaboration (See ASEAN Plus Three 2023).

Taiwanese piece of the puzzle

Concerning China's geopolitical strategy towards Taiwan, the extant literature in the West is largely preoccupied with the quandary of a potential military campaign by the People's Republic of China on the island (Chen 2022; Cote 2022; Kastner 2022). It is imperative to differentiate between several components in this regard. Primarily, Taiwan, being an island, occupies a pivotal geopolitical position in China's security policy and represents one of the principal sites where the contest for the emerging world order will be waged. Within this context, Taiwan serves as the epicentre of global security, which, in the post-pandemic epoch, has shifted from the European and Mediterranean regions to the new

⁶ This places South Korea as China's second-largest source of foreign investment, whereas China is the second-largest investment destination country for South Korea.

Indo-Pacific construct. The crux of the Indo-Pacific theatre encompasses Taiwan in the northernmost region, followed by a series of disputed archipelagos in the South China Sea – the Paracel Islands, subject to contention by Beijing, Taiwan and Vietnam and the Spratly Archipelago, which also attracts territorial claims from Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, culminating in the southernmost region, where crucial transit chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait are situated. Such intensified security complexity leads to potential unilateral use of military force as an instrument of the security policy of the great powers. Some authors are of the opinion that the geography of interventionist politics, the desire to achieve hegemonic stability, then the lucrative reasons for military interventions, as well as the realization of the relative power and status of the intervening actor, are key variables in explaining why superpowers or great powers unilaterally would deploy force in international system (Stekić 2022). From the other spectrum of explanations about the use of military force, interventions are cited as a strategic reason for a great power and part of its Grand Strategy (Sullivan and Koch 2009). In that domain, there are arguments about the internationalization of intrastate conflicts in the states against which military intervention is intended, then different opinions on the geopolitical code of both the target state and the state that is the intervening actor as a possible predictor of military interventions and there are also different justifications for the use of armed force under with the slogan of humanitarian interventionism and pragmatic abuse of the democratization of the countries that were the victims of the intervention, which was especially manifested as an element of the security and foreign policy of the USA at the height of the era of unipolarity. Igor Okunev claims that each geopolitical state code is determined by two fundamental variables, which are orientation and historical *continuum* (Okunev 2013, 68). He argues that while there may be intense debates on this matter, identifying any geopolitical code requires addressing certain questions, such as determining who the potential and current allies and enemies are, figuring out ways to maintain existing alliances and establish new ones and developing strategies to combat present adversaries and potential threats (Taylor & Flint 2000: cited in Okunev 2013: 68).

The following difficulties will affect China's Taiwan policy and consequently East Asian security. The first trend that has emerged in recent years is growing worldwide (and especially Western) support for Taiwan. Over the past few years, Taiwan has experienced growing support

from nations across the world, notably the United States, Japan and some European nations. Even though currently 181 countries around the world, including the United States, have established diplomatic relations with PR China on the basis of the one-China principle (Chinese MFA 2023), most of the countries of the Global West maintain relations with Taiwan in parallel. This backing makes it more difficult for China to politically isolate Taiwan and could motivate Taiwan to fend off Chinese pressure. Second, Taiwan's economy is strong and its high-tech sectors are important participants in the global supply chain. Taiwan has a highly developed economy. According to the ITRI Industrial Economics and Knowledge Center, the production value of Taiwan's semiconductor industry in 2020 amounted to US\$115 billion, representing a substantial annual growth rate of 20.9% (Taiwan News 2021). Notably, Taiwan exhibited superior performance in the semiconductor sector relative to its competitors during the aforementioned year while the industry's output value in Taiwan was likely to rise by an additional 8.6% in 2022 which is by far global majority of semiconductor global production (Taiwan News 2022). Suffice to say that such industry is a key element People's Liberation Army desperately needs to advance its sophisticated means of weaponry. Hence, China's efforts to economically isolate Taiwan could have detrimental effects on China's own economic and military development.

In addition to these factors, relations on both sides of the Strait will be severely burdened by two other challenges. The first is Taiwan's military significancy, which may be attributed to the fact that it is surrounded by highly developed armies, has cutting-edge weaponry and has recently raised its defence spending and the second is internal political opposition; in Taiwan, reunification with China is strongly opposed. It is challenging for China to have an impact on Taiwanese politics since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which now controls the government, is firmly committed to protecting Taiwan's independence.

The One China policy is a diplomatic framework that regards Taiwan as a valid portion of China and the People's Republic of China as its sole legal government. This policy was first formally expressed in 1972 when the United States normalized relations with the PRC and it has since become a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. The PRC maintains Taiwan is its part and should eventually be reunited with the mainland, even if it requires the use of force. In near-historic sense, this assertion is primarily supported by China's Anti-Secession Law from 2005. It states that "the country (PR China) may take unreasonable

measures, peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity” if “major incidents occur that will result in Taiwan’s separation from China, or the possibility of peaceful reunification is completely lost” (China Anti-Secession Law 2005: art. 8).⁷

Taiwan was a longstanding challenge in Sino-American bilateral relations since the end of World War II, with the exception of the period of rapprochement in 1972. During a meeting with Nixon, Mao Zedong, the then-President of China, emphasized that Taiwan is an integral part of China. In response, the USA officially acknowledged that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”. The US government did not challenge this stance and reiterated its interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through Chinese efforts (Chinese MFA 2023).

Such Beijing’s position goes even beyond the present time. In August 2022, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published the document titled *The Taiwan Issue and China’s Unification in the New Era*. It acknowledged the Communist Party of China’s role in “promotion of the complete reunification of the motherland” (Chinese MFA 2022). Furthermore, it deploys historical, philosophical and ethical roots to explain why Taiwan constitutes an indivisible part of the PR China. In that manner it represents a *plaidoyer* for reunification offering a set of reasons whose implementation would Taiwan and its inhabitants benefit from. According to argumentation articulated in this paper, official Beijing believes that Taiwan re-unified with continental China would have “a wider space for development” including economic, industrial and supply chain trade development (Chinese MFA 2022). Next, PR China views reincorporated Taiwanese vital interests and its inhabitants as fully protected while the “compatriots on both sides of the Strait would share the great glory of national rejuvenation” (Chinese MFA 2022). However, it is interesting the very last part of this document allows Taiwan to maintain its semi-official institutional cooperation with the third parties, subject to approval of Chinese Government, while international organizations

⁷ The Anti-Secession Law also covers the scenario where China may resort to non-peaceful and other necessary measures against Taiwan. These measures must be carried out in accordance with the law’s provisions, and the state is obligated to safeguard the safety, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwanese civilians and foreigners in Taiwan and minimize losses. Additionally, the state must also protect the rights and interests of Taiwanese compatriots living in other parts of China (China Anti-Secession Law 2005, art. 10).

and institutions would also be able to set up their representation offices in Taiwan (Chinese MFA 2022).

All of these proclaimed goals were reaffirmed at the opening of China's National People's Congress at the beginning of March 2023, when Prime Minister Li Keqiang in one of his last appearances in such role, affirmed his commitment to the "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan while vowing to take a firm stance against Taiwan independence. He made this statement as a response to Taipei's call for Beijing to "respect the Taiwanese people's commitment to democratic values and freedom" (Reuters 2023). The announcement also followed a significant 7.2% increase in China's military budget for the year 2023.

The next set of geopolitical toolkit underpinning Chinese "design" for East Asia is the issue of achieving supremacy and global hegemony, or leadership as the official Beijing would claim. Such intention reflected within China's "peaceful growth" critically entails HST postulates. Taiwan is both national and international security issue, which China acknowledge in its official policies. Some scholars argue that a potential conflict over Taiwan is deeply connected with the occurrences in East Tarkestan – Xinjiang and that it would lead to significant economic disruptions for Beijing (Yan 2022). In case of intensification of security tensions China would have to rely on Central Asia for energy and maintain critical supply chains while further entangling China's geopolitical designs over Taiwan (Yan 2022).

The peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, according to one press release from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is not only a blessing for the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, but also for the international community and the people of the world. It also states the reunification of China won't harm any country's legitimate interests, including its economic interests in Taiwan (Chinese MFA 2022). However, Chinese side sees reunification with Taiwan as a way to prove itself as a hegemon within the international system, thus claims that reintegrated Taiwan would "inject more positive energy into the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world", consequently making "greater contributions to the cause of world peace and development and human progress" (Chinese MFA 2022). If integrated, China would no more suffer from the containment threat emanating from the US activities in the region. This would consequently mean weaker roles of Japan and South Korea in regional security dynamics. Whether China develops peacefully or not, it cannot become a fully-fledged

superpower without finding a solution to the Taiwan problem. Such a “reputation” constitutes another element of China’s geopolitical strategy for Taiwan and by extension, East Asia and more broadly, for its global aspirations. Only by completing the Taiwan puzzle, China would be able to promote itself to a thalassocratic superpower with a global reach.

FUTURE OF EAST ASIAN (GEO)POLITICS: TAIWAN AS AN INCOHERENT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE

This article discussed China’s stance on the East Asian region, particularly on the issue of Taiwan’s (geo)political status. It highlighted China’s tailored approach to the region and examined it within the context of the global competition for world dominance with the USA. The author provided a set of arguments that China has compelling reasons to pursue reunification with Taiwan in the near future. In spite of many concrete activities and actors involved in this region, there arises a question of which theoretical ground mediates between China’s aspiration to achieve proclaimed “peaceful growth” and ontology of US fears for its shaken global throne? What would particularly be also of interest for further similar studies is whether the HST postulates would work in case of China’s peaceful growth if the globe is being split physically into two (or even more) parallel entities? This reflects predominantly in the field of international finances where efforts are being made to expel US dollar as the global trade main currency. In June 2022, Russia has expressed its willingness to collaborate with China and other BRICS nations in developing a new global reserve currency that would compete the status of the US dollar. During the BRICS 2022 Business Forum, Putin stated that the proposal to create an international reserve currency based on the basket of currencies of BRICS countries was being reviewed. Some analysts believe this move could potentially challenge the US hegemony and the role of the IMF (Business Insider 2022).⁸ The ongoing phenomenon of global “decoupling” is manifesting not only in the financial realm

⁸ The process known as de-dollarization has had ripple effects beyond its originating regions. As evidence of this, Brazil and Argentina have initiated discussions in early 2023 regarding the creation of a shared currency called the “Sur” (South). The two nations’ officials have specified the project’s ultimate aim is to establish a novel unit of account, akin to the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights, which would serve as an alternative to the United States dollar in the denomination of bilateral trade and financial transactions (CSIS 2023).

but also in the institutional domain of international organizations. A year following the armed conflict in Ukraine, scholars and politicians in the Western world are contemplating the potential suspension of the Russian Federation's membership in the United Nations and other affiliated entities. While practically unfeasible, such endeavours may have unintended consequences by driving the "remaining" countries aligned with Russia and China into a separate political entity, subject to distinct organizational models and regulatory frameworks.

Lastly, a contentious issue is how the Chinese geopolitical strategy for East Asia would change if there were no Taiwan problem, especially in light of the fact that the Indo-Pacific and East Asia have become the new focal points of global security as a result of strategic competition with the US. There is no doubt that China will intensify its regionally tailored approach to East Asian politics in the years to come. Lukas Danner and Félix E. Martin (2019) suggest that in the near future China will be neither violent nor peaceful but a trade-oriented superpower and hegemon in the system of international relations. Because China must maintain commercial activity and military peace on the bases of its economic prowess and its conventional military competitive disadvantage, the so-called "Third Hegemonic Way" or "Dutch-style" hegemony will consider the economy as the primary variable in thinking about China's policy towards the East Asian region, as well as its future global agenda (Danner and Martin 2019).

However, in the examination and comprehension of the overall Chinese foreign policy towards the region, a significant reason appears as relevant and goes beyond the current geopolitical circumstances. Chinese authorities usually refer to the years between 1839 and 1945, which span the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, as the "Century of Humiliation", an era of history characterized by anti-Western and anti-Japanese animosity. This attitude is particularly evident in the culture of remembrance, which includes wars, threats and other military and foreign policy actions taken against China. That is why, although contemporary Chinese society is rooted in the Confucian principles of benevolence, official Beijing will certainly be undertaking activities in the future that will prevent potential repetition of the "Century of Humiliation" and ensure adherence to the Five principles of peaceful coexistence that have been in place for seven decades in its own closest geographic region.

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Ненад Стекић

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

КИНЕСКИ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧКИ ДИЗАЈН ЗА ИСТОЧНУ АЗИЈУ: ТАЈВАНСКИ ДЕО СЛАГАЛИЦЕ

Сажетак

Овај чланак је приказао позицију Народне Републике Кине према региону Источне Азије са нарочитим освртом на питање статуса Тајвана. Аутор је приказао регионално скројени приступ Кине за овај регион и кроз призму глобалне конкуренције за превођу у свету са САД, указао да је Кина има више разлога за уједињење са Тајваном и то у блиској будућности. Неких од таквих настојања укључују сопствену политику „једне Кине” која Тајван сматра делом континенталне Кине који се на крају мора поново ујединити са копном, чак и ако је за то потребна сила. Међутим, растућа подршка Тајвана широм света, снажна економија, напредни војни значај и унутрашње политичко противљење чине Кини изазове у постизању циља. Поновно уједињење се сматра средством за унапређење софистицираног кинеског наоружања и развоја економије и индустријске трговине, а верује се да ће поновно уједињење користити Тајвану и његовим становницима, омогућавајући им да поделе „велику славу националног подмлађивања”. Свекинески народни конгрес потврдио је у заседању из марта 2023. године своју посвећеност мирном поновном уједињењу са Тајваном, истовремено обећавајући да ће заузети чврст став против независности острва. И поред многих конкретних активности и актера укључених у наведеним процесима, овај рад је изнедрио питање о теоријском утемељењу. Оно би било најадекватније као „посредник” између тежње Кине да постигне прокламовани „мирни раст” и онтолошког страха САД за свој пољуљани глобални статус. Оно што би такође било од интереса за даље сличне студије јесте утврђивање да ли би постулати теорије хегемонске стабилности (или било које друге теорије међународних односа) функционисали у случају мирног раста Кине ако се свет физички подели на два или више паралелних ентитета. Рад је приказао и неке конкретне војне и спољнополитичке

одговоре Пекинга, укључујући војну политику у вези са Зоном обавезне идентификације противваздушне одбране у Источном кинеском мору и последице које произилазе из недавно усвојене стратегије под називом „Тајванско питање и уједињење Кине у новој ери”. Због свеукупног настојања глобалног Запада предвођеног САД да се спроведе спољнополитичка стратегија обуздавања Кине кроз нове мултилатералне безбедносне аранжмане – КВАД и АУКУС, као и промоције конструкт-региона Индо-Пацифика, аутор овог рада верује да ће Кина у наредном периоду иницирати својеврсни интегрисан спољнополитички и безбедносни одговор зарад супротстављања тежњама САД, што би последично могло да има импликације на глобалну безбедност и реконфигурисање међународног поретка каквим га данас опажамо.

Кључне речи: Тајван, безбедносна политика Кине, безбедност источне Азије, геополитички дизајн, теорија хегемонске стабилности

*Dragan Trailović**

Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM AS INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO CHINA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF XINJIANG**

Resume

The national security of the People's Republic of China is susceptible to an array of intricate internal challenges, risks and threats. This includes challenges that may be of a political nature, risks caused by economic and social differences, threats caused by tensions in ethnic relations, as well as many others. This paper seeks to concentrate on ethnic tensions, namely ethnic violence and terrorism, as the most substantial factors that pose a significant threat to the country's stability and security.

The paper delves into the development of ethnic tensions and conflicts resulting from the interaction between Chinese authorities and factions within the Uyghur movement for national self-determination. It emphasizes the extremist current within the broader Uyghur ethnonational movement that utilizes violence and acts of terrorism in political activism.

This paper aims to follow the evolution and changes of strategies and tactics employed by Uyghur nationalists in Xinjiang over time and present the most characteristic violent and terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang to exemplify these alterations. These changes are reflected in increased violence, a shift in targets from primarily security forces

* Contact: dragan.trailovic@ips.ac.rs

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to civilians, including violent clashes between Uyghur and Han citizens and an expansion in the geographic reach of attacks.

Keywords: national security, People's Republic of China, Xinjiang (XUAR), East Turkistan, Uyghur issue, ethnic violence, terrorism

INTRODUCTION

The increased presence and visibility of China on the global stage, coupled with its growing role in economic, political, cultural and security spheres, which have exposed the nation to a large number of new external challenges, risks and threats to its national security. As China seeks to secure energy, raw materials and new markets for its economic and social progress, it encounters competing interests from both state and non-state actors within the international arena, resulting in additional security risks and geopolitical tensions (Stefanović-Stambuk and Popović, 2022). However, China's national security has long been subject to a range of complex internal risks and threats, such as political issues, economic inequality and ethnic tensions, which continue to undermine stability and security. Of particular concern is the issue of ethnic tensions, which include ethnic violence and terrorism, representing one of the most pressing internal challenges to national security and a source of possible social unrest and political instability within the country.

China is home to numerous ethnic groups and national minorities, with a total of fifty-six officially recognized. Despite the Chinese government's assertion that these groups, along with the majority Han population, constitute a unified Chinese nation, the complex nature of ethnic relations presents a significant threat to national unity and overall national security. Throughout its history, China has faced a multitude of challenges related to ethnic relations, often resulting in violent ethnic riots with tragic consequences for human lives. Despite these challenges, the Chinese state continues propagating the narrative that all ethnic groups within China coexist harmoniously with the Han majority (Tobin 2020a, 166-191).

Until now, the most significant instances of ethnic tension, discontent, violence and conflict in China have been observed in three regions among three ethnic groups: Tibetans in Tibet, Mongols in Inner Mongolia and Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In this paper, the focus of analysis of

internal challenges, risks and threats to China's national security will be on Uyghur nationalism, particularly its manifestations through separatism, religious extremism and terrorism, which will serve as a case study.

Xinjiang, a region in the northwest of the People's Republic of China, is home to a predominantly Muslim minority Turkic-speaking Uyghur population. Uyghur organisations, groups and individuals argue that discrimination and unequal treatment towards Uyghurs stem from their ethnic characteristics, language, religion and culture (World Uyghur Congress 2021). They assert the Chinese government systematically suppresses the most crucial aspects of their ethnic identity, violating their rights as a minority group. Consequently, Uyghur nationalists have demanded greater political, economic and cultural self-governance within the ethnic autonomous region of Xinjiang and some have even called for its secession and independence from China. In contrast, the Chinese government maintains the regional ethnic autonomy status exists to protect the linguistic, religious, cultural and other rights of ethnic minorities, as guaranteed by the Chinese constitution.

The different views and activities of the central Chinese authorities, who implement policies aimed at building a unified Chinese nation (nation-building process) on one hand and individuals, groups and movements among the Uyghurs, who see these processes as assimilation and acculturation with the Han ethnic and cultural pattern on the other hand, have led to increased ethnic tensions, conflicts and the use of violence in relations between the state and Uyghur ethno-nationalists, as well as between Uyghurs and Han Chinese themselves (Trailović 2014). Explanations of the nature of this conflict, which significantly threatens the national security of the People's Republic of China, range from those who point out that it is ethnic separatism based on the Uyghurs' sense of their ethnic and cultural uniqueness in relation to the Chinese, to the notion that the basis of Uyghur dissatisfaction lies in religious reasons, such as the control and restriction of religious activities by the Chinese state and to the argument that modernization and economic development have affected the conflict by producing significant disparities in the distribution of economic wealth between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in favour of the Han (Millward 2021; Zhang and McGhee 2014; Hasmath 2018; Bovingdon 2011; Millward 2004, Starr 2004; Dillon 2004;).

The Chinese authorities, however, view the Uyghur movement for self-determination, which has its various forms, from those that are within the framework of peaceful conflict resolution to those that use violence

and terrorist acts, as a threat to national security, territorial integrity and stability, placing it in the discursive framework of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Making it a national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity and stability of the state as vital national interests, China justifies the numerous security activities and measures it implements in Xinjiang (Kam and Clarke 2021; Zenz and Leibold, 2019; The State Council Information Office 2019a, Smith Finley 2019; Zenz 2018).

The Uyghur movement for national self-determination and independence has evolved over time, with some factions becoming more militant and using terrorist methods. These groups have formed various organizations and have even made connections with other extremist and terrorist organizations in the wider region – Central Asia and the Middle East (Potter 2013). As Clarke (2018) commented, the evolution of the Uyghur separatist movement suggests it has taken on a transnational dimension (19-28). Since 2002, Chinese authorities have accused Uyghur terrorist organizations of being responsible for ethnic riots and terrorist acts in Xinjiang and allege they have received support from other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria (Duchâtel 2016, 2-5) . The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) have been identified as the main culprits of numerous terrorist acts, with the goal of establishing an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang (Potter 2013, 73).

The paper will examine the development of ethnic tensions and violence in the relationship between the Chinese authorities and certain factions of the Uyghur movement for national self-determination that have resorted to violent and terrorist tactics. It aims to illustrate how the strategies and tactics of Uyghur nationalists in Xinjiang have evolved over time and the resulting consequences. Additionally, it will offer an overview of the internal challenges and security threats in Xinjiang, with a focus on significant violent incidents that have taken place in the region.

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the main challenges to the national security of the People's Republic of China, specifically on ethnic tensions. The second part deals with the Uyghur movement for national self-determination, analysing its most important militant organizations and the significant violent and terrorist incidents that have occurred over time. This analysis allows for an identification of changes in the movement's evolution.

THE STRUCTURE OF MAIN INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO CHINA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

As with other countries, the People's Republic of China faces numerous challenges to its national security, both of internal and external nature (On external challenges see Pejić 2022; Tanasković 2019). When we talk about internal challenges to China's national security, we can speak of challenges, risks and threats common to most countries in the world, but we can also detect those that are specific to China and related to its local political, economic, security and other social characteristics.

The People's Republic of China faces various internal challenges to its national security, which can be broadly categorized into the following groups. The political challenges include issues related to political stability, legitimacy of the Communist Party of China, corruption and factionalism within the Party (Shukla 2021), as well as many others that are related to the political issues. The second group of challenges would refer to economic aspects, that is, the overall stability of the country, reflected in the possible creation of greater social inequalities and the potential threat of broader social cohesion. The emergence of social tensions and sporadic protests in China is attributed to the growing economic disparities in Chinese society (Chan 2010, 821-825). In addition to these challenges, ethnic unrest, separatism and terrorism pose significant threats to China's national security with the potential to severely impact the political and social stability in certain regions like Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. This is particularly relevant in light of China's status as a multi-ethnic country, with fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups residing in over half of its territory (Anand 2019, 131). Hence, the concept of "territorial security" assumes an important role in ensuring the overall national security of the state (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022, 6). Moreover, the issue of Taiwan further complicates the security landscape and poses additional challenges to the People's Republic of China. While the Chinese authorities have emphasized China's political stability, ethnic unity and social stability, as well as China's growing resilience to risks, a national security document released in 2019 recognizes that the country faces a range of diverse and complex security threats and challenges. Notably, separatist groups advocating for the independence of Taiwan, Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang) are identified as the most immediate and serious threat to China's national security and social stability (The State Council Information Office 2019b).

Important challenges to the national security of the People's Republic of China are also those related to its energy security, health security (Covid-19 pandemic), cyber security, as well as threats to the environment and climate change (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022; Grünberg and Wessling, 2021).

To address the numerous challenges facing Chinese society and the state, particularly those related to the unity and prosperity of the Chinese nation, President Xi Jinping is promoting the slogan of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” As a result, a new concept of national security in China — “comprehensive national security” — is emerging and developing. This concept expands upon the traditional understanding of national security, encompassing sixteen aspects or types of security to facilitate the further development of Chinese society (Grünberg and Wessling, 2021). It implies the need for a centralized national security system to provide a unified response to internal and external challenges. To this end, the Central Commission for National Security was formed in 2014 (Julienne 2021). Further, in 2015 the country's first counter-terrorism legislation was passed (Clarke 2018, 36).

Since the introduction of the aforementioned security concept in 2014, national security has become an absolute priority for the Chinese state and the Communist Party and is directly related to the country's development goals. In this sense, even after assuming the third mandate in 2023, Xi Jinping points out that “security is the basis of development, while stability is a prerequisite for prosperity” (China Daily, 2023).

THE UYGHUR MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS A FACTOR OF INSTABILITY IN XINJIANG

Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has been confronted with the demands of particular Uyghur organized groups and individuals for greater autonomy, as well as aspirations for the establishment of an independent Uyghur state. Over the years, various activists, movements and organizations advocating for Uyghur national self-determination have opposed the central Chinese authorities through organized and spontaneous protests of varying forms, ranging from nonviolent demonstrations and civil disobedience to rebellions and uprisings that have involved direct physical violence, sabotage, assassination and other acts of terrorism. Since the founding of the People's

Republic of China, there have been several waves of peaceful protests, but also violent uprisings by individual members of the Uyghur people. These events were in many cases prompted by significant internal and external (international) structural changes and circumstances (Trailović 2012, Trailović 2011). Several such periods are significant: the founding of the People's Republic of China; the beginning of the "reform and opening policy"; the period from the 1990s onwards when there were changes in the international environment due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and ethnic conflicts in neighbouring Central Asia (Millward 2021, 279-404); and new changes in international circumstances arising after September 11, 2001, when the US launched a global war on terrorism and China joined it by designating various Uyghur organizations in and outside Xinjiang as terrorist and linked to global terrorism (Evron 2007).

The Uyghur movement for national self-determination is not monolith and unified and, depending on numerous internal and external factors, it has different specific expressions. Different Uyghur groups and organizations have differently formulated political goals, different recommendations for a possible resolution of the conflict with the Chinese authorities, as well as different methods and mean to achieve the proclaimed goals, which in some cases also involve the use of force. The approaches of the Uyghur ethnic minority can be grouped into three categories: one that sees the solution of the Uyghur issue in integration with the Han cultural and civilizational pattern through the acceptance of the state policy of co-optation; the second advocates the achievement of essential political, economic and cultural autonomy within the Chinese state as a way of preserving the uniqueness of the Uyghur ethnic identity, language and culture, which is significantly different from the majority Han; and the third, which starts from the assumption that the Uyghur ethnic identity, language, culture and religion and their uniqueness can only be preserved within the framework of an independent national state, that is, by secession from the People's Republic of China (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016, 13; Fuller and Starr 2003, 22-26).

According to the methods for achieving the proclaimed political goals, the Uyghur movement for independence, conditionally speaking, is divided into two larger groups. One group consists of those Uyghur organizations, dominant in the Diaspora, which mainly advocate for non-violent means of achieving essential autonomy or independence (World Uyghur Congress, Uyghur -American Association, East Turkistan Government-in-Exile, East Turkistan National Awakening Movement)

(Trailovic 2019a, 42-44) and the other group consists of various armed, militant and terrorist organisations, often with religious overtones, which operate in China, primarily in the area of Xinjiang and in the surrounding countries (Castets 2003, 11).

The Most Prominent Organizations of Uyghur Extremist Currents

The first such organization after the founding of the People's Republic of China, which was hierarchically structured and well organized with the aim of recruiting and mobilizing members, primarily Uyghurs, was the People's Party of East Turkistan, founded in 1968. The party used guerrilla tactics such as sabotage and clashes with the police and the Chinese military and was involved in several attempts to organize insurgencies during the 1960s and 1970s (Castets 2023, 7-9). The 1960s, 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were a time of significant ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, largely driven by ethnic tensions. In 1962, tensions boiled over into violence (Mullenbach 2013).

The 1990s saw a significant rise in unrest and separatist sentiment among Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Several factors contributed to this trend, including economic disparities, cultural and religious differences and perceived discrimination by the Han Chinese majority. Xinjiang saw a surge in Uyghur nationalism and separatism following the independence of Central Asian republics from the Soviet Union. Militant Uyghur groups used porous borders with neighbouring countries to set up training camps and transfer weapons into Chinese territory. Economic reforms and increased communication between Uyghurs and Muslims in Central Asia and the Uyghur diaspora strengthened the Uyghur cause and linked it to the wider Islamic movement in the region. These factors, helped to fuel the rise of Uyghur separatist and terrorist organizations. The emergence of these groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), marked a turning point in the Uyghur struggle for independence and self-determination in Xinjiang (Trailović 2019b, 210-214).

As previously mentioned, during the 1990s, there was a surge in violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang, leading to the emergence of several militant and terrorist Uyghur groups and organizations. The Chinese government labelled them as separatist, extremist and terrorist and many of these groups were eventually disbanded or eliminated through

Chinese military operations. These organizations, collectively referred to as the “East Turkestan forces” by Chinese authorities, were responsible for numerous rebellions and armed attacks in Xinjiang with the aim of achieving separatist goals like secession of Xinjiang from China and the declaration of independence (The State Council Information Office 2019a). Chinese state authorities have reported that between 1990 and 2008, around 200 violent incidents with fatal consequences occurred in Xinjiang (Evron 2007, 77).

During one of the biggest uprisings in Xinjiang, in the city of Baren in 1990, the pan-Turkic nationalist group, the Islamic Party of East Turkestan, which had emerged in the southern part of Xinjiang in the 1980s, gained attention. Also, one of the most well-known Uyghur organizations was the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), which was founded in Istanbul in 1996. China designated this organization as a terrorist group in 2002, holding it responsible for numerous acts of violence in Xinjiang. According to Chinese authorities, the group operated and trained in Chechnya and other locations (Gunaratna, Acharya, & Pengxin, 2010, pp. 79-80).

In 2001, the global community became aware of the Uyghur extremists when US forces engaged in combat with Uyghur fighters who had aligned themselves with the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in support of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). As a result of this conflict, the US detained twenty-two Uyghurs during a mission in Afghanistan and transferred them to Guantanamo (Rodríguez 2013, 141-142).

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a separatist group that aims to establish an independent state for Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The group has been designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including the United States, China and Russia. In 2020 the US removed it from its terror list stating there’s “no credible evidence” that it still exists (Kine 2021).

The history of the ETIM dates back to the 1990s when Uyghur separatist groups in Xinjiang began to coalesce under the banner of Islam. The group was founded by Hasan Mahsum, a Uyghur who fought in Afghanistan against Soviet forces during the 1980s. Mahsum was killed by Pakistani authorities in 2003, but the group continued to operate under the name ETIM. The ETIM has been involved in a number of violent attacks in Xinjiang and other parts of China, including bombings, assassinations and riots. The group has also been linked to several high-profile terrorist

incidents outside of China (Xu, Fletcher and Bajoria 2014; Rodríguez 2013, 141-142). The ETIM has also been involved in propaganda efforts aimed at promoting its separatist agenda and recruiting new members. The Chinese government has accused the ETIM of being responsible for a number of violent incidents in Xinjiang. China has also claimed the group is linked to Al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations (Primiano 2013, 461).

The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uyghur-led militant group, succeeded the East Turkestan Islamic Movement between 2006 and 2008 (Rodríguez 2013, 143-144). TIP has carried out several attacks in Xinjiang and surrounding areas, including a suicide car bombing in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 2013, mass stabbing attacks at train stations in Kunming and Guangzhou in 2014 and double suicide bombings at a train station in Urumqi in April 2014 (Zenn 2014). The organization has effectively utilized the media and the internet to increase its public visibility, especially by advocating for a holy war against the People's Republic of China. In addition, the group has released propaganda videos showing Uyghurs fighting in Syria and clashing with the Chinese military in Xinjiang (Roberts 2020, 116-127). TIP declared its primary objective in 2016 as establishing an Islamic caliphate. This group has shifted the centre of Uyghur terrorist activities from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Syria, having confirmed its involvement in the Syrian conflict in 2012.

Ethnic Violence and Terrorism as Strategies of Uyghur Extremist Currents: The Key Violent and Terrorist Incidents

The Uyghur movement for national self-determination traces its roots back to the early 20th century when Uyghur intellectuals and activists began demanding greater autonomy and self-government (Wang and Fletcher, 2018; Wang 1998, 2). The emergence of modern Uyghur nationalism took place gradually and according to Uyghur nationalists, the beginning of this process dates back even to the middle of the 19th century, when a large number of Muslim uprisings against the Qing dynasty took place in parts of present-day Xinjiang. However, it gained significant momentum after the Bolshevik Revolution, largely due to the influence of the Uyghur population that migrated to Russia or territories under its control as early as the 1880s (Roberts 2020, 29-33).

During the period from 1912 to 1949, the Xinjiang region was controlled by various "warlords", primarily due to political changes in

China, including the fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic. The region suffered political influences from the Soviet Union, while at the same time Uyghur nationalism grew. This resulted in conflicts between the Muslim population, primarily the Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities, which led to the formation of two Uyghur republics of East Turkestan, the first of which lasted from 1933-1934 and another, which lasted from 1944 to 1949 (Millward 2021, 175-230; Tredaniel and Lee 2018, 181; Wang 1998, 2-3;). After that, Xinjiang was placed under the control of the newly formed People's Republic of China and its Communist Party.

In the following decades, particularly from the 1960s onwards, Uyghur nationalism gained new momentum and nationalists organized protests and demonstrations calling for greater rights and autonomy. The first significant incident took place in 1954 in the city of Khotan, when an Uyghur rebellion occurred in response to the Chinese government's policy of restricting and suppressing religious practices in the region. A second incident took place in 1962 with a conflict in Ili that led to the exodus of the Muslim population from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union (Millward 2021, 257-260; Wang 1998, 4-5). The conflict arose when the Soviet Union allowed Muslims from Xinjiang to enter its borders, while the Chinese authorities attempted to obstruct this movement (Roberts 2020, 47). The dispute involving the Soviet Union occurred on the western boundaries of China as well (Mitrović 2010, 80). Another conflict between the central Chinese authorities and Uyghur nationalists occurred in 1969. It was an attempted uprising by members of the East Turkestan People's Revolutionary Party (Mullenbach 2013).

During the 1990s, Uyghur nationalism became more militant in its expression and conflict continued to intensify, with some Uyghur nationalists resorting to terrorist tactics. The first incident that marked the beginning of a period of instability in the Xinjiang region was the uprising in the town of Baren in 1990 (Roberts 2020, 53). Following the conflict in Baren, during which approximately fifty Uyghur people and six policemen were killed, the uprising spread to other cities and led to the deaths of over a hundred people (Mullenbach 2013). This uprising is considered a significant event in the history of ethnic relations and a turning point in the history of ethnic tensions in Xinjiang (Rodríguez-Merino 2019, 32). It was one of the larger uprisings of Uyghur Muslims against the Chinese government's policies in the region and paved the way for later protests and rebellions in these areas. The Baren uprising

suggests a coordinated scheme involving Uyghurs who had received military and religious training in Afghanistan and smuggled weapons across the border (Rodríguez 2013, 137). During 1992 and 1993, there were also bombing attacks in Xinjiang. The Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party was responsible for a bus attack in Urumqi in February 1992, while the East Turkistan Democratic Islamic Party carried out bomb attacks in southern Xinjiang that killed four people in 1993 (Castets 2003, 11). In 1995, there were major riots in the area of the city of Yining and in the same year riots also broke out in Khotan. There were also new incidents in 1996 in the Aksu area (Wayne 2008, 82).

In the period from 1996 to 1997, there were a large number of incidents with outbreaks of ethnic violence and Uyghur rebellions. One of the largest protests in Xinjiang took place in 1997 in the city of Yining (Ghulja), when a demonstration that began peacefully and then turned into violent riots left several people dead and around two hundred wounded (Mullenbach 2013). The main reasons for the demonstrations were Xinjiang authorities were implementing a rigorous policy of restricting the religious activities of the Muslim population and their traditional religious gatherings (Shamseden 2021). In the same year, three bombs exploded in public transport in Urumqi, which caused deaths and injuries (Roberts 2020, 56; Primiano 2013, 460). Between February and April of 1998, a string of bombings occurred in Kargilik County with the aim of targeting economic entities and public security officials at the local level (Clarke 2018, 24).

There were minor incidents in the next years. But according to Chinese authorities, a new wave of terrorist acts and violence began in 2008. One of the largest incidents in Xinjiang happened in its capital city, Urumqi, in 2009. During this outbreak of ethnic violence, nearly 200 people were killed and almost 2,000 were injured. The tension and unrest initially started after a clash between Uyghur migrant workers and Han Chinese workers at a toy factory in Guangdong province (South China), where two Uyghurs were killed (Tobin 2020b, 305; Zambelis 2010, 16). Uyghurs held peaceful protests in Urumqi in response to this incident. However, the demonstration turned violent, resulting in clashes between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, attacks on Han Chinese civilians and widespread rioting after the police tried to disperse the crowd. The violence quickly escalated, with mobs of Uyghurs attacking Han Chinese people, shops and vehicles. On July 6-7, Han individuals attacked Uyghurs. Armed with various weapons, including spiked clubs,

pipes, machetes and cleavers, these Han individuals roamed the streets and targeted Uyghur neighbourhoods (Millward 2021, 373). The Chinese government respond with force and deployed thousands of troops to the region to quell the unrest. According to some authors, the widespread violence involved ordinary citizens attacking each other, as opposed to previous incidents such as those in Baren and Ghulja during the 1990s when attacks were mainly directed towards police stations and security institutions (Tobin 2020b, 309).

From 2010 to 2016, a series of violent incidents occurred in Xinjiang including the 2010 bombing in Aksu which killed at least seven individuals, the 2011 clashes in Hotan and Kashgar resulting in the deaths of 17 individuals, the Uyghur separatist attack in Kashgar from July 30 to August 1, 2011 resulting in the deaths of 15 individuals, the 2011 clash in Pishan resulting in the deaths of seven Uyghurs and one government policeman and the February 28, 2012 riots in Kashgar which resulted in the deaths of 20 individuals (Mullenbach 2013). The attacks in Kashgar on July 2011, marked a significant shift in the nature of violence in Xinjiang. According to Potter (2013), these complex and coordinated attacks included a car bombing, a truck hijacking and stabbings on the first day, followed by an attack on an area popular with Han Chinese involving multiple explosions, shootings and stabbings the next day. The attackers' degree of operational sophistication suggested cooperation and a video released a month later by TIP showed one of the attackers receiving training in a Pakistani camp (75). The change was predicted in 2008, as evidenced by the Kashgar attack. This attack showcased a new way of operating, involving driving a truck into a border patrol police division during a soldiers' exercise, followed by a knife-hacking rampage and throwing rudimentary explosives. According to Rodríguez (2013), this suggests a higher level of organization (143). As noted by Potter and Wang (2021), there are indications that the Uyghur militants are improving their tactics and becoming more sophisticated over time, especially in terms of adopting coordinated attacks and suicide bombings similar to those used by al-Qaeda (5).

During this period, attacks became more frequent and widespread, with major incidents occurring in Beijing and other eastern cities (Kunming and Guangzhou). Notably, these attacks targeted busy city centres, resulting in increased civilian targeting and the random killing of civilians, which marks a significant departure from previous incidents that were mainly concentrated in Xinjiang and primarily targeted state

institutions and law enforcement agencies (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016, 4; Potter and Wang 2021, 4-5). The transfer of terrorist acts from Xinjiang to other parts of China has been a significant aspect in the evolution of the Uyghur nationalist movement. Starting with the explosion of a bomb in Beijing in 1997, which was claimed by the East Turkistan Freedom Organization (Castets 2003, 11).


In October, 2013 a terrorist attack occurred in Tiananmen Square where a car driven by two Uyghurs intentionally drove into a crowd, resulting in five fatalities and around forty injuries (Radio Free Asia 2013). The same year a violent incident occurred in the town of Lukqun in the north Xinjiang, where a group of Uyghurs attacked a police station, local government buildings and a construction site with machetes. 17 people were reportedly killed by the attackers and all 10 of them were killed by security forces (Roberts 2020, 166). In 2013, a situation similar to that of 2009 occurred, which went against the commonly observed pattern of conflicts in Xinjiang being primarily between Uyghur extremists and security forces. Specifically, there were two incidents in Korla and Karghilik, respectively, where Uyghur and Han citizens reportedly engaged in violent clashes (Roberts 2020, 165). Subsequently, on March 1, 2014, the Kunming (southern province of Yunnan) stabbing incident, took place, in which a group of eight knife-wielding attackers, allegedly belonging to a separatist group from Xinjiang, launched an assault on passengers at the railway station, resulting in 33 deaths and over 140 injuries (Smith Finley 2019, 2). The incident is considered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in China. According to Roberts (2020), the attack deliberately targeted defenceless civilians and demonstrated signs of preplanning, suggesting political motives. This is supported by the alleged discovery of Eastern Turkistan flags at the site of the incident (170).

On October 12, 2014, a predominantly Han Chinese agricultural trading centre in Maralbexi (Bachu) district in Kashgar Prefecture was attacked by four Uyghur men armed with knives and explosives, resulting in the deaths of 22 people. The attackers targeted Han Chinese stall owners with explosives and stabbed several police officers (Radio Free Asia 2014). A year before that, another incident happened in this same district. According to the Chinese authorities and state media, three Chinese community workers visited an Uyghur house and found individuals watching terrorist videos and possessing knives. The workers reported the situation to the police, but were attacked by individuals in the house. Police officers sent to investigate were ambushed and killed and

the attackers then attempted to assault a local police station (Rodríguez-Merino 2013, 9). In 2014, two major terrorist attacks happened in Urumqi: a suicide bombing in the South railway station, which killed three and a suicide attack at a market, which killed 31 and injured 90 (Smith Finley 2019, 2; Roberts 2020, 166)

As documented by Rodríguez-Merino (2013), there were 28, 34 and 18 reported violent episodes in the region in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively (9).

Chart 1. Number of violent and terrorist acts in Xinjiang from 1990-2020



Data source: (START 2022)

On September 18th, 2015, an attack involving knives in Aqsu (XUAR) resulted in the loss of 50 lives and caused injury to an additional 50 individuals (Hasmath 2018, 1). In July 2015, the police in Shenyang, the capital of China’s north-eastern province of Liaoning, killed three Uyghur men who were claimed to be members of a terrorist group called “Hijrah Jihad.” Later in November 2015, China’s state media reported a terrorist attack in a coal mine in Baicheng county, located in the Xinjiang region, which was believed to have resulted in 16 deaths (The State Council Information Office 2019a, Tredaniel and Lee 2018, 177). According to other sources, around 50 people died in this incident (Clarke 2018, 26).

From 2016 until today, almost no new cases of terrorism have been recorded in Xinjiang. According to Chinese officials, Xinjiang

has not experienced a terrorist attack since December 2016. China has implemented measures to prevent terrorist activities in Xinjiang, including increased surveillance and security, establishment of “re-education” camps, suppression of religious and cultural practices and promotion of economic development. The Chinese government claims that its measures have been effective in preventing terrorist attacks and unrest in Xinjiang and reduced violence in the region since the implementation of these measures (Maizland 2022; Mai 2021).

CONCLUSION

Uyghur issue poses a significant challenge to Chinese national security, with complex and multifaceted implications for domestic stability, regional security, ethnic relations and international reputation. The situation has also been complicated by allegations of terrorism and separatism in the region, which the Chinese government has used to justify its crackdown. The issue has attracted international attention and criticism, with many countries and human rights organizations calling for greater transparency and an end to the alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang. On the other hand, Chinese government maintains its actions are necessary to combat extremism and terrorism. (Trailovic 2021).

The Uyghur movement for national self-determination is a diverse and multifaceted group, consisting of different organizations with varying political goals, conflict resolution strategies and methods to achieve their objectives. The movement can be broadly categorized into three approaches, including integration with Han culture, autonomy within China or secession from China for an independent national state. Additionally, the movement can be grouped into two larger categories based on their methods, including non-violent means advocated by diaspora organizations and armed, militant and terrorist organizations primarily operating in Xinjiang and surrounding countries.

The Uyghur separatist and extremist movement have evolved over the years in response to changing political, economic and social conditions in Xinjiang and beyond. Uyghur nationalism gained new momentum from the 1960s onwards. Protests and demonstrations were calling for greater rights, autonomy and independence and conflicts between the Chinese authorities and Uyghur nationalists occurred, such as the 1954 Khotan rebellion and the 1962 Ili conflict. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Uyghur separatist movement became increasingly violent, with a number

of bombings, assassinations and other attacks carried out by Uyghur militants. Some of these attacks targeted Chinese government officials, while others were aimed at Han Chinese civilians. Not only were Han Chinese officials and communities targeted in these attacks, but also Uyghurs who were suspected of collaborating with Chinese authorities. In the 2000s and 2010s, some Uyghur militants began aligning themselves with global jihadist movements, including Al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State. This led to an increase in attacks inspired by these groups, as well as concerns about the potential for Uyghur militants to travel to other parts of the world to carry out attacks.

The Uyghur extremist activity emerged in two major waves: the first occurred after the fall of the USSR, peaking in 1997 with 50 deaths and 98 injuries, while the second began before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and culminated in 2014 with 164 deaths and 426 injuries in 28 incidents (Potter and Wang 2021, 4-5).

As discussed earlier, the Uyghur nationalist movement has evolved over time, with an increase in attacks targeting civilians and a shift towards more coordinated and sophisticated tactics. Changes in the development of the Uyghur movement for national self-determination and its extremist currents implied the diffusion of tactics and capabilities that have the potential to substantially increase the sophistication and lethality of terrorism in China (Potter 2013, 71). The transfer of these attacks from Xinjiang to other parts of China is a significant aspect of this evolution. The involvement of Uyghurs who have received military and religious training abroad suggests a coordinated scheme. There was a significant variance in the pattern of aggression, with attackers demonstrating a higher level of organization.

The conflicts in Xinjiang have also shifted from primarily being between Uyghur extremists and security forces to attacks targeting civilians. A noteworthy aspect of the conflict is that it involved direct violent clashes between Uyghur and Han citizens. As Chinese security officials and experts observed there was a shift in the nature of terrorist attacks in China. They note four trends: expanding geographic reach, maximizing casualties, increasing frequency and increasing sophistication (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016, 32).

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Драган Траиловић

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

**ЕТНИЧКО НАСИЉЕ И ТЕРОРИЗАМ
КАО УНУТРАШЊИ ИЗАЗОВИ
НАЦИОНАЛНОЈ БЕЗБЕДНОСТИ КИНЕ:
СТУДИЈА СЛУЧАЈА СИНЋАНГА**

Сажетак

Национална безбедност Народне Републике Кине подложна је низу сложених унутрашњих изазова, ризика и претњи. То укључује изазове који могу бити политичке природе, ризике изазване економским и социјалним разликама, претње изазване тензијама у етничким односима, као и многе друге. Овај рад се фокусира на етничке тензије, односно етничко насиље и тероризам, као најбитније чиниоце који представљају значајну претњу стабилности и безбедности земље.

Рад се бави развојем етничких тензија и сукоба који су резултат интеракције између кинеских власти и фракција унутар ујгурског покрета за национално самоопредељење. Наглашавају се активности екстремистичке струје унутар ширег ујгурског етнонационалног покрета, која се користи насиљем и терористичким актима у свом политичком деловању.

Овај рад има за циљ да прати еволуцију и промене стратегија и тактика које су користили ујгурски националисти у Синђангу током времена и представи најкарактеристичније насилне и терористичке инциденте који су се десили у Синђангу као пример ових промена. Ове промене се огледају у повећаном обиму насиља, померању циљева терористичких и насилних аката са првенствено кинеских безбедносних снага на цивиле, укључујући насилне сукобе између грађана Ујгура и Хана, и ширење географског обухвата напада.

Кључне речи: национална безбедност, Народна Република Кина, АО Синђанг, Источни Туркистан, ујгурско питање, етничко насиље, тероризам

*Sanja Stošić**

Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

THE NATURE OF CHINA AND TAIWAN CONFLICTING RELATIONS

Resume

The relations between China and Taiwan are widely considered “as one of the most sensitive issues,” especially nowadays, in the era of U.S.-China strategic competition. For China, Taiwan’s reunification is one of the key security issues. Within the scope of *the new geopolitical dynamics in the existing world order, the goal of this paper is to address questions regarding China’s-Taiwan policy as well as the U.S.-Taiwan policy, providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the nature of China and Taiwan tense relations. Starting from the premise that the changing policies related to China, Taiwan and the U.S., are related with the emerging global power shift, as well as with the redefinition of national interests of all the parties involved, by using qualitative data analysis, in this paper we will try to rethink how do changes in U.S.-China relationship and U.S.-Taiwan partnership may be primary triggers of the Taiwan Strait conflict scenario.*

Keywords: China, Taiwan, cross-Strait relations, Xi Jinping, the U.S.-China rivalry, Asia Pacific, Indo-Pacific, global power shift

* Contact: sanja.stosic@ips.ac.rs

INTRODUCTION

After the closure of the Cold War, nowadays the Taiwan's crisis can be regarded as the most relevant issue in the Asia-Pacific. One of the China's most important foreign policy goals is definitely oriented towards the cross-Strait unification or reunification between the mainland of China and Taiwan. Nonetheless, to understand the complex and controversial relationship between Taiwan and the mainland, it's necessary to describe ambiguity and vagueness of Taiwan's position in the realm of history and international law. Additionally, even though China and Taiwan are the two parties directly involved in the cross-Strait relations, Sino-American competition based on contradictory geopolitical objectives and sharp ideological divisions has imposed itself as a pivotal variable in this inherently triangular relationship (Hsieh 2020, 189). With that said, we will try to give the overall interpretation of historical Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the background of relationships within U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan policy.

Although in 1386 Pescadore Islands (Penghu) located in the Taiwan Strait were considered part of China, Taiwan, nonetheless, wasn't part of the Chinese Empire. During the 16th and 17th century, Spain, Japan and Dutch tried to take control over Taiwan. However, under the followers of the mainland Ming dynasty in 1661 China managed to establish its sovereignty over Taiwan. The mainland Qing dynasty captured Taiwan in 1683 and China continued exercising sovereignty by governing Taiwan from Beijing, until integrating the island as a Chinese province in 1887 (Charney and Prescott 2000, 453-455).

To exploit the resources and secure their trading interests, from 1830s Western powers started to exerted pressure over China. In that sense, because of the China's prohibition of the import and use of opium, and its unwillingness to open more ports than Canton to trade, British initiated the 1840-1842 Anglo-Chinese war, also known as the Opium War. Furthermore, after the Anglo-French invasion of Guangzhou (Canton), in 1858 China signed the Treaties of Tientsin, permitting simultaneously approach to the ports of Tamsui and Taiwan-fu to UK, the U.S., Second French and Russian Empire, testifying in that way its sovereignty over the island. The massacre of some Ryukyu castaways in 1874 generated a confrontation between China and Japan, which led to Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), when Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands were given up to Japan by Treaty of Shimonoseki. During the time of Japanese colonial

rule, the revolutionary league led by the nationalist Kuomintang, who was allied with the U.S. and the UK, and oriented towards the overthrow of the Qing Empire, founded in 1912 a political party of the Republic of China (ROC). After Japan's loss in the Second World War, by San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and by the multilateral Treaty of Peace signed by the Republic of China and Japan in 1952, Japan gave up its claim to Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands. However, the Taiwanese sovereignty remained an ambiguous issue after 1951.

From 1928-1949 most of China, and consequently Taiwan, were governed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the **Nationalist Party**, or **Kuomintang**. The corrupted and overall dictatorial regime of Chiang, based on "nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood," was inherently opposed to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a result, in 1928 erupted the Chinese Civil War and China was divided internally. Bearing in mind the fact that during the 1940s the ROC acted as the Chinese government, it was logical that in 1943, by the non-binding Cairo Declaration, and later the Potsdam Proclamation, the allied powers had given back Taiwan to the ROC.¹ Moreover, after Japan's defeat in 1945, the ROC regime ruled by the KMT party started exerting jurisdiction over Taiwan, declaring "Taiwan Province, Republic of China," and the Treaty of Shimonoseki as one of the "Unequal Treaties" enforced during "China's Century of Humiliation." Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the regime of the ROC was unstable and denoted as the "Warlord Era 1916-1928," or period when rule of the country relied upon opposing military cliques and various secessionist regional groups, emerged after the overthrow of the Qing Empire.² Precisely in that period, as leading and opposing political parties rose the KMT allied with the U.S., and the CCP allied with the Soviets. The Chinese Civil War, also known as the Chinese Communist Revolution, which was fought between the KMT and the CCP, was temporarily stopped after the Second Sino-Japanese war when the CCP defeated the KMT on the mainland (1949). Then, under Chiang's Kai-shek leadership, the Nationalists retreated their soldiers and citizens to Taiwan and established their capital in Taipei.

¹ The ROC was representing China in 1945 at the United Nations, as well as at the Security Council.

² The late Qing reforms (1850–1864) didn't originate unified, national military force. Due to that, regional armies and militias guided by provincial leaders characterized military-civil authority (McCord 1993, 29, 39, 44).

Having gained control of mainland China in 1949, Mao Zedong and the CCP established the People's Republic of China (PRC), but the ROC had de facto maintained control over Taiwan and other peripheral islands. So, at the beginning of the 1950's, the ROC and the PRC stated its sovereignty over China and, therefore, over Taiwan as a part of the mainland. Consequently, the process of bringing Taiwan and China each under the rule of a different government resulted in establishment of the concept of "Two Chinas." Despite the fact that China was the first country to explore and invade Taiwan and that by 1894 and maybe even earlier in the 1660s China had asserted its sovereignty over the islands, it is difficult to resolve the question of Taiwanese independence after the Second World War.

This vagueness of Taiwan's status is rooted in international law. As an example, the Cairo Declaration (1943) promulgated by China, the UK and the U.S., stated in explicit terms that Chinese territories seized by Japan, like adjacent Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, should be reintegrated into China or given back to the ROC as the only legitimate Chinese regime at that time. However, although the Cairo Declaration officially suspended the sovereignty of Japan based on the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, the document by itself wasn't legally binding instrument per se. In the same way, the Potsdam Proclamation (1945) issued by the U.S., the UK and China, wasn't a treaty that could formally settle the issue of sovereignty over the islands. On the contrary, even though the multilateral Treaty of Peace signed by Allied Powers with Japan (1951) was legally binding and thus effectively transferred Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores, China wasn't included in the Treaty, neither through the ROC nor the PRC. Hence, there wasn't any legal entity to inherit Taiwan and again the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan remained unresolved (Charney and Prescott 2000, 458-459).

Nonetheless, rejecting "Two Chinas" concept and replacing it with the "One China" as the only one acceptable, and with the aim to officially acknowledge China's legitimate sovereignty over Taiwan, the PRC started a diplomatic fight with the ROC. By assuming the position in the UN in 1971, the PRC fulfilled its goal and expelled the ROC from that position.³ After its loss in the Chinese civil war (1946-1949), the ROC government fled to Taiwan where the Nationalists stayed in power

³ In certain way this was awkward because the ROC still ruled Taiwan but didn't enjoy the membership in the UN which had become one of the essential conditions of statehood. Despite its limited recognition as a sovereign state, but due to its previous

throughout the 1990s, exercising practically all legislative, executive and judicial power. Till the closure of the 20th century Taiwan had already experienced several important cycles of economic, cultural and socio-political transformations. Simultaneously, Taiwan's insistence on maintaining its sovereign status had deepened division between Taiwan and mainland China. Besides, this situation significantly aggravated due to the half-century of Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) during which were established social and economic preconditions for the development of a distinctly Taiwanese national sentiment.

However, in 1945 the Taiwan independence movement wasn't still active, so the KMT was initially welcomed. Nonetheless, by inaugurating a military regime oriented towards the systematic exploitation of the natives, the KMT rule resulted much more dictatorial than the Japanese. Thus, the Chinese Nationalist regime provoked growing dissatisfaction among the native population. Furthermore, the KMT refusal to recognize Taiwan as an equal part of the Chinese nation provoked the bloody revolt in 1947 which resulted in the extermination of the clandestine communist movement in the early 1950s and émigré regime. Being unable to identify with the mainlanders, the majority of disillusioned populace developed "cultural nationalism," favoring the establishment of an independent Formosan state over the re-imposition of Chinese national government (Meisner 1963, 97-99, 102-103).

Overall, distinctive nature of interpretations based in the realm of an international legal analysis of the peace treaties after World War II caused in 1951 disagreement between the Allied powers about the legitimate role of the PRC or the ROC as Chinese control of Taiwan. In this context, the U.S. President Truman affirmed that by the Cairo and the Potsdam declaration, Taiwan was given to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the Korean War (1950-1953), Truman stressed an international aspect of Taiwan's issue, and thus the necessity of "the restoration of security in the Pacific before the determination of the future status of Formosa" (Charny and Prescott 2000, 458-459, 461). Anyhow, after the withdrawal of Taipei in 1971 from the UN, among many countries that had cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, in 1979 the U.S. also restrained official relationship with Taipei in favor of Beijing. Previously, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter had accepted the PRC's demands like "the termination of formal diplomatic relations with

legitimate government of China, the ROC managed to maintain high level of is unofficial recognition.

the ROC, the abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and removal of all U.S. troops from Taiwan” (Van Vranken Hickey 2015, 253). Nonetheless, with the aim to “unofficially” maintain the relations with Taipei, in 1979 the Carter Administration proposed to Congress the Taiwan Enabling Act (TEA) which was afterwards signed into law. Briefly, the TEA defines U.S. policy on Taiwan based on the promotion of economic, political, and cultural cooperation and security alliance.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the ROC’s transition to a Multi-party system was followed by political liberalization and thus democratization, which enabled the independence-oriented parties to gain majority control over Taiwan and the growth of Taiwan’s national identity.⁴ Moreover, the KMT government experienced gradational shift from “militarism to developmentalism, and “Taiwan became a major international export platform, first for labor-intensive commodities like footwear, textiles and toys, and later for technology-intensive computers and machinery” (Ho 2010, 3-4). In this light, dissidents from the KMT secretly funded in 1986 the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Being the first legal opposition party, DPP became the governing party in the 1990s. With the Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 2000, the Nationalists’ representative, Lien Chan was defeated. Although in 2001 compared with the DPP the Nationalist Party lost both its legislative primacy as well as its plurality of seats, in 2004 the Nationalists recovered their legislative control, and in 2008 they defeated the DPP. To overcome Taiwan’s deeply entrenched differences with China, in next legislative elections the party outlined the so-called policy of Three Nots based on the principles of “not unification, not independence and not military confrontation.” However, despite growing economic and intensifying cultural ties in cross-Strait relations at the beginning of the 21st century, the central political dispute over China-Taiwan relations remains. In short, for China, the ROC ceased existing in 1949, namely when the PRC was proclaimed, and Taiwan has never gained the sovereignty. In other words, the concept of “One China” for Beijing relates to the PRC, while for Taipei it relates to the ROC (Chi, 2009). Bearing in mind China’s brisk military progress, as well as its refusal to renounce the use

⁴ The son of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, President Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1987 abolished martial law under which was banned the formation of political parties, except the KMT. Moreover, the abolition of the martial law enabled reunion of family members from the mainland with the ones from the island, as well as the cultural and economic cooperation.

of military intervention to “reunify” Taiwan, the Taiwan issue can be a potential source of armed conflict. Moreover, the cross-Strait relations transcend China and Taiwan because the U.S. also has its crucial role in this inherently triangular relationship due to the changing dynamics of U.S.-China relations.

THE FEATURES OF CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN

From the time of the peace treaties till today, if not de jure, the PRC de facto has exercised governmental control over historical China. Nonetheless, if not the de jure, we can distinguish de facto the governing authority of the PRC in Beijing, and the ROC’s governing authority on Taiwan, although with the support of the U.S. In fact, having developed economic and legislative self-rule despite Beijing, the government on Taiwan has imposed itself as an autonomous. Thus, since 1949 Taiwan have been ruled independently as a de facto separate state from mainland China.

Considering the island as its province, Beijing has always been determined to “unify” Taiwan with the mainland. Hence, during the 1950s there were two Strait crises or armed conflicts between the PRC and the ROC. Although China intended to annex Taiwan immediately after the closure of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War (1950) and the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty (1954) made “One China” policy impossible. Besides, the atmosphere of the early Cold War aggravated the U.S. policy towards East Asia, and consequently the cross-Strait relations. Hence, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the American administration changed its initial policy of military nonintervention concerning Taiwan. To stop further escalation of the Korean conflict and show support for the Nationalists, the U.S. President Harry Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan along with the economic aid. Moreover, due to the strategic geographical location of Taiwan, located between continental and maritime Asia, the U.S. perceived Taiwanese territory as suitable for the expansion of communism in the region, and although the U.S. administration didn’t officially

favor Taiwan against China, this rather intervention represented a radical change in American foreign policy, hence Washington directly intervened in the Taiwan Strait for the first time. Although the Chinese communists were frustrated by the American policy, instead to Taiwan they dispatched their troops to the northeast border with Korea. Shortly after the inauguration of President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 and the end of the Korean War, the U.S. withdrew the naval blockade of Taiwan and changed its strategy of containment by converting Taiwan into a U.S. ally in the Cold War.

The control over some thirty offshore islands just off the central coast of the mainland, generated the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1954–1955). Although Jinmen (Quemoy), Mazu (Matsu), Dachen (Tachen), and several other clusters of small offshore islands were under the control of the Nationalists, legally they were part of Chinese territory. When the Nationalists fled from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, they maintained control of the offshore islands to use them as “staging areas.” Although Jinmen, Mazu, and other islands were far from Taiwan, hence of debatable strategic value for its defense, since 1949 the control over the offshore islands occasionally caused clashes between the Communists and Nationalists.

By the start of the 1954 crisis, encouraged with the U.S. help, Chiang Kai-shek had made of the offshore islands strategic outposts. To prepare for the future invasion of the mainland, the Nationalists built fortifications and sent their soldiers to the islands. Only in Jinmen there were more than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers. At the same time, the U.S. was explicitly against the Chinese Communists (Chang, 1988: 98-100). By supporting Taiwan with economic and military aids, the U.S. became Taiwan’s “security guarantor.” The conclusion of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in the middle of crisis enabled the development of Taiwan’s economy and defense.⁵ In cooperation with the U.S. on joint intelligence gathering and use of military aviation equipped with photo-reconnaissance missions over the mainland, the offshore

⁵ The Mutual Defense Treaty also contained a secret agreement from Chiang Kai-shek not to take offensive actions against the mainland without explicit U.S. consent. This shed new light on the cross-strait policy on Taiwan.

islands in Chinese vicinity like Jinmen and Mazu were transformed by the government in Taipei into fortifications for more than 100.000 soldiers (Wang 2013, 95).⁶

Before occupying the neighboring Dachen islands, in September 1954 the Communists started shelling Jinmen and Matsu. In spite of the U.S. opposition to any vindictive activities of the Communists, the outbreak of the Crisis for Mao was also the possibility to “liberate Taiwan” by unifying the Chinese people against foreign powers, so he commanded the bombing. After the Formosa Resolution in 1955, Chinese stopped bombing Jinmen and Matsu. Although between 1956 and 1957 Mao opted for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the Nationalists troops stayed on the islands and in 1958 tension increased again in the Taiwan Straits. Challenged by the American interference in China’s affairs with Taiwan and motivated by his plan for the Great Leap Forward, in 1958 Mao again initiated the bombing of Jinmen and Mazu, as well as the second Taiwan Strait crisis. In response, the President Eisenhower sent U.S. forces and a large naval contingent to the Taiwan. To strengthen the allegiance of the U.S. to the defense of Taiwan, Eisenhower didn’t mind the escalation of conflict in Sino-U.S. relations, and publicly even threatened to use nuclear weapons if the Communists launched a major assault (Huei 2019). Lastly, after the conciliatory gesture of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou Enlai) who stated that “the Chinese people are friendly to the American people” China opted for a diplomacy instead of war and the bombing of Jinmen and Mazu soon terminated (Chang 1988, 117).⁷

In the early 1970s, China tried to improve relationship with the U.S. by practicing Ping Pong Diplomacy (Eckstein 1993). In that context, for Deng Xiaoping, also known as the “architect of modern China,” the development of cross-Strait economic ties with Taiwan as a “natural economic partner” was the best way for “peaceful

⁶ In the upcoming years, the U.S. started more explicitly to support the Nationalists government in Taiwan. For example, with the aim of preventing the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region, in 1954 the U.S. and its allies like France, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

⁷ In response to Washington’s threats, in 1955 China launched its own nuclear program (Chang 1988, 121-122).

reunification” under the framework “One Country, Two Systems.” In that context, for Deng Xiaoping, also known as the “architect of modern China,” the development of cross-Strait economic ties with Taiwan as a “natural economic partner” was the best way for “peaceful reunification” under the framework “One Country, Two Systems.” At the same time, Deng Xiaoping didn’t exclude the use of force from Beijing’s options (Blackwill and Zelikow 2012, 25).

With the aim of developing diplomatic ties between China and the U.S., in 1972 President Richard Nixon was the first U.S. president who went to Beijing and met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. On that occasion it was signed the Shanghai Communiqué by which the U.S. expressed its preparedness for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, confirming the “One China” principle, as well as the U.S. willingness to withdraw its forces and military installations from Taiwan. The stabilization of U.S.-China diplomatic relations was formally confirmed in 1978 by their second joint communiqué. Although the U.S. acknowledged the “One China” principle and the PRC’s government, it also acknowledged its disposition to “unofficially” maintain other relations with Taipei through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). In that sense, despite the annulment of the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, the American administration signed in 1979 the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that provided both countries with “unofficial” consulate offices, Taiwan with its “defensive capability” based on arms sales determined by the American Congress in security crisis of any kind, but without any commitment of the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense. Hence, this protective alliance was inherently based on the principle of “strategic ambiguity” instead on the prior Nixon’s concept of “constructive ambiguity.”

To mitigate rising Sino-U.S. tensions generated by the TRA, the U.S. and China endorsed another joint communiqué in 1982. Despite U.S. promise to limit arms sales to Taiwan, the American government has continued to provide Taiwan with weapons and military services.⁸ Even though the KMT and the CCP came to

⁸ Since 1979, American military aid to Taiwan has enlarged notably. In the 1990s,

“the 1992 Consensus” by confirming there was “One China,” both parties have differently interpreted its content.⁹ For the first time in 1995 the White House granted an entry visa to the Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui, which Beijing interpreted as a major provocation. So, before Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996, cross-Strait relations deteriorated significantly and China launched missiles towards Taiwan. As a response to this, the U.S. sent its aircraft carrier groups through the Taiwan Strait. However, the cross-Strait relations shift occurred in 2004, when for the first time Beijing officially set as its priority to block Taiwan’s de jure independence (PRC Embassy in the United States, 2004). This policy was reinforced in 2005 by the Anti-Secession Law, which approved China’s use of “non-peaceful means” in case of radicalization of Taiwan’s separatist movement and absence of other means. However, in that moment any further movement towards Taiwan’s independence didn’t actually align with the Chinese or American interests, so equally the Bush and Obama administrations adopted the principle of “peaceful resolution”, but not necessarily reunification, while China’s efforts shifted from “proreunification” to “anti-independence.” This contemporary consent regarding the Taiwan issue enabled improvement of relations between Taiwan and Beijing since 2008. After the electoral victory of the Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT’s regained power over the Taiwan government. Relying on “the 1992 Consensus,” the KMT committed not to put more pressure on Taiwanese independence. Reciprocally, China promised to abstain from the intimidation or use of military force. This context enabled stability of cross-Strait relations and the establishment of the “three links,” or introduction of direct flights, postal and shipping services to the Taiwan Strait, and consequently of economic, social, and political cooperation among Taiwan and

the U.S. and Taiwan have already held meetings in order to manage and coordinate *national security issues*.

⁹ For the PRC, “the 1992 Consensus” means that “the two sides of the Strait belong to one China, and therefore both sides will jointly seek national reunification,” while for the KMT it means “one China” with the ROC as the leading party.

mainland China.¹⁰ Additionally, the Ma Ying-jeou's administration promoted a "diplomatic truce," so conflicts between China and Taiwan over international recognition significantly diminished.

When in 2012 Xi Jinping took up the post of president, China's focus was on economic prosperity and promotion of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.¹¹ Trying not to challenge U.S. supremacy, but also accomplish the reunification goal, Xi Jinping maintained the policy of the status quo regarding Taiwan. With this background, Xi Jinping's policy continued "the approach of six proposals for peaceful development" of Taiwan issue adopted by Hu Jintao and prioritized the impediment of Taiwan's de jure independence instead the reunification.¹² Nonetheless, in 2013 Xi Jinping emphasized that a political solution to cross-Strait relations could not be postponed forever and thus stressed the prevalence of the strategic framework of the "one-China principle" in cross-Strait relations.¹³ In comparison with his earlier talks on the Taiwan issue, Xi Jinping again in 2014 emphasized the relevance of political trust between the mainland and the island based on "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and overall interest of the Chinese nation." Likewise, he stressed the reunification model of "One Country, Two Systems" under which "no secessionist act would be tolerated." Furthermore, while striving to form a "new type of great-power relationship," Xi insisted on dissociating the issue of Taiwan's reunification from the Sino-American relationship (Huang 2017, 244-245).

With the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment, President Ma Ying-jeou's popularity eroded. So, after the loss of the KMT in 2014, the DPP (more pro-independence party) won the presidential election in 2016. After DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen election victory, the relatively harmonious PRC policy toward Taiwan changed

¹⁰ After the Chinese Civil War in 1949 or almost 60 years, direct transport and communication links between the two sides were established again.

¹¹ By the late 2000s, China became the second largest economy in the world.

¹² While Deng's policy was rooted in a "goal-fulfilling and national-interest oriented doctrine", Hu Jintao's strategy was "go global" and oriented towards "soft power diplomacy."

¹³ Xi's vision of national aggrandizement, presented in his "Chinese Dream," incorporates the "reunification" of the Taiwan Strait with the motherland.

significantly. Tsai insisted that “the two sides of the strait were two sovereign states” and she rejected “the 1992 Consensus.” While claiming to support “the status quo”, Tsai firmly advocated the “de-Chinaization” process, openly influencing the party members to “resist pressure from China” (Strong 2016). In response to Tsai’s separatist policy, China decided to cut official ties with Taiwan. To restrain the evolving trend of “national self-determination” and increasing secessionist sentiment pushed by the Tsai’s leadership, and simultaneously conserve the socio-economic cooperation between China and Taiwan and win over the Taiwanese, Beijing has adopted various accommodative approaches covering a wide political spectrum. Because of Tsai’s non-compliance with the “One-China” principle, China has adopted a “dual track Taiwan policy framework featuring ‘selective engagement.’” The “selective engagement policy” adopted by Beijing comprehends “a combination of containment and engagement measures,” which includes “a set of complementary dual-track approaches from two dimensions.” These dimensions refer to “confrontational measures in security, political and diplomatic fields,” with embracing “approaches on economic, social and cultural affairs,” as well as to “a combination of punitive measures against the Taiwan independence activists, with accommodative approaches to all the other politically non-pro-independence forces” (Qiang 2020, 535-536).

To secure China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the reunification of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never abstained from the use of force as an option. Therefore, the PLA underwent a comprehensive military reform in 2015, and in recent years has turned to modern military technology, employing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) to deter the interests of the U.S. in the West Pacific region.¹⁴ In support of

¹⁴ Opposing the Taiwan’s secessionist forces, the PLA has increased its military pressure on Taipei. For example, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) made for the first time in 2016 circling patrols around Taiwan. After that, for several times in 2017 and 2018 more complex aircraft formations of the PLA have organized “island encircling exercises.” In response, in 2017 Taipei adopted a new military strategy, and in 2018 under the Trump presidency the U.S. has issued licenses to sell its submarine technology and permit Taiwan to produce its own “diesel-electric submarines”, or “an offensive weapon. Moreover, In 2019, Tsai publicly suggested that Tokyo should share military intelligence with Taipei and the need for establishing security dialogue between Taiwan

“One-China” principle, after Tsai’s inauguration Beijing has also initiated its political and diplomatic struggle. In the period from 2009 to 2016 Taiwan participated in the World Health Assembly (WHA), and in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2013. Nonetheless, since the DPP rejected the “One China” principle, influenced by Beijing, those international organizations stopped sending invitations to Taipei. Likewise, because of Beijing’s opposition, Taiwan’s international presence has been limited in various UN agencies and international NGOs. To isolate Taiwan internationally, China has also influenced many states to cut off their diplomatic relations with Taipei. As a result, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies have declined to 14 countries (Fukuda 2023). In the same manner, Beijing has cut off all official relations and contacts with Taiwan and coerced multinational companies, including airlines and hotel chains, to express their compliance with the “One-China” policy by referring to “Taiwan as a Chinese province.” In contrast to this, Beijing has preserved economic, social and cultural cooperation with Taiwan as the counterweight “for the turbulent cross-Strait relations.” In that sense, by promoting the principle of “cooperation for mutual benefits” during his speech in 2019, President Xi emphasized the need for equal treatment of Taiwanese compatriots (Qiang 2020, 541-542).

Despite China’s efforts to integrate Taiwan into its national orbit, while ramping up the pressure upon the Tsai Administration, the strained cross-Strait relations have worsened. Currently, the Taiwanese generally consider Beijing strives to dominate Taiwan by putting it under pressure to acknowledge the “One country, two systems” frameworks. By manipulating public opinion, Taiwan’s political parties have influenced today’s young generation that acts as the main promoter of Taiwan’s independence movement. Because of the unstable socio-economic environment that has emerged in Hong Kong since the reunification, for the Taiwanese Hong Kong demonstrates the collapse of “one country, two systems” policy. Additionally, the Taiwan authorities have categorized the “one country, two systems” policy as “insulting” and “harmful” (Ning 2019, 128). In addition, after her victory in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen emphasized that Taiwanese people have never accepted the ‘1992 Consensus’ “because the Beijing’s definition of the ‘1992 Consensus’ is ‘one China’ and ‘one country, two systems’” (Blackwill & Zelikow 2021, 27).

and Japan with the aim of opposing the “growing military threat’ from the mainland” (Qiang 2020, 539).

Furthermore, American government has continued undermining the “One-China” policy. Besides, Taiwan’s successful response to COVID-19 has benefited its international standing, and European countries have supported Taiwan in the international field. In that context, many states have criticized China’s “authorial ideals,” and rigid political allegiance to “One-China” principle (Mitić 2022, 34). Regardless, China has focused on asserting its “One-China” policy in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and other amicable countries of the Asia-Pacific region. After a spree of “special military exercises” conducted by the PLA in the vicinity of Taiwan in August 2022 to protest the U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s stopover in Taiwan, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that in comparison with the U.S. and its few followers, a vast majority of countries had supported China’s policy toward Taiwan. Likewise, during the meeting with Secretary-general of the United Nations António Guterres, Xi Jinping reaffirmed the importance of the “One-China” principle as “China’s red line that shouldn’t be crossed” (Fukuda 2023).

Moreover, the immediate publication of China’s white paper regarding the Taiwan question during the “new era” has provoked far-reaching political implications for cross-strait relations. Specifically, the new paper determines “peaceful reunification as the first choice,” while reinforcing that if Taiwan’s military resists any China’s attempt to reunify the island, military confrontation would be unavoidable. In comparison with earlier versions (1993 and 2000), the latest white paper doesn’t include the possibility of coexistence between socialism and capitalism in post-unification reality and advocates “Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era” as prevailing ideology. In addition, for the first time, the 2022 white paper also mentions the possibility of “diplomatic space” and international participation of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the paper for the first time also states that Taiwan, if reunified with the mainland, wouldn’t be allowed to maintain its armed forces.

U.S.-TAIWAN POLICY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC

Nowadays, the Sino-American relations are closer to a historic breakdown than they have ever been before. Even though at various times the U.S. has officially stated its political neutrality on the Taiwan issue,

in accordance with its national interests, Washington has influenced political developments of its allies and its opponents. In that sense, even though during the course of Obama's presidency the stability of cross-strait ties, and the preservation of "the status quo" endured, Obama's policy was conditioned by "the strategic ambiguity framework," as part of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship from the beginning of the Cold War (Chen 2016, 758-759).

Given Taiwan's significance in Sino-American relations, in the face of China's extraordinary rise as an emerging global power, the U.S. policymakers have reappraised "the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region." In that sense, "the U.S. strategic shift toward Asia-Pacific occurred during Obama's presidency when the U. S. aimed to reaffirm its influence in Asia-Pacific, retake its economic supremacy, advance democracy and the security order in the region" (Lai 2013, 12).

Beijing's increasingly assertive foreign policy and maritime advance, especially under Xi Jinping's government, has marked China's actions regarding its maritime and territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea by increasing nationalist sentiment, militarization and thus expansionism.¹⁵ In that context, the traditional U.S.-Taiwan policy of "strategic ambiguity" has been replaced by the policy of maximum pressure. Thus, the issue of cross-strait relations, as inherently an internal Chinese problem has become a major problem in Sino-American relations. Xi Jinping's government is determined to reunite Taiwan, establish China's "sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific," and reshape the global governance order in accordance with its strategic interests (Becley & Brands 2021, 1). In that sense, even though the Taiwan issue is basically of political nature, because of its military dimension it also brings the possibility of further escalation and clash of two superpowers. At the other side, as the most economically prosperous region, the Indo-Pacific will probably determine the 21st-century world order. Therefore, the Sino-American competition is deeply conditioned by opposing geopolitical interests.

In line with this, in the framework of the new U.S. National Security Policy (NSP), China is marked as a "strategic rival that compromises American security and prosperity." Hence, try fighting China's rise and its political influence over the countries along the Indian and Pacific oceans the U.S. has adopted a relatively new maritime-related strategy which encompasses a "free and open Indo-Pacific and "a new alliance of democracies" (Hu & Meng 2020).

¹⁵ For China's maritime disputes in South China Seas see (Jevtić et al. 2018, 34).

Formally, U.S. President Donald Trump revealed the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in 2017. The strategy comprehends “economic integration and defense cooperation” with Indo-Pacific region countries and is developed by “the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad).” The strategy’s goal is to undermine the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), maintain U.S. predominance in the region, bolster and widen the American partnership network, and sabotage China’s relationships with states bordering the Indian and Pacific ocean (Kolev 2019, 100). Striving to contain China, in 2018 the U.S. passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) into law, and following its guidance, Pentagon in 2019 published the first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report named “Preparedness, Partnership and Promoting a Networked Region” (Shicun & Colombage 2019). In 2021, Biden administration officially launched its U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy based on five primary objectives: “a free and open Indo-Pacific, building connections within and beyond the region, regional prosperity, bolstering security and, building resilience.” To restore the U.S. hegemony in the region and “Bring Back Better World (B3W),” apart from reviving Quad, the U.S. IPS also includes a “trilateral security pact between the United Kingdom and Australia,” or (AUKUS), as well as the through geo-economic initiatives participation of G7 countries (Mufassir 2022).

As stated in the policy brief based on the “American strategy for the Indo-Pacific in an age of U.S.-China competition,” China’s actions that subvert U.S. “vital interests” refer to the “use of coercion – whether in the form of gray-zone tactics, political interference, economic pressure, or military force – to weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia, press unilateral territorial claims, and settle international disputes with disregard to international law.” In that context, Beijing erodes “democratic resilience in the region” by trying to unilaterally reunite Taiwan with the Chinese mainland (Yeo 2022).

Notably, as a strategic location near China, “Taiwan has high strategic value in implementing the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy”¹⁶. Given the context, it is understandable recent U.S. militarization of Taiwan is

¹⁶ Chinese territorial expansion is restrained by the group of its neighboring islands, referred to as the first island chain, which Taiwan is a part of along with the Philippines and a few other island chains. To restrain China’s and the Soviet Union’s maritime pretensions, in the 1940s the U.S. coined the security concept of “Island Chain Strategy.” Although China has established a solid presence by “its grey zone operations in the first island chain,” without absorbing Taiwan into the mainland, China can’t seize the first island chain (Espena & Bomping 2020).

a countermeasure to China's A2/AD system.¹⁷ Moreover, by deepening ties with Taiwan, the U.S. has secured its partnership with Taiwan's Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) (Gyu 2021, 2).¹⁸

Simply put, absorbing Taiwan into the mainland is one of the most important China's foreign policy goal. Hence, to achieve this goal, China invests one-third of its defense budget. In sum, if China reunified Taiwan, it would not only obtain access to its semiconductor industry, dozens of ships, hundreds of rocket launchers, fighter aircrafts, and billions of dollars, but could also use island as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and control the flow of any potential conflict by projecting military power into the western Pacific, and over many of the other islands in the region, like Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines, and other U.S. allies in East Asia (Beckley & Brands 2021. 4).

Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, Washington has been trying to "contain" China by supporting Taiwanese independence movement. On the other hand, to emphasize its determination to faith against "Taiwan's de jure independence," Beijing has reacted by demonstrating its readiness to go to war by developing and deploying new weapons systems and conducting military exercises near Taiwan.¹⁹ In that sense, by opposing Chinese national "core interests" and preventing Taiwan-PRC political unification, the U.S. is actually implementing "danger-zone strategy" and trying to "throw Beijing off-balance" (Beckley

¹⁷ During the Trump administration, the U.S. support for Taiwan raised significantly. Under Trump's presidency was finalized the sale of sixty-six F-16s to Taiwan, and private and public visits between the U.S. officials and the Taiwanese officials at all levels intensified, as well as the number of naval transits through the Taiwan Strait. Likewise, Trump signed the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, facilitating the exchange of senior military officers and the 2020 Taiwan Assurance Act, promoting regular arms sales to Taiwan. The Biden administration has continued Trump's policy and has contributed to further militarization of the island by "reaffirming the 'longstanding commitments' of the United States, to 'continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability'" (Blackwill & Zelikow 2021, 19-20).

¹⁸ Taiwanese firms account for 60 percent of the global chip making industry. As semiconductors represent the most critical technology necessary for all electronics, from phones, computers, cars and fighter jets, the U.S. has strategically focused on transferring the global semiconductor supply chains away from China. In 2023, TSMC announced opening a new 5-nanometer chip plant in Arizona, and in 2024 another chip factory producing 3-nanometer chips.

¹⁹ Since the beginning of the 2000s, China has significantly modernized its force by acquiring advanced weapons ranging from cruise missiles to long-range stealth aircraft, and improving its navy.

& Brands 2021, 4). However, we must bear in mind that “Asian-Pacific security affairs rely generally upon arm foundation of formal and informal bilateral agreements, supplemented by a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements” (Katzenstein & Okawara 2001, 15). So, even though the “historic dominance” of the U.S. in the Pacific is seemingly declining, due to the enduring alliances between Japan, Australia, India and South Korea and the U.S., “China still may not have the power to radically alter the nature of the international system in East Asia” (Wong 2021). Therefore, we consider that the “Second Cold War with China” would not only endanger the stability of the whole Asia-Pacific region, but would also lead to a new “global Cold War” (Blackwill & Zelikow 2021, 47).

CONCLUSION

In the modern age, the U.S.-China relationship remains a complicated one. All in all, the current U.S.-Taiwan relationship based on a mixture of informal and formal robust diplomatic ties, ambiguous assurances, and substantial arms sales on credit, has provoked sharp deterioration in cross-Strait relations. Therefore, apart from presenting China-Taiwan relations and theoretical nuances of the “One China” policy, this article’s findings deliver key insights providing the understanding of cross-Strait dynamics and complex triangular nature of China-Taiwan-United States relations.

The new *U.S. strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific* created during the Trump administration dominates Biden administration’s policy too.²⁰ In that sense, the actual U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific surely transcends Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia” strategy. To fight China’s global rise through Taiwan, the U.S. has undertaken military buildup in the Indo-Pacific region and more resilient security architecture based on diplomatic alliances and partnerships. Herein, Taiwan has become the issue of primary importance in Sino-American relations, and thus in international politics. Strengthening its alliances on the bases of joint interests, the U.S. will continue to pressure China. Nevertheless, a new Cold War wouldn’t be in the best interests of all countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Overall, we must be fully aware current and future events concerning the relations between China and Taiwan can be properly understood only when analyzed in the light of the U.S.-China power

²⁰ See also (Stefanović Štambuk, Popović 2022, 11).

shift. In that sense, the nature of the latest U.S.-Taiwan policy of maximum pressure should only be understood within the scope of U.S.-China rivalry. Thus, we strongly believe that future framework of cross-Strait development should rely on the “model of national modernization jointly constructed by both sides of the Strait” instead on the U.S.-China-Taiwan framework.

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Сања Стошић

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

ПРИРОДА КОНФЛИКТНИХ ОДНОСА КИНЕ И ТАЈВАНА

Сажетак

Односи између Кине и Тајвана сматрају се једним од најосетљивијих питања, посебно данас, у ери стратешког надметања између САД-а и Кине. За Кину је питање Тајвана једно од кључних безбедносних питања. У оквиру нове геополитичке динамике у постојећем светском поретку, циљ овог рада је да путем преиспитивања кинеско-тајванске, као и америчко-тајванске политике, пружи свеобухватан теоријски оквир за разумевање конфликтне природе кинеско-тајванског односа. Полазећи од претпоставке да су промене политике у односу на Кину, Тајван и Сједињене Америчке Државе повезане са појавом глобалне промене моћи, као и са редефинисањем националних интереса свих укључених страна, коришћењем квалитативне анализе података, у овом раду ћемо покушати да преиспитамо како промене у америчко-кинеским и америчко-тајванским односима могу да делују као примарни покретачи конфликта у Тајванском мореузу.

Кључне речи: Кина, Тајван, односи у Тајванском мореузу, Си Ђинпинг, америчко-кинеско ривалство, Азијски Пацифик, Индо-Пацифик, глобална промена моћи

STUDIES
ОГЛЕДИ И СТУДИЈЕ

*Miloš Tomić**

Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade

STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE ARCTIC AND POSSIBLE ARMED CONFLICT OF THE GREAT POWERS

Resume

The geopolitical competition of great powers over the control of strategically important natural resources is an integral part of the political agenda aimed at achieving economic and thus military dominance on a global level. The territory of the Arctic, as the northernmost part of the planet Earth, has large reserves of natural resources (primarily oil and gas), the sovereign control and exploitation of which are contested by the countries that surround (a total of eight of them) this area, but also recently by countries that have granted themselves the status of “near arctic state” like the People’s Republic of China. The trend of accelerated militarization of the Arctic in the period after the closure of the Cold War can be interpreted as a consequence of the damaged relationship between the key actors of international politics and different perceptions of the future global order. The goal of this work is a systematic description of the dynamics of relations between Arctic states with a special focus on the USA (including NATO) and the Russian Federation and their activities in the military-defense sphere. To achieve the projected goal, the technique of content analysis of strategic documents, the technique of narrative analysis and historical comparative analysis was used. The results of this research indicate the increased interest of the great powers in controlling the Arctic, i.e. the natural resources present in this area, as well as the strategically important international traffic corridor, the

* Contact: milos.tomic@fb.bg.ac.rs

Northern Sea Route. Accordingly, the engagement of the armed forces should enable the unhindered implementation of the defined political-economic activities of the Arctic states with the status of a great power.

Keywords: Arctic, natural resources, militarization, control, Northern Sea Route

INTRODUCTION

The worldwide trend of intensive consumption, population growth at the global level and less availability of non-renewable natural resources such as water, oil, gas and various minerals can be seen as specific indicators of future intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Moreover, geopolitics and control over the exploitation of natural resources are constantly intertwined through the search for power, space and prosperity. Geopolitical competition over natural resources appears as a central issue in the national agenda not only for developing countries (rich in resources) but also for developed countries that consume resources to maintain their economic and military dominance. Seen from the aspect of security sciences, the potential conflict over natural resources is related to sociological, political and economic factors used to understand the context of the emergence and development of such an unstable security situation.

The Arctic, as the northernmost region occupying 6% of the surface of the planet Earth, has been identified as a strategically significant natural resource primarily for the countries that surround it (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United States of America and the Russian Federation) and increasingly for other geopolitical actors (People's Republic of China). It is estimated that 10% of the world's oil production and 25% of gas comes from Arctic sources, including 10% of fish reserves. In addition to the huge quantities of the aforementioned natural resources, the Arctic represents an extremely important corridor for the development of international transport with two legs recognizable as the North-East and North-West Sea Routes. Accordingly, the interest of the great powers in controlling the Arctic Circle becomes particularly relevant after the Second World War, when the two superpowers begin the construction of military bases, airports and warehouses of nuclear weapons, bombers and ballistic missiles. However, after the post-Cold

War stagnation and the establishment of a new mechanism of cooperation between the Arctic states, a new phase of militarization followed, which was further accelerated by the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The paper analyzes in detail the relations between the Arctic states through the formal mechanism of the Arctic Council, as well as the announced process of militarization of the Arctic area. In order to achieve the stated goal, a historical-comparative analysis was applied, the technique of content analysis of key strategic documents of the United States and the Russian Federation, including the analysis of the narratives of the securitizing actors.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN THE RELATIONS OF THE ARCTIC STATES

The change in the security paradigm at the global level, which began in the eighties of the 20th century, is often linked to the geopolitical processes of controlling strategically important natural resources. The statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, the president of the Soviet Union, on the necessity of future cooperation and the reduction of armed tensions (through demilitarization) between the two powers, given on October 1, 1987, in Murmansk, is considered to be key to the establishment of an international Arctic control mechanism (Atland 2008). Namely the so-called The Murmansk Initiative represents a new Soviet policy that entails a comprehensive analysis of the role of the Arctic region in predominantly non-military forms of security (Issraelian 1992). Generally speaking, the new direction of the foreign policy of the Soviet Arctic does not treat civil cooperation in the field of environmental protection strictly as a confidence-building measure, but with this the USSR fundamentally changed the definition of security (Griffiths 1992, 5) which was practically confirmed by oil spill accidents at the ending of the eighties.

Atland explains the Murmansk initiative is significant for two reasons: the first leaders of the USSR were successful in dividing military and non-military issues within the national security paradigm, and secondly, although the initiative did not lead to direct cooperation of the Arctic states in the sphere of defense, certain shifts in their contacts (Atland 2008, 305-306). Finland, as one of the first countries interested in cooperation in the Arctic region, invoking the Murmansk initiative in 1989, organized a meeting of the leaders of eight Arctic countries with

the aim of solving environmental protection problems (Sale & Potapov 2010). Meetings in Rovaniemi (Finland), then in Yellowknife (Canada) and Kiruna (Sweden) lay the foundations for the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.

As one of the first documents establishing the principles and principles of cooperation between the Arctic states, the AEPS foresees a specific structure for future coordination. Namely, in the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment adopted on June 14, 1991, at the First Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, the signatory states Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the USSR and the USA commit themselves to the full implementation and development of the AEPS including the establishment of a prevention, preparedness and emergency response mechanism in the Arctic. The Arctic environmental strategy as a comprehensive assessment of the state of the environment is focused on various sources of threats to the ecosystem and the consequences of oil, radioactivity, noise, acidification and heavy metals pollution, but without specific obligations of each of the signatories individually. Similarly, Sale & Potapov note that the AEPS has three key limitations: first, although the Strategy deals with the protection of the Arctic environment, no definition of the Arctic is proposed anywhere; second, the Strategy does not establish any rights and obligations for the signatory states as is usual for international agreements; the third organization concerns the absence of the obligation to ratify the agreement of the Arctic states, which in a legal sense diminishes the importance of the Strategy (Sale & Potapov 2010, 140). The aforementioned limitations actually call into question the real motives of the initiators of cooperation in the Arctic region, primarily Finland, which was in the Soviet sphere of interest.

Some authors (Keskitalo 2004; Sale & Potapov 2010) explain the political leadership of Finland saw the Murmansk initiative as an opportunity to change its foreign policy orientation and focus on Western partners. Moreover, the ending of the Cold War forced most European countries to develop better relations with the West and fit into the New World Order more quickly. The possibilities of foreign policy development after Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk were fully utilized not only in AEPS but also in achieving the relevant status of Finland for the great powers with a simultaneous focus on the European Union (Keskitalo 2004, 61). It should be noted that apart from Finland, which is primarily guided by its foreign policy interests, the structure and design of the Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy was developed in detail by Canada as the most interested in controlling the Arctic region. (Keskitalo 2004). Therefore, it was precisely the different interests of the Arctic states and the perception of the future recomposition of international relations that contributed to the creation of a voluntary rather than legally binding Arctic environmental protection strategy.

Nord explains that the year 1990 can be marked as a turning point in the development of the Arctic intergovernmental organization as part of the then new Canadian foreign policy in dealing with the Arctic (Nord 2006). Namely, the concept of the future Arctic Council was presented on November 20 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Joe Clark, as a priority in the action of the Government of Canada (Nord 2006). Not long after, at the first meeting of the Arctic states on the occasion of the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in Rovaniemi in 1991, Canadian officials presented a proposal for the establishment of the Arctic Council with all the details about the goals, responsibilities and functions of this intergovernmental organization. According to the Government of Canada, the four most important goals to be left behind in the Arctic Council treaty are:

1. The spread of beneficial contacts between the various peoples inhabiting the Circumpolar North;
2. Improvement of environmental protection for threatened ecosystems in the north;
3. Reducing the military presence in the North (it can be said that this is the motive of the proponent);
4. Ensuring broad recognition of the economic, social and political rights of the indigenous people in that area (Nord 2006, 299).

Canada's unilateral action by pursuing exclusively its national interests over the other seven Arctic states caused the negotiation process to be prolonged, bearing in mind the individual consultations that had begun for the purpose of revising the founding treaty. The greatest resistance to the original was directed by the United States of America and demands that the Canadian proposal be adapted to the interests of this great power (Nord 2006). The negotiation process was directed in the direction that implied the expansion of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to other political areas that are not related to purely environmental issues (Bloom 1999). Despite radical changes to the originally conceived concept and constant return to traditional elements

of multilateral cooperation, on September 19, 1996, in Ottawa, the Arctic states finally reached an agreement on the establishment of the Arctic Council. Accordingly, the members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United States of America and the Russian Federation (Arctic Council 1996). It is precisely the sovereignty of the aforementioned states that extends above the Arctic Circle.

According to the founding agreement, “The Council was formed as a high-level forum with the aim of providing the means to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states with the inclusion of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants in relation to common Arctic issues, especially issues of sustainable development and environmental protection on” (Arctic Council 1996). A particularly interesting position noted in the Ottawa Declaration (an integral part of the founding treaty) is that the Arctic Council will not deal with (in the text “it is prohibited”) issues related to military security. The mentioned position has a high level of restrictions on the cooperation of the Arctic states and is often the focus of disputes between the United States of America and Canada on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other. Moreover, in the document itself, it is possible to see the signatory states are also the ones in charge of controlling the work of the Arctic Council, while other actors like the repeatedly mentioned indigenous peoples are completely marginalized in terms of their role and contribution.¹ Namely, in Article 2 of the Declaration, it is clearly stated that the decisions of the Arctic Council must be made exclusively by consensus of all eight Arctic states. (Arctic Council 1996). Moreover, indigenous groups can have the status of “Permanent Participant”, although with the limitation that their number cannot equal or exceed the number of founders “at any time”(Arctic Council 1996; Arctic Council 2023a).

The Council’s activities are carried out through six Working Groups and one independent Expert Group responsible for a wide range of activities from climate change to emergency response, mental health and sustainable development (Arctic Council 2023a). The development of scientifically based research is the main task of the Arctic Council, which further enables quality decisions to be made in the sphere of environmental protection and Arctic security.

¹ According to available information from the Arctic Council, there are currently six indigenous peoples’ organizations that have achieved permanent participant status.

The establishment of the Arctic Council is actually the result of the collective political will of all eight Arctic states, while the absence of any legally binding provisions contributed to the loss of the international subjectivity of this organization. The functions of the Arctic Council are limited exclusively to adopting reports, making recommendations, and creating its own rules of procedure (Wilson 2016). Therefore, the rules of the Council are considered by the members to be binding in an ethical and not a legal sense, while everyone can use the Council's forum or not if they consider it appropriate. It has been shown that managing primarily the national interests of the member states completely shapes the role of the Arctic Council, while the degree of their cooperation, in the last few years, is quite low (East-West relationship).

The first period of the Council's work from 1996 to 2013 was marked by the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the five most powerful members of the Arctic Council (the "Arctic Five"), namely the Russian Federation, USA, Norway, Canada and Denmark at a meeting held outside the organization. The declaration expressly rejects the need for a "new and comprehensive international legal regime aimed at governing the Arctic Ocean" and calls for respect for the existing cooperation framework (Wilson 2016). According to some authors (Potts & Schofield 2008; Koivurova 2010), the Council was criticized as a strictly discussion forum that could not translate the discussion into concrete policies within the organization itself. A particularly striking move by the Council to grant observer status (in 2013) to six non-Arctic states, namely China, Japan, India, Singapore, South Korea and Italy, can be interpreted as the beginning of the reconfiguration of the so-called "exclusive club of Arctic nations" (Davis 2012; Wilson 2016).

The second period of functioning of the Arctic Council, from 2013 until today, has not significantly changed the originally defined way of management in which the national interests of the Arctic member states are highly privileged. At the ministerial meeting in Reykjavík held on May 20, 2021, the Strategic Plan of the Arctic Council for the period from 2021-2030 was presented, the content of which is strictly ecological in nature (Arctic Council 2021). However, in the last part of the documents, entitled "Stronger Arctic Council", it is precisely stated that "cooperation with relevant public and private bodies should be improved, including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council, as well as international institutions that reflect the connection between the Arctic and the rest of the world" (Arctic Council

2021, 23). The Arctic Coast Guard Forum can be seen as a channel for security dialogue between the United States of America and the Russian Federation when other channels are blocked (Østhagen 2015), which has been very relevant in recent years.

PROJECTION OF MILITARY POWER AND CONTROL OF THE ARCTIC

The establishment and development of the Arctic Council as an international organization with solid legal and institutional foundations and a formally unlimited mandate to manage the Arctic region were accompanied by the emergence of new political, economic, environmental and military threats with a wide potential to threaten a large number of states. However, with the Ottawa Declaration, the resolution of military and thus a part of security issues is completely excluded, despite the deployment of military forces in the Arctic dating back to the Cold War period. The necessity of expanding cooperation in the defense sphere is discussed by Willis in the work “Arctic Council: Supporting Stability in the Arctic”, when he explains that the armed forces are the only ones who have the ability to apply appropriate monitoring instruments outside of their responsibility and are trained to act in such a way inhospitable environment (Willis 2013). Certain steps towards the introduction of military forces in the implementation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, that is, the part related to responding in emergency situations, were made in 2011 with the adoption of the Agreement on Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. The security dilemma that arises from the introduction of certain forms of so-called soft security, as it turned out in the following years, is a prelude to a low-intensity conflict primarily between the most powerful signatories/founders of the Council of the United States of America (along with other Western countries) and the Russian Federation. It should be noted that the People’s Republic of China has also become one of the dominant security actors in controlling the Arctic in recent years.

Already in 2008, the European Union was actively involved in the security discourse related to the control of the Arctic. In the report of the European Commission entitled “The European Union and the Arctic Region” as the main problems in the management of the Arctic, the “fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of effective instruments, the absence of a comprehensive policy-making process, as

well as gaps in participation, implementation and geographical scope” are cited (European Commission 2008, 10). In addition, the interest in the policy of managing the Arctic, as expected, did not bypass even the most powerful military-political alliance, i.e. NATO.

In 2012, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the report “Forum for Arctic Climate Change and Security, Military Cooperation” states that in terms of NATO leadership, the Arctic needs a security management system that will include a military component (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2012). A decade later, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (Jens Stoltenberg) told the daily *Politico* that this organization “must increase its presence in the Arctic” in view of the increasing activity of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which sees itself as “a country close to the Arctic” (*Politico* 2023). By systematically reviewing the national strategic documents of individual countries/great powers, it is possible to see the importance of establishing control over the Arctic region for political, military and economic reasons.

In October 2022, United States officials presented the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which clearly envisions future security activities in the context of controlling the Arctic. The strategy is based on four interrelated pillars: first, security; other climate change and environmental protection; third, sustainable economic development; fourth, international cooperation and governance (The White House 2022). A particularly interesting part of the strategy refers to the sphere of security, where it is stated that “the US priority is to protect the American people, sovereign territory and people. In this regard, the US intends strengthening the military and civilian capacities needed to defend American interests in the Arctic, an area that has been neglected so far.” The Strategy further states “we will continue cooperation with Arctic allies and partners in support of achieving these goals and managing the risks of further militarization or unintended conflict, including those resulting from geopolitical tensions with Russia.” These improvements should “contribute to the national security and livelihood security of the State of Alaska” (The White House 2022, 8-9). Therefore, it can be concluded that the national interest of the USA is the control of the Arctic primarily through the process of militarization.

Within the framework of the first security pillar, three strategic goals are presented that should be fulfilled within the defined time frame from 2022 to 2032. The first goal concerns “improving understanding of

the Arctic operational environment” by investing in the modernization of equipment and assets dedicated to: observation, mapping, weather, water and sea ice forecasting, disaster preparedness and satellite coverage to enable efficient trade and ensure maritimately and air security. The second strategic objective is called “presence exercise in support of priority objectives” and has a special significance for the aforementioned militarization of the Arctic. Namely, the US armed forces should enable “homeland defense, global projection of the military and power and deterrence objectives”, whereby special attention is paid to the expansion of the US Arctic Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet to support the presence in the American Arctic and, if necessary, in the European Arctic. The last strategic goal, which unites the previous two, refers to “maximizing unity and efforts with allies and partners.” The maximization of cooperation with the Arctic states, as stated, is primarily motivated by improving common security and deterring aggression in the Arctic, especially from the Russian Federation. It also calls for increased interoperability and a focus on training and exercises including coordination with “NATO Allies and Arctic partners to defend NATO’s security interests in the region while reducing risks and preventing unintended escalation, especially during this period of heightened tensions with Russia” (The White House 2022, 9). Therefore, military and security analysts of the USA recognize the Arctic as a place of potential conflict with the Russian Federation and at the same time demand the active participation of NATO in the implementation of control and surveillance activities in this region.

The administration of US President Joseph Biden (Joe Biden) pays special attention to the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the Arctic Research Commission as key institutions responsible for implementing various activities in the Arctic.²Of course, as in the case of the adoption and implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic region, the American National Security Council, which unites the work of the aforementioned institutions at the federal level, has a decisive influence. However, any long-term military confrontation of the USA with the countries presented as the main competition in the Arctic, primarily the Russian Federation and possibly the People’s Republic of China, is not possible because of limited capacities, bearing in mind that the armed forces are untrained and unequipped to carry out war

² Read more about the *Transatlantic challenge of the Biden administration* in: Lišanin 2021.

activities in an unfavorable weather environment characteristic for low temperatures.

The change in the geopolitical situation on the European continent, which was initiated by the implementation of a special military operation in Ukraine, raised the issue of relations between the Arctic states. Namely, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the USA and Iceland make a decision to refuse cooperation with the Russian Federation within the Atlantic Council, even though this country has the role of chairman for the period from 2021 to 2023. The suspension of coordination with the largest acting state can lead to the collapse of the Atlantic Council, which further causes the emergence of new international conflicts in this region. Abie Tingstad, assistant director of the RAND Corporation, explains in the article “Putin’s actions in Ukraine spread north” that increased military activity could cause a collision, nuclear accident or other. It is a misunderstanding that continues to rapidly increase tensions between Russia, the Western Arctic states and even the People’s Republic of China (Tingstad 2022). The most likely escalation of the conflict is supported by the fact that any possible incursion (real or apparent) into the Northern Sea Route and the Barents Sea, i.e. its vast northern border, Russia could treat as a threat (Tingstad 2022). In addition, the presence of the People’s Republic of China in the Arctic, which since 2014 has been investing significant funds in the exploration and exploitation of gas and oil in the part of the Arctic under the control of the Russian Federation (Tingstad 2022), is an additional incentive to overcome the new crisis. Therefore, the limited ability of the US to maintain a military presence in the Arctic is one of the basic motives behind the announced formation of the NATO Arctic Command (NATO Arctic Command, ARCCOM), including close cooperation with the Baltic states, which the Russian Federation views as a threat to its national interests.

As a country whose northern borders are mostly located in the Arctic, the Russian Federation has the most modern equipment and means for carrying out a series of scientific, military and economic activities. The Russian Arctic is a territory inhabited by about 2.5 million inhabitants and extends over 24,000 km including: Murmansk Oblast, Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka Autonomous Oblasts and Komi Republic, northern municipalities of Arkhangelsk Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Oblast, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of Karelia, archipelago and islands in the Russian part of the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Council 2023b). In addition, the Russian Federation controls 53% of the coast

of the Arctic Ocean and thus the largest Exclusive Economic Zone at a distance of 370 kilometers from the continental part in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, as the key national interests of the Russian Federation in terms of presence in the Arctic, the following can be stated:

- Use of the Arctic region as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation through the solution of the issue of socio-economic development of the state;
- Preserving the Arctic as an area for peace and cooperation;
- Preserving the unique ecosystem of Arctic;
- Use of the Northern Sea Route as the national unified transport line of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2023b).

Since the Russian Federation strengthened its positions in the Arctic during the time of the Soviet Union through the construction of military and civil infrastructure, this type of activity has taken on a new and more intense form in the last few years. Namely, on October 26, 2020, a new Strategy for the development of the Russian Arctic zone and ensuring national security until 2035 (Кремль 2020) was adopted by the decree of President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Владимир Владимирович Путин) which represents continuity in terms of developing all the necessary Arctic control capacities. Seen through the prism of security sciences, the Strategy pays special attention to Article 18, clearly stating “that in order to ensure military security, protect and preserve the sovereignty of the Russian Federation through the effective exploitation of available natural resources (independently or in cooperation with other actors) and the control of the Northern Sea Passage. In order to preserve the state borders of the Russian Federation, constantly maintain the necessary level of combat readiness of the general-purpose units of the armed forces and other military formations, depending on the forecasted nature of military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (Кремль 2020, 15). In addition, comprehensive provision of combat and mobilization readiness at the level necessary, to solve the problem of violent pressure and aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies is foreseen, including the implementation of all types of activities in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (Кремль 2020, 16). Therefore, the Arctic region has strategic importance for the defense of the Russian Federation against potential aggressors that may

come from the eastern direction, ie. Bering Strait or from the western part via the bases stationed in Greenland and Norway.

The construction of naval and air bases of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, after a long period of stagnation from the time of the Soviet era, has been especially intensified since 2014 and the introduction of economic sanctions by Western countries led by the USA. From the perspective of the Russian Federation, natural resources in the Arctic provide a good enough basis for economic stability and social well-being. Precisely for this reason, the oil infrastructure and gas terminals require the undertaking of a series of preventive defense measures, which was confirmed by the construction of 10 search and rescue bases, 16 deep-water ports, 10 new air bases (out of a total of 14) and 10 air defense installations (РИА новости 2021a). Special attention of military strategists was attracted by the completion of the decades-long construction of the state-of-the-art military base “Arctic trefoil” (Арктический трилистник) on the island of Alexander Land, Franz Josef Land archipelago in the very north of the Russian Federation. The main task of this base is to provide anti-missile and anti-ship defense, and the garrison includes “Onyx” and “Bastion” missile complexes with a range of over 600 kilometers. The high defense range covers the entire Russian north and thus the Arctic area.

According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, because of the enormous importance of the Arctic for national interests, on December 15, 2014, the Joint Strategic Command “North” was established as a powerful formation of the Navy that has the status of a military district (Министерство обороны РФ 2018). The construction of modern military infrastructure in the north of the Russian Federation can also be interpreted as a deterrent strategy for NATO, bearing in mind that the Northern Fleet has a larger number of submarines and warships (RIA News 2021b). For example, the frigate “Admiral Gorshkov” and the nuclear submarine “Severodvinsk” became the first carriers of hypersonic missiles “Zirkon”. (РИА новости 2021б). Accordingly, the Northern Fleet is gradually turning into a full-fledged “army within an army”, where the command has the main forces and means that allow it to operate both in the Arctic region and beyond its borders - protecting the borders of the state or projecting the force factor (Газера ЗП 2021). The Northern Fleet has the function and capabilities to operate in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, including entering the North Atlantic.

According to researchers Paul & Swistek from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the Arctic security dilemma is becoming increasingly intense because of the growing military ambitions of the Russian Federation and to some extent the People's Republic of China (Paul & Swistek 2022). As an example, they cite Sweden, which in its new strategic document from November 2020 identifies "new military dynamics in the Arctic region." Data that in the period from 2021 to 2025, this country will increase its external expenses by 40% and even by 85% compared to the level of 2014 (Paul & Swistek 2022). Also, the USA and other NATO members have partially answered the question of how they will react to the increased engagement of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and North Atlantic region (Paul & Swistek 2022). The authors conclude that the measures they have implemented – armaments, exercises and redeployment of operational resources – must be embedded in a well-balanced combination of deterrence, defense and dialogue.

Contrary to the analyzes of Western experts on the Russian militarization of the Arctic region, Elena Karanauhova (Елена Каранухова) in the article "Possibility of armed conflict in the Arctic in the 21st century," explains the genesis of the relations of great powers in the matter of controlling the Arctic from the 20th to the 21st century. The author's basic conclusion is that, under the current circumstances, an armed conflict in the Arctic is not possible, but there are certain risks (Карнаухова 2021). The first risk of the militarization of the region arose "due to the interrupted communication between the Russian Federation and Western countries after the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, although the Russian side makes proposals for its restoration. Arctic contradictions bring us back to the question of the need to renew or modify the Russia-NATO Council. However, it would be dangerous to reduce the Arctic agenda to exclusively relations between Russia and the Alliance – this could expand the Baltic-Black Sea conflict system, as well as strengthen NATO's claims to be the key guarantor of security in the Arctic. At the same time, such a channel of communication should not be built on the basis of the Arctic Council, which may lead to the securitization of its mandate. A possible way out of that situation is the formation of a forum on security in the Arctic with the participation of the military Arctic and sub-Arctic states, as well as observer states of the Arctic Council. The development of the current Russian-Norwegian cooperation through the General Staff could encourage others to do so" (Карнаухова 2021). Another risk concerns NATO's military provocations in the Arctic Ocean

under the pretext of ensuring free navigation in the Northern Sea Route. The last risk is the Arctic case brings us back to the issue of information security.” The experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that to defeat the enemy, it is not at all necessary to conduct military operations on any territory. The wars of the future (more precisely, today's) are wars of a hybrid nature with an emphasis on countermeasures in the information space and attacks on critical infrastructure. The abundance of negative publications about the “war in the Arctic” is proof of that” (Карнаухова 2021). The author notes that cyber attacks by Western intelligence agencies on Russian infrastructure intended for strategic deterrence in the Arctic are a particular cause for concern.

One of NATO's largest military exercises in the last thirty years called “Cold Response” was held in 2022 in the Arctic with the participation of over 30,000 soldiers, 220 aircraft and 50 vessels from 27 countries. The participation of Norway as the host state of military tactical exercises, including the cooperation of Finland and Sweden, is particularly significant for the interpretation of the security situation and tensions surrounding the membership of these Baltic state in NATO. The Secretary General of NATO, in a conversation with the armed forces that participated in the exercise, stated that with these activities, “we show the unity and strength of NATO in action” (NATO 2022). On the other hand, the reaction of the Russian Federation to refuse to send its representatives to monitor the military exercise indicates this country's disagreement with NATO's increased military activities in the Arctic. Furthermore, the Russian Federation has activated a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) danger zone west of the Lofoten archipelago outside the main exercise area of NATO forces. However, an activated hazard warning does not indicate what weapon will be used within the hazard zone. Therefore, the actions of militarizing the Arctic through the implementation of military exercises and the construction of military infrastructure contribute to the creation of a security dilemma whose negative consequences can be reflected in international security.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the Arctic area as a natural resource of strategic importance for the countries that surround it, involves monitoring the political, economic, military, security and social aspects of real cooperation or possible conflict. The paper systematically describes

the role and importance of the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental organization whose basic task is to coordinate the activities of the Arctic states, primarily in the field of environmental protection, while military forms of cooperation are completely excluded. However, each of the signatories is guided exclusively by their national interests, which has a negative impact on the work of the Council, bearing in mind that the decisions made are not legally binding. Since the Arctic Council does not have executive powers, any form of cooperation is mainly reduced to voluntary participation, which in the case of accidental situations caused by anthropogenic or natural action can represent an extremely limiting character.

The second part of the paper contains a systematic analysis of the relationship of the Arctic states (with the status of great powers, ie. the USA and the Russian Federation) towards the Arctic as an important geostrategic area rich in natural resources. The results of the analysis of strategic documents show that the control of the Arctic represents one of the national interests, that is, energy stability, and then political, economic and social, will depend on the exploitation of resources that are above the world average in this area. In addition, the Northern Sea Route, as a corridor for international traffic, greatly shortens the distance between countries and trade centers on the East-West route. It is for these reasons that the Western Arctic states, led by the USA, are bringing up the issue of the militarization of the Arctic, accusing the Russian Federation of intensive construction of military air and naval bases. The paper also presents data related to the existing military potential of Russian Federation, linked to the dynamics of the armed crisis in Ukraine that began in 2014. On the other side, the more frequent military exercises of NATO members and the announced greater presence of armed forces, primarily the USA, have a significant impact on the disruption of the security situation in the northernmost part of the planet Earth. Based on the existing data, it can be concluded that political and military tensions over the control of the Arctic in the future may have negative consequences for international security, bearing in mind the fact that a certain reconfiguration of the international order implies a fight over strategically important areas rich in natural resources.

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Милош Томић

Факултет безбедности, Универзитет у Београду

СТРАТЕШКА КОНТРОЛА АРКТИКА И МОГУЋИ ОРУЖАНИ СУКОБ ВЕЛИКИХ СИЛА

Сажетак

Геополитичко надметање великих сила око контроле стратешки важних природних ресурса саставни је део политичке агенде усмерене ка достизању економске а тиме и војне доминације на глобалном нивоу. Територија Арктика као најсевернијег дела планете Земље располаже већим резервама природних ресурса (пре свега нафта и гас) за чију се суверену контролу и експлоатацију надмећу државе које окружују (укупно њих осам) ово подручје али у последње време и земље које су себи доделиле статус „близу арктичка држава“ као штп је НР Кина. Тренд убрзане милитаризације Арктика у периоду након завршетка Хладног рата може се тумачити као последица нарушених односа кључних актера међународне политике и различите перцепције будућег глобалног поретка. Циљ овог рада јесте систематичан опис динамике односа арктичких држава са посебним фокусом на САД (укључујући НАТО) и Руску Федерацију и њихових активности у војно-одбрамбеној сфери. Ради постизања пројектованог циља коришћена је техника анализе садржаја стратешких докумената, техника анализе наратива и историјско компаративна анализа. Резултати овог истраживања указују на повећано интересовање великих сила за контролу Арктика односно природних ресурса присутних на овом подручју као и стратешки важан међународни саобраћајни коридор Северни морски пут. Сходно томе ангажовање оружаних снага треба да омогући несметано спровођење дефинисаних политичко-економских активности арктичких држава са статусом великих сила.

Кључне речи: Арктик, природни ресурси, милитаризација, контрола, Северни морски пут

Siniša S. Domazet*

*Faculty of Security Studies, Educons University,
Sremska Kamenica*

Ivona Šušak-Lozanovska

Faculty of Law, University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola

CHILDREN'S DATA AND PRIVACY ONLINE – GROWING UP IN A DIGITAL AGE

Resume

Adolescents in the age of technology face a variety of security issues, but one of the most significant ones, that needs to be addressed by legislators, is privacy and data protection. Research has shown that children's rights, especially children's privacy, are regulated by a large number of international regulations. At the European level, both the European Union and the Council of Europe guarantee the rights to privacy and data protection. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act is the relevant act in the US. The most common violations of children's data and privacy have been found to be online data sharing and mobile application data collection practices. Children's privacy on the Internet can be improved by better communication between parents and children regarding Internet use, educating children about cyber security and online threats, using parental control software, installing antivirus programs on devices used by children and the like.

Keywords: Law, Security, Cyberspace, Children, Privacy

* Contact: sdomazetns@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The number of young Internet users has increased substantially in recent years, indicating that one-third of all Internet users worldwide are under 18 years old. (UNICEF 2019). The now growing Z (born between 1995-2010.) and Alpha (2010 -) generations has a tendency to spend more time online, and they start living their online life at a younger age.

Technological development offers incredible opportunities and can progress everyday life, but each major advantageous improvement also has many disadvantages. The emergence of internet-connected toys as well as other smart gadgets and applications that weren't necessary created for kids' usage has drawn much criticism. Unfortunately, they added many hidden concerns, such as invasions of privacy and data protection violations, in addition to the obvious risks like becoming a victim of some rather sexual violence, becoming addicted or with low self-esteem, becoming overweight or having other more serious health problems.

As a result children are becoming "data subjects" whose information are shared, gathered, and analyzed without their awareness or any comprehension of the repercussions. (Caglar 2021).

For children raised in a digital world, childhood has become "a critical site of datafication and dataveillance" (Mascheroni 2018). The digitalisation of their "lifeworlds" significantly affects both their ability to exercise their rights and the likelihood that their rights will be upheld or ignored. Because of this, just as every parent teaches their child the fundamental skills, they need knowing, such as exercising caution when crossing the street, it is now crucial for parents to educate their children how to use the Internet responsibly. However, governments also have important duties to carry out to highlight the need for children's protection, not just in their real lives, but also on the Internet.

In the digital era, children face a variety of security issues, but one of the biggest issues that has to be addressed by lawmakers is privacy and data protection. The paper will cover more of these problems and dilemmas.

THE CONCEPT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The dynamic development of information and communication technologies, artificial intelligence, blockchain technologies, the Internet

of Things has brought numerous changes in modern society and improved the lives of citizens. As stated by Dimitrijević, “with the development of communication networks, emerged the notion of ‘networked society’, a virtual world in which everyone communicates with everyone. This communication becomes a source of the most diverse data about people, since in the virtual world a person is far less careful. Apparent invisibility and distance creates a feeling of anonymity and security, so in certain situations people tend to give their personal data or undertake actions they would never do in the physical world” (Dimitrijević 2014.). However, it has been shown that modern technologies can be misused in various ways, especially when it comes to privacy. This opened numerous questions regarding the preservation of guaranteed human rights, but also opened the dilemma of the existing definitions of the concept of privacy. According to Diggelmann and Cleis, “the right to privacy made an impressive international career in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly because the umbrella notion lends itself to an application in diverse fields. In our age of information technology and electronic media, the integral guarantee of a right to privacy became a key right. Secondly, the importance of the right contrasts with the uncertainties about its conceptual basis” (Diggelmann / Nicole Cleis 2014). The right to privacy is particularly threatened by phishing, which has “evolved and become much more complex and sophisticated, including the use of numerous advanced software solutions for concealment to obtain sensitive (personal) data” (Autor 2018, 115-133).

At the moment, there is no universally accepted definition of privacy on the international level, but there are many different approaches to this concept in theory and jurisprudence.

For example, Bošković defines the right to privacy as “the right to prevent the risk, or reduce the risk to an acceptable level, that one subject uses other people’s private information, without being authorized to do so” (Bošković 2017). The definition of privacy given by American judges Samuel Warren and Louis Brandais in the 19th century is also interesting, who define the right to privacy as “the right to be left alone” (Warren / Brandais 1890). According to Diggelmann and Cleis, „the right to privacy had become an International HR before it was a nationally well-established fundamental right” (Diggelmann / Nicole Cleis 2014). Another definition of the right to privacy that was “born” by American jurisprudence should be mentioned at this point. Thus, in the 1965 case of *Griswold v. Connecticut*, which was decided before the US Supreme

Court, Sarat said that “the court identified a right to privacy grounded in the ‘penumbras’ and ‘emanations’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the US Constitution and argued that the right to privacy in marriage was older than the Bill of Rights itself” (Sarat 2015).

According to Sindelić, „in the second half of the 20th century, this right grew into the right to personal autonomy and consisted of guaranteeing through legal regulations a sphere of personal autonomy within which each individual would have the right to independently regulate their relations with other people. In France, it functions as a unique notion of private life, understood narrowly and with an emphasis on secrecy. In the German doctrine, the right to privacy was very limited, until a rule in 1954 by the Federal Court recognized the general personal rights, and explicitly the right of every person to a private sphere” (Sindelić 2012). The same author states that „the Swiss Civil Code contains a general clause on the protection of the individual, which is the legal basis for the protection of the right to privacy. The already determined right to privacy is the absolute subjective right of a natural person to be able to independently decide on introducing third parties to any manifestation of their personal existence. From this right arose specifically personal rights such as: the right to private life, the right to character, the right to vote, the right to personal writings” (Sindelić 2012).

There is also a definition given by Ho, Hichang, Rivera-Sánchez, Milagros, Lim, Sun Sun, who consider privacy as “personal autonomy, democratic participation, managing one’s own identity and social coordination” (Cho, Rivera-Sanchez / Sun Sun 2009) Kurland took the position that the right to privacy represents “a set of three rights: the freedom from intrusion and unauthorized observation of one’s private life, the right to maintain control over personal information, and the freedom to act without interference” (Kurland 1976) In the literature, there are viewpoints according to which privacy is defined as a political right, but also as a “right that exists to protect the interests of citizens” “ (Barnes 2006). Garfinkel defines the right to privacy as “as having control over something that belongs to the person, their autonomy and integrity, or as their right to control what details of their life can be disclosed” (Garfinkel 2000). There are also authors who understand the right to privacy as “the right of an individual to be protected from intrusion into their personal life, business affairs, lives of their family members, either by direct action or by disclosing personal information” (Shah 2013).

The literature also uses the term “information privacy”, which according to Boban, includes “information security, which means that an individual that lives in an information society decides when, to whom, to what extent and how will their personal data be disclosed, taking into account their rights and needs, as well as the rights and needs of the community they live in” (Boban 2012). Also, according to Boban, “information privacy incorporates the legal values of protection of the rights of individuals in a society with developed information technologies, whereas this concept of personal data protection related to communication via electronic networks is also called ‘e-privacy’” (Boban 2012). On the other side, there are also authors who use the term “privacy in electronic communications”, which includes “collecting, processing and providing information about the user to third parties, whereby individuals when recording activities and personal data determine when, how and in which measures information about their private sphere should and can be available to others” (Jovanović 2014).

When it comes to the right to privacy, it is of the greatest importance to refer to the relevant international regulations, as well as the activity of international organizations.

In this regard, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in Article 8 provides the “right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence”. According to ECHR „the suspension of this right may be exercised only when prescribed by Law or when necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or economic well-being of the country, to prevent social disorder and crime, to protect public health or morality, or to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. The right to privacy is also protected by Article 12 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with private life, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks on honor and reputation.” Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attack.” A similar position is contained in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966, which states that “no one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his private life, his family, his home or his correspondence, nor illegal injuries caused to his honor or his reputation.”

When it comes to the UN, General Assembly emphasized that member states had the duty to “respect and protect the right to privacy, including in context of digital communication” (United Nations General

Assembly, The right to privacy in the digital age 2013), and that “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy” (United Nations General Assembly, The right to privacy in the digital age: resolution 2015). The prohibition of violation of the right to privacy is also present in the Commentary of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from 1988, where in par. 8. states that “surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interception of telephone, telegraphic and other forms of communication, eavesdropping and recording of conversations should be prohibited” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 1988).

Also, the 2014 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also points to the prohibition of violating the right to privacy and points out that “the state must ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence is permitted by laws which (a) are publicly available; (b) contain provisions that ensure that the collection, access and use of communication data is tailored to certain legitimate purposes; (c) are sufficiently precise, specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which such interference may be permitted, procedures for granting authorization, categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance, limitations on the duration of surveillance, and procedures for the use and storage of collected data; and (d) provide effective safeguards against abuse” (United Nations General Assembly, The Right to privacy in the Digital Age 2014).

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights also protects the right to privacy. This was pointed out, for example, in the case of *Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom* from 2008, where in par. 56. states that “telephone, fax and e-mail communications are covered by the terms “private life” and “correspondence” in the sense of Article 8 (European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ed. S.D). The Court recalls its findings in previous cases [...] that the mere existence of a law authorizing a system for the secret monitoring of communications implies a threat of surveillance to all those to whom the law may apply. This threat necessarily affects the freedom of communication between users of telecommunication services and thus represents an interference with the exercise of the rights of the applicants under Article 8, regardless of all the measures taken against them” “ (Case of *Liberty and Others v. The United Kingdom* 2008).

Considering all the complexity of this concept and the challenges brought about by new technologies, it should not be surprising that

various bodies dealing with the protection of human rights have avoided precisely defining the concept of the right to privacy. Moreover, it can be said that in jurisprudence the concept of privacy is understood quite broadly (Author 2022). This was confirmed in the case of *Mikulić v. Croatia*, where the European Court of Human Rights in par. 54. took the position that “respect for private life requires everyone should be able to determine the details of their identity as individual human beings and that the individual’s right to such information is important because of its implications for his personality” (*Mikulić v. Croatia Judgment 2002*). The position of the Court in the case of *Pretty v. United Kingdom* is particularly important. It was underlined there (in par. 61) that “the concept of “private life” is a broad term that is not subject to an exhaustive definition.” It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. Sometimes it can encompass aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sex life belong to the personal sphere, in accordance with Article 8 (European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ed. S.D). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. Although no previous case has established as such the right to self-determination contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees” (*Pretty v. United Kingdom Judgment 2002*).

When it comes to national regulations, the right to privacy is regulated differently around the world. Thus, in some countries, the right to privacy is a constitutional category or is indirectly regulated by the constitution, as well as by regulations in the field of criminal legislation (the USA can be taken as an example). Some countries have their own legislation on the protection of personal data (in the Republic of Serbia, it is the Law on the Protection of Personal Data from 2018), while in some countries the right to privacy is unrecognized as an autonomous right at all, as is the case in China (Author 2022, 79-97).

Therefore, in the next part of the paper, we will discuss more about the concept of children’s data an privacy online, and then we will move on to the analysis of possible abuses.

CHILDREN'S DATA AND PRIVACY ONLINE – LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

It is obvious that the extensive collection, processing and analysis of personal data has grave consequences for the fundamental rights of data subjects of all age groups. Children deserve special protection due to their particular characteristics, thus they have specialized rights that exclusively apply to them, even though human rights are universal and apply to all equally (Caglar 2021).

The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is a significant agreement between nations that committed to defend and uphold children's rights. The UNCRC is an inspirational document that outlines the minimum standards all children should enjoy. According to the UNCRC, "children should be treated with respect and safeguarded, so they can realize their full potential." It also emphasizes the need for adults to behave in children's best interests by protecting them from harm and ensuring their rights are kept safe. (United Nations 1989).

The Convention ensures that every child has the right to privacy, or privacy protection, and also regulates children's access to information. But online existence was not as popular when the UNCRC was established, so no particular regulations regarding online services are included in this text. However, its concepts remain applicable in the virtual as well as the real world. This was confirmed in the UN resolution, which stated unequivocally that "rights that people have offline must also be protected online" (United Nations, UNESCO 2018). The UNCRC's essential principles and cornerstones should guide the stakeholders when implementing current regulations into practice, which consequently removes any question regarding whether these regulations can be used to protect children during the collection and usage of their data.

For a formal clarification of this dilemma, in order to explain how the Convention applies to the digital age, the CRC Committee decided to create a General Comment at the beginning of 2018. On March 24, 2021, General Comment 25 on Children's Rights in Relation to the Digital Environment went into effect, after being formally adopted. It explains, "why and how States and other duty bearers should act to achieve children's rights in the digital age." The CRC Committee is quite aware that discussions about new technologies are polarizing in stating that "the digital environment affords new opportunities for the realization of children's rights, but also poses risks of their violation and

abuse.” In few words, when it comes to protecting children’s rights in the digital age, the CRC Committee promotes a thoughtful, balanced approach to legislation and policymaking. The best interests of the child should be the first priority, and the development of children’s capacities should be a guiding element, in circumstances when public or private actors must strike a balance between child protection and participation (UNCRC 2021).

At the European level, both the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU) guarantee the rights to privacy and data protection.

The rights to privacy and data protection are outlined in a number of Council of Europe’s documents. These rights, were first of all, guaranteed by article 8 of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, following the 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. The 1981 Convention is the first legally binding international instrument that gives data subjects rights, provides fundamental principles and protections, and defends against abuses that may occur in connection with the collecting and processing of personal data. The Convention was amended in 2018 in light of the shortcomings in data privacy laws. (Council of Europe 2018). The Convention now explicitly compels “institutions to pay close consideration to the rights of children and other vulnerable individuals in data protection when it comes to raising public awareness, given the diverse roles of supervisory authorities” (Štareikė 2022).

Given that all individuals are covered by the ECHR’s and Convention 108’s provisions, it is obvious that children and adolescents are also covered by these laws and that their privacy and data are protected to the same extent, if not stronger, as those of older generations (ECHR, 2872/02), especially in light of the recent CoE focus on children’s rights.

This raising awareness of the importance of protecting children’s rights in the complex conditions of digitalization is especially evident through a series of recommendations, declarations, resolutions and strategies as part of so-called soft law. For example, the 2008 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on protecting the dignity, security and privacy of children on the Internet (Committee of Ministers 2008), the 2014 Recommendation on a Guide to human rights for internet users (Committee of Ministers 2014) and the 2016-2021 Strategy for the Rights of the Child (Council of Europe 2016) have emphasized how important it is to protect children’s rights in the world of the internet. The CoE Strategy for the Rights of the Child clearly states the digital world exposes

children to a wealth of opportunities, whether it is through computers, gaming consoles, tablets or smartphones” (Council of Europe 2016). The Strategy also stresses the digital environment has a dual function – on the one hand, it is pointed out that digitalization pose a potential danger of increasing vulnerability of children, while on the other hand, it opens the possibility of strengthening and protecting their rights to freedom of expression, to participation and to education (Milkaite / Lievens 2019).

A Recommendation on Guidelines to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill the Rights of Children in the Digital Environment was released by the Council of Europe in July 2018. With the assistance of this directive, stakeholders will be guided to develop and manage the frequently complicated digital environment. It is crucial to ensure the engagement and safety of children in this setting. Among the various topics covered are the vulnerability and resilience, helplines and hotlines, privacy and data protection, providing child-friendly content tailored to their changing needs, as well as the role and responsibilities of business enterprises. To guarantee that national policies effectively meet advancements in the digital world, the guidelines also urge governments to involve children in decision-making processes (Council of Europe 2018).

When it comes to European Union, the protection of privacy and personal data generally are part of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. “Every individual has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, the inviolability of housing and the confidentiality of communication”, according to Article 7 of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 8 determines the protection of personal data, which states that: “Everyone has the right to the protection of their personal data. Personal data must be properly processed and used only for the purposes for which it was collected, with the subject’s consent, or in accordance with other legal justifications specified by law” (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000).

Since 1995, when it comes to the European Union’s secondary laws, the Data Protection Directive (DPD) has served as the main legal text governing data protection in EU Member States. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which took effect in 2018, was adopted by the Council and the Parliament of the European Union in the context of the EU data protection reform because the previous legislation was inevitably out of date given that it was adopted more than 20 years ago.

In the paragraph (38) of its preamble, GDPR says that “Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, as they may

be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific protection should, in particular, apply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with regard to children when using services offered directly to a child. The consent of the holder of parental responsibility should be unnecessary in the context of preventive or counseling services offered directly to a child” (GDPR 2016/679).

In simple terms, the GDPR permits the collection of data for particular purposes and the storage of such data for a period of appropriate time, taking into account the duration of use and the principle of data minimization. Children’s personal information receives extra protection under GDPR, and data controllers that handle children’s information in the course of their business are subject to stricter requirements. Because of the difficult technological balance between service quality and compliance requirements in the areas of security and privacy, this rule serves as both a safeguard for children and a problem for digital service providers (Krasznay, Racz-Nagy / Dora 2020).

The Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications (e-Privacy Directive), which provides guidelines for the processing of personal data in these sectors, is another segment of the EU’s data protection model. In the upcoming years, the e-Privacy Regulation will take the place of this Directive. The Regulation would amend the present laws and provide further protections for users of these services, with the goal of preserving and enhancing privacy and data protection in the sphere of electronic communications (Gesley 2021).

The relevant legislation in the United States is the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which was enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. Limitations on the collection of children’s personally identifiable information, requirements for user-friendly and transparent privacy policies, and the need for verifiable parental consent prior to data collection are some of the key provisions of COPPA, thus providing an opt-in model for the processing of data of children under the age of 13. COPPA took effect in 2000, and in 2012, its regulations were updated to include protections for a mobile, geolocation, gaming, and social media activities. The definition of personally identifiable information was also expanded to include photos and other online content, and behavioral advertising, the use of “cookies,” and other identifiers were also restricted.

It's interesting to note the GDPR doesn't go into greater detail about this as the Children Privacy Protection Act does. It offers detailed illustrations and procedures for gaining valid consent. The GDPR now offers strong protections for children's privacy and data protection, but, it still needs to be improved to increase transparency and give individuals control over their personal information. This presents an opportunity to evaluate the current principles and how they are being implemented into practice (Verdoodt, Clifford / Lievens 2016).

MOST COMMON VIOLATION OF CHILDREN'S DATA AND PRIVACY ONLINE

There are many forms of violation of children's rights and violations of children's privacy. With the development of information and communication technologies, the variety and number of infringement cases will increase. Among the most famous forms of violation of children's privacy stand out "Sharenting" and Data Collection Practices of Mobile Applications.

"Sharenting"

"Sharenting" tends to be defined as any situation where an adult "transmits private details about a child via digital channels." Children's information can be uploaded to various data tracking technologies including fertility apps, smart toys or personal cloud servers, even though the phrase "sharenting" is typically used to relate to social media and popular telecommunications channels (Hsu 2019).

Taking adorable or humorous pictures and videos of children is nothing new, almost certainly we have all looked through family photo albums our parents created or seen home videos of ourselves at various ages and stages. However, as childhood and family life become more mediatized (Krotz & Hepp 2011), this leads to an increase in online visualization, which then follows a sharp rise in online photo sharing intended to produce "online biographies." (Autenrieth 2018).

Because technology is widely available and the Internet is easy accessible, more than 81 percent of children worldwide have an online presence before the age of two. This digital footprint may begin before birth for some thrilled parents who post prenatal sonograms, or it may begin later with photos of a toddler's "firsts" or even whole accounts

on various social networking sites that capture the sweet nuances of a child's development (Brosch 2018).

The risk associated with this more advanced method of documenting the child development is that now it has a bigger audience than ever before, complemented with the potential for it to go viral (whether intentionally or not). In addition, parents frequently post information about their children online that might be harmful, like their full name, date of birth, or photos that might be humiliating to them. It should be clear parents leave a digital trail of material about their children online, which may have unintended repercussions both now and in the future. According to these, Eric Schmidt thinks every young person will one day be able to change their name to renounce humiliating digital pasts, since, nobody knows how nowadays information will be utilized to mold children's online experience (Holman / Jenkins 2010).

Also, there are many other grave risks. Due to harassing and humiliating children to increase internet views, parents have lost custody; YouTube routinely removes child-focused videos out of concern for their exploitation; public information on children's habits and whereabouts exposes them to pedophiles, child abductors and other criminals who target this vulnerable group (Ranzini, Newlands / Lutz 2020).

The conflict of a parent's right to share online with a child's right to privacy is still unsolved. Unfortunately, laws do nothing to shield children from oversharing by parents, even there are laws in existence that safeguard an individual's privacy in some situations. In fact, the child's right to privacy only shields them from strangers, but in practice, it should also protect them from any harm that parents may do by sharing overmuch personal information. Parents sometimes fail to realize they merely have the legal authority to act in the child's best interests and are not the actual data owners of their child.

Data Collection Practices of Mobile Applications

It has been found that mobile applications (apps) can gather digital identifiers and send them to third-party companies.

Tens of thousands of the millions of programs (apps) available on the Google Play and Apple App Stores are child-targeted games or educational apps (Zhao, et al. 2020). Children use these applications on a regular basis, whether they are playing video games, messaging friends, exploring social media, or watching movies. Ad technology is gathering

millions of pieces of personal data on their activity when they interact with these applications.

“Super Awesome Research” shows that “by the time a child is 13, over 72 million pieces of personal data will have been captured about them” (Mccann 2021). While children are playing it, Subway Surfer, Candy Crush Saga, Angry Birds, and even educational technology apps designed to teach children how to paint or help them with their schoolwork all spy on them (Picalate 2022). These applications capture children’s general geolocations and other personally identifiable data, such as their app usage patterns and past purchases, and sell it to businesses that track user interests and forecast what they might like to buy.

Digital privacy laws like COPPA (in the US) and GDPR (in Europe) have been enacted to make this illegal, but this type of data-harvesting technology continues being the fundamental engine of the Internet. COPPA’s privacy protections only apply if it is known that a user is 13 years-old or younger. First, 13 is a completely arbitrary age for on-line users, and there’s no good reason why you don’t deserve privacy anymore when you are older. Second, no matter how old kids are, companies just have to get parental consent, then they can do nearly whatever they want with the data (COPPA 1998).

Article 8 of the GDPR effectively has the same requirements: “apps need verifiable parental consent before they can collect (but not process) data from children.” GDPR protects more children. It applies to children under 16 (but individual states may lower the age to 13 or in between). Privacy Policy clauses are required too. They need to be written in language that children can understand, and they should outline clearly the opt-ins and opt-outs, as well as a description of parental rights. One step forward are GDPR’s data minimization principles and they are clear that applications shouldn’t gather data they don’t need especially from children — and they should be clear about the data they do have, what they do with and how they delete it (European Union 2018).

But ultimately, it is up to the parents. They should examine the privacy rules of apps to check if they claim to be for adults only or if they share data with third parties. Therefore, unless we relieve busy parents of this responsibility, children’s privacy is under risk every day.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, it can be concluded that children's rights, especially children's privacy, are regulated by a large number of international regulations. At the European level, the right to privacy and the right to data protection are ensured both within the Council of Europe and within the European Union. The relevant law in the United States is the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, which is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. The most common violation of children's data and privacy was found to be online sharing, as well as the data collection practices of mobile applications. Of course, these are only some of the most common forms of abuse of children's data in cyberspace, but there are other forms that will appear at some point, given the rapid development of information and communication technologies.

Bearing in mind the above, it is necessary to take appropriate measures in order to more effectively protect children on the Internet and their personal data. In this regard, adequate steps should first be taken to educate children about cyber security and cyber threats. This should first of all refer to the use of social networks, measures to protect against fraud on the Internet, securing financial data, measures to protect computers from viruses and other malicious software. Secondly, it would be of great importance to use some parental control software, in order to gain control over the child's activities on the Internet, especially in terms of which websites are visited, the time spent on them, as well as insight into potentially malicious websites. Thirdly, the installation of adequate anti-virus programs in the devices used by children, as well as their regular updating, is of great importance. This applies not only to antivirus programs, but also to the Windows operating system and other accompanying software that children may use. Fourth, it is necessary to take appropriate steps in order to ensure the security of the home Internet network, as well as to educate children regarding access to public Wi-Fi networks. Finally, one of the main steps in protecting children in cyberspace and their personal data should be to create and nurture healthy virtual habits and cyber security awareness.

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Синиша С. Домазет

*Факултет за студије безбедности, Универзитет Едуконс,
Сремска Каменица*

Ивона Шушак-Лозановска

*Правни факултет, Универзитет „Св. Климент Охридски“,
Битољ*

ДЕЧЈИ ПОДАЦИ И ОНЛАЈН ПРИВАТНОСТ – ОДРАСТАЊЕ У ДИГИТАЛНОМ ДОБУ

Сажетак

У дигиталној ери постоји безброј безбедносних проблема са којима се малолетници суочавају, али заштита приватности и података један је од главних изазова које законодавци треба да реше. Истраживања су показала да су права детета, посебно приватност деце, регулисана великим бројем међународних прописа. На европском нивоу, право на приватност и право на заштиту података обезбеђени су како у оквиру Савета Европе, тако и у оквиру Европске уније. Релевантни закон у Сједињеним Државама је Закон о заштити приватности деце на мрежи, који спроводи Федерална комисија за трговину. Утврђено је да је најчешће кршење приватности деце онлајн дељење, као и пракса прикупљања података мобилних апликација. Приватност деце на интернету може се побољшати бољом комуникацијом родитеља и деце у вези са коришћењем интернета, едукацијом деце о сајбер безбедности и онлајн претњама, коришћењем софтвера за родитељску контролу, инсталирањем антивирусних програма на уређаје које деца користе и слично.

Кључне речи: право, безбедност, сајбер простор, деца, приватност

УПУТСТВО ЗА АУТОРЕ

У часопису *Политика националне безбедности* објављују се радови који представљају резултат најновијих теоријских и емпиријских научних истраживања у области политичких наука. Аутори би приликом писања радова требало да се позивају претежно на резултате научних истраживања који су објављени у научним часописима, првенствено у часописима политиколошке тематике. Радови се објављују на српском језику и ћириличком писму или енглеском, руском и француском језику.

Часопис се објављује два пута годишње. Рокови за слање радова су: 1. април и 1. октобар.

Исти аутор не може да објави рад у два узастопна броја часописа, без обзира да ли је реч о самосталном или коауторском раду.

Радове слати на имејл-адресу: pnb@ips.ac.rs.

Научни чланак може имати највише 40.000 карактера са размацама, укључујући фусноге. Приликом бројања карактера изоставити списак референци. Изузетно, монографска студија може бити већег обима у складу са одредбама *Правилника о поступку, начину вредновања и квантитативном исказивању научноистраживачких резултата истраживања*.

Осврт може имати највише 15.000 карактера са размацама.

Приказ књиге може имати највише 10.000 карактера са размацама. Приликом провере броја карактера користити опцију *Review/Word Count/Character (with spaces)* уз активiranу опцију *Include textboxes, footnotes and endnotes*.

НАЧИН ЦИТИРАЊА

Часопис *Политика националне безбедности* користи делимично модификовани Чикаго стил цитирања (17. издање приручника *Chicago Manual of Style*), што подразумева навођење библиографске парентезе (заграде) по систему аутор–датум у тексту, као и списак референци са пуним библиографским подацима након текста рада. Податке у библиографској парентези и списку референци навести на језику и писму на коме је референца објављена.

У наставку се налазе правила и примери навођења библиографских података у списку референци и у тексту. За сваку врсту референце прво је дато правило навођења, а затим пример навођења у списку референци и библиографској парентези.

Библиографска парентеза се по правилу наводи на крају реченице, пре интерпункцијског знака, и садржи презиме аутора, годину објављивања и одговарајући број страна, према следећем примеру: (Суботић 2010, 15–17).

Монографија

Један аутор

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

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Два или три аутора

Презиме, име, и име презиме. Година издања. *Наслов*. Место издања: издавач.

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Четири и више аутора

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Уредник/приређивач/преводиоца уместо аутора

Након навођења имена, ставити зарез, па након тога одговарајућу скраћеницу на језику и писму референце, нпр. „ур.“, „прев.“, „orig.“, „ed.“, „eds.“

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Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов поглавља.” У *Наслов*, ур. име презиме, број страна на којима се налази поглавље. Место издања: издавач.

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Чланак у научном часопису

Чланак у редовном броју

Презиме, име. Година издања. „Наслов чланка.” *Наслов часописа* волумен (број): број страна на којима се налази чланак. DOI број.

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Енциклопедије и речници

Наведен је аутор/уредник

Презиме, име, име и презиме, ур. Година издања. *Наслов*. Том. Место издања: издавач.

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Није наведен аутор/уредник

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Наведен је аутор

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Референца са корпоративним аутором

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Посебни случајеви навођења референци

Навођење другог и сваког следећег издања

Презиме, име. Година издања. *Наслов*, напомена о издању. Место издања: издавач.

Гаћиновић, Радослав. 2018. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Ево Book.

Више референци истог аутора

1) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Ређати према години издања, почевши од најраније.

Степић, Миломир. 2012. „Србија као регионална држава: реинтеграциони геополитички приступ.” *Национални интерес* 14 (2): 9–39. doi: 10.22182/ni.1422012.1.

Степић, Миломир. 2015. „Позиција Србије пред почетак Великог

рата са становишта Првог и Другог закона геополитике.” У *Србија и геополитичке прилике у Европи 1914. године*, ур. Миломир Степић и Љубодраг П. Ристић, 55–78. Лајковац: Градска библиотека; Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

2) *Исти аутор, иста година* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу почетног слова назива референце. Поред године објављивања ставити почетна слова азбуке или абецеде која се користе и у библиографској парентези.

Гађиновић, Радослав. 2018а. „Војна неутралност и будућност Србије.” *Политика националне безбедности* 14 (1): 23–38. doi: 10.22182/rpb.1412018.2.

Гађиновић, Радослав. 2018б. *Млада Босна*, друго допуњено и измењено издање. Београд: Evro Book.

(Гађиновић 2018а, 25), (Гађиновић 2018б)

3) *Исти аутор као самостални аутор и као коаутор* – Прво навести референце у којима је самостални аутор, а затим оне у којима је коаутор.

Стојановић, Ђорђе. 2016. „Постмодернизам у друштвеним наукама: стање парадигме.” У „Постмодернизација српске науке: политика постмодерне / политика после постмодерне”, ур. Ђорђе Стојановић и Мишко Шуваковић, посебно издање, *Српска политичка мисао*: 5–35. doi: 10.22182/spm.specijal2016.1.

Стојановић, Ђорђе, и Живојин Ђурић. 2012. *Анатомија савремене државе*. Београд: Институт за политичке студије.

4) *Исти аутор као први коаутор у више различитих референци* – Ређати према азбучном или абецедном редоследу презимена другог коаутора.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Посебни случајеви навођења библиографске парентезе

Изузеци од навођења библиографске парентезе на крају реченице

1) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице* – Годину издања ставити у заграду након навођења презимена, а број стране на крају реченице у заграду. За референцу на латиници или страном језику у загради навести и презиме аутора.

„Према мишљењу Суботића (2010), ...” (30).

„Бокслер (Bochsler 2018) у својој књизи тврди...”

2) *Навођење презимена аутора у оквиру реченице пре цитата из*

референце – Након навођења презимена, у библиографској парентези навести годину и број стране, а затим навести цитат.

Као што Суботић (2010, 45) наводи: „ ... ”

Миршајмер (Mearsheimer 2001, 57) изричито тврди: „ ... ”

3) *Навођење исте референце више пута у једном пасусу* – Ако се наводи иста страна или опсег страна, унети библиографску парентезу приликом последњег навођења или на крају пасуса пре интерпункцијског знака. Ако се наводе различите стране, референцу навести приликом првог позивања на одређену страну, а затим до краја пасуса у заграду стављати само различите бројеве страна. Не користити „исто”, „*ibid*”, или „*op. cit.*” за вишеструко навођење референце.

Навођење израза „видети”, „упоредити” и сл.

Изразе унети у библиографску парентезу.

(видети Кнежевић 2014, 153)

(Степић 2015; упоредити Кнежевић 2014)

Секундарна референца

У библиографској парентези прво навести презиме аутора, годину и број стране примарне референце, затим „цитирано у:” и презиме аутора, годину и број стране секундарне референце. У списку референци навести само секундарну референцу.

„Том приликом неолиберализам се од стране највећег броја његових протагониста најчешће одређује као политика слободног тржишта која охрабрује приватне фирме и побољшава избор потрошачима, разарајући при том ’неспособну, бирократску и паразитску владу која никада не може урадити ништа добро, без обзира на њене добре намере’” (Chomsky 1999, 7 цитирано у: Ђурић и Стојадиновић 2018, 47).

Ђурић, Живојин, и Миша Стојадиновић. 2018. „Држава и неолиберални модели урушавања националних политичких институција.” *Српска политичка мисао* 62 (4): 41–57. doi:10.22182/srp.6242018.2.

Иста библиографска парентеза, више референци

1) *Различити аутори* – Референце одвојити тачком и зарезом.

(Степић 2015, 61; Кнежевић 2014, 158)

2) *Исти аутор, различите године* – Навести презиме аутора, а затим године издања различитих референци по редоследу од најраније до најновије и одвојити их зарезом, односно тачком и зарезом када се наводи број страна.

(Степић 2012, 2015) или (Степић 2012, 30; 2015, 69)

3) *Различити аутори, исто презиме* – Иницијал имена. Презиме аутора. Година издања.

(Д. Суботић 2010, 97), (М. Суботић 2010, 302)

Суботић, Драган. 2010. „Нови јавни менаџмент у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 91–114. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.5.

Суботић, Момчило. 2010. „Војводина у политичком систему Србије.” *Политичка ревија* 23 (1): 289–310. doi: 10.22182/pr.2312010.15.

Правни акти

У библиографској парентези навести члан, став и тачку или параграф коришћењем скраћеница „чл.”, „ст.”, „тач.”, „Art.” „para.” и сл.

Устави и закони

Назив акта [акроним, по потреби], „Назив службеног гласила” и број, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Устав Републике Србије, „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 98/06.

(Устав Републике Србије 2006, чл. 33)

Закон о основама система образовања и васпитања [ЗОСОВ], „Службени гласник Републике Србије”, бр. 88/2017, 27/2018 – др. закон, 10/2019 и 27/2018 – др. закон.

(ЗОСОВ 2019, чл. 17, ст. 4)

Zakon o nasljeđivanju [ZN], „Narodne novine“, br. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, i 33/15 i 14/19.

(ZN 2019, čl. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Одлуке државних органа и институција

Назив органа [акроним или скраћени назив], Назив акта и број предмета, датум доношења акта, или интернет адреса и датум последњег приступа.

Заштитник грађана Републике Србије [Заштитник грађана], Мишљење бр. 15–3314/12, 22. октобар 2012, https://www.osobesainvaliditetom.rs/attachments/083_misljenje%20ZG%20DZ.pdf, последњи приступ 20. децембра 2019.

(Заштитник грађана, 15–3314/12)

U.S. Department of the Treasury [USDT], Treasury Directive No. 13–02, July 20, 1988, <https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/td13-02.aspx>, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(USDT, 13–02)

Законодавни акти Европске уније

Назив акта, подаци из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.
(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Међународни уговори

Оснивачки уговори Европске уније

Назив уговора или консолидоване верзије [акроним], подаци о коришћеној верзији уговора из службеног гласила у формату наведеном на сајту *EUR-lex*: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 191, 29.7.1992, p. 1–112.
(TEU 1992, Art. J.1)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 13–45.
(TEU 2008, Art. 11)

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 1–388.
(TFEU 2016, Art. 144)

Остали међународни уговори

Назив уговора [акроним или скраћени назив], датум закључивања, регистрација у Уједињеним нацијама – UNTS број, регистрациони број са сајта *United Nations Treaty Collection*: <https://treaties.un.org>.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], 15 April 1994, UNTS 1867, I-31874.
(Marrakesh Agreement 1994)

Convention on Cluster Munitions [CCM], 30 May 2008, UNTS 2688, I-47713.
(CCM 2008)

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [Israel Jordan Peace Treaty], 26 October 1994, UNTS 2042, I-35325.

(Israel Jordan Peace Treaty 1994)

Одлуке међународних организација

Назив међународне организације и надлежног органа [акроним], број одлуке, Назив одлуке, датум усвајања.

United Nations Security Council [UNSC], S/RES/1244 (1999), Resolution 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999.
(UNSC, S/RES/1244)

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], Doc. 14326,

Observation of the presidential election in Serbia (2 April 2017), 29 May 2017.
(PACE, Doc. 14326, para. 12)

Судска пракса

Судска пракса у Републици Србији

Врста акта и назив суда [акроним суда], број предмета са датумом доношења, назив и број службеног гласника или друге публикације у коме је пресуда објављена – ако је доступно.

Одлука Уставног суда Републике Србије [УСРС], IУа-2/2009 од 13. јуна 2012. године, „Службени гласник РС”, бр. 68/2012.
(Одлука УСРС, IУа-2/2009)

Решење Апелационог суда у Новом Саду [АСНС], Ржр–1/16 од 27. априла 2016. године.
(Решење АСНС, Ржр–1/16)

Судска пракса Међународног суда правде

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, врста одлуке са датумом доношења, назив и број гласила у коме је пресуда објављена, број стране.

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)*, Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 644.
(ICJ Judgment, 2011)

International Court of Justice [ICJ], *Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports, p. 403.
(ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2010)

Судска пракса Суда правде Европске уније

Назив случаја, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (*ECLI*).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.
(*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union*, C-270/12) или
(CJEU, C-270/12)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/12, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 12 September 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562.
(Opinion of AG Jääskinen, C-270/12)

Судска пракса Европског суда за људска права

Назив случаја, број представке, врста случаја са датумом доношења, Европска идентификациона ознака судске праксе (*ECLI*).

Pronina v. Ukraine, No. 63566/00, Judgment of the Court (Second Section) on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 July 2006, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0718JUD006356600.

(*Pronina v. Ukraine*, 63566/00, par. 20) или (ECHR, 63566/00, par. 20)

Судска пракса других међународних судова и трибунала

Назив суда [акроним суда], *Назив случаја*, број случаја, врста случаја са датумом доношења.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY], *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-A-AR77, Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, Judgment of 27 February 2001.

(*Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic*, IT-94-1-A-AR77) или (ICTY, IT-94-1-A-AR77)

Архивски извори

Назив установе [акроним или скраћени назив], назив или број фонда [акроним или скраћени назив], кутија, фасцикла (уколико постоји), сигнатура, „Назив документа” (ако нема назива, дати кратак опис одговарањем на питања: ко? коме? шта?), место и датум документа или н.д. ако није наведен датум.

Архив Србије [АС], МИД, К-Т, ф. 2, r93/1894, „Извештај Министарства иностраних дела о постављању конзула”, Београд, 19. април 1888.

(АС, МИД, К-Т, ф. 2)

(АС, МИД, ф. 2) – ако је позната само фасцикла, а не и кутија Dalhousie University Archives [DUA, Philip Girard fonds [PG], B-11, f. 3, MS-2-757.2006-024, “List of written judgements by Laskin,” n.d. (DUA, PG, B-11, f. 3)

Извори са интернета

Презиме, име или назив корпоративног аутора [акроним]. Година објављивања или н.д. – ако не може да се утврди година објављивања. „Наслов секције или стране унутар сајта.” *Назив сајта*. Датум креирања, модификовања или последњег приступа страници, ако не може да се утврди на основу извора. Интернет адреса.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. “Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html>.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Институт за политичке студије [ИПС]. н.д. „Предавање др Фридриха Ромига.” *Институт за политичке студије*. Последњи приступ 10. октобар 2018. <http://www.ips.ac.rs/rs/news/predavanje-dr-fridriha-romiga/>.

(Институт за политичке студије [ИПС], н.д.) – *прво навођење*
(ИПС, н.д.) – *свако следеће навођење*

Танјуг. 2019. „Европска свемирска агенција повећава фондове.” 28. новембар 2019. <http://www.tanjug.rs/full-view1.aspx?izb=522182>. (Танјуг 2019)

ФОРМАТИРАЊЕ ТЕКСТА

Опште смернице о обради текста

Текст рада обрадити у програму *Word*, на следећи начин:

- величина странице: А4;
- маргине: *Normal* 2,54 cm;
- текст писати курентом (обичним словима), осим ако није другачије предвиђено;
- проред између редова у тексту: 1,5;
- проред између редова у фуснотама: 1;
- величина слова у наслову: 14 pt;
- величина слова у поднасловима: 12 pt;
- величина слова у тексту: 12 pt;
- величина слова у фуснотама: 10 pt;
- величина слова за табеле, графиконе и слике: 10 pt;
- увлачење првог реда пасуса: 1,27cm (опција: *Paragraph/Special/First line*);
- поравнање текста: *Justify*;
- боја текста: *Automatic*;
- нумерација страна: арапски бројеви у доњем десном углу;
- не преламати речи ручно уношењем цртица за наставак речи у наредном реду;
- сачувати рад у формату .doc.

Примена правописних правила

Радове ускладити са *Правописом српског језика* у издању Матице српске из 2010. године или из каснијих издања.

Посебну пажњу обратити на следеће:

- Приликом првог навођења **транскрибованих страних**

имена и израза у облој загради поред навести и њихове облике на изворном језику у курзиву (*italic*), нпр: Франкфуртер алгемајне цајтунг (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*), Џон Ролс (*John Rawls*), Алексеј Тупољев (*Алексей Туполев*).

- Поједине **општепознате стране изразе** писати само на изворном језику у курзиву, нпр. *de iure, de facto, a priori, a posteriori, sui generis* итд.

- **Реченицу не почињати** акронимом, скраћеницом или бројем.

- **Текст у фуснотама** увек завршавати тачком.

- За навођење израза или **цитирања на српском језику** користити наводнике који су својствени српском језику према важећем правопису („ ”), а за навођење или **цитирање на енглеском или другом страном језику** користити наводнике који су својствени том језику (“ ”, « »).

- **Угласом заградом** [] означавати: 1) сопствени текст који се умеће у туђи текст; или 2) текст који се умеће у текст који је већ омеђен облом заградом.

- **Црту** писати са размаком пре и после или без размака, никако са размаком само пре или само после. Између бројева, укључујући бројеве страна, користити примакнуту црту (–), а не цртицу (-).

- За **наглашавање појединих речи** не користити подебљана слова (**bold**), нити подвучена слова (underline) већ искључиво курзив (*italic*) или наводнике и полунаводнике (‘ ’ на српском језику или ‘ ’ на енглеском језику).

Форматирање научног чланка

Научни чланак форматирати на следећи начин:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

Име и презиме другог аутора

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ РАДА**

** Фуснота: по потреби, навести један од следећих (или сличних) података: 1) назив и број пројекта у оквиру кога је чланак написан; 2) да је рад претходно изложен на научном скупу у виду усменог саопштења под истим или сличним називом; или 3) да је истраживање које је представљено у раду спроведено за потребе израде докторске дисертације аутора.

Сажетак

Сажетак, обима од 100 до 250 речи, садржи предмет, циљ, коришћени теоријско-методолошки приступ, резултате и закључке рада.

Кључне речи: Испод текста сажетка навести од пет до десет **кључних речи**. Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

У тексту је могуће користити највише три нивоа поднаслова. **Поднаслов** навести без нумерације, на следећи начин:

ПОДНАСЛОВ ПРВОГ НИВОА

Поднаслов другог нивоа

Поднаслов трећег нивоа

Табеле, графиконе и слике уносити на следећи начин:

- изнад табеле/графикона/слике центрирано написати: Табела/Графикон/Слика, редни број и назив;
- испод табеле/графикона/слике навести извор на следећи начин: 1) уколико су табела/графикон/слика преузети, написати *Извор:* и навести референцу на исти начин као што се наводи у библиографској парентези; 2) уколико нису преузети, написати *Извор:* Обрада аутора.

Референце наводити у тексту према *Начину цитирања*.

Фусноте користити искључиво за давање напомена или ширих објашњења.

РЕФЕРЕНЦЕ

Списак референци навести након текста рада, а пре резимеа, на следећи начин:

- прво навести референце на ћирилици по азбучном реду;
- затим навести референце на латиници и страним језицима по абecedном реду;
- прву линију сваке референце поравнати на левој маргини, а остале увући за 1,27 cm, користећи опцију *Paragraph/Special/Hanging*;
- све референце наводити заједно, без издвојених делова за правне акте или архивску грађу;
- референце не нумерисати;
- наводити искључиво оне референце које су коришћене у тексту.

Након списка референци навести име и презиме аутора, наслов

рада и резиме на енглеском језику на следећи начин:

First Author*

* In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended.

Affiliation

Second Author

Affiliation

TITLE

Resume

Резиме, обима до 1/10 дужине чланка, садржи резултате и закључке рада који су образложени опширније него у сажетку.

Keywords: Кључне речи писати курентом и једну од друге одвојити зарезом.

Уколико је **рад написан на страном језику**, након списка референци, име и презиме аутора, наслов, резиме и кључне речи навести на српском језику.

Форматирање осврта

Осврт форматирати на исти начин као научни чланак, без навођења сажетка, кључних речи и резимеа.

Форматирање приказа

Приказ књиге форматирати на следећи начин:

Текст поделити у **две колоне**.

Име и презиме аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора:
Препоручује се навођење институционалне
имејл-адресе аутора.

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ ПРИКАЗА

Испод наслова **поставити**

слику предње корице

Испод слике предње корице
навести податке о књизи према

следећем правилу:

Име и презиме. Година

издања. *Наслов*. Место

издања: издавач, број страна.
Текст приказа обрадити у
складу са општим смерницама
о обради текста.

УПУТСТВО РЕЦЕНЗЕНТИМА

Улога рецензента је да допринесе очувању високог квалитета нашег часописа. Рецензије су анонимне у оба смера. Рок за рецензирање је седам дана од пријема рада. Садржај рецензије је поверљив, те се не сме откривати особама које нису у уредништву часописа. Уколико рецензент у било ком тренутку схвати да постоји било који вид конфликта интереса у вези са радом који треба да рецензира потребно је да о томе што пре обавести редакцију. **Приликом рецензије рукописа, рецензент треба да попуни рецензентски лист у прилогу.**

Име, презиме и звање аутора текста:

Назив рада:

Актуелност, друштвени и научни значај разматране теме:

У којој мери је аутор јасно назначио теоријски, методолошки приступ у раду:

Да ли је рад заснован на савременој и релевантној литератури, посебно у којој мери је аутор користио најновије резултате објављене у научним часописима и зборницима (посебно часописи и зборници из политикологије).

Научни и друштвени допринос рада. Општи коментар о квалитету рада:

Ваша сугестија аутору за побољшање квалитета рада, ако је потребно: Молимо Вас да одаберете једну од препорука за категоризацију рада:

1. Оригинални научни рад
2. Прегледни рад
3. Научна критика, полемика и осврти

Молимо Вас да одаберете једну од препорука о публикавању овог рада:

1. Објавити без измена
2. Објавити уз мале измене
3. Након корекције, рад послати на нови круг рецензије
4. Одбити

Додатни коментари за уредника који се тичу етичких (плагијаризам, превара, итд.) или неких других аспеката рада, а који ће уреднику помоћи у доношењу коначне одлуке о даљем статусу рада.

Датум оцене рада

Име, презиме и научно звање рецензента:

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