

***Dragan Simeunović\****

*Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade*

## **GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\*\***

### **Abstract**

To understand the relation between globalization and international relations, it is necessary to propaedeutically differentiate notions of new world order, globalism, and globalization that are often used without much theoretical understanding, sometimes even as synonyms, which creates terminological confusion. These are three different terms that are related because they refer to intertwined phenomena. Globalism is an ideology, globalization is a process of implementing the ideological premises of globalism, and the new world order is a political- legal system of an emerging world. Concept and practice of globalization include radical change in the modern world in favour of one centre of power and thus imply drastic change in international relations. Globalization implies that contemporary international relations should be characterized by: informal government of the world from one centre of power by controlling and guiding global political, economic, and financial flows; democratization of all world countries by introducing Euro-Atlantic model of democracy as the only valid one; negation of national sovereignty and overcoming national identity; diminished role of the UN and of all international organizations and institutions where proponents of globalizations are not decision makers; ‘managerial’

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\* E-mail: dragan.simeun@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0003-6455-5769

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instead of mediating diplomacy; exclusivity of the right of globalists to use force in international relations; favoring humanitarian interventions as a type of armed conflicts; attempt to direct migrant flows and their intensity; deprivation of rights to progress to all non-globalized countries, even more stronger ones such as Russia and China; putting international relations directly into service of satisfying interests of multinational companies. The proponents of globalization have had only limited success in these efforts due to various types of resistance. Globalization has been mostly achieved at the international economic level, and much less at the international political and international security levels. Although the beginning of globalization announced a fast end to the national state, its sovereignty, and consequently a nation as its basis, this has not happened. Almost everything that has had a national prefix resisted globalization to a greater or lesser extent in the name of the right of the individual to exist as much as the general, and this is the main reason why globalists see the national as the greatest threat. The time of great migrations, as well as the war between Russia and Ukraine, fueled by arms, funds, and logistics of the Western forces, brought new, great, and consequently still unfathomable challenges not only to globalization as a process, but to globalism as an ideology and new world order as a projected political-legal construction of a global system. Russia has announced the new concept of a new world order, and many countries, some of which are EU members, have stood up against global models, thus pivoting strongly towards their national interests, restoration of their national sovereignty, and strengthening of their national values, although it seemed up until recently that these countries had completely merged into supranational unity. It is becoming more obvious that the war and migrations were just a reason for a reiterative renewal of the concept of a national state as an important heritage and its greater independence, and not only on the territory of Europe, indicating a process of re-sovereignisation in globalized areas as a more widespread phenomenon. This, as well as other current processes of using and distributing power among states at a global level, will undoubtedly strongly affect the profiling of international relations in the near future.

**Keywords:** globalization, international relations, sovereignty, national state, migrations, armed conflicts, re-sovereignisation

*We wanted capitalism, so let's endure the victory!*  
Momo Kapor

In the pursuit of harmony that includes his own good, man has always strived to arrange the world around him in the way he thinks is best for him. The problem is that we do not all have the same vision of harmony, and that what is best for one person, often is not best for another. This human aspiration, and at the same time the problem related to it, is also evident in the institutional efforts of powerful states to organize the world according to their own model and will, which always means, according to their own interests and with the greatest possible benefits for themselves.

Until the present moment in the recorded history of civilization, no endeavor has been made to establish a comprehensive political framework that would be, if not more favorable to others than for its founders, then at least a framework of fairness regarding the aspirations of all, and in terms of advantages for all whom it embraces (Simeunović 2014). “This was the main problems of all previous concepts of the new world orders in history,” and it was also the main reason for their incompleteness and collapses (Simeunović 2014, 108). “Even the so-called communist political order, which advertised itself as an order of absolute equality, was nothing more than a specific attempt to establish a new world, a ‘red’ order, and did not at all meet these conditions” (Simeunović 2014, 108). Not solely did it, in both theoretical and ideological terms, privilege a single social stratum – namely the proletariat – by granting it an unfounded entitlement to govern all other classes, but in practical implementation, it was a different stratum, the political bureaucracy, that emerged as the primary beneficiary. Within that political framework, this bureaucracy was the sole group that succeeded in realizing nearly all of its own interests, including the exercise of governance in the name of the working class (Simeunović 2014). “Obviously, communist and all the other political orders in the world were based on the principle of *vis dominandi*. Precisely for this reason, this trap set for others, which was, in fact, the cause of the downfall of globally imagined orders, could not avoid even communism, that was nothing more than the concept and practice of attempting to achieve such a world order in which the working class, or more precisely its political representatives, would have a dominant position, and in which their interests and benefits would be the most important” (Simeunović 2014, 108).

Furthermore, a profound flaw inherent in incomplete global political systems resides in their endeavor to transpose the centralized power model of their own nation-state onto a framework for governing the entire world. This conceptual oversight arose from the circumstance that nation-states entail a particular form of consensus, as well as a specific entitlement – and indeed an obligation – to organize the life of their own collective entity, including the family, from the apex of authority, in an optimal manner, even employing a measure of compulsion. Nevertheless, identity-based collectives – ranging from the family unit to the nation – generally comprehend and acquiesce to this dynamic that it is not about “making people happy by force.”<sup>1</sup> Given these circumstances, “in this increased benefit from an ordered, Ours, lies the meaning of social unity and voluntary involvement in every collective, especially the one that has the most potential to accomplish our good due to its possession of political as the greatest of powers” (Simeunović 2014, 108–109).

In all remaining instances where a collective identity is absent, the inherent seed of alterity and opposition to the outsider yields “bear far greater fruit” (Simeunović 2014, 109). This engenders a rise in diversity, which carries with it an elevated potential for fragmentation. Every empire in history has been multiethnic, multicultural, and often multi-religious. The attempt to avoid the danger of disintegration by equating the national and religious has produced variable and rarely lasting results. The enforcement of a particular kind of order as a universal paradigm of governance was better accepted when that order proved effective within the sphere of its utility for everyone, and consequently was more broadly tolerable, or at a minimum, did not provoke widespread uprisings (Simeunović 2014).

“As a dominant contemporary political, economic, and military phenomenon, globalism is inexorably based on related historical experiences of humankind. In terms of ideological basis, it serves as an illustration of how a specific ideology emerges from the general ideology” (Simeunović 2009, 138). It is merely a branch of liberalism, specifically the variant commonly described as the economic dimension of neoliberalism, and which, since the seventh decade of the 20th century, has been heavily oriented toward utilizing political principles

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<sup>1</sup> According to Immanuel Kant, making people happy by force is the greatest possible form of despotism.

that secure economic benefits, or more specifically, profit (Simeunović 2009). “Globalism is actually neoliberalism on a mission” (Simeunović 2009, 138).

Although each ideology seeks to realize its own principles in actuality, globalism distinguishes itself from the rest in its pronounced focus on utility and pragmatism in accordance with the maxim: “Politically good is something that is economically beneficial in the end” (Simeunović 2009, 138). While this ideology endeavors to function across numerous domains, its primary objective remains the economy. Its foremost objective is to create a world devoid of barriers (or at a minimum, devoid of rigid frontiers), in order to facilitate the unimpeded movement of commodities, thereby converting the entire globe into a single vast free market, within which large transnational enterprises will wield primary influence, and all other actors will possess the right to compete against them, albeit with little prospect of prevailing over them. Globalism, in essence, actually represents the ideology of these corporations, which are its main supporters, so that even large countries, such as the USA and Great Britain (from where globalism originated), sometimes give the impression of being their implementers only (Simeunović 2009, 139). “The political order of a world structured in this way should be a new world, in neoliberal order, because what ensures dominance and gives advantage in every system is the power of determining the rules of the game (see: Simeunović 1994). Therefore, the aim is not only to create a world market free from impenetrable national-state borders, but also to organize this market on liberal principles” (Simeunović 2009, 139).

As an ideology “rooted in the West, globalism entails a substantial infiltration of Western values into other regions of the world, particularly the East (Simeunović 2009, 139); thus, within the international relations theory, this phenomenon is known as Westernization. However, the frequent criticism claiming that the West, through its transnational corporations, has flooded the world with fast food and unhealthy beverage brands, must take into account the fact that there is also a response from the East, not only in the form of the massive spread of its own types of food in the West, such as Chinese cuisine, but also in “the form of cheap, low-standard products that have poured into the West, including the USA, a process labeled as Easternization” (Simeunović 2009, 139). In the view of globalism’s critics, this has led to a poor-

quality products exchange, wherein both sides make profits, and only consumers are dissatisfied, but have no other choice possible.

What globalism finds fundamental intolerance lies in the firm stance of particular states on their national, or more exactly, state sovereignty, which stands as a serious obstruction to globalization. That is the reason globalism proclaims an epoch of post-sovereignty wherein states will be deprived of their role as guardians of their nations and religions, while the duty for this is to be shifted to the international community (Simeunović 2009).

Globalism endeavors to eradicate the apprehension of the small and the vulnerable by introducing the principle of all kinds (including violent) of international protection for different minorities, in the sense of protecting the uniqueness of ethnic, religious, cultural, gender, and even sexual orientation, provided that they do not stand in the way of achieving its global political and economic interests. This likewise legitimizes the deployment and application of military power across the globe by the nations that serve as the carriers of globalization (Simeunović 2009). “Globalism sees nationalism and the nation-state as its main opponents, which are not guided by universal, but by their national interest, and tend to confine their nations to their borders, with their tariffs and regulations that hinder the movement of goods and reduce the profits of large multinational corporations” (Simeunović 2009, 139).

A significant challenge for globalization emerges in the shape of informal transnational opposition to it. Nation-states are not the actors that would be capable, either individually or at least on their own, to halt the offensive of globalization, simply because they represent, at least for the time being, a lesser force than that embodied by the nations that serve as the carriers of globalization. Globalization encounters a challenge, largely produced by ethnic and religious extremists, who position themselves as defenders of creed and nation, utilizing violence, chiefly in the form of political radicalism and terrorism, which has itself, to a certain extent, become globalized, and has rendered the progress of globalization neither smooth nor rapid, while necessitating arduous and expensive covert as well as overt conflicts (Simeunović 2009).

While certain regions of the globe, particularly Asia and Africa, demonstrate considerable resistance to globalization as an ideological framework, the phenomenon seems inexorable, at least in economic terms. In other spheres, nonetheless, the matter of its acceptance depends

on the ability to overcome markedly different impediments, including opposing faiths (Islam, for example), or the tradition of a self-contained political order such as China's (Simeunović 2009).

Across the annals of history, the establishment of a cohesive global order has eluded all attempts. This failure stems partly from the world's profound diversity and its inherently unstable nature, which presents constant challenges and fosters new dreams. Such dynamism is, of course, a direct expression of the human spirit itself (Simeunović 2014). "We will see whether the world of neoliberalism will succeed in this" (Simeunović 2014, 106). It possessed a viable prospect at the close of the 20th century, for never before had a single power exercised such dominance over the remainder of the world as the United States did at that time, and this remains true today, because it presents an order that is sufficiently appealing not only in economic but also in political terms to numerous countries – more precisely, to their political and economic elites – to the degree that they embrace it of their own accord (Simeunović 2014).

This is actually a hidden exchange. The political elites of these states follow the principle of subsidiarity, which implies transferring their powers, and therefore the responsibility for managing the country and its economy, to those more powerful than themselves, and in exchange for this, they renounce, without any pressure, both their sovereignty and their political independence (Simeunović 2014, 106).

"Every individual is a human being that dominates, because he is a human being that is frightened" (Simeunović 2014, 107). Fear attends us from the moment of our birth, endures through our years in countless guises, and finally accompanies us to our dying breath. Of all living beings, the human newborn is the most helpless, tormented from the outset of its life by a piercing realization of its own feebleness. To defend against this dread, human beings gradually establish control over their environment and, more significantly, develop an excess of authority. Such an accretion, regardless of whether it is consciously pursued, inevitably generates dominance over others. Our fundamental need for power stems from self-preservation. Yet, once we quickly grasp its additional benefits, we deliberately overlook the burdens it entails. As a phenomenon, power presents at least two critical issues. First, it proves more addictive than any narcotic. Second, it belongs to the category of *apeiron* – the boundless realm of the immeasurable. It possesses no definitive limits, no genuine ethical boundaries, and lacks adequate

internal restraints once it becomes ingrained within us (Simeunović 2014). “In his desire to acquire as many powers as possible, human beings have created various systems of supremacy, formally primarily for their own protection, and in reality, for the purpose of domination over others. The transfer of these systems from the microsocial to the macrosocial plan has always been a matter of technique, tools, and the ability to implement plans and illusions of general and eternal domination over others” (Simeunović 2014, 107).

Since ancient times, the idea of establishing a “world order” has appeared in states that had an outstanding military dominance compared to their wider environment. It was not just a mere military-conquering concept, but also an effort to establish one’s own model of political and economic order in conquered countries as universal, of which some written traces remained (Simeunović 2014, 110). One of the first recorded attempts of that kind shows absolute similarity to the present time, so it is quite appropriate to mention it.

The Persian, or rather Achaemenid, ruler Darius (*Daravavush*), famous in many ways, sought, through his conquests, to achieve *Arta*, “the true order of the world,”<sup>2</sup> which would be based on pure, divinely-known “truth.” The truth consisted, to begin with, of the fact that the rulers of other, primarily surrounding countries, were not rulers, but “impostors” and “rebels against Darius” since he did not recognize them as rulers, and the condition of recognizing them could not be fulfilled because Darius firmly held the position that only he could govern their countries and that the world should be “ruled by one ruler only.” The reason for this, Darius found in a completely ideological ethical premise that as the ruler of the most powerful state, he was obliged to establish and implement justice, since he was given a mission by the god Ahura Mazda and the forefathers to know what justice and truth were and to implement them. Hence, *Arta*, as an “order built on truth,” in addition to its enlightening function, had a distinct corrective function when it came to socio-political issues of the other communities: “What was incorrect, I made correct” (Spasojević 2006, 135). Along with this, went the introduction of the Persian religion as the only correct one and the prohibition of all other religions as demonic.

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<sup>2</sup> “*Arta* or *asha*, one of those big words of archaic humanity that are difficult to translate. Its meaning is: the true order of the world, an order built on truth” (Spasojević 2006, 135).

Darius introduced his “true world order,” or Arta, to 23 conquered countries, about which he left numerous records, and his son Xerxes raised that number to 29 countries. Darius’s international military performance was, quantitatively speaking, truly impressive. In just one year, he waged and won 19 wars, while executing nine defeated rulers. The years that followed were also years of his military victories. Darius made records of them on high rocks by the roads,<sup>3</sup> on palaces, tombs, but also on clay and metal tablets, measuring stones, and on animal skins and vases, that he sent to all conquered and many unconquered regions, so that everyone would be informed about his power and invincibility. As the rumor about him was heard in advance, so did the fear grow, and the will to resist diminished, which resulted in the surrender of the enemy or at least made Darius’s next victory much easier. It is clear that Darius, as the bearer of the “world order,” knew how to economize on force and use war marketing better than many rulers of today.

Darius found the motive for conquering foreign territories and incorporating them into the “world order” in the need to prevent any injustice, and especially to prevent any violence that would be committed by a rebellious ruler over a weaker one. The world order promised harmony, and there could be no harmony if many had the right to use self-willed force. Violence was allowed only to one, the strongest among all the rulers, following his convictions about justice and truth: “I do not want the powerful to commit violence against the weak” (Spasojević 2006, 106). No resistance was possible because “I also do not like the right of the powerful to be violated by the actions of the weak” (Spasojević 2006, 106), he says. Here we come to Darius’ understanding that superiority is the basis of the right to treat other peoples and countries, which remained characteristic of all future concepts of world orders as the principle of their international relations regulation.

It would be wrong to conclude that this “king of a country with races of all kinds” relied solely on force. There are many facts in his writings that testify that he achieved a lot in gaining supporters in foreign countries, who were impressed not only by his military power, but also motivated by various rewards, from financial to political, after

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<sup>3</sup> The inscription of King Darayavush on Mount Bisotun is the largest stone inscription in the world. It is written at a height of 75 meters and consists of 414 lines arranged in 5 columns, each four meters high and two meters wide.

the conquest of their countries: “To everyone who cooperates, I give a reward that is worth his labor” (Spasojević 2006, 106).

The order was treated as something sacred; even more, it was elevated to the level of worship equal to that expressed towards God, and in this way was celebrated. Not only that it was celebrated and glorified as the best possible order by the Persians who introduced Arta, as the order of the world in numerous countries, but it had to be celebrated and “accepted with the heart” by all those peoples who were actually conquered, regardless of whether they were annexed to the empire by war, or by surrendering the power to Darius after their own rulers were overthrown due to fear that Darius might attack their countries. The fear of Darius’ military superiority was not only the fear of the destruction of the country, but also the fear of the nobles that Darius would label them as supporters of the disobedient ruler because he treated such a person cruelly. After defeating rebellious rulers and their supporters, they would first be publicly humiliated, tortured, and mutilated for a long time before being killed in a brutal manner, thus sending a message to the rest of the people. Long before the advent of mass media, Darius achieved complete awareness of his political and legal principles, although in a morbid way by forcing all adult males of the defeated people to watch the scene of the humiliation, condemnation, and destruction of their former ruler: “I cut off his nose, ears, and tongue and gouged out one eye. He was kept tied hand and foot at my door, and all the people looked at him. Then I hanged him in Hamedan, and I hanged his most prominent supporters in the fortress (underlined by DS)” (Spasojević 2006, 85). Non-acceptance of the “world order” by any nation, or even by an individual in the conquered territories, was out of the question because it violated the principle of absolute domination that was the core of that order, and for the purpose of its general acceptance, not only violence was used, but also the mass propagation of the norms of the new, as the true world order: “do not allow anyone to remain uninstructed in respecting order and the commandments of the law” (Spasojević 2006, 8). “Also, Darius was of the opinion that the world order was best propagated through great construction works, not only by building temples, but also by implementing economically very useful projects, even such grandiose ones as the Suez Canal, which was built during his reign”<sup>4</sup> (Darius’ inscription on the Suez Canal panel

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<sup>4</sup> “I gave the order to dig this canal, from the flowing water called the Nile, which

in: Simeunović 2014, 114). That not much has changed to this day is evidenced by the number of dead, arrested, and fugitive current rulers who were disobedient to the contemporary bearers of the “new world order,” from Saddam Hussein to Milosevic and Gaddafi (Simeunović 2014, 114)

As one of the medieval conquerors of the world, the Mongol Khan Tamerlane, laconically defined it: the world is too small to have two rulers. For him, any, even the slightest, resistance was equal to the greatest military defeat, and therefore, no resistance was allowed on the territory he ruled. This goal was always achieved only through cruelty and the ruthless use of military force. The Byzantine historian Ducas noted that where Tamerlane’s army passed, “neither the barking of dogs, nor the crowing of roosters, nor the crying of children could be heard afterward” (Simeunović 2014, 114).

None of the great conquerors wanted to stop, and each wanted more of what he had already conquered. In the 15th century, the Byzantine historian Laonik Halkokondil described in detail Tamerlane’s plans to conquer China, the entire Mediterranean, and the Christian world. Like many other strongmen such as Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Dusan the Great, he was prevented from expanding his empire by a sudden death.

Henry Kissinger may be incorrect in his assertion that in “every century” there arises “a country that possesses the power and will, as well as the intellectual and moral strength to shape the entire international order in accordance with its own system of values” (Kisindžer 1999, 5), yet he is entirely accurate that such a phenomenon does occur. While no fixed pattern governs the appearance of this occurrence – wherein a nation consistently perceives itself as the architect of a “new world order” – there has perpetually existed a “will to power” among the most powerful states, or at minimum those that regarded themselves as such, along with their ambitions to structure the world according to their own perspectives, requirements, and concerns. This historical reality was constructed through the military, political, and cultural supremacy of the ancient Persians, Greeks, Romans, and others, and was validated by the blades of their commanders, beginning with Alexander

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flows in Egypt, to the sea that comes from Persia. This canal was dug as I ordered, and ships passed through it from Egypt to Persia as I intended” (see Darius’ inscription on the Suez Canal panel in: Simeunović 2014, 114).

the Great and subsequent “first conquerors of the world” (Simeunović 2014, 115) followed by Caesar and later Attila, Tamerlane or Napoleon, continuing all the way to contemporary leaders – distinct in character yet fundamentally identical as carriers of unchecked supremacy (Simeunović 2014).

The current preeminent global power, the United States, has its own ambitions and intentions. Mirroring hegemonic powers of the past, it possesses its own network of allies, adherents, and adversaries. The opponents of a dominant power seldom openly identify themselves as such, primarily out of apprehension regarding retaliation from the prevailing force. Conversely, numerous allies of the dominant state are not genuinely committed to its cause; rather, they fundamentally align themselves with whichever entity holds supremacy, viewing this as the most effective strategy to advance their own objectives. This phenomenon is deeply rooted in human nature, which has historically gravitated toward and revered the victorious (Simeunović 2014).

The endeavors of the United States and the nations aligned with it through official and unofficial means are currently described using various labels, among which the following three appear most frequently: “globalism, globalization, and the new world order” (Simeunović 2014, 116). These terms are often employed without adequate comprehension, sometimes even interchangeably, leading to conceptual ambiguity. Therefore, it is vital to emphasize that these are three different terms that all refer to phenomena that are intertwined. Their meanings are similar, but they do not completely coincide; they only intersect (Simeunović 2014).

What is commonly referred to as the phrase “new world order,” laden with unwarranted negative connotations or primal apprehension, denotes the creation of uncontested political, economic, and military supremacy by the United States alongside a collection of highly advanced industrial nations from the West. These countries are united within or in association with various international bodies of an economic, political, or military character, exercising dominance over nearly all remaining states across the globe. This supremacy is exhibited through efforts to advance their strategic military, political, and economic objectives, along with those of their partners, by conducting foreign policy predominantly from a standpoint of strength and by meddling in the domestic matters of sovereign nations. This interference occurs not only via the traditionally “controlled” military, economic, and political frameworks

and international bodies, but also by exploiting organizations such as the UN. These institutions, prior to the initial phases of instituting the “new world order,” were designed for the collective advantage of all member states and operated in that manner to a considerable extent, and more or less functioned in that way (Simeunović 2014).

“Since the basic principle of implementing this domination is the expression of all kinds of superiority, it is natural that the functionality of the “new world order” is mainly reduced to the use of a position of force, especially in international relations, which can also explain the behavior of a group of dominant countries in the “new world order,” which is increasingly characterized, not only by disrespect but also by flagrant violation of the norms of international law” (Simeunović 2014, 117). It is obvious that these countries treat the currently valid norms of international law as a historically outdated international legal expression of the former two blocks’ balance of power, with the disappearance of which the need for respecting most of these norms also disappears.

“It is too early to speak of a ‘new world order’ as fully conceived, and especially as a materialized concept, due to the lack of a clear and definitive profile of the concept’s content, despite the fact that there are clear indications of the goals and methods of establishing a “new world order” (Simeunović 2014, 118). Whether the establishment of a new order, which has been bombastically announced many times in history before, will come about, and, in particular, whether this establishment will be carried out in the form that now seems inevitable to many, remains to be seen. In the view of Vladeta Jerotić, the “new world order” is simply another example of the many never-ending eschatological undertakings (Jerotić 2000, 30). After all, the future, as a descendant of history and of the present time, mostly takes after its ancestors and always looks a lot like something new, itself as it is and itself as the future present.

Therefore, for the time being, we cannot speak of the establishment of a “new world order,” but only of the efforts to establish it, as well as the results of these efforts. For this reason, it is quite rational to mark this term with quotation marks, which does not, in the least, diminish its importance as a subject of observation.

“For this topic, it is important that the establishment of a “new world order” only at first glance manifests itself as the establishment of an order of global domination made by a single center of collective power, a single state, a single ideology” (Simeunović 2014, 119). Precisely,

there is a clear expression of continental and regional dominance of the emerging world powers with a tendency to increase all their power resources, which are increasingly not subordinated to the formal center of global domination.

In economic, political, and even military terms, and even before unification,<sup>5</sup> Germany stands as the indisputably strongest country in Europe. An equivalent level of continental dominance is progressively being established in the Far East by China, displacing Japan from that position. These countries, in their novel and, for the moment, enduring growing, do not yet declare loudly their aspiration to elevate their status into line with the top and the global scale of the dominance of the “new world order,” but it is to be expected, according to all indicators, that in a relatively short period of time, in less than two decades, these countries will grow stronger, proportionally “to the extent that the growth of the economic, and thus political and military power of the USA will decline, and that, similar to the law of connected vessels, the now narrowly concentrated power of the strongest will have to spread over at least to the three points which, admittedly, at first, will be very interdependent on each other and not entirely and identically structured in the resource domains of power. In this race for prestige, which will at that point become public, it cannot be decisive that some of them will be stronger only in a particular field, like military or economic” (Simeunović 2014, 120).

The essential element in their competitiveness is determined by both their total capacity and the level of interdependence among the most powerful nations – a dynamic that has never been more critical,

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<sup>5</sup> European predictions from the early 1990s regarding the political, economic, and military outcomes of German reunification turned out to be remarkably precise. For instance, 43% of the French population believed that achieving political cohesion within Europe would become more challenging, while 37% anticipated that France's standing on the continent would diminish. Even prior to reunification, the French acknowledged Germany's economic and political dominance, though they raised questions about its democratic credentials. This skepticism helps explain the growing apprehension regarding Germany's economic strength, which rose from 39% of French respondents in 1987 to 42% in 1989. Interestingly, despite these concerns, 48% of the French considered West Germany to be France's closest ally, a figure that climbed to 54% by October 1988. In Germany, 77% of citizens viewed the United States as their foremost partner in 1983, but by 1988, this affection had notably declined, with surveys indicating that 67% of Germans regarded France as their most trusted friend (SOFRES 1991, 82–86).

given their technological, monetary, and economic development. This phase of the formulation and construction of the “new world order” will be a phase of equalization in power and multilateral domination of the world until one of the mentioned states is able to significantly expand the sphere of its influence in the pursuit of economic, political, and military interests on “foreign” terrain, without jeopardizing its previous position in the division of dominance. In the meantime, it is reasonable to anticipate that Germany and Japan will keep expanding principally the economic, fiscal, and political components of their influence, while the United States will continue to augment its military and political assets, although we should not forget, not already mentioned fact that Germany, even before its unification, almost unnoticed, became the strongest military power in Western Europe, but also that Japan has just as quietly, in the last half century, renewed and significantly strengthened its military potential to the extent that it makes its neighbors think about it seriously (Simeunović 2014).

“However, military power is no longer, nor is it likely to be, the sole determining factor of prestige on a global scale” (Simeunović 2014, 121). This is confirmed by the example of Russia, whose military power is undoubtedly very impressive due to its nuclear potential, but its economic power is not sufficient to make it a leading world power. “The balance in economic power as the basis of the total power of the three, already existing, economic and technological centers of the world (the USA, the EU headed by Germany and China, India and Japan as moderators of the economic outlook and power of the Far East), will decide whether the USA will retain, in not so distant future, the throne of the supreme position in the global hierarchy or it will have to co-share it, and eventually abandon it” (Simeunović 2014, 121). Their current supreme position in military strength will hold little value without preserving economic might as the foundation of general supremacy. Similarly, a strong military today would not be worth much to either Russia, together with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), nor China if they had not economically strengthened, the first one less, the second one more, but both countries have clearly strengthened enough to dare to claim their share of the throne of world power (Simeunović 2014).

It is a logical to assume that Germany and Japan, despite increasing their military potential It is to be expected that powers such as Germany and Japan, despite increasing their military power, will

not in the future strive to implement their interests through the use of military force on the international stage, and the least of all by using their own forces, except at the request of “the big brother,” but will strive to do so through channels of economic and, especially, technological and financial influence with the extensive use of multilateral institutions. This explains the persistence of Germany and Japan, as well as some other regional powers, in their efforts to join the UN Security Council as soon as possible and, as permanent members, gain as much of the political power and global influence as possible, and the strong opposition to this from the USA, but also from France and England, which are already second-rate powers that derive their political power to the greatest extent precisely from possessing this positional advantage in relation to Germany and Japan. Indeed, America currently enjoys “greater co-optive power than other” (Nye 1991, 2–7) countries, due to its privileged position in the world’s most influential international forums and structures (UN, IMF, GATT, OECD, NATO). However, although this position of the USA has been shaped and acquired by historical forces, it is, unlike the position of Great Britain and France, whose political power lays heavily in the historical position as the permanent membership in the UN Security Council is, not primarily contained only in some historical right to power, but, on the contrary, it is one and a very clear expression of the current general and enormous political, economic and military power that the USA has (Simeunović 2014).

This “fight” over the entry into the UN Security Council appears all the more logical in the light of the fact that the “new world order” is expected to be elitist, expressed in the possibility of possessing and using exclusive positions of power. By taking advantage of the global tendency to shift the center of gravity of power from the legislative to the executive, the designers of the “new world order” have transformed the UN General Assembly, formerly the main body, into a body of second-class importance, and the UN Security Council into a body of first-class importance, and even into a kind of seed of a world government, justifying this by the reasons of swiftness of decision-making as a critical element in the process of providing assistance to “endangered” countries and peoples. As a result of this change, which has enabled the nearly complete dominance of the USA in the UN agenda, the organization is progressively becoming a, while legally constituted, yet increasingly questionable instrument. It is used to advance the strategic military,

political, and commercial objectives of the world's most economically and politically dominant nations. These nations aspire to institutionalize a "new world order" as a perpetual condition of their own hegemony within the global community, disregarding the desires and necessities of other states. This often occurs in direct opposition to the wishes and, specifically, the well-being of the majority of UN members categorized as developing nations (Simeunović 2014).

The growth of the power of Japan and Germany, which positions them on the map of global great powers, should not obscure our view of the great power bases for activities on this global plane by the Russian Federation. We must also include the geopolitical space of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Behind them, an even greater global power is on the rise, China, which is not only an economic and political giant but also an unavoidable military factor. We should not lose sight of the fact that the spheres of influence of these global players are still the same ones in which periods of conflict and cooperation with Germany and Japan alternated, as if they were also spaces of various forms of state closeness.

The new rise of Russia began during the reign of Vladimir Putin. However, this time, this rise is not based on nationally based federal units, as during the Soviet Union, when these national creations were necessarily directed towards insincere mutual declarations of solidarity. Also, it is not about the creation of a new nation-state, but rather the restoration of an empire without an emperor. Starting from the fact that empires could never be mononational, if we bear in mind the empire's need to control large geographical areas, but that they therefore always had to be multinational, then we can logically conclude why this state restoration could not rely only on the Russian nation. To make the demographic, national asymmetry even more striking, we will recall that millions of Russians remained to live outside the current borders of the Russian Federation, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was led by the catastrophic Soviet model of forming republics. This model was the same in the USSR as in the FPRJ, and later in the SFRY, and was characterized by the fact that state engineering insisted that federal units be tailored to the needs of small nations. These needs were satisfied primarily through the imperative that all members of a smaller nation be included in a federal unit, to the detriment of a larger nation, and especially to the detriment of the largest nation, such as the Russians in the USSR or the Serbians in the FPRJ and SFRY.

Considering the fact that any Russian reconquest that would aim to return any territory with a majority Russian population would be doomed to political and military difficulties, it remains logical that the restoration of the “empire” is limited primarily to the existing internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation. The return of any Russian territory that remained in other states, in addition to being very challenging, does not seem to be an overly useful undertaking, considering the risks. However, over time, with the strengthening of the state space of the Russian Federation, the reintegration of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan would be attempted. The new state community thus created would be the core of a broader military-political connection in which states close in religion and culture, such as Serbia and Bulgaria, but also the Slavic Czech Republic and Poland, despite religious differences, could find their place. The geopolitical entity thus created would later be strengthened by alliances in the East through which the Eurasian Union would be created, primarily through cooperation with North Korea and China. Of course, this Eurasian connection would imply closer integration with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Such geopolitical integration of Eurasia would enable the redistribution of world power. All of Russia’s efforts in this direction imply the return of military power, which declined sharply in the years of the collapse of the USSR and remained at a low level during the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Until this long-term process takes off, Russia can only achieve a balance between the military power of the US and NATO through the competitiveness of its vast strategic and tactical arsenal. The Russian-Ukrainian war shows that Russia is determined on its path to restoring the empire. In these aspirations, the fact that Russia is ready to enter into open conflict with NATO for parts of the old empire, such as Crimea and Sevastopol, which would not exclude the use of nuclear weapons, is striking. Without access to the southern coasts that territories such as Crimea provide, Russia would remain a regional power (Simeunović 2014).

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**Драган Симеуновић\***

*Факултет политичких наука, Универзитет у Београду*

## **ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЈА И МЕЂУНАРОДНИ ОДНОСИ\*\***

### **Резиме**

Да би се разумео однос између глобализације и међународних односа, неопходно је пропедевтички разликовати појмове новог светског поретка, глобализма и глобализације који се често користе без много теоријског разумевања, понекад чак и као синоними, што ствара терминолошку забуну. То су три различита термина која су повезана јер се односе на испреpletене феномене. Глобализам је идеологија, глобализација је процес имплементације идеолошких премиса глобализма, а нови светски поредак је политичко-правни систем света у настајању. Концепт и пракса глобализације укључују радикалне промене у савременом свету у корист једног центра моћи и стога подразумевају драстичне промене у међународним односима. Глобализација подразумева да савремене међународне односе треба да карактерише: неформално управљање светом из једног центра моћи контролисањем и вођењем глобалних политичких, економских и финансијских токова; демократизација свих земаља света увођењем евроатлантског модела демократије као јединог валидног; негација националног суверенитета и превазилажење националног идентитета; смањена улога УН и свих међународних организација и институција где заговорници глобализације нису доносиоци одлука; „менаџерска” уместо посредничке дипломатије; ексклузивност права глобалиста да користе силу у међународним односима; фаворизовање хуманитарних интервенција као врсте оружаних сукоба; покушај усмеравања токова миграната и њиховог интензитета; ускраћивање права на напредак свим неглобализованим земљама, чак и оним јачим попут Русије и Кине; стављање међународних односа директно у службу задовољавања интереса

\* Имејл: dragan.simeun@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0003-6455-5769

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мултинационалних компанија. Заговорници глобализације имали су само ограничен успех у овим напорима због различитих врста отпора. Глобализација је углавном постигнута на међународном економском нивоу, а много мање на међународном политичком и међународно-безбедносном нивоу. Иако је почетак глобализације најавио брз крај националне државе, њеног суверенитета, а самим тим и нације као њене основе, то се није догодило. Готово све што је имало национални префикс опирало се глобализацији у већој или мањој мери у име права појединца да постоји колико и опште, и то је главни разлог зашто глобалисти национално виде као највећу претњу. Време великих миграција, као и рат између Русије и Украјине, подстакнут оружјем, средствима и логистиком западних сила, донео је нове, велике и последично још увек несхватљиве изазове не само глобализацији као процесу, већ и глобализму као идеологији и новом светском поретку као пројектованој политичко-правној конструкцији глобалног система. Русија је објавила нови концепт новог светског поретка, а многе земље, од којих су неке чланице ЕУ, устале су против глобалних модела, снажно се окрећући ка својим националним интересима, обнови свог националног суверенитета и јачању својих националних вредности, иако се донедавно чинило да су се те земље потпуно стопиле у наднационално јединство. Све је очигледније да су рат и миграције били само повод за поновно обнављање концепта националне државе као важног наслеђа и њене веће независности, и то не само на територији Европе, што указује на процес ресуверенизације у глобализованим подручјима као распрострањенији феномен. Ово, као и други актуелни процеси коришћења и расподеле моћи међу државама на глобалном нивоу, несумњиво ће снажно утицати на профилисање међународних односа у блиској будућности.

**Кључне речи:** глобализација, међународни односи, суверенитет, национална држава, миграције, оружани сукоби, ресуверенизација

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