



02

СРПСКА ПОЛИТИЧКА МИСАО

THOUGHT
POLITICAL
SERBIAN

SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

POWER, ORDER AND STRATEGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Aleksandar Mitić, Nenad Stekić, Slobodan Janković,
Željko Budimir, Dušan Proroković, Sanja Stošić,
Milovan Subotić, Marina Mitrevska

ESSAYS

Aleksandar Gajić, Ljubiša Despotović,
Ivana Luknar, Sanja Šuljagić

REVIEWS

Nevena Jakovljević, Mile Obrenović



СРПСКА ПОЛИТИЧКА МИСАО SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

ISSN 0354-5989

UDC 32

No. 2/2025.



СРПСКА ПОЛИТИЧКА МИСАО

SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Publisher: Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade. Tel: +381 11 3349-204

E-mail: ips@ips.ac.rs; spm@ips.ac.rs

<https://www.ips.ac.rs> www.ips.ac.rs/rs/magazines/srpska-politicka-misao

ISSN 0354-5989 UDC 32 No 2/2025. XXXII vol. 90

Editor-in-Chief:

Miša Stojadinović, Ph.D., Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Political Studies

Deputy Editor-in-Chief:

Nada Raduški, Ph.D., Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Political Studies

Copy editors:

MA Olga Stevanović, Research Assistant, Institute for Political Studies,

MA Andrea Matijević, Research Assistant, Institute for Political Studies

Members of the Editorial Board:

Milan Jovanović, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty for Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,

Dejan Đurđević, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, Živojin Đurić, Ph.D.,

Jasna Milošević Đorđević, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty of Media and Communications,

Đuro Bodrožić, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies, Miša Stojadinović,

Ph.D., Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Political Studies, Kirill Shevchenko, Ph.D., Professor,

Russian State University of Social Sciences, Minsk, Višnja Stojadinović, Ph.D., Research Associate,

Institute for Political Studies, Andrei Baranov, Ph.D., Professor, Kuban State University, Krasnodar,

Mamoru Sadakata, Ph.D., Professor, Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University, Japan,

Ewa Bujwid-Kurek, Ph.D., Professor, Institute for Political Science and International Relations

of the Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, Mikhail Zalihanov, Ph.D., Professor,

member of the Russian Academy of Science

Editorial staff

Marija Dokić, Ph.D., Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies,

MA Jelena Vujanović, Research Assistant, Institute for Political Studies

Members of the Advisory Board

Zoran Avramović, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade,

Sreten Sokić, Ph.D., retired Full Professor, Faculty for Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,

Milovan Mitrović, Ph.D., retired Full Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade,

Milomir Stepić, Ph.D., Principal Research Fellow, Institute for Political Studies,

Dragan Simeunović, Ph.D., retired Full professor, Faculty for Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,

Milan Brdar, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad,

Zoran Stojiljković, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty for Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,

Dragana Mitrović, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty for Political Sciences, University of Belgrade,

Ljubiša Despotović, Ph.D., Full professor, Faculty for European Legal and Political Studies,

University of Novi Sad

International Members of the Advisory Board

Simon James Critchley, Ph.D., Professor, New School for Social Research,

Anastasia Mitrofanova, Ph.D., Professor, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation, Moscow,

Ivan Alexeyevich Charota, Ph.D., member of National Academy of Sciences of Belarus;
member of Russian Academy of Sciences, member of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Proof-reading

Anja Maljević

JOURNAL IS PUBLISHED SIX TIMES A YEAR.

Articles SPT are available in electronic databases: SCIndexs, C.E.E.O.L.

(Central and Eastern European Online Library),

ERIH PLUS (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences),

and Russian Science Citation Index (RSCI).

Printing:

Donat Graf, Belgrade

Circulation: 50

Reproduction of articles published in this journal, whether in whole or in part, is not permitted without the explicit consent of the publisher. The views expressed in the articles represent the personal opinions of the authors and do not reflect the positions of the Editorial board or the institutions the authors are affiliated with.

SERBIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

CONTENTS

This Issue's Theme:

POWER, ORDER AND STRATEGY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Aleksandar Mitić, Nenad Stekić

THE RECALIBRATION OF CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY
DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION.....1-26

Slobodan Janković, Željko Budimir

MEDITERRANEAN AFTER US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
IN 2024: SCENARIO FOR THE NEAR FUTURE.....29-49

Dušan Proroković

EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY AND THE CONCLUSIONS
OF THE UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCES:
BETWEEN DESIRE AND POSSIBILITIES.....51-72

Sanja Stošić

RHETORIC OF THE "COLLECTIVE WEST" AND
GLOBAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE.....75-101

Milovan Subotić, Marina Mitrevska

MEDIA, MIGRATION AND TERRORISM
– SOME CORRELATIONS.....103-123

ESSAYS

Aleksandar Gajić, Ljubiša Despotović

GANDHI'S "SATYAGRAHA" AND
EUROPEAN POSTMODERN REVOLUTIONS.....125-143

Ivana Luknar

SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE ERA OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.....145-162

Sanja Šuljagić

ON THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POLICY OF THE
RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO A WESTERN COLONIAL
CAMPAIGN IN THE BALKANS IN THE 19th CENTURY.....165-194

REVIEWS

Nevena Jakovljević

R. A. REISS: NEUTRALITY IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE
FACTS OF CRIME.....197-203

Mile Obrenović

SECURITY STRATEGIES OF MILITARY-NEUTRAL
COUNTRIES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.....205-209

THIS ISSUE'S THEME

**POWER, ORDER AND STRATEGY
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Aleksandar Mitić*

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

Nenad Stekić**

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

THE RECALIBRATION OF CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

Abstract

Amid the continuous rise of China's diplomatic, technological, military, economic, and normative power, in the context of the transition to multipolarity, Washington has expanded its competition and rivalry with Beijing under the Joseph Biden administration. In addition to Donald Trump's "tariff wars," Biden's presidency presented elements of a "containment 2.0" policy, upgraded with a strong liberal internationalist discourse on the need to uphold the "rules-based world order" (RBO) and a Manichean "democracy vs. autocracy" narrative. It led to boosting the RBO narrative against "authoritarian states," building alliances against the Russian Federation and China, and new formats of securitization of globalization and weaponization of the global value chain. Beijing thus faced the Biden administration in a complex geopolitical environment and had to adapt its grand strategy. In response to the RBO, China proposed "true multilateralism." Faced with a host of new "mini-alliances" in the Asia-Pacific, China boosted its military prowess. Beyond the region,

* E-mail: aleksandar.mitic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-6918-7561

** E-mail: nenad.stekic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-9066-0480

*** The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2025," financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, during the year 2025.

Beijing pursued the expansion of existing (Belt and Road Initiative, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS) and new multilateral initiatives (Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative). China demonstrated resilience and strategic foresight, while the agility and coherence of its evolving grand strategy have allowed Beijing to “welcome back” Donald Trump into the White House with readiness and self-confidence despite a “rocky road ahead”.

Keywords: China, Grand Strategy, USA, Biden, Trump, foreign policy, international politics

INTRODUCTION

The administration of U.S. President Joseph Biden (2021–2025) has built on the approaches of President Donald Trump’s first mandate in the White House (2017–2021) to expand competition and rivalry with the People’s Republic of China. Beyond the “tariff wars” and technological competition, Biden’s administration has focused on (re) building military, political, and economic alliances, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Such progression, aimed at containing and deterring China’s growing influence, has compelled Beijing to recalibrate its grand strategy. The evolution of China’s grand strategy during the Biden administration thus presents a complex interplay of adaptation and response to U.S. geopolitical manoeuvres. This paper explores the concept of hesitant hegemony, positing that China’s grand strategy is increasingly poised to counter U.S. challenges, particularly in light of the ongoing trade war and the formation of mini-alliances across Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The argument is framed around China’s readiness to navigate the shifting dynamics initiated by both the Trump and Biden administrations, adapting its strategies to maintain its influence and safeguard its interests. This includes enhancing regional partnerships, expanding existing multilateral initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, but also proposing new global initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI). The analysis will explore how

China's strategic narrative has evolved, reflecting its readiness to absorb shocks and adapt to new geopolitical realities.

This paper is organized into three main sections. The first section explores the concept of Grand Strategy (GS) within the context of the emerging multipolar world order, emphasizing the evolution of China's GS since the establishment of the People's Republic. It identifies the key components of China's GS within the contemporary international system, in which the United States perceives China as a strategic challenger. The second section examines the evolution of U.S. China policy under the Biden administration and contrasts them with those of the Trump administration's first term. The third section analyses China's responses to these varying policies and examines its strategic adaptation to shifting international circumstances. Beyond Beijing's reactions to U.S. "alliance-building" in the Asia-Pacific, key themes include China's visions of "true multipolarity" and its global initiatives aimed at expanding global development and the role of the Global South, the maintenance of strategic partnership with the Russian Federation amid the conflict in Ukraine, energy security amid the conflict in the Middle East and trade partnership with the European Union amid calls for de-risking and de-coupling. These are embedded in China's strategic narrative, which views the Western-led "rules-based world order" as a threat to the UN Charter, an obstacle to global development and trade, and incompatible with "great changes unseen in a century." The paper concludes with implications of the evolution of China's GS for Sino-American relations during the Trump 2.0 U.S. presidency from 2025 on.

EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

Grand strategy encompasses a nation's overarching plan for utilizing its military, economic, and diplomatic resources to achieve long-term objectives in international relations. In foreign policy discourse, grand strategy refers to a coherent system of commitments and positions adopted by a sovereign state on critical global issues (Layton 2012). It serves as an essential framework for shaping and executing foreign policy, both in the short and long term. As an established concept in theory, grand strategy functions as a tool for achieving the foreign policy objectives of great powers. It constitutes the "intellectual framework" that structures foreign policy, providing a logic that helps states navigate a complex and perilous world. Emerging initially from the practical

need for success in wartime operations during World War II and later adapted for peacetime conditions, the concept of grand strategy was forged through the Allied efforts to coordinate diplomatic, economic, political, and military initiatives on a global scale. Operationally, grand strategy represents an integrated approach to aligning interests, threats, resources, and policies, addressing new and unusual circumstances within the international system. As a codification of the relationship between short-term and long-term goals and the principles underlying foreign policy, Hal Brands asserts that grand strategy is more inherently suited to peacetime than wartime contexts (Brands 2014).

China's grand strategies have evolved through distinct phases, reflecting its adaptation to shifting domestic and international dynamics (Cho 2011). During the Maoist era (1949–1978), China's primary focus was on internal consolidation and survival amidst external hostilities, emphasizing self-reliance, ideological positioning in the Cold War, and limited international engagement. Under Deng Xiaoping (1978–2000), the strategy shifted toward economic modernization and integration into the global economy. This period was marked by the “hide and bide” principle, where China avoided international leadership roles while prioritizing domestic development. During the Hu Jintao era (2000–2012), the concept of “peaceful rise” was promoted to alleviate fears about China's growing power. Economic diplomacy and active participation in global institutions became central to presenting China as a responsible global actor. Since 2012, under Xi Jinping, China's strategy has grown more assertive (Horesh 2020). Initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative exemplify its ambition to reshape global economic and political structures, focusing on “national rejuvenation” with increased investment in military modernization, technological advancements, and efforts to influence global governance (Cho 2011). This trajectory underscores China's pursuit of long-term objectives of economic prosperity, national unity, and global influence, reflecting a calculated balance between ambition and restraint.

Some scholars contend that several key factors significantly shape China's security policy. Among these, they highlight interactions with industrialized and transitional countries, the collapse of the traditional legal frameworks of former socialist states, and escalating tensions in the Southeast Asian region (Swaine, Daly and Greenwood 2000). For China, this involves securing national interests, maintaining territorial integrity, and fostering economic growth while navigating a complex

global landscape characterized by competition with the United States. In the Chinese context, grand strategy is deeply rooted in synthesizing historical philosophy and modern pragmatism and recognizing evolving power dynamics. Drawing from Sun Tzu and Confucian diplomacy principles, China's strategic outlook emphasizes long-term planning, adaptability, and power balancing. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, grand strategy has become synonymous with the "China Dream" (中国梦), encapsulating goals of national rejuvenation, economic modernization, and military prowess.

Some scholars argue that the most applicable concept of understanding China's GS evolution is a "hesitant hegemony" (Stekić 2023). It reflects China's cautious approach to asserting global leadership. Stekić argues that China seeks to balance its rise by avoiding direct confrontation with established powers, particularly the United States. This approach is characterized by strategic ambiguity, selective engagement in multilateral institutions, and a focus on economic statecraft rather than military dominance. Stekić posits that China's hesitancy stems from its recognition of the risks of overextension and the potential backlash from other nations wary of its ascent (Stekić 2023).

While China's grand strategy has undergone significant transformations since the late 20th century, we can distinguish several of its key components. First is economic integration. Central to China's grand strategy is economic integration within Asia and beyond, particularly the Global South. Initiatives like the BRI aim to create interconnected trade networks that enhance China's influence while promoting regional and global development. The second is military modernization. China has invested heavily in modernizing its military capabilities, focusing on advanced technologies and expanding its presence in the South China Sea, effectively building the world's largest navy. This military assertiveness is both a deterrent against U.S. intervention and a means to project power regionally. The third is diplomatic engagement. Through multilateral forums and bilateral agreements, China seeks to cultivate relationships that promote its interests, its vision of a UN-centred transition to multipolarity, and its counterbalance to U.S. influence. The fourth is soft power. China recognizes the importance of soft power in shaping global perceptions. Cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and media outreach are integral components of its grand strategy to foster a favourable international environment.

Dorđević and Stekić (2022) argue that China's potential fifth Grand Strategy will increasingly prioritize domestic factors over systemic challenges, emphasizing the centrality of the security agenda and dedication to the international system in its formulation and implementation. Based on a cross-tabulated risk matrix, their analysis identifies domestic considerations as the most influential drivers of China's GS, while systemic factors such as material disparities are less significant. New competitors and overseas military dynamics are deemed critical among external challenges, whereas Black Swan events have minimal impact. Temporally, they suggest that while structural challenges are more significant in the present, intrinsic variables and domestic priorities will gain importance by 2035, reflecting a shift toward predictability and internal stability. The fifth GS is seen as potentially evolving beyond the 2003 "rejuvenation" strategy, in line with Xi Jinping's vision of reinforcing socialism with Chinese characteristics and securing global dominance. Drawing on scenarios outlined by Scobell *et al.* (2020), the authors argue that China is likely to follow an "ascendant" trajectory, balancing assertiveness with cooperative strategies, while unlikely to achieve uncontested global hegemony or face collapse.

BIDEN'S CHINA POLICY: FROM CHAMPIONING RBO TO "CONTAINMENT 2.0"

One of the key characteristics of Donald Trump's first term as U.S. president was the strategic reframing of U.S.–China relations. Dissatisfied with the slowness of Barack Obama's "turn to Asia," Trump's White House first designated China as a "strategic competitor" and reinvigorated the "China threat" narrative, denouncing Beijing-led initiatives, such as the BRI (Mitić 2023a). Under the "America first" policy, he then launched a "tariff war" with Beijing when he imposed in early 2018 a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminium imports before pursuing a few months later with a 25% tariff on 818 categories of goods imported from China worth 50 billion dollars (Fetzer and Schwarz 2020). The White House increased technological competition by imposing restrictive measures against Chinese companies and urging partners to drop quests to use networks such as Huawei's 5G. Furthermore, he increased the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan and blamed Beijing for the outbreak of COVID-19. In the final document on China, the "United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China," published during the 2020

electoral campaign, Trump's administration argued it was disappointed with the evolution of China's foreign policy since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1979, and Washington's support for China's opening-up and inclusion in the globalisation system. Washington officials expected that "deepening engagement would spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder," but the Communist Party of China "has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules-based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favour" (White House 2020). Moreover, Trump's administration contended that "the CCP's expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world" (White House 2020).

While many had expected changes following the 2020 elections, Joseph Biden toughened Trump's policy. Rush Doshi, Biden's director for China at the National Security Council (NSC) argued China had "strategies of displacement," targeting U.S. power in China and Asia, before setting the scene for a worldwide effort to "displace the United States as the global leader (Doshi 2021, 4). As U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinker argued, "we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system" (Blinken 2022).

Indeed, Trump "produced a sharper, more rapid shift in US policy than might otherwise have occurred, and accelerated the ongoing erosion of support for the old policy of engagement," while "Republicans and Democrats were able to agree on the need for a change in US China policy and, for the first time, ambitious figures in both parties began to compete to see who could stake out the tougher stance" (Friedberg 2022).

Neorealists argued that "it's no longer debatable" that the U.S. and China "are entering their own new cold war," referring to containment policy during the rivalry with the Soviet Union (Brands and Gaddis 2021, 10). On the other hand, neoliberals contended that "this is not like Cold War containment," and that "meeting the China challenge will require a more complex strategy that leverages the alliances and rules-based system we created" (Nye 2023).

The four years of Biden's mandate (2021–2025) have witnessed elements of a "containment 2.0" policy and were upgraded with a strong

liberal internationalist discourse on the need to uphold the “rules-based world order” and a Manichean “democracy vs. autocracy” narrative.

Boosting the RBO narrative against “authoritarian states”

While the concept of a “rules-based world order” (RBO) is not entirely new, it has notably risen in prominence during the Biden administration, and it presents a critical field of battle in the global war of strategic narratives (Mitić 2024). In fact, for its supporters, the RBO is the “foundation of liberal internationalism and a resilience mechanism in preserving the post-Cold War order – epitomized by the US ‘unipolar moment’ – against non-Western ‘autocratic transgression’” (Mitić 2024). For the challengers, primarily but not exclusively China and Russia, the RBO “incorporates a set of mechanisms that selectively lean on elements of international law, interpret them freely and creatively, and align them with the interests of the political West, using double standards and the principle of ‘unique,’ *sui generis* cases to fit the needs, thus effectively undermining the UN system” (Mitić 2024).

Kachiga argues that, differing from Trump, Biden created a “new narrative” and framed US–China relations as that of “ideological competition between authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes. Biden views China as a threat to democratic rule” within a dichotomy which claims “the democratic culture is anchored in the traditional West, and the authoritarian regimes which are found in non-Western cultures, namely, in China and Russia” (Kachiga 2022, 181).

Indeed, already in December 2021, Biden summoned his “Summit for Democracy,” which reflected “a prominent view within the Biden administration that assembling a global coalition of democracies can counter China’s rise” (Pepinsky 2021). At the summit, Biden designated Moscow and Beijing as key “autocratic” challengers.

Building alliances *versus* China and Russia

At the follow-up 2023 “Summit for Democracy,” a year after the outset of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, Beijing was designated Moscow’s main supporter in discrediting the RBO. This discourse was reproduced in various Western formats, from the European Council (European Council 2023) to NATO (Lee and Woo 2023) and the G7 (Nagy 2023). Ever since the launch of Russia’s operations in Ukraine in

February 2022, Washington and its Western allies pressured China to condemn Moscow, distance itself, and refrain from commercial dealings, particularly the exports of arms and dual-use equipment. Washington summoned Beijing to pressure Moscow and stand on the side of Kiev and NATO.

However, this approach was already in place before the 2022 hostilities. In fact, in the days following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Biden first set in motion the “U.S.–Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership” (U.S. Department of State 2021), before forming in mid-September the AUKUS (Australia, UK, US), a strategic partnership which objective is to contain the rise of Beijing’s influence in the Pacific. It was clear by then that Biden would indeed pursue a policy of reinvigorating U.S.–led military alliances, not just in the Euro-Atlantic (NATO) but also in Asia-Pacific. In Europe, the U.S. amplified its presence and NATO’s new role by admitting two new members of the Alliance, Finland and Sweden. In Asia-Pacific, Washington fostered China-containment partnerships akin to the “island chain strategy” that John Foster Dulles had put in place during the era of the Korean war: increase of mobility for U.S. Marines in Okinawa; construction of an airfield in Mageshima; the opening of U.S. Marines base in Guam; agreement with the Philippines on the use of four bases; agreement on joint exercises and deployment of aircraft carriers with Seoul, including a B-52 bomber capable of deploying a nuclear weapon; trilateral US–Japan–South Korea summit at Camp David; operationalization of AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.); reinvigoration of QUAD (Japan, Australia, India, US); formation of “the Squad” (Australia, Japan, Philippines, U.S.); and providing 10 billion US dollars in military-purpose grants for Taiwan over five years (Mitić 2023b; Stošić 2024). Karlin argues that, taken together, “these campaigns demonstrate a modernized approach to collaborating with allies and partners in the service of deterrence,” and Washington, with its military, “creates several potential pathways to preclude Chinese efforts to overturn the status quo, increases the complexity of those contingencies, and induces uncertainty about which may be the most relevant” (Karlin 2024).

Securitization of globalization and weaponization of the global value chain

Under Biden, the U.S. updated Trump's tariff war and promoted an excessive securitization of globalization and the weaponization of the supply chain, leading to de-globalization through protectionist concepts such as "de-coupling"/"de-risking" and "friendly-shore outsourcing," which means the transfer of supply chains to allied countries.

Washington has pursued such policy both bilaterally and multilaterally. It argued against China's "intrusive" investment in technology and Western critical infrastructure. In 2022, Biden banned American sales to China's producers of chips before establishing 2023 the "Chip 4" alliance with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to undermine Beijing's role in semiconductor supply (Kyodo News 2023).

In 2022, Washington launched IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), with the participation of 13 other countries, with the aim of boosting U.S. economic presence in the region (Manak 2022). Chinese media slammed it and labelled it "economic NATO" (Banerjee 2022).

Finally, in competition with the BRI, Biden's administration worked on alternatives. Under Trump, the U.S. created the DFC (Development Finance Corporation), a bank established by Congress with the mission of "countering China," "reducing dependence on China in critical supply chains," and providing countries "a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments and United States strategic competitors" (Pike and Lu 2024).

During the Biden administration, the initiative was integrated in the G7 Partnership for Global Investment and Infrastructure (PGII), with the aim to "compete" and "combat" the BRI (Lemire and Mathiesen 2022). The European Union also integrated its BRI rival version – the "Global Gateway" – into the PGII (Borrell 2022). The strategic narrative of the PGII is an alleged "superiority of values" against the BRI – its projects being described as "environmentally-sound," "labour-responsible," "value-based," "transparent," and "democratic."

Near the end of his mandate, in December 2024, Biden visited the Lobito port on the Angolan coast, the starting point of the U.S. flagship railway development project in Africa. The project, financed by the DFC, aims to connect Angola's port to Zambia and, ultimately, the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. However, it is mainly devoted to fighting a "global reputational battle with China" and the BRI (Pike and Lu 2024).

ADAPTATION OF CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

Beijing faced the Biden administration in a challenging environment during the COVID-19 pandemic, negatively affecting both global supply chains and China's internal consumption. Furthermore, the geopolitical upheaval from 2021 on, following the US focus on Ukraine and sanctions against its strategic partner Russia and the building of military power in Asia-Pacific, diverted China's attention and put it in an overall defensive posture. Thus, Beijing had to adapt its grand strategy to the changes.

“True multilateralism” vs. RBO

Sensing the arrival of the prominence of the concept of RBO in Western, particularly U.S. foreign policy discourse, President Xi Jinping put forward in April 2021, at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, the concept of “true multilateralism.” “True multilateralism” is contrasted to “pseudo-multilateralism,” used by a group of states to “protect their self-serving agendas, significantly diminishing the effectiveness of international multilateral institutions’ governance” (China Institute of International Studies 2024, 3). The first feature of “pseudo-multilateralism” is its reliance on the RBO: “under the pretext of a ‘rules-based international order,’ the authority of the United Nations has been compromised by the imposition of exclusive ‘small-circle states’ within the international community, disregarding fairness and justice” and imposing “small-circle rules” which “only safeguard the interests of the ‘small circles’ and even target and undermine the interests of others” (14). This practice involves “selectively adhering to or dismissing the foundational norms of international relations, established by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter” (15). Other features of “pseudo-multilateralism” include the promotion of “universal values” in neglect of civilizational diversity, a Cold War zero-sum mindset over “indivisible security,” “small group collective action” featuring unilateral sanctions, ignoring multilateral commitments to global governance and applying “double standards in all areas of international relations,” effectively “undermining the international system with the United Nations at its core” (15–17). In contrast, “true multilateralism focuses on the principles of the UN Charter as a foundational guideline,” on extensive consultation, joint contribution, shared benefits and adapting to changes, particularly the rise of the Global South, global development

and preventive diplomacy (44–46). On the other side, a research group at the U.S. Army War College argued that “true multilateralism” is part of China’s great strategy, which aims to “develop and shape a China-led alternative to the US-led rules-based international order by 2035 through a ‘Covert Hegemonic Ambition’ (CHA) strategy” (Flury et al. 2024, 3). The team argues that the PRC has not formally articulated it but that “this grand strategy highly likely centers on aligning global governance with ‘Xiism,’ a combination of China’s core national interests and Chairman Xi’s ideological orientation,” which must adhere to Xi’s vision of “community of common destiny” and using hybrid tactics of economic, political and legal warfare, favourable energy and tech standards creation, cyber warfare and information/cultural influence operations (Flury *et al.* 2024, 3).

Boosting old, introducing new global initiatives

Despite Washington’s pressure points and the overall context of the COVID-19 pandemic, China opted for an offensive shaping strategy by reinvigorating the BRI and launching new initiatives.

During the Biden administration, the Belt and Road Initiative celebrated its 10th anniversary with results that impressed even some of its fiercest critics. The Economist argued that “in many ways the BRI has lived up to the hype” as “more than 150 countries, accounting for almost 75% of the world’s population and more than half of its GDP, have signed on to the scheme” (The Economist 2023). Through 3,000 projects, the BRI helped increase the GDP share of developing and emerging countries by 3.6% (Embassy of the PR of China in Grenada 2023). Despite the conflict in Ukraine, the China-Europe Railway Express, passing through the Russian Federation before ending up in the EU, showed a dramatic increase in the transport of goods, with an increase of 27% year-on-year in the first seven months of 2023 (Blair 2023). The route, launched in 2017, became an essential BRI transit route and an alternative to the dependence on transport through the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which connects China’s Western region of Kashgar to the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, in southwestern Pakistan, provided access to the Strait of Hormuz and the daily transport of between 20 and 30% of world’s total oil consumption (Strauss Center for International Security and Law 2023). The BRI-related projects in Europe also progressed. The Athens–Piraeus

port, operated by Chinese COSCO, turned into a leading European hub, increasing capacity four-fold since the acquisition (Xinhua 2023a). Further north, on the pan-European Corridor X linking Piraeus and the Mediterranean to Central Europe, the high-speed railway connecting Belgrade and Budapest progressed, with the Serbian leg completed in 2024 and the Hungarian segment scheduled for 2026. In South America, President Xi inaugurated a \$1.3 billion deep-water port in Peru's Chancay during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima, thus boosting BRI cooperation and connectivity by reducing the duration of maritime transport across the Pacific (Baptista, Aquino and Elliot 2024). The BRI also helped China implement its "mask and vaccine diplomacy" during the COVID-19 pandemic and launched the "Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on COVID-19 Vaccines Cooperation" with 28 countries (Liangtao, Huang and Jin 2022).

Two other older multilateral initiatives – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS – took fundamental steps forward in expanding membership. For China, the SCO is a multilateral mechanism that helps shape a Eurasian security space without U.S. meddling. It performed a balancing act in 2023 when it allowed Iran to enter the SCO together with awarding a "dialogue partner" status to Saudi Arabia. While Beijing intensified its military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, it participated in joint naval exercises with Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman.

At the 2023 Johannesburg summit, BRICS decided to enlarge and allowed full membership to countries that are important BRI actors and China's bilateral partners – from Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to Iran and, from 2025 on, Indonesia, which became the first Southeast Asian member of the organization, an important impetus for Beijing (Strangio 2025).

In addition, President Xi presented three new Chinese initiatives in the 2021–2023 period: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI). The GDI was launched in 2021 to recover the lost time from the slow achievement of the United Nations' 17 SDGs, focused on tackling uneven and inadequate development. Beijing received support from more than 100 countries in a Group of Friends of the Initiative and completed over 200 projects in the Global South in just two years, and announced it would contribute 10 billion dollars to the GDI implementation fund (CGTN 2023).

Xi Jinping announced the GSI in the aftermath of the start of Russia's operation in Ukraine by describing the timing as the moment in which: "changes of the world, of our times and of history are unfolding in ways like never before" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of China 2022). The GSI served as a basis for China's proposal for 2023 for the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, focusing on indivisible security, clear commitment to the UN Charter, opposition to double standards regarding territorial integrity, and unilateral sanctions outside of the UN system. In 2024, Brazil joined hands with China to set up the "Friends for Peace" group at the UN, aimed at de-escalating the conflict in Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of China 2024a). In the Middle East, another conflict zone that erupted during the Biden administration, China made two important inroads based on the GSI. In 2023, it helped re-establish diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Global Times 2023). In 2024 it mediated an agreement between opposing Palestinian factions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of China 2024b). Furthermore, the GSI helped boost cooperation in tackling terrorist threats from the "Islamist Movement of Eastern Turkistan" in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, endangering the border with China's Xinjiang, as well as the "Liberation Army of Baluchistan," disrupting transport to the China-CPEC port of Gwadar (Mitić 2022).

Finally, in 2023, Xi announced the GCI (Global Civilization Initiative) with the aim of promoting respect for the right of the world's nations to have their own development paths, as opposed to Western-imposed "universal" principles of human rights, democracy, and development (Xinhua 2023b). By promoting these initiatives, China also aimed to answer to the creation of artificial barriers to global trade, to decoupling and de-risking strategies pursued by the West, whose protectionism Beijing sees as both a blow to globalized free trade and to the development of the Global South which it increasingly sees as an important market in the future. This was reflected at the Third Plenary of the 20th Congress of the CPC in 2024 (Central Committee of the CPC, 2024).

Balancing "anti-China" economic and military alliances

China's grand strategy during the Biden administration reflects a multidimensional approach characterized by geopolitical assertiveness, economic resilience, and military modernization. Each is intricately

tied to China's global ambitions and domestic priorities and responses to global and regional challenges.

Economically, Beijing has accelerated efforts toward self-sufficiency in critical technologies and adopted the "dual circulation" strategy to balance domestic growth and consumption with global economic integration and export-oriented growth. One of the most evident manifestations of this adaptive strategy has been China's approach to the ongoing trade war initiated during the Trump administration and exacerbated under Biden. Beijing has pursued a dual approach: safeguarding its economic stability while diversifying trade partnerships to reduce dependence on the U.S. market. This has involved deepening ties with nations participating in the BRI, fostering economic integration through mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and accelerating its push for technological self-sufficiency. By prioritizing sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy, China aims to insulate itself from the adverse effects of U.S.-led decoupling efforts and export controls. China has sought to mitigate the impact of U.S. sanctions and diplomatic pressure by strengthening ties with emerging economies and diversifying its energy and resource imports. For example, partnerships with countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America have become integral to Beijing's long-term strategy of reducing vulnerability to U.S.-led initiatives. Moreover, the Biden administration's focus on human rights and democracy promotion has led to heightened scrutiny of China's domestic policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Beijing's response has been twofold: defending its policies through assertive diplomacy and simultaneously seeking to reshape global narratives through media, think tanks, and international forums. This underscores China's broader strategy of countering U.S. influence by promoting alternative governance models and emphasizing the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

Geopolitically, China has pursued a dual strategy of asserting sovereignty claims, particularly in the South China Sea, while deepening ties with developing nations through the BRI and other global initiatives. Biden administration's emphasis on strengthening partnerships, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, has prompted a recalibration of China's diplomatic engagements and security partnerships. By promoting the concept of a "Community of Shared Future for Mankind," leveraging platforms such as the SCO, and proposing concepts of indivisible security under the GSI, China seeks to project itself as a stabilizing force in contrast to what

it frames as the divisive policies of the U.S. The renaming of the Asia-Pacific region to the “Indo-Pacific” underlines the U.S.’s strategic shift towards addressing the rising influence of India and counterbalancing China. Beijing, however, has responded by reinforcing its presence in critical regions such as the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. This includes militarising artificial islands, expanding naval patrols, and increasing joint military exercises with allies like Russia.

These actions reflect China’s readiness to assert its sovereignty claims while countering the U.S.’ and its allies’ perceived encirclement efforts. Adaptation has also been a hallmark of China’s approach to internal and external challenges posed by the Biden administration’s policies.

China’s military modernization has been another critical component of its readiness to confront U.S. challenges. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has prioritized asymmetric capabilities designed to deter U.S. intervention in potential flashpoints such as Taiwan. Investments in space and cyber warfare, hypersonic missile development, and an expanded naval presence highlight Beijing’s commitment to achieving strategic parity with Washington. Joint military exercises and expanded deployments in the Indian Ocean and Africa further signal China’s ambition to project power on a global scale.

After the beginning of the Russian military operation in Ukraine, and in a wider economic, political, and security context, China recalibrated its statecraft. In response to what it viewed as a provocative visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, China performed massive military drills in the Taiwan Strait and launched for the first time ballistic missiles over Taipei. Similarly, when Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen traveled to the U.S. in April 2023, Beijing responded by simulating sealing off Taiwan.

With the focus on testing land-strike and sea-assault capabilities, the drills showed Beijing’s readiness to react militarily in case of Taipei’s unilateral independence moves. Although smaller in scale, similar exercises were carried out in April 2023 and simulated sealing off Taiwan in response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s trip to the U.S. In addition, Beijing has also broadened its aerial incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone.

Despite pressures in the neighborhood, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) expanded its operation scope, particularly after signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, extending its reach in the South Pacific (Zongyuan 2022). Furthermore, the PLAN

participated in joint drills with fellow BRICS members (South Africa and Russia in the Indian Ocean in February 2023; Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman in March 2023, Russia in the Sea of Japan in September 2024).

CONCLUSION: READYING FOR TRUMP 2.0

The evolution of China's grand strategy during the Biden administration reflects a complex interplay of defensive posturing and proactive engagement. Confronted with heightened U.S. competition and shifting global dynamics, Beijing has adapted its geopolitical, economic, and military strategies to secure its interests and assert its role as a pivotal global actor. China has demonstrated resilience and strategic foresight by prioritizing technological self-sufficiency, expanding the BRI, BRICS, and the SCO, introducing the GDI, the GSI, and the GDI, and modernizing the PLA.

Throughout 2024, during the U.S. presidential campaign, one of the key questions for IR scholars, and the broader public opinion indeed, has been the issue of the effects of a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House and of what it would mean for the future of U.S.-China relations and the transition of global order. Trump announced he would introduce new tariffs, continue expanding barriers to China's access to U.S. technology, and continue a multidimensional competition and rivalry. Trump's choice for national security adviser, Michael Waltz, argued, "We're in a global arms race with an adversary that, unlike any in American history, has the economic and the military capability to truly supplant and replace us" (Klare 2024). Klare argues that "Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach" but that "he will have to choose between them – and his decisions will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone living on this planet" (Klare 2024).

Conversely, China has sent a clear message during the campaign: "Whoever sits in the White House, we are ready." This calming message is intended to show self-confidence in Beijing's adaptation and preparedness to absorb shocks and its lack of nervousness. Indeed, it aimed to show confidence in its grand strategy. The discourse was pursued after Trump's victory in November 2024.

Prominent Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong, the proponent of "moral realism" and transition from Deng Xiaoping's policy of "hide capabilities and bide time" into Xi's policy of "striving for achievement," admitted

that “the rocky relationship between the two countries is set to get rockier” (Yan 2024). However, he argued that China’s leaders “do not look at Trump with fear,” as they learned a lot from Trump 1.0: “his propensity for economic protectionism will lead to further disputes and rising tensions, but Beijing believes that it can navigate such confrontations,” while “Trump’s dubious commitment to U.S. allies will encourage other countries to hedge their bets, building ties with Beijing to offset the unpredictability of Washington” (Yan 2024).

One of these spheres might be the issue of clean energy and the fight against climate change. As Trump sets to return to fossil fuels, his domestic critics argue that China “will likely benefit the most” and “may take advantage of America’s inconsistency to become even more dominant in the global renewable energy marketplace” – where it already produces 80% of the world’s solar panels and controls 60% of the world’s wind turbine production capacity – while European partners might distance from Washington (Benson 2025).

On the other side, Beijing has shown its commitment to stand by its strategic partners throughout Biden’s presidency despite turbulence and threats. The Russian Federation is a clear example, with Beijing and Moscow expanding the “no-limit” strategic partnership in all fields, despite Western sanctions and calls on China to distance itself: BRICS and SCO have expanded, meetings between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin proceeded regularly, military drills have remained at pre-2022 levels, while trade has been substantially increased. In 2023, China–Russia trade reached an all-time high of 240 billion dollars, a considerable increase from 147 billion dollars in 2021 (Fong and Merrow 2024). This approach aligns with Yan Xuetong’s moral realism, which argues that Beijing should reward those who “want to have a constructive role in China’s rise” (Yan 2014).

Such consistency sets an immediate stumbling block to any potential U.S. strategy to create wedges between Moscow and Beijing. It also shows Beijing’s confidence in its global narrative on the future of “true multilateralism,” a UN-centred transition towards multipolarity, and indeed, the coherence and agility of its grand strategy.

REFERENCES

- Banerjee, Mayuri. 2022. "China's Response to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework," *Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/China-Response-to-Indo-Pacific-M-Banerjee-150622#footnote1_9k6kypg
- Baptista, Eduardo, Marco Aquino, and Lucinda Elliott. 2024. "Starting Latin America trip, Xi Jinping opens huge port in Peru funded by China." *Reuters*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-arrives-lima-apec-open-pacific-megaport-2024-11-14/>
- Benson, Thor. 2025. "China Is Ready to Take Advantage of Trump Trashing Clean Energy." *Rolling Stone*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/china-take-advantage-trump-trashing-clean-energy-1235224713/>
- Blair, Alex. 2023. "Signal: China-Europe rail freight traffic increases 27% in H1 2023." *Railway Technology*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.railway-technology.com/news/china-europe-rail-freight-traffic-increases-by-27-in-2023/?cf-view&cf-closed>
- Blinken, Anthony. 2022. *The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China – Speech at the George Washington University, Washington DC*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>
- Borrell, Josep. 2022. "The Global Gateway, a brand to boost European action worldwide." *European Union External Action*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-gateway-brand-boost-european%C2%A0action-worldwide_en
- Brands, Hal, and John Lewis Gaddis. 2021. "The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (6): 10–20.
- Central Committee of the CPC. 2024. "Full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China." International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrassReport/>
- CGTN. 2023. "China to launch special fund for Global Development Initiative, says Xi." *CGTN*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-08-24/Xi-says-China-to-launch-special-fund-for-Global-Development-Initiative-1mx0hrmQBfG/index.html>

- China Institute of International Studies. 2024. *True Multilateralism: Conceptual Development, Core Essence and China's Practice*. Beijing: China Institute of International Studies.
- Cho, Tony K. 2011. "Mao's War of Resistance: Framework for China's Grand Strategy." *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 41.3 (2011): 4.
- Doshi, Rush. 2021. *The Long Time: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Đorđević, Branislav, and Nenad Stekić. 2022. "Beyond China's Grand Strategy Cultivation: Connectivity as Neglected Variable." In: Liu Zuokui and Branislav Đorđević (eds.) *The Connectivity Cooperation Between China and Europe: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis*. London: Routledge, 51–71.
- Embassy of the PR of China in Grenada. 2023. "10 Years on, the Belt and Road Initiative is not Only Fruitful, but also Promising." Embassy of the PR of China in Grenada. Last accessed January 10, 2025. http://gd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zxhd_1/202308/t20230826_11133075.htm
- European Council. 2023. "European Council conclusions on China, 30 June 2023". Council of the European Union. Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/30/european-council-conclusions-on-china-30-june-2023/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=European%20Council%20conclusions%20on%20China%2C%2030%20June%202023
- Friedberg, Aaron. 2022. *Getting China Wrong*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Fetzer, Thimo, and Carlo Schwarz. 2020. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." *The Economic Journal* 131: 1717–1741.
- Flury, Mike, Andi Tallman, Troy Johnson, Nick Panepinto, and Patrick Ryan [Flury et al]. 2024. *China's Strategic Blueprint: Creating A Multipolar World Through 2035*. Carlisle: United States Army War College.
- Fong, Clara, and Will Merrow. 2024. "Where the China-Russia Partnership Is Headed in Seven Charts and Maps." Council on Foreign Relations. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.cfr.org/article/where-china-russia-partnership-headed-seven-charts-and-maps>
- Global Times. 2023. "Saudi Arabia, Iran agree to resume ties, reopen embassies after talks in Beijing." *Global Times*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287076.shtml>

- Horesh, Niv. 2020. *China's Grand Strategy Under Xi Jinping: How History Complicates Beijing's Global Outreach*. New York: Routledge.
- Kachiga, Jean. 2022. *The Pulse of China's Grand Strategy*. New York: Routledge.
- Karlin, Mara. 2024 "The Return of Total War." *Foreign Affairs* November/December 2024. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/return-total-war-karlin>
- Klare, Michael T. 2024. "What to Expect With Trump's Future China Policy." *The Nation*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-policy-trump-administration/>
- Kyodo News. 2023. "Japan, U.S., South Korea, Taiwan launch 'Chip 4' talks for supply chain." *Kyodo News*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/02/fb77092264b1-japan-us-s-korea-taiwan-launch-chip-4-talks-for-supply-chain.html>
- Layton, Peter. 2012. "The idea of grand strategy." *The RUSI journal* 157.4 (2012): 56–61.
- Lee, Liz, and Ryan Woo. 2023. "China lashes back at NATO criticism, warns it will protect its rights." *Reuters*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-opposes-natos-move-into-asia-pacific-region-warns-resolute-response-2023-07-12/>
- Lemire, Jonathan, and Karl Mathiesen. 2022. "G7 unveils \$600B plan to combat China's Belt and Road." *Politico*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.politico.eu/article/g7-unveils-600b-plan-to-combat-chinas-belt-and-road/>
- Liangtao, Liu, Yongli Huang, and Jiyong Jin. 2022. "China's Vaccine Diplomacy and Its Implications for Global Health Governance." *Healthcare* 10 (7): 1276.
- Manak, Inu. 2022. "Unpacking the IPEF: Biden's First Big Trade Play." Council on Foreign Relations. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.cfr.org/article/unpacking-ipef-bidens-first-big-trade-play>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. 2022. "Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022." Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202204/t20220421_10671083.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. 2024a. "Friends for Peace Group on the Ukraine Crisis Set up in the United Nations." Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjzbzhd/202409/t20240929_11500459.html

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. 2024b. "Palestinian Factions Sign Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity." Last accessed January 10, 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202407/t20240723_11458790.html
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2022. „Kina i Bliski istok nakon američkog povlačenja iz Avganistana.” In Katarina Katarina Zakić and Nenad Stekić (eds.) *Kineski razvojni izazovi: promene i projekcije*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 95–118.
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2023a. "From globalisation 'friend' to global 'foe': the evolution of the US strategic narrative on China's rise." *The Review of International Affairs* 74 (1189): 31–56.
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2023b. "Statecraft Repertoires of China and the U.S. Before and During the Conflict in Ukraine." *The Policy of National Security* 24 (1): 29–59.
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2024. *Global Strategic Narrative Wars: The Battle for Serbia*. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.
- Nagy, Stephen. 2023. "Investing in a rules-based order will dominate the G7." *The Japan Times*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/05/17/commentary/japan-commentary/g7-summit/>
- Nye, Joseph. 2023. "A new cold war with China?" In Ryan Hass and Emilie Kimball (eds.), *Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?*, Washington: Brookings. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-us-pursue-a-new-cold-war-with-china/>
- Pepinsky, Thomas. 2021. "Biden's Summit for Democracy should focus on rights, not economics and geopolitics." *Brookings*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/22/bidenssummit-for-democracy-should-focus-on-rights-not-economics-and-geopolitics/>
- Pike, Lili, and Christina Lu. 2024. "Is the U.S. Answer to China's Belt and Road Working?" *Foreign Policy*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/16/dfc-investment-africa-china-bri-lobito-corridor-infrastructure-development/>
- Scobell, Andrew, Edmund J. Burke, Cortez A. Cooper III, Sale Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner, and J. D. Williams [Scobell, Andrew *et al.*] 2020. *China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

- Stekić, Nenad. 2023. *A Hesitant Hegemon: Layers of China's Contemporary Security Policy*. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.
- Stošić, Sanja. 2024. "The Philippines as the United States' Geostrategic Partner: Fight for 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific". In: Nebojša Vuković and Mihajlo Kopanja (eds.). *Geostrategija Indo-Pacifika: veliki poligon globalnog sučeljavanja*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu i Fakultet bezbednosti Univerziteta u Beogradu, 274–290.
- Strangio, Sebastian. 2025. "Indonesia Officially Becomes First Southeast Asian Member of BRICS." *The Diplomat*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/indonesia-officially-becomes-first-southeast-asian-member-of-brics/>
- Strauss Center for International Security and Law. 2023. "Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the threat to oil flows through the Strait." Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-about-the-strait/#:~:text=Oil%20tankers%20carry%20approximately%2017,via%20the%20Strait%20of%20Hormuz>
- Swaine, Michael D., Sara A. Daly, and Peter W. Greenwood. 2000. *Interpreting China's grand strategy: Past, present, and future*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation
- The Economist. 2023. "China's Belt and Road Initiative will keep testing the West." *The Economist*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/09/07/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-will-keep-testing-the-west>
- U.S. Department of State. 2021. *U.S.–Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-ukrainecharter-on-strategic-partnership/>.
- White House. 2020. *United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China*. Washington DC: White House. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf>
- Xinhua. 2023a. "BRI brings new vitality to Greece's largest port." *Xinhua*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://english.news.cn/20230830/56c8f33bebae4b34af79c5f13c0de518/c.html>

- Xinhua. 2023b. “Global Civilization Initiative injects fresh energy into human development.” *The State Council Information Office of the PR of China*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/19/content_85177312.htm
- Yan, Xuetong. 2014. “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7 (2): 153–184.
- Yan, Xuetong. 2024. “Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump.” *Foreign Affairs*. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-china-isnt-scared-trump>
- Zongyuan, Liu Zoe. 2022. “What the China-Solomon Islands Pact Means for the U.S. and South Pacific.” Council on Foreign Relations. Last accessed January 10, 2025. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-solomon-islands-security-pact-us-south-pacific>

Александар Митић*

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

Ненад Стекић**

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

РЕКАЛИБРАЦИЈА ВЕЛИКЕ СТРАТЕГИЈЕ КИНЕ ТОКОМ АДМИНИСТРАЦИЈЕ ЏОЗЕФА БАЈДЕНА***

Резиме

У светлу континуираног раста дипломатске, технолошке, војне, економске и нормативне моћи Кине, у контексту транзиције ка мултиполарном поретку, Вашингтон је проширио домен конкуренције и ривалства са Пекингом током администрације Џозефа Бајдена. Уз „царинске ратове” Доналда Трампа, Бајденова политика укључила је елементе стратегије „обуздавања 2.0”, надограђене снажним либерално-интернационалистичким дискурсом о неопходности очувања „поретка заснованог на правилима” (*Rules-based Order* – RBO), као и манихејским наративом о супротстављеним парадигмама „демократије и аутократије”. Овакав приступ довео је до интензивирања RBO наратива у односу на „ауторитарне државе”, изградње савеза против Руске Федерације и Кине, као и до успостављања нових формата секуритизације глобализације и инструментализације глобалних вредносних ланаца у геополитичке сврхе. Суочена са сложеним геополитичким окружењем, Кина је морала да прилагоди своју велику стратегију. Као одговор на RBO, Пекинг је промовисао концепт „истинског мултилатерализма”. Суочен са порастом броја нових „мини-савеза” у Азијско-пацифичком региону, Пекинг је ојачао своје војне капацитете. Изван региона,

* Имејл адреса: aleksandar.mitic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-6918-7561

** Имејл адреса: nenad.stekic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-9066-0480

*** Овај рад представља налазе студије спроведене у оквиру истраживачког пројекта „Србија и изазови у међународним односима 2025”, финансираног од стране Министарства науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије, а реализованог од стране Института за међународну политику и привреду, Београд током 2025. године.

Кина је наставила са ширењем постојећих (Иницијатива Појас и пут, Шангајска организација за сарадњу, БРИКС) и успостављањем нових мултилатералних иницијатива (Глобална иницијатива за развој, Глобална безбедносна иницијатива, Глобална иницијатива за развој). Кина је показала отпорност и стратешку далековидост, док су флексибилност и кохерентност њене еволуирајуће велике стратегије омогућили Пекингу да „дочека” повратак Доналда Трампа у Белу кућу са спремношћу и самопоуздањем, упркос „неизвесном путу пред собом”.

Кључне речи: Кина, велика стратегија, САД, Бајден, Трамп, спољна политика, међународна политика

* This manuscript was submitted on January 14, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for online publication and published *online first* on February 24, 2025. It was accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

Slobodan Janković*

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

Željko Budimir**

Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja Luka

MEDITERRANEAN AFTER US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2024: SCENARIO FOR THE NEAR FUTURE***

Abstract

American presidential elections in 2024 among other things are marked by Donald Trump's announcement regarding changes in foreign affairs. In this moment of history, which was characterized by changing world order, the Mediterranean Sea, in particular Eastern and Southern parts, and the Balkans are areas in proximity or directly affected by conflicts. The paper starts with the assumption that change in the White House would imply a certain discontinuity in their foreign policy. By implementing the Italian neoclassical geopolitical framework, the authors question the hypothesis. In line with that approach, opposition between NATO and Russia is considered as among the elites marked by diverging cultural traits and histories. The paper is divided into four parts. In order to arrive at the outcomes of the Trump scenario (new presidential mandate of Donald Trump), importance of the South and East Mediterranean and the Balkans is analyzed from the geopolitical perspective and in the view of current global reordering. Finally authors conclude that change could

* E-mail: slobodan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-1891-2545

** E-mail: zeljko.budimir@fpn.unibl.org; ORCID: 0000-0002-1745-6667

*** The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2024," financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, during the year 2024.

occur *vis-à-vis* Ukraine, while US politics in the Middle East would follow the current stance.

Keywords: Donald Trump, Mediterranean Sea, Russia, NATO, Balkans

INTRODUCTION

The greatest close sea is crucial for the relations between Europe and North Africa, for the large chunk of transport and connections among the European Union, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Pacific nations. Gibraltar, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and the Suez Canal are potential choke points and, at the same time places for connections. The Balkans and Asia Minor, divided by the straits, are in between the Mediterranean and another closed sea, since 2022, a war theatre, the Black Sea. For the Black Sea countries, and in particular for Russia, as a great power and currently involved in World War Three (Janković 2023, 24–46, 222–232), and for its strategic opponent – the West led by Anglo-American elites – wider Mediterranean area play an important part for the warfare planning. Various dimensions of the World War as a total war (Kopli 2022, 35–45), implicate cultural, economic, and classical armed warfare. While Russian leadership (Chinese, too) seems to be rock solid and confirmed with the latest presidential elections¹ in 2024, the US presidential elections are marked by considerations of change in its strategic posture in internal and foreign policy. Hence, who will be the official host of the White House will or should also have an impact on the US Mediterranean policy (and on the war in Ukraine, too).

Donald Trump's and the team of Biden have differing stances on the war in Ukraine. Robert F. Kennedy was pushing to run, with almost null chances to win, before joining the Republican nominee. There were small chances for the establishment to allow him adequate mediatic campaign in order to challenge the current president, favored by the Democratic party (Fowler 2024).

While democratic candidate Kamala Harris or any of the Biden entourage would choose for continuity in foreign policy, Trump could

¹ Putin won another landslide victory in the presidential elections in Russia in March 2024 with 87.28 percent of votes and a turnout of 73.3%. The Chinese leadership is confirmed without elections (Turato 2022; “Результаты выборов президента России. Инфографика” 2024).

potentially seek a settlement with Russia, but only regarding Ukraine. Mediterranean policy is important as it is in proximity to European war theatre, and the Middle East is part of it. The aim of the paper is to analyse whether announced changes in the case of the new Trump presidency will have an impact on US policy in the wider Mediterranean Sea area.

Addressing future trends requires understanding the position and importance that the Mediterranean and the Black Sea assume in the global confrontation (of West and East, generally speaking). The wider Mediterranean area in this text refers to the East and South Mediterranean, the Balkan Peninsula and the Middle East. The starting assumption is that if the candidate of the Democratic party or other proposed by the current US administration (2021–2025) is proclaimed as the winner, there will be continuity, while it is to be assumed that certain discontinuity is to be expected.

Foreign policy analysis is a usual framework for the study of foreign policy behaviour, it explains the making and shaping of foreign policy (see: Alden and Aran 2017; Potter 2017). Still, for the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean, an adequate approach is also the Italian neoclassical geopolitical school adopted in this paper. It could be summed up in the lesser importance of the geographic features compared to the German classical school or that of Mackinder or Mahan understandings (Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman are the most relevant representatives of the Anglo-American classical geopolitical concepts). The resume of this approach is the primary importance of the will (*volonta'*) of the elites, imbued with a historical legacy to achieve this or that objective in the concrete territory. For example, this was the explanation for why the fascist regime wanted to revive the Roman empire or the Nazis perceived themselves as bearers of the tradition dating back to Charlemagne. Thus, geography is primarily understood through the lens of the interested actors, shaped by their cultural legacy (see: Janković 2020, 101–125).

South Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor and, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are parts of the rimland (concept of Nicholas Spykman) important for logistics through Suez by the sea and all the way toward central Asia by continental roads. When it comes to actual conflict for the new distribution of power at the global scale Asia Minor and the Straits are already strategically positioned for the Russian operations in Syria and, generally, its Mediterranean presence. The potential importance of the mentioned areas for the Western coalition

(USA, UK, and EU countries that send bellicose material and operators of modern military equipment) lies in the fact that Ukraine is continentally linked to the West through Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania and by the sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Sometimes, the Bulgarian and Romanian Black Sea coast is important ground for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion toward the East and, in particular, in the strategy of controlling this closed sea since 2004. Thus, the Mediterranean is of more importance for Russia than it is for the US. However, Russian presence in the Middle East and in Africa in part depends on the free navigation in the Mediterranean (Syria and Libya). Russian military presence in the air bases in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso, with the availability of the Air Base in Niger's Niamey partly overcomes the limits imposed for the Russian military fleet.² This is a modified way of using the airpower (Budimir 2020, 125–172).

In the concrete case, the opposition between NATO and Russia is not primary or only geographic as opposition between thalassocratic power (US, UK, and NATO as their extension) and continental power (Russian bear), but between the elites having different cultural traits and histories of claim on this or that territory. The British are interested in not permitting the Russians to control the Black Sea and, therefore, the Straits because they are afraid of the strength and resources of the power controlling the continental mass having the possibility to build a strong navy and downgrade their status of a naval power (which China did). American elites want to maintain and augment their planetary reach using territorial features of their allied or subordinate (Lake 2009, 14–15) countries. Anglo-Americans consider Russia as a cultural, i.e., ideological enemy, and China as a strategic rival (Huntington 1993; Naročnicka 2008; Jankovic 2023; Shatzer 2022, 136). This is why the opposition does not exhaust itself at levels of diplomacy, economy, and armed warfare. Confrontation is total. This totality implies that the fronts run along fields of classical cultural and societal relations in the East or postmodern in the West. That explains the limits imposed on the study and popularization of Russian high culture (literature, ballet, concerts of classical music) in some EU countries.

Russian governing elite historically considers all or most of Ukraine as part of its own culture, and at the same time wants to assure safe

² One might assume that Russia also uses civilian cargo ships to transport material through the Black Sea (see: Sutton 2023; Avia 2020).

passage for Russia's military navy through the straits to the Mediterranean. Similarly, Polish elite ambitions based on the history of their modern kingdom and conquests of the part of modern Belarus and Ukraine are used in order to promote social anti-Russian mobilization in that country. This historical experience used by the elites relying on national culture to shape objectives in foreign policy is adapted to geographic traits.

GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE US AND RUSSIA

Geopolitical features are susceptible to change in a way in which technology shrinks the distances or may underline or diminish the importance of the terrain, demography and, other elements. On the other hand, the will to use geopolitical characteristics, like the Houthi's usage of the Bab el Mandeb Strait to influence Israel and its allies' economies, demonstrates relevance of the Italian neoclassical geopolitical approach.

The Balkans

The Balkan Peninsula, or Southeastern Europe has a triangular shape with a negative demographic trend between Central Europe (Danube River) and the seas. It is some 1300 km wide, in the north and 480 km only from Thessaloniki on the coast of the Aegean Sea to the town of Smederevo on the right bank of the Danube River. Scarce demographic weight (around 50 million people), and economic, too, make this part of the continent less attractive for big investments, but the geopolitical location between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and the transport connection to Asia Minor reveal its current significance in the global turmoil.

National liberation movements and rebellions of the 19th century, the interest of several great power countries in the Balkans, and the rise of unipolar US policy in the 1990s shaped the contemporary map of this part of Europe. The renaissance of Russia as a great power and the eruption of the military front of the Third World War (WWIII) in the eastern European plains requires a new analysis of the Balkan locus in great power politics.

Primary importance for Russia traditionally lies in control of the straits and of the Black Sea shores. Thus, friendly relations of Moscow

with Romania and Bulgaria with their maritime coast are objective of Russia. Still, both of the countries are NATO members and diversely active against Russia through weapons and other military aid for the Ukrainian Army or through conscriptions of the so-called volunteers – actually of mercenaries.³ Balkan heartland, with Serbia and Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) assumes additional importance looking for Moscow a) diplomatically: as European countries and territories resisting the Anti-Russian policies, and b) from the point of view of geostrategy, as potential territory from which it is possible to partially withhold part of the military pressure on Ukrainian front in eventuality of the open NATO-Russia war.

Looking from Washington, control of the Balkan shores, crucial for maritime transport is assured and part of the inland roads remains only potentially unstable, due to the Serbian factor. Still, NATO is linked through the Partnership for Peace program, the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) agreement with Serbia (in 2015, Tanjug 2015) and the organisation of joint military drills. The perception of the potential for Russia to expand the ties with the Serbs and reach the Danube River probably could make two separate types of moves of US: 1) negotiation with Russia in order to settle the conflict before the eventual propagation of war into Moldavia, 2) instigation of Moldavia as a non-NATO member to enter the military conflict by attacking the Transnistria. That could inflame the public settlement in neighbouring Romania, an interested actor in the political future of the former Soviet Republic of Moldova.

Namely, support of NATO for Ukraine through weapons as aid (Pellicciari 2022, 69) needs multiple logistic's routes. The Russian route from Herson to Odesa will affect the status of Moldova. In that case, control of Balkan routes and the peninsula as a platform of anti/aerial and of offensive actions will be of additional importance due to the fact that it lies on Danube River and is bordering Romania. The official presence of NATO soldiers in Ukraine (French Legion Étrangers) utterly fuels the war and additionally reinforces the possibility of the extension of war further to the West.

Control of the Greek coast and islands is equally, or of similar importance as availability of using the Straits and control of the Black Sea shores of Asia Minor for the logistics or military and commercial

³ Romanian mercenaries were in the first months of the war second only to Poland with the number of fighters alongside the Ukrainian forces (see: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation 2022; Snider 2024).

supplies. In the Trump administration bilateral ties were boosted in opposition to Turkey. Maritime routes pass after the Straits through the Greek exclusive economic zone in the Aegean Sea. An important land route, via Egnatia connects Albanian port to Dures to Constantinopoli, and another one starts from Athens and Thessaloniki following the valleys of Vardar and Morava rivers until Belgrade and the Danube River.

The Danube River is potentially suitable for the transport of goods necessary in warfare, with only inconvenience for NATO that it runs through military-neutral country of Serbia. The road network still misses adequate connections between the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea, except for the Egnatia highway through northern Greece. The highway connecting the ports of Rijeka and Trieste, and Belgrade (road distance is 553 km, and direct distance is 477 km) still has only a motorway until Romania, and the road connecting the Albanian port of Dures and the Black Sea is far from over.


Southeastern Europe or better said, Balkan politics and, in particular, geopolitical position was an often studied issue in the 1990s and afterward in the first years after the NATO aggression on the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see: Guskova 2001; Гуськова 2013). Research in different aspects of international criminal law kept the Balkans interesting due to the process in the Hague Tribunal (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]), which served as a laboratory for the disciplinary politics against rebellious countries and peoples. Occasional outbursts of the fragile situation in the Peninsula and its geostrategic position between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, between the Danube River and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, including episodes of Greek-Turkish diplomatic confrontation and tensions around the status of autonomous Serbian entity inside *de facto* confederally conceived Bosnia and Herzegovina is an indicator of potential for instability in this micro-region. The focus of European politics in media and in diplomacy shifted towards Ukraine at least since 2004 and on the Caucasus, which is periodically reactivated as one of regions in which Russia is challenged by the West (Gabellini 2012). The position of Southeastern Europe in the current global confrontation is definitely behind the frontlines. Membership in NATO and position on the Ukraine war reveal total NATO control of the shores with the exception of Serbia and the Republic of Srpska/Bosnia and Herzegovina in the heartland of this part of Europe. Serbs are again the only ones not following the full program dictated by the West military (NATO) and civil arm (EU) (Map

1 representing NATO control of the Peninsula shores and the Serbian territories in the heartland).

In line with the need to assure logistic supply for the Ukrainian front, NATO announced: “Strengthening our ability to move, reinforce, supply, and sustain our forces to respond to threats across the Alliance, including through effective and resilient logistics and the development of mobility corridors. Training, exercising, and integrating NATO’s Forward Land Forces into the new plans, including by continuing to strengthen our forward defences on NATO’s Eastern Flank (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] 2024).”

As of July 2024, two new mobility corridors have been announced. One is Greece-Bulgaria-Romania *Harmonized Military Mobility Corridor* (Комарин 2024). The second is envisaged along the Pan-European Transport Corridor VIII, between Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, and North Macedonia. These four countries signed a Letter of Intent for cross-border military mobility cooperation (Pavikjevikj 2024).

Map 1: NATO control of the Balkan shores with Serbian lands in the peninsulas heartland



Map by S. Jankovic, CC BY (edition of the map taken from www.nato.int).

Announcement of building important antiaircraft and antiballistic military NATO base in Romania, and others in Bulgaria and Albania are part of the larger reinforcement of US military presence in the Balkans. Before, US negotiated with these countries to reinvigorate the cooperation in defense with the Hellenic Republic, according to the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (U.S. Department of State 2020a), with the

possibility to use 23 locations, in particular bases of Souda, Stefanovikeio, Larissa, and the port of Alexandroupolis. Previously, the US relied much more on territory of Turkey and the Incirlik air base. But, in June 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reportedly threatened to close it (Jones 2019). Port of Alexandroupolis is strategically located close to the Straits and in proximity to the Black Sea and the Gas Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria (Serbia Energy 2024).

Asia Minor

The position of Turkey changed after the end of the Cold War with the advent of ambitious Turkish non-Kemalist political elites in governing positions, with regional autonomy and ambitious neo-ottoman policy (Yavuz 2016, 438–465; Trifković 2011; Tanasković 2011). Positioned between two continents and as a land mass between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea today, it connects Syria with Russia and important gas routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe. Previously principally set as a rimland southeastern flank of NATO, it achieved substantial autonomy trading favours with the United States and Russia. Turkey has the strongest NATO army in Europe, second eventually only to France. At the same time, it is acting in between with strong interests to maintain a balanced position. This allows the Turkish government to sell the drones to the Ukrainian Army and not to align with the US-proposed sanctions against Russia.

Asia Minor is in the form of a rectangle. In fact, it is a natural land bridge with additional advantage of being on the straits, whose control is strategic not only for the Ukrainian front, but for the maritime food trade also, as Russia and Ukraine are internationally among the top exporters of grain. Mastodont pretensions of the Anglo-American elite with their insatiable appetite for global enslavement or control, although not feasible are still characterizing the apparatus and the *modus operandi* of strategic thinking in the upper echelons of the Western alliance. Think tanks and research centres formulate policy papers and analyses out of which will emerge the document. One such think tank is The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, which proposed the Black Sea strategy for NATO (Atlantic Council 2023). Text is classically presumptuous as if the unipolar moment still endures and the US is the light bearer. North Atlantic Alliance and US interests are, of course (in the document) in the Black Sea (and in that sense, all over the universe), and control of the

shores is necessary for Euro-Atlantic security (*sic* in Atlantic Council 2023). Namely, “Russian aggression in the Black Sea region threatens the security of every Black Sea state and the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole, as well as global food security, international economic stability, and the viability of international legal frameworks.” (Atlantic Council 2023). In the minds of Washington planners there is no single region in the world directly linked to the ‘Euro-Atlantic region’. Would the Trump government change this?

Currently, the US is *de facto* engaged in the war at the Ukrainian front, initiated by the previous administration, through its proxy represented in the Ukrainian Army, and through the provision of training, armaments, and its mercenaries. These logistics in the form of foreign aid changed the scope and the relations of international aid and among donor and recipient countries. As Pellicciari argues, “There has been an enormous quantity of diversified aid concentrated mostly on new areas of intervention (financial, political-institutional, military), relegating traditional humanitarian aid to second place” (Pellicciari 2024, 7). Weapons asked for by the recipient country and financing of it became the principal part of the aid (Pellicciari 2024, 7; 82–85). Black Sea shores of the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor are thus considered through the prism of field operation control. Washington supported and pushed its partners to maintain and enforce sanctions against Moscow. Militarisation of the shores through the establishment of a series of new military bases in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece should a) ensure supplies for the operations in south Russian or Ukrainian plains, b) provide the defence shield for the Central and Western Europe and c) provide the basis for eventual offensive operations against Russian territory, augmenting American and NATO threat capabilities. A new approach of Washington is seemingly that of rapprochement in the broader strategy of dismantling the globalist mechanisms, built after WWII.

In order to assure the three mentioned military objectives US planners wanted to control political processes and impose the reforms leading to the creation of an environment hostile to eventual internal and, subsequently, foreign political change of behaviour. Ideological reforms are thus of strategic importance. This political position, previously endorsed by the US government, changes with the new Trump presidency, but only as far regards the previous focus on Europe.

East and South Mediterranean

The Middle East and North Africa region by large corresponds to the south and east Mediterranean, plus the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran. Major changes in the foreign positioning of great powers and their influence are occurring in this part of the Mediterranean. Four out of five new BRICS members since January 2024 are Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates), and the fifth is Ethiopia. For a short period, until Russian intervention in Syria (2015), US hegemony was disputed only by Tehran and Damascus, from 1990 to 2015 (Janković 2019). New partnerships with Russia and China are changing the regional positioning previously framed in the NATO-aligned Istanbul cooperation initiative (since 2004).

The slow disengagement of the US from the wider region (from Iraq, with the return of limited forces in 2014, and from Afghanistan in 2021), was paralleled with the US push for the process of the diplomatic recognition of Jewish state by Arab countries during the Trump administration (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco), which was announced in the Trump's deal of the century in January 2020 (U.S. Department of State 2020b). The first step in that direction started outside the region, with the Washington agreement on economic normalization between Serbia and the so-called Kosovo⁴ at the beginning of September 2020, which included mutual recognition of Israel and the Muslim majority self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, led by secessionist forces in the Serbian southern province (Mirović 2020; Đorđević and Davidov 2022). The plan to create a safer environment for Israel in the region through diplomatic channels in the situation of the rising importance of Russia and China in the Middle East and North Africa came into question with the Israeli retaliative war on Gaza.⁵

In the background of the Ukrainian war, and in the proximity of the Gaza war, Mohamed Al Orabi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt in November 2023 predicted chaos „if new president who is not believer in two-state solution” (*sic*) comes into office in Washington

⁴ All references to Kosovo in this document should be understood to be in the context of United Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

⁵ Russia reemerged as a great power with interventions in Syria and in Libya to continue to spread its influence in the Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa afterward, but also through energy agreements with Turkey (see: France info 2022; Fukutomi 2023; Mitić 2022; 2024; Janković 2023, 322–327).

(and he attends it).⁶ Houthi actions in the Red Sea and even against commercial ships in the Indian Ocean are damaging the maritime trade through the Suez Canal. War in Gaza and its spin-off in bombings and artillery attacks between IDF and Hezbollah are fomenting the wider war in the region.

TRUMP SCENARIO

British scholar Ruth Deyermond, highly critical *vis-à-vis* Russia, claims that Trump's presidency was unusual and even irrational (as opposed to rational warmongering policy of the political West is to be assumed). In this partisan analysis where Russia is the aggressor, Trump "administration's policy on Russian aggression in Ukraine was not merely flawed or inconsistent over time, it was profoundly incoherent" (Deyermond 2023, 1609). Deyermond noted correctly that "[F]undamental aspects of policy concerning Russian aggression in Ukraine – the status of Crimea, or whether and how Russia should be punished for its aggression, for example – were called into question by the actions of administration members (most frequently the president) after they had been set out in key documents, press releases or speeches," (Deyermond 2023, 1600) and that is why there is a need to look beyond official documents in order to understand the decisions. Thus, the posture of the US toward the Mediterranean area cannot be deduced from official documents, and even not all of the official statements by the State Department are to point to the direction, which US policy could take in the case of the next Trump presidency. Although Trump's rhetoric is different towards Russia, his stance was in line with the Obama administration regarding China. What remains are Trump's speeches and his comments on the NATO, Russia, Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. Non-diplomatic, American business, non-formal style approach characterized even the public speeches (White House 2019).

Campaign of fear against the reelection of the businessman once famous as the host of *The Apprentice*, TV Show, among the Natists – his political opponents – shares the claim that Trump is a threat to them (Fix and Kimmage 2024). In a campaign speech held in Detroit on Saturday, June 15 2024, Trump said that he would settle the practice of Zelensky taking US money every time he visits the States (C Span 2024). Fiona

⁶ Mohamed al Orabi, Online Lecture via Zoom, November 2023, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

Hill, a Council of Foreign Affairs member and one of the advisers on the presidential staff, commented on Trump as having the same idea on Ukraine as Russian President Putin (Pengelli 2024). Part of the mediatic campaign against Trump's policy was that he lacked expertise with regard to the peace plan for Ukraine, which he did not reveal personally but was alluded to by Hungarian President Victor Orban and others. According to them the plan to "solve the war in 24 hours," "consists of pressuring Ukraine into giving up Crimea and the Donbas in exchange for a peace deal" (Rohac and Droin 2024).

Trump's pick of young Ohio senator J. D. Vance may point to more Biden/Harris period-like policies toward Ukraine. If money talks, then support for the nominated candidate for the position of Vice President would say that drone production and involvement in Ukraine front means continuity (Webb 2024). As far regards the support for Israel in the Middle East there are no reasons to believe that some U-turn would occur, in particular as Trump was the one to promote the 'deal of the century' a plan of essentially recognizing Israel in turn for some hazy perspective of Palestinian so-called state, as that entity would have sovereignty only as much Israel would approve with possibility to *de facto* temporarily revoke it through military incursions.⁷

As far regards Iran and the MENA region in general, any US administration will follow a policy that could not in any way do any harm to Israeli national interests. This would mean keeping the ties with those Arab countries that would guarantee diplomatic and security guarantees for the Jewish state. More concretely, it would translate into maintaining military support and cooperation with Cairo, continued cooperation and support for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and good relations with Morocco. Relations with the Arabian Peninsula would depend on the general great power's confrontation or cooperation, as Chinese and Russian influence and the general importance of the BRICS in the region grows.

Small, and at the same time, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous Balkans were not in the focus of the administration, but employees from

⁷ "Conditional on Palestinians recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, rejecting and combatting what Israel considers "terror in all its forms," and accepting special arrangements providing for Israel's security needs—including Israel's right to conduct security operations within the Palestinian state. The plan also requires Palestinians to grant Israel responsibility for security and control over all air space west of the Jordan River" (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies [ACRPS] 2020).

the State Department sought to ‘deliver’ solutions, to settle the issue of Kosovo by supporting the “border correction” or a land swap deal which would, as they planned and hoped for, be accepted by Belgrade and Pristina.⁸ However, this ‘deal’ was not concluded. The Balkans, at the moment assumes importance in relation to Ukraine and in relation to Asia Minor. Military corridors toward the Black Sea and the Ukraine will continue to be of strategic interest for the Pentagon and the State Department. Whether Trump would try to unsettle the “swamp” by changing foreign policy or, more likely, by internal – identity politics, he will have limited possibility and will to change US policies toward the Peninsula.

CONCLUSION

Is the chaos Mohamed al Orabi mentioned, at least reserved for the Middle East, as opposed to some orderly situation? The transition of the order at the world level has been evident ever since then liberal-democratic Western elites won the Cold War and started shifting politics and economics toward the end of history. This drive on the road with no turnings right or left, hit a dead end, and new roads are still optional. One of them with apocalyptic scenario.

Internal change in the US would temporarily try to mitigate processes leading to the new multipolar order marked by crisis and conflicts in its formative period. The emphasis of Trump on bilateral initiatives and announced intention to settle the issues that feed the ‘deep state’ indicate a lesser propensity for wars and international crisis, at least as far regards European theatres.

Different arrangement awaits the South and East Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and the Balkans. US policy in these regions will be characterized by both continuity and change in the case of Trump’s victory. Support for Israel as *sine qua non* of US foreign policy shapes the regional approach more than any geopolitical characteristic (see: Janković 2019). Trump administration would not be strategically different in that region, trying to push Arab countries to put aside the troubled Palestinian issue by dividing the issue of Jerusalem from the fate of local Arab population. Israel with rightwing government would count on the

⁸ This initiative was backed by US administration and negotiated by the Serbian and the so-called president of Kosovo, Hashim Taci (see: Walker and MacDowall 2018).

continued support against Iran if it succeeds in dragging the Iranians into a more open and wider conflict. It would mean continuity with the current situation. Possibly, it could feed the fire with gasoline. The statement of Trump after the Iranian retaliatory attack with ballistic missiles against Israel, was to strike the nuclear facilities in Iran (Bickerton 2024). This propagandistic announcement seems to be intended as a critique of the Democratic-led White House and competition for the support of the Israel lobby in the US.

This behaviour would in turn reward China and Russia. They could further be profiled as a more credible mediator in local conflicts. Turkey or the policy toward the Asia Minor will depend on the aftermath of Erdoğan. Trump would not challenge current settings in which Turkey is an isolated island of stability. If the repercussions of the efforts to finish the war in Ukraine, would mean renewed American influence in the Arab Peninsula, full support to Israel would prevent the US from renewing its influence in the Arab countries.

Lower interest in the Balkans leaves somewhat more space for other actors' initiatives. That situation could ease American pressure in the region and presupposes the potential for eventual stronger Russian influence in non-NATO members. Essentially what could change is the approach, from proactive to reactive Balkan politics of the USA.

Finally, the world war, of which the main reason is the spread of NATO and the imposition of the Western model of governance and economy, will be challenged in the US. The outcome of that internal struggle will shape continued confrontation or seeking a pause and the new rearrangement of the spheres of influence (Trump scenario).

REFERENCES

- Alden, Chris, and Amnon Aran. 2017. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New approaches*, 2nd edition. Routledge. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315442488>
- Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). 2020. "Deal of the Century: What it is and Why Now?" *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS)*. February 4, 2020. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deal-of-the-century-what-is-it-and-why-now/>
- Atlantic Council. 2023. "A Security Strategy for the Black Sea." December 2023. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/AC-Black-Sea-Strategy-ack-revised.pdf>

- Avia. 2020. „Россия начала переброску тяжёлых танков Т-90 в Сирию.” *Avia.pro*. July 7, 2020. <https://avia.pro/news/rossiya-nachala-perebrosku-tyazhyolyh-tankov-t-90-v-siriyu?page=151>
- Bickerton, James. 2024. “Donald Trump Says Israel Should ‘Hit’ Iran’s Nuclear Sites First.” *Newsweek*. October 5, 2024. <https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-says-israel-should-hit-irans-nuclear-first-1964268>
- Budimir, Željko M. 2020. „Geoprostorni činilac u klasičnim geopolitičkim učenjima.” Doktorska disertacija. Univerzitet u Beogradu: Fakultet političkih nauka.
- C Span*. 2024. “Donald Trump Speaks at Turning Point Action Conference.” *C Span*. June 15, 2024. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5120988/donald-trump-speaks-turning-point-action-conference>
- Deyermond, Ruth. 2023. “The Trump presidency, Russia and Ukraine: explaining incoherence.” *International Affairs* 99(4): 1595–1614. DOI:10.1093/ia/iia120
- Dorđević, Goran V. i Isak Davidov. 2022. *Sporazum iz Vašingtona i pravni poredak*. Beograd: Centar za izučavanje tradicije Ukronija.
- Fix, Liana, and Michael Kimmage. 2024. “Trump’s Threat to Europe.” *Foreign Affairs*. March 22, 2024. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trumps-threat-europe>
- Fowler, Stephen. 2024. “RFK’s voters know they’re not electing the next president. They’re with him anyway.” *Kosu.org*. May 30, 2024. <https://www.kosu.org/politics/2024-05-30/rfks-voters-know-theyre-not-electing-the-next-president-theyre-with-him-anyway>
- France info*. 2022. “Burkina Faso: une guerre d’influence entre la France et la Russie.” *France info*. October 3, 2022. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/emploi/metiers/armee-et-securite/burkina-faso-une-guerre-d-influence-entre-la-france-et-la-russie_5395018.html
- Fukutomi, Shuntaro. 2023. “Russia and Iran eye trade route with India to bypass sanctions.” *Nikkei Asia*. January 11, 2023. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Russia-and-Iran-eye-trade-route-with-India-to-bypass-sanctions>
- Gabellini, Giacomo. 2012. *La parabola: Geopolitica dell’unipolarismo statunitense*. Anteo edizioni.
- Guskova, E. 2001. *Istoriya Yugoslavskogo krizisa*. Moskva: Russkoe pravo, Russkiy nacionalniy fond.
- Yavuz, Hakan M. 2016. “Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision.” *Die Welt des Islams* 56 (3–4): 438–465. DOI:10.1163/15700607-05634p08

- Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22–49.
- Janković, Slobodan. 2019. *Bliskoistočna kriza: rat bez mira*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Catena mundi.
- Janković, Slobodan. 2020. "Geopolitička misao apeninskog poluostrva: učitelji i učenici." *Međunarodni problemi* 72 (1): 101–125. DOI: 10.2298/MEDJP2001101J
- Janković, Slobodan. 2023. *Žarišta svetskog rata*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Catena mundi.
- Jones, Dorian. 2019. "Key US Base at Risk as Turkish-US Tensions Escalate." *Voice of America*. July 25, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_key-us-base-risk-turkish-us-tensions-escalate/6172624.html
- Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kopli, Gregori R. 2022. *Novi totalni rat 21. veka*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa.
- Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. 2022. *Number of foreign mercenaries in Ukraine*. June 17, 2022. <https://eng.mil.ru/files/Number%20of%20foreign%20mercenaries%20in%20Ukraine.pdf>
- Mirović, Dejan. 2020. "Vašingtonski sporazum 2020." *Srpska pravna misao* (53): 25–37.
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2022. "Kina i Bliski istok nakon američkog povlačenja iz Avganistana." U *Kineski razvojni izazovi: promene i projekcije*, ur. Katarina Zekić i Nenad Stekić, 95–118. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu. DOI: 10.18485/iipe_dokri.2022.ch4
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2024. "China's New Initiatives and the Shaping of Eurasia's Strategic Environment." In *Eurasian Security after NATO*, ed. by Dušan Proroković and Ekaterina Entina, 113–140. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.
- Naročnicka, Natalija. 2008. *Rusija i Rusi u svetskoj istoriji*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. 2024. "Washington Summit Declaration." July 10, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm
- Orabi, Mohamed al. Online Lecture via Zoom, November 2023, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

- Pavikjevikj, Luka. 2024. "Albania, Bulgaria, Italy and North Macedonia sign military mobility agreement." *Ekathimerini*. July 11, 2024. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1243751/albania-bulgaria-italy-and-north-macedonia-sign-military-mobility-agreement/>
- Pellicciari, Igor. 2022. "Aid in War or Aid to War? Foreign Aid in the 2022 War in Ukraine." *The Review of International Affairs*, year 73, LXXIII (1186): 61–78.
- Pellicciari, Igor. 2024. *World War Aid: Interventionist Aid and the War in Ukraine*. Routledge 2024.
- Pengelli, Martin. 2024. "Trump thought Ukraine 'must be part of Russia' during presidency, book says." *Guardian*. April 12, 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/apr/12/trump-russia-ukraine-book-comments>
- Potter, Philip B.K. "Methods of Foreign Policy Analysis." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. November 30, 2017. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.34
- Rohac, Dalibor and Mathieu Droin. 2024. "Trump's Proposed Ukraine 'Deal' Threatens European Security." *AEI*. April 19, 2024. <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/trumps-proposed-ukraine-deal-threatens-european-security/>
- Serbia Energy. 2024. "Bulgaria: Transported volume via IGB gas pipeline exceeded 15.5 million MWh in 2023." *Serbia Energy*. January 9, 2024. <https://serbia-energy.eu/bulgaria-transported-volume-via-igb-gas-pipeline-exceeded-15-5-million-mwh-in-2023/>
- Shatzer, George. 2022. "Russia's Strategy and Its War on Ukraine." *Parameters* 52 (2): 135–142. DOI:10.55540/0031-1723.3157.
- Snider, Ted. 2024. "How many foreign fighters are fighting in Ukraine?" March 20, 2024. *Responsible Statecraft*. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/foreign-fighters-ukraine/>
- Sutton, H. I. 2023. "Russian Ship Loaded With Military Equipment Enters Black Sea." *Naval News*. March 5, 2023. <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/03/russian-ship-loaded-with-military-equipment-enters-black-sea>
- Tanasković, Darko. 2011. *Neoosmanizam: Doktrina i spoljnopolitička praksa*, II izdanje. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Tanjug. 2015. "IPAP 'improves Serbia-NATO cooperation.'" *B92*. January 16, 2015. https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2015&mm=01&dd=16&nav_id=92890

- Trifković, Srđa. 2011. „Turska kao regionalna sila - neoosmanizam u akciji.” *Politeia* 1 (2): 83–95. DOI: 10.5937/pol1102083T.
- Turato, Matteo. “Il Partito Comunista Cinese mette scienziati al governo per competere con gli Usa.” *Formiche*. November 21, 2022. <https://formiche.net/2022/11/nuova-elite-pcc/>
- U.S. Department of State. 2020a. “Protocol of amendment to the Mutual Defense Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and Greece.” Last accessed on October 30, 2024. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20-213-Greece-Defense-TIMS-62163.pdf>
- U.S. Department of State. 2020b. *The Abraham Accords*. Last accessed on July 8, 2024. <https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/>
- Walker, Shaun and Andrew MacDowall. 2018. “US-backed Kosovo land-swap border plan under fire from all sides.” *Guardian*. September 3, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/03/us-backed-kosovo-land-swap-border-plan-under-fire-from-all-sides>
- Webb, Whitney. 2024. “The Man Behind Trump’s VP Pick: It’s Worse Than You Think.” *Unlimited Hangout*. July 18, 2024. <https://unlimitedhangout.com/2024/07/investigative-reports/the-man-behind-trumps-vp-pick-its-worse-than-you-think/>
- White House. 2019. “Remarks by President Trump and President Erdoğan of Turkey in Joint Press Conference.” *White House*. November 13, 2019. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-erdogan-turkey-joint-press-conference/>
- Гуськова, Е. 2013. *Агрессия НАТО против Югославии в 1999 году и процесс мирного урегулирования*. Москва: Индрик.
- Комарин, Сергей. 2024. “Главы МО Болгарии, Греции, и Румынии решили создать военный коридор.” *Военное дело*. 11.07.2024. <https://voennoedelo.com/posts/id61863-nato-sozdaet-novyj-voennyj-koridor-v-evrope>
- “Результаты выборов президента России. Инфографика.” 18 Мар 2024. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/03/2024/65f46f899a79473113ba1384>

Слободан Јанковић*

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

Жељко Будимир**

Факултет политичких наука, Универзитет у Бањој Луци

МЕДИТЕРАН ПОСЛЕ ПРЕДСЕДНИЧКИХ ИЗБОРА У САД 2024: СЦЕНАРИО ЗА БЛИСКУ БУДУЋНОСТ***

Резиме

Амерички председнички избори су, између осталог, обележени најавом Доналда Трампа о променама у спољној политици. У овом историјском тренутку, који карактерише измена светског поретка, Средоземно море, посебно источни и јужни делови, као и Балкан су области у близини или су непосредно погођени сукобима. Чланак започиње са претпоставком да би промена у Белој кући имплицирала одређени степен дисконтинуитета у спољној политици. Аутори испитују ову претпоставку користећи се италијанском неокласичном геополитичком мишљу као теоријским оквиром. У складу са овим приступом, опозиција између НАТО и Русије се сагледава кроз елите које обележавају разлике у културном обрасцу и историји. Рад је подељен у четири дела. Како би се дошло до резултата Трамповог сценарија (новог председничког мандата Доналда Трампа), значај јужног и источног Средоземља, те Балкана је анализирана у геополитичкој перспективи, имајући у виду актуално глобално преуређење. У последњем делу се закључује да се промена може десити у погледу Украјине, али

* Имејл адреса: slobodan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-1891-2545

** Имејл адреса: zeljko.budimir@fpn.unibl.org; ORCID: 0000-0002-1745-6667

*** Рад је настао у оквиру истраживачког пројекта „Србија и изазови у међународним односима 2024. године“, који финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије, а реализује Институт за међународну политику и привреду у Београда, током 2024. године.

би, што се тиче Блиског истока, политика Сједињених Држава следила тренутну политику.

Кључне речи: Доналд Трамп, Средоземље, Русија, НАТО, Балкан

* This paper was submitted on October 30, 2024, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

Dušan Proroković*

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCES: BETWEEN DESIRE AND POSSIBILITIES**

Abstract

The energy transition is one of the most important strategic objectives of the European Union. Its implementation, primarily through the European Green Deal, not only strengthens energy security but also leads to the transformation of the entire economic system of the European Union. Focused on 2050, by which time it aims at completing this process and achieving climate neutrality, the EU seems to be paying less and less attention to the real problems and shortcomings that make the aforementioned strategy increasingly questionable. This paper draws attention to the real problems that exist in the implementation of the energy transition, as well as to the shortcomings that could cause European countries to face major consequences in the coming period. The first part of the paper is dedicated to explaining the European Green Deal and the intentions of the EU, as well as the doubts that exist regarding its implementation on the domestic level. The second part describes

* E-mail: dusan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-3064-2111

** The paper represents an expanded version of the author's presentation at an international scientific conference, "Geopolitics of Energy in the Western Balkans: Issues and Opportunities" held on February 27-28, 2025, in Belgrade, organized by the Union - Nikola Tesla University and the Institute for Political Studies. The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and challenges in international relations 2025", financed by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, during the year 2025.

the EU's initiatives within the framework of the Paris Agreement and the US's withdrawal from this international platform, while the third provides an overview of the work of the UN Climate Conferences and the competing strategies of different actors. The fourth chapter contains concluding remarks.

Keywords: energy transition, Paris Agreement, climate change, EU, UN climate conferences, European Green Deal

EU STRATEGY AND EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY: PLANS AND DOUBTS

Europe's energy security largely depends on EU strategies regarding this topic. The EU is a key determinant of political and economic processes across the continent at the beginning of the 21st century and thus shapes security dynamics in (macro)regional frameworks. The issue of EU energy security has been articulated for the most part through strategic documents adopted in the second half of the second and first half of the third decade of the 21st century. The EU, dependent on energy imports, has long been engaged in examining ways and models of ensuring energy security based on alternative energy sources since the late 1990s (elaboration of the concept of energy transition). However, the crisis in relations with Russia caused by the events in Ukraine in 2014 had the greatest impact on the intensification of these examinations and their concretization in political practice. Logically, the process gained momentum after February 2022 and the drastic deterioration of relations between Brussels and Moscow. In general, the EU's approach to ensuring energy security, it turns out, affects not only the replacement of some energy sources with others but also the projected transformation of the entire economic system in the coming decades, as well as certain social changes. Back in 2019, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution calling on the EU and other institutions to commit to the strategic goal of achieving "climate neutrality" by 2050 (Evropski parlament 2019a). This included reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030, compared to the 1990 baseline (Evropski parlament 2019b). This overly ambitious target had to be adjusted later, but the strategic direction of action remained the same. This strategic direction of action was represented by the European Green Deal, which includes a set of

political initiatives of the European Commission (Evropski parlament 2019b). The intention is that all regulations and recommendations are aligned with the “green agenda” and that the ultimate expression of such an implementation of the “grand strategy” will be – establishing a circular economy, protecting and/or restoring biodiversity, initiating new innovations, and developing agriculture. The EU wants to induce a long-term transformation of the economic system and a change in the way of life of citizens (changing habits). The implementation of the European Green Deal ensures the rights to clean air, clean water, and clean land while at the same time reducing energy prices, producing healthier food, reducing waste, and increasing the share of electric cars (Evropski parlament 2024). Focusing on creating a sustainable food sector (one of the “main culprits” of climate change is the agro-industrial complex) means environmentally sustainable land use, with a 50% reduction in the use of pesticides, artificial fertilizers, and antimicrobials. According to the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, presented in 2020, the EU stated that it wants to attract over a trillion euros of investment (public and private) by 2030.

However, despite ambitious plans and noble initiatives, when it comes to achieving what was presented within the given deadlines, several doubts arise. First, the European economy is practically stagnating; low growth rates have been detected for two whole decades, which became especially visible during the COVID-19 pandemic and after that period (since 2019). It is neither certain where the necessary investments can be attracted from nor is it clear where the funds will be found to finance the expensive projects determined by the “green agenda”? As stated, we are talking about thousands of billions of euros, which is a colossal sum in every respect. At the same time, since February 2022, it has been observed that the EU has been spending more and more on aid to Ukraine, but also on subsidizing the price of (American liquefied petroleum) gas. The justification for these costs (which are unforeseen) is either non-existent or minimal. How will the EU return the hundreds of billions of euros invested in Ukraine, most often through arming the Ukrainian armed forces? The political agreement on resolving the crisis in Ukraine and stopping the armed conflict is initiated by Russia and the US, the role of European countries in all this is limited. Even in the case of spending tens of billions of euros on subsidizing the price of gas during 2022 and 2023, it is difficult to calculate the benefit of everything since the economic crisis has continued anyway, with investors “fleeing” from

Europe to other parts of the world (primarily to the US). High gas prices on the European market (both in absolute terms and, more importantly, in relative terms, compared to gas prices in other parts of the world), and following the diversion of the strategic Nord Stream pipeline and the halting of transit through Ukraine, will remain so in the medium to long term, even if the armed conflict is stopped. Russian gas can only reach Europe in limited quantities, as there is no longer any infrastructure through which it can be distributed. As a result, European countries are forced to import more expensive liquefied petroleum gas, which affects the competitiveness of European producers on the global market. In such a situation, European countries have two unpleasant choices: either to continue spending tens of billions of dollars on subsidies that are unlikely to pay off (at best, they can mitigate the crisis and make it more bearable, which will prevent the escalation of social and/or political discontent) or to allow the further decline in the competitiveness of European producers on the global market. The explosion of energy prices (primarily gas) and the instability of supply during 2022 have already had enormous consequences for the European economy. Entire sectors of the European economy are at risk, and managers of leading companies are warning of a “great risk of deindustrialization of Europe” (Irwin-Hunt 2023). The chemical industry was the first to be hit, recording irreparable losses in a short time. “Martin Brudermüller, CEO of BASF, said in late 2022 that the company would have to permanently reduce its workforce in Europe due to higher energy prices” (Irwin-Hunt 2023).

Related to this is another concern: Europe is no longer dominant on a global scale. The European Round Table for Industry (ERT), monitoring 64 indicators measuring “Europe’s industrial strength” and comparing it with other actors in the global economy (the US and China, first and foremost), has concluded that “Europe is losing its global competitiveness and is behind the curve on adopting the emerging production technologies that will secure future prosperity. Other jurisdictions, notably China, are taking on a prominent role, and in many key areas the US, too, is ahead of us as well. Please note that our loss in competitiveness is not merely due to being overtaken by China. Rather, it is a consequence of Europeans having taken our industrial competitiveness for granted for too long” (Heemskerk 2022). This is also indicated by statistical data, which say that “The German economy was in recession in early 2023 after household spending in Europe’s economic engine finally succumbed to the pressure of high inflation. Gross domestic product fell by 0.3% in

the first quarter of the year when adjusted for price and calendar effects, a second estimate from the statistics office showed on Thursday. This follows a decline of 0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2022. A recession is commonly defined as two successive quarters of contraction” (Reuters 2023). “At the same time, short-term forecasts of a possible recession indicate a relatively low exposure to this threat for China (12.5%) and Brazil (15%) and almost none for Saudi Arabia (5%), Indonesia (2%) and India (zero!), but also a high exposure for France (50%), Germany (60%), the USA (65%) and the UK (75%). Russia is in this parameter at 37.5%, approximately at the same level as Japan and South Korea, in a far more favorable situation than Western economies” (Proroković 2023). In this context, “competitiveness pressures will also inform industrial firms’ decisions on whether to remain idle, relocate or move into insolvency or to produce goods at an uneconomical price. In many sectors, most prominently the automotive sector, this is taking place in tandem with the green transition, causing European manufacturers of green goods, such as electric vehicle motors, batteries, and solar and wind turbines, to operate at a cost disadvantage from the outset. German industry groups have warned that sustained high energy prices could lead to the ‘deindustrialisation of Germany’, and automakers in Eastern Europe have threatened to move production to southern Europe, where energy costs are lower, or out of the region altogether. More industries are likely to follow suit. The policy response by national governments and the European Commission has so far focused on short-term crisis management rather than on maintaining medium-term competitiveness” (EIU 2022). The economic stagnation was compounded by the fact that European suppliers no longer dominated the world market due to their reliance on modern technologies (this exclusivity was lost because a technological revolution was also taking place in other parts of the world, and competitors were catching up or surpassing European producers), and this was compounded by the rapid increase in energy prices. The cumulative effect of all this produces numerous consequences, which are no longer only economic but also political and social. Also, the cumulative effect of all this is that the question arises: how will the implementation of the “green agenda” be financed? There is simply not enough money to mitigate the cumulative effects of crises that are occurring one after the other and to simultaneously stimulate the growth of industrial production based on “green innovations.” The third doubt concerns the political stability of European states and, in particular, the EU. A comprehensive

strategy such as the European Green Deal requires political consensus. Is there a political consensus in the EU on anything? The internal crisis, caused by the continuous conflict between “unionists” and “sovereignists,” is becoming deeper and more intense over time. This is easily observed from election to election in a number of countries (Deimantaite 2020, 59-69). Essentially, it is a conflict over the question of the structure of the EU and, consequently, the geopolitical order of Europe. Will the EU be a tightly integrated supranational entity that will completely “disempower” its members, or just a loose alliance of sovereign states that will retain the most important functions in their own hands? As this conflict continues, the achievements of the EU, including the “green agenda,” may be threatened and/or questioned. Just as there is a chance that the EU will implement the European Green Deal by 2050, there is also a chance that the EU will disappear from the historical scene by then. The doubts arise due to the acute crises that are shaking Europe and are not resolved in the long term. Europe’s energy security depends not only on strategies and plans but also on the economic situation and political circumstances.

PARIS AGREEMENT – EU CONFLICT WITH DONALD TRUMP

At the COP28 UN Climate Change Conference held in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) at the end of 2023, António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, warned that “the cracks that used to exist are turning into canyons” and that this requires a change in the way we use fossil fuels (Guterres 2023). Anne Olhoff, lead author of the UN report on greenhouse gas emissions, says the situation is actually much worse than current projections of global average temperature increases suggest. According to her, the announced average increase of 3 degrees Celsius worldwide also means that in some parts of Africa, the temperature will increase by 60 degrees (Frost 2023). Extreme climate change in certain regions of the world will cause desertification, a decrease in arable land, water and food shortages, mass migrations, and armed conflicts. Such forecasts are taken very seriously by the EU institutions and, in general, by European politicians. Without a doubt, there is an awareness in European countries of progressive environmental degradation and accelerated climate change, as well as the fact that something must be done urgently and decisively. In parallel with the development of the idea

of an energy transition (in the 1990s), which would later finally give rise to the European Green Deal, the EU has also worked intensively on the foreign policy level, initiating international agreements on environmental protection. The EU has been at the forefront of this, whether it was initiatives within existing international organizations (the UN in the first place) or multilateral talks on various diplomatic platforms (for example, during G20 meetings). This is why the EU (and/or the European Member States) emerged as one of the initiators of the Paris Climate Accords. The Paris Agreement is the continuation of the international community's commitment to combating climate change after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol. This protocol was an addition to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in 1997, but did not enter into force until 2005 due to problems in the ratification process. Namely, it was necessary for it to be ratified by at least 55 countries and for these countries to account for at least 55% of polluters (emitters of harmful gases – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and hexafluoride). The first criterion was adopted relatively quickly, but the second was much more difficult (Grubb and Depledge 2001, 269–272). The biggest political problem was the fact that the USA had not even joined the Kyoto Protocol. According to the original proposal, the USA, as the largest polluter, was supposed to reduce its emissions of harmful gases by 7% compared to the reference year 1990, and measurements in the period 2008–2012 determined that they increased this parameter by 9% (Shishlov, Morel, and Bellassen 2016, 768–782). In the meantime, the Kyoto Protocol, which was time-limited, implemented too late, and constantly obstructed (mostly by the USA, which is why other countries then raised questions about the necessity of implementing the agreement), expired, and discussions began within the UNFCCC about its replacement. Thus, in 2015, during the COP21 Summit in Paris, a new solution was reached, which was associated with a slightly different approach. The Paris Agreement does not set exact deadlines, it does not have fixed periods of validity, and, in principle, does not even have explicit requirements for quotas for reducing harmful gases. The Paris Agreement is based on a voluntary basis, which proved to be a good introduction because literally all UN member states finally agreed to such a platform.

The main goal of the signatory countries is to keep the increase in global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Here, pre-industrial levels refer to the period prior to the Industrial

Revolution, that is, 1850-1900 (Walsh *et al.* 2017). Greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced by relying on new scientific solutions through energy transition and the participants' initiatives. Initiatives can be legislative, political, and/or diplomatic, so although the agreement is generally implemented by voluntary promises of participants to reduce emissions, its authors (mostly authors from the UN and EU systems) remained convinced that transparency and peer pressure from initiators of certain actions will influence all signatories to implement what they promised and to accept the position of the majority. This approach is calculated to reduce the reputation in international relations of those who do not fulfill their national five-year plans. Otherwise, all participants are obliged to present their own five-year national plans for greenhouse gas emissions, which they define themselves according to their own capabilities (UNFCCC 2015). Of course, regardless of the fact that everything is based on voluntariness, as soon as the topic of quotas and emissions was elaborated, the (old) debate on mutual relations and trading of quotas was opened (which was also done during the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol). Countries that emit less gases than the agreed limit could sell their unused emissions to large polluters (countries that emit more than the set limit). This is defined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which is among the key ones (Stavins 2016, 53–56). At the COP26 Summit in Glasgow in 2019, the implementation of Article 6 was discussed, and it was agreed that signatory countries could trade emissions (or, as it was colloquially presented at the time, “carbon trading”) and establish a framework for managing Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMO). The established Article 6.4 thus defines that the achieved gas emissions in one country can be transferred to another country and counted towards its national five-year plan (i.e., the quota defined by the plan). The EU has also established its own emissions trading system, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which has been operating since 2005 and is due to be expanded in the coming period (in addition to “classical pollutants” from the industrial sector, the so-called ETS2 will “cover” pollutants from the road transport sector, as well as various facilities and installations that represent pollutant emitters) (Bayer and Aklin 2020, 8804-8812). In the context of reducing gas emissions from industry, transport, and other sectors, the EU has introduced a range of measures. These include the reform of the emissions trading system (e.g., free air traffic fees will be abolished by 2026, and the use of sustainable aviation fuel will be

encouraged); introduction of taxes on goods whose production uses carbon or hydrocarbons (to prevent the allocation of dirty technologies from the EU to other parts of the world); introducing a Regulation on burden sharing between EU member states, in order to increase the national targets of all countries; tightening the rules for the use of carbon in land exploitation or forestry; introducing a zero-emission rate for new private cars and vans from 2035; increasing the number of charging stations for electric cars and trucks using alternative fuels; gradually switching to new (alternative) marine fuels; defining new energy consumption targets at EU level by 2030. In addition, the EU has designed packages to help households and small producers affected by the energy transition, which will be financed through the Social Climate Fund (Aleksandrova, Kuhl, and Malerba 2024, 878-893).

In addition to the EU, other developed European countries are acting similarly. Switzerland has already expressed its desire to purchase ITMO and has signed trade agreements with Peru, Ghana, Senegal, Georgia, the Dominican Republic, Vanuatu, Thailand, and Ukraine (Federal Council 2022). After Switzerland has done so, it is expected that, due to pressure from the initiators, others will also start to apply this model. Otherwise, for starters, the question of their reputation in international relations will be open. Later, if the conditions are met and if a convincing majority applies a single mechanism for controlling gas emissions, then it is possible to carry out certain legislative, political, or diplomatic initiatives against those who do not apply the mechanism. At the COP29 Summit held in Baku (Azerbaijan) in 2024, the EU attempted to exert diplomatic pressure to continue further development of this concept, which would include the establishment of a climate finance fund worth 300 billion dollars per year (more on this in the next chapter of the paper). However, just as there are certain internal doubts regarding the implementation of the “green agenda,” so are doubts regarding the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. This is particularly noticeable after Donald Trump’s decision to (again) withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. Trump made the same decision in 2017, just six months after taking office (Bearak 2025). Ignoring criticism from the EU, Canada, and China, he persisted with the decision, although the withdrawal procedure turned out to be taking longer than expected. The procedure was formally launched in November 2019 and completed only a year later, so (bearing in mind that Joseph Biden won the November 2020 elections and that he “expressly returned” the US to the Paris Agreement immediately after taking office) the US

was “absent” for only a few months (McGarth 2020). Interestingly, the EU, which at the time announced that the US was making a “serious mistake,” found an ally in China to criticize Trump’s decision (Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy 2024, 8-24). Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stated: “There is a saying in China: ‘We keep our word, therefore our actions lead to success.’ China will adhere to its commitments when it comes to climate change and is not alone in this. Our experts in this field are in contact with colleagues from around the world and will closely monitor activities on climate protection” (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2017).

Instead of climate change, Donald Trump prioritizes the US reindustrialization project. Unlike the EU, which wants to ensure economic growth through the energy transition process, Trump actually calls on investors to use the cheapest and most accessible energy sources, regardless of how their exploitation and use will affect the environment. The US has the ninth largest proven oil reserves in the world (74 billion barrels), and what is even more important for them is that the countries of its immediate neighborhood are in fifth place (Canada with 170 billion) and first place (Venezuela with 304 billion barrels) (EIA 2023). They also have significant reserves of coal and natural gas. The US can ensure its energy security by relying on these resources for the coming decades. From this point of view, they do not need a rapid energy transition. Otherwise, like the European and American economies, they are escaping long periods of stagnation. The US is no longer the world’s largest economy; China is today. Also, China’s technological lag, which was evident only two decades ago, no longer exists. Trump’s intention to ensure US energy security through (increased) exploitation of oil and gas is a major blow to the functionality of the Paris Agreement. The situation from the beginning of the century is being repeated again when the US simply did not want to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which ruined the initiatives of the EU and several other countries committed to climate protection. Hence, there is another doubt regarding the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement and the EU’s initiatives within this framework.

UN CLIMATE CONFERENCES: EU, WORLD AND OIL PRODUCERS

Of course, the influence of the oil lobby on political decision-makers in the US should not be ignored (McGreal 2021). It is not in

the interest of oil companies to implement the Paris Agreement, just as it is not in their interest to further develop any “green agendas.” This reduces their profits and threatens their business, and in the conditions of American “corporate democracy,” procedures have been built for the lobbying process, and there are also legal possibilities to influence the US president. Powerful oil companies are actually the “other side of the coin” of all discussions on energy transition, climate change, new ways of producing energy, and similar topics. Despite the fact that most countries have taken – in principle – and the EU has taken – concrete action on the energy transition, crude oil consumption (and, of course, the production of petroleum products) is constantly growing. In 2024, demand averaged 104.5 million barrels per day; ten years earlier, it was around 92 million, and in 2004, it was below 83 million (Statista 2024). The only decline was recorded in 2020, and this was a direct consequence of lower demand during the pandemic. Simply put, the current state of the above-mentioned topics has only a limited impact on the oil market. “The size of the crude oil market has been constantly growing in recent years. The market will grow from \$3055.97 billion in 2024 to \$3207.18 billion in 2025 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.9%. The growth in the observed period can be attributed to industrialization and economic growth in the transportation sector, petrochemical industry, power generation, and global energy demand. The size of the crude oil market is expected to grow steadily in the next few years. It will grow to \$3795.54 billion in 2029 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.3%” (TBRC 2025). The oil market is showing “resilience” and cannot be disrupted by decarbonization plans. With the more dynamic economic growth of the so-called “developing countries,” the need for even greater exploitation and processing of crude oil will arise. Energy is essential for economic development, and often there is no real alternative other than using “hydrocarbons” as the basis for ensuring the energy security of the state, and to this should be added the power of oil companies to create political processes. In the primary market worth more than 3 trillion dollars, companies operate with annual turnovers of hundreds of billions of dollars and are important not only as suppliers of energy but also as drivers of economic processes in various countries. The influence of oil companies on slowing down or relativizing the processes that are being designed for the sake of the energy transition is now also visible in the work of the UN Climate Conferences. In this context, two illustrative examples can be cited from the last two conferences, held in

Dubai in 2023 and Baku a year later. The Dubai conference was declared controversial even before it took place. Not only is the UAE the seventh largest crude oil producer in the world, but Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, CEO of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), was appointed as the chairman of the conference (Al-Sarihi 2023).

The conference was marked by conflicts between the EU (which had the support of some other countries of the collective West, such as Canada and Australia) on the one hand and China and India on the other. The position of China and India is shared by a number of developing countries (and poor countries), as well as fossil fuel producers, which then gives this position “additional political weight.” The conflict is fundamentally of a principled nature and concerns the application of one of two proposed concepts: “out” or “down” of the use of fossil fuels in the future. “Out” implies setting a deadline for phasing out fossil fuels, and states that do not comply with the provisions of the agreement after the adoption of this concept – pay “penalties” and suffer certain sanctions from the “international community.” “Down” means that the agreement is aimed at gradually reducing the share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix. As the first and third largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the world, China and India are in favor of the option of gradual reduction, justifying this by the need to continue to use fossil fuels to a certain extent in order to ensure long-term growth in gross domestic products (Modi 2023; Patel 2024). Developing countries need this in order to fight poverty. Developing countries do not have the capacity (financial, technological, economic) to carry out an efficient energy transition in a relatively short period of time, i.e., such a project could exhaust their economies (they would have to import technologies, “switch” to using more expensive cars and means of transport, build new logistics centers and infrastructure facilities that are not currently their priority) and prove counterproductive.

Also problematic are the issues of determining reference years for the beginning of the assessment of certain processes. Why is 1990 the reference year for assessments of the increase or decrease in emissions of harmful gases? Climate change is a consequence of pollution and emissions of harmful gases over the last century, so responsibility must be determined in a different way. The position of Indian politicians is that their country, measured per capita, continues to emit harmful gases below average, while for the Chinese, the initiative according to which further progress in the production of energy from renewable

sources is compared with the state in 2022 is controversial (the EU has proposed declaring three times the amount of “green energy” produced by 2030 as a strategic goal) (Proroković 2024, 13-26). Because of all this, environmental and energy topics have been deeply politicized, and the discussions have taken a different course. “Imposing the concept of ‘out’ in the broadest possible political sense is an attempt to freeze the existing state of power distribution on a global level in the long term. More precisely – it is a means to prevent further transformation of the structure of the world political system towards a multipolar one. One of the indicators of power is economic power. The rich states of the collective West, albeit at enormous cost – can afford to abandon fossil fuels. They will turn to the full use of energy obtained from renewable and ecologically clean sources. What will happen to other countries and regions? Especially: what will happen to developing countries? How will they carry out the energy transition? Where will they get the money for it? How will this affect their economic power and then their position in the world political system? Does this mean that they must also give up the fight against poverty? And if they cannot eradicate poverty, will there be, sooner or later, major internal destabilizations” (Proroković 2024, 13). Partly under the influence of oil corporations (and the diplomacy of the “producing countries” from which the oil corporations come), and partly under pressure from developing countries, at the COP28 conference in Dubai, the concept of “down” was essentially accepted, the implementation of which in practice may be stretched and delayed (there is no guarantee that this process will be completed in 2050, especially after the US withdraws from the Paris Agreement again) (UN Climate Change Conference 2023). Therefore, no “epochal” results could be expected at the COP29 conference organized in late 2024 in Azerbaijan, and Papua New Guinea “declared a boycott of the UN climate summit, labeling the negotiations on global warming as a waste of time full of empty promises from big polluters” (France24 2024). The EU criticized Azerbaijan because the hosts did not put a single item on the agenda for the gradual elimination of fossil fuels, but only a discussion of the topic of mitigating the consequences of climate change and implementing the agreement agreed in Dubai (Mooney, Hancock, and Williams 2024). Mitigation involves the creation of a climate finance fund worth \$300 billion per year, which would finance energy transition projects in developing countries and encourage regional integration of renewable energy networks that will help more efficiently access “green energy”

(Townend 2024). The World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have expressed their willingness to participate in financing these projects, but in any case, the bulk of the investment is expected to come from private sources. This issue has caused tension, as developing country representatives have maintained that these funds are insufficient (according to their projections, at least \$500 billion per year is needed), while EU and US representatives have insisted that other countries with more significant resources, such as China and the Gulf Cooperation Council members, should also be involved in financing projects through public grants and other forms of direct support (Alayza and Larsen 2025). In terms of concreteness, practically the only new topics raised in Baku concern the establishment of deadlines for the gradual phasing out of coal and the development of a green hydrogen market. There are no new conclusions on the use of oil, its exploitation, and the production of oil derivatives. Nor are there any indications that there will be any. EU initiatives through the UN Climate Conferences remain limited in scope and without broad support from other actors in international relations.

CONCLUSION: HOW FAR HAS THE STRATEGY BEEN IMPLEMENTED?

Europe's energy security is being shaped by the EU strategies that are grounded in the European Green Deal and the broader framework of the energy transition. The EU has several reasons for doing this. First, the EU is a "hydrocarbon importer", dependent on foreign "sources" of crude oil and natural gas, so it is necessary to devise a way to reduce this type of dependence. Second, together with the energy transition, the EU wants to promote a circular economy, which will significantly affect the transformation of both the economic system and the habits of the population. In this way, new postulates are being set for the functioning of the European economy, more reliant on local producers and local resources. Third, the EU defines climate change as one of the key threats to global security and is focused on combating it. Fourth, for the EU, the "green agenda" is becoming one of the key foreign policy goals; as a global leader in this area, Europe is building a new image in international relations, which is important for exercising influence and strengthening political power. For the above reasons, the EU's goal is to achieve "climate neutrality" by 2050.

At the same time, the EU is facing several current and potential problems in the implementation of this “grand strategy” (i.e., the European Green Deal), which is why the question is how the entire concept will be further applied and developed. First, it should be borne in mind that, regardless of the EU strategy, oil production (and, of course, oil consumption) is constantly growing. In order to ensure continuous economic growth, energy sources are necessary, and the main energy source is oil. The consumption of oil derivatives is constantly growing in all developing countries, as well as in some developed countries. Oil is needed, as are gas and coal, and these fuels will continue to play a leading role in the global market in the future. As a result, EU strategies must be oriented to the long term, which reduces their effectiveness and “blunts” political penetration. Second, the EU’s insistence on a rapid energy transition, which includes the implementation of the “out” concept and the construction of a market for trading emissions (which has existed since 2005 and now operates within the framework of the Paris Agreement), is not well received by a number of other actors in international relations. Without broad international support, the EU will not be able “to transfer” (some or all) of the provisions of its strategies into international standards and therefore requires a more “tactical” diplomatic approach. The EU is at the forefront of energy transition issues; it wants to be and is a global leader in this field, but it must not fall into the trap of becoming a “moral judge” in international relations on issues of the “green agenda.” This type of politicization of the fight against climate change can only harm both the EU’s goals and the reputation of European states. Thirdly, the EU cannot count on its traditional ally – the USA – in this matter. The USA has already withdrawn from the Paris Agreement twice during Donald Trump’s term, which indicates that for a part of the American elite (political and business), the fight against climate change is not a priority; that is, for them, it is more important to initiate the reindustrialization of the American economy based on the use of hydrocarbons. Considering that Europe’s security largely depends on the USA (due to the role of NATO), a conflict with the USA on this (for the EU strategic) issue could have a negative impact on overall European security. Fourth, when it comes to the growth of the European economy, it has either been non-existent or has been occurring at minimal (one might say negligible) rates for two full decades. The implementation of the European Green Deal implies 1,000 billion euros of investments by 2030, and it is not clear where these investments will come from. Especially considering all the doubts

that arise regarding the implementation of the “green agenda” in other parts of the world. Fifth, the competitiveness of the European economy on the world market is constantly declining. The energy transition, as an expensive and demanding process (which must be subsidized), will cause European products to become even more expensive on the world market. While the EU is considering the long-term effects of the energy transition, short-term and/or medium-term losses caused by declining exports and slowing economic dynamics could have fatal consequences for the European economy.

Sixth, the costs of the war in Ukraine (arming the Ukrainian military and other forms of assistance to official Kyiv) and the amortization of the consequences of the war in Ukraine (subsidizing the purchase of energy) affect the EU’s ability to finance and lend to other strategic goals, including the energy transition. This cost, given the fact that European countries will be less concerned about the political resolution of the Ukrainian crisis than Russia and the USA, is irreparable. Seventh, faced with internal problems and constant discussions about further continental (dis)integration, European states are becoming (politically) destabilized. This also means that there is no consensus on strategic issues between key political actors. For the implementation of such a grand plan as the European Green Deal, both political consensus and long-term stability are necessary. The desire to ensure European energy security through the implementation of the “green agenda” is one thing, and the reality that the EU is facing is something else entirely. The idea of an energy transition is useful and noble, but only if it does not jeopardize its own competitiveness in the world market and the current economic dynamics. Also, to implement this agenda, allies must be found, and other actors in international relations must be won over. Otherwise, by implementing the energy transition in the way it is being done, the EU may jeopardize its own stability and undermine its position in international relations.

REFERENCES

- Alayza, Natalia and Gaia Larsen. 2025. "How to Reach \$300 Billion — and the Full \$1.3 Trillion — Under the New Climate Finance Goal." *World Resources Institute*, February 20, 2025. Last accessed on February 22, 2025. <https://www.wri.org/insights/ncqg-climate-finance-goals-explained>
- Aleksandrova, Mariya, Laura Kuhl, and Daniele Malerba. 2024. "Unlocking climate finance for social protection: an analysis of the Green Climate Fund." *Climate Policy*, 24(7): 878-893.
- Al-Sarihi, Aisha. 2023. "COP28 controversy and the challenge of energy transition in the Gulf." *Chatham House*, December 18, 2023. Last accessed on February 3, 2025. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/cop28-controversy-and-challenge-energy-transition-gulf>
- Bayer, Patrick, and Michaël Aklin. 2020. "The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO₂ emissions despite low prices." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117 (16): 8804–8812.
- Bearak, Max. 2025. "Trump Orders a U.S. Exit From the World's Main Climate Pact." *New York Times*. January 20, 2025. Last accessed on February 1, 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/20/climate/trump-paris-agreement-climate.html>
- Deimantaite, Aiste. 2020. "The EU and national sovereignty: the encounter of two concepts of sovereignty. Change or continuity?" *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies*, Vol 12 (3): 59–69.
- US Energy Information Administration [EIA]. 2023. "Petroleum and other liquids." Last accessed on February 2, 2025. <https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/petroleum-and-other-liquids/annual-crude-and-lease-condensate-reserves>
- Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU]. 2022. "Energy crisis will erode Europe's competitiveness in 2023." October 13, 2022. Last accessed on January 26, 2025. <https://www.eiu.com/n/energy-crisis-will-erode-europe-competitiveness-in-2023/>
- Evropski parlament. 2019a. „Evropski parlament proglasio klimatsku krizu." European Union, November 28, 2019. Last accessed on January 20, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/hr/press-room/20191121IPR67110/europski-parlament-proglasio-klimatsku-krizu>

- Evropski parlament. 2019b. „Što je ugljična neutralnost i kako je postići do 2050.?” European Union, October 3, 2019. Last accessed on January 20, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/hr/article/20190926STO62270/sto-je-ugljicna-neutralnost-i-kako-je-postici-do-2050>
- Evropski parlament. 2024. „Zeleni plan: ključ za klimatski neutralan i održiv EU”, European Union, July 10, 2024. Last accessed on January 19, 2025. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/hr/article/20200618STO81513/zeleni-plan-kljuc-za-klimatski-neutralan-i-odrziv-eu>
- Federal Council. 2022. “Bilateral climate agreements.” Confederation Suisse. Last accessed on January 21, 2025. <https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/climate/info-specialists/climate--international-affairs/staatsvertraege-umsetzung-klimauebereinkommen-von-paris-artikel6.html>
- France24. 2024. “Papua New Guinea to boycott ‘waste of time’ UN climate summit.” October 31, 2024. Last accessed on January 25, 2025. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241031-papua-new-guinea-to-boycott-waste-of-time-un-climate-summit>
- Frost, Rosie. 2023. “World on track for nearly 3C of warming under current climate plans, UN report warns” *Euronews*. November 20, 2023. Last accessed on January 24, 2025. <https://www.euronews.com/green/2023/11/20/world-on-track-for-up-to-29c-of-warming-under-current-climate-plans-un-report-warns>
- Grubb, Michael, and Joanna Depledge. 2001. “The Seven Myths of Kyoto.” *Climate Policy*, 1(2): 269–272.
- Guterres, António. 2023. “Secretary-General’s opening remarks at press encounter at COP28.” *United Nations*. December 11, 2023. Last accessed on January 17, 2025. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2023-12-11/secretary-generals-opening-remarks-press-encounter-cop28>
- Heemskerk, Frank. 2022. “Europe’s loss in competitiveness: Home-made solutions for a home-made problem.” *BRE Review*. University of Turku. Last accessed on January 22, 2025. <https://sites.utu.fi/bre/europes-loss-in-competitiveness-home-made-solutions-for-a-home-made-problem>
- Irwin-Hunt, Alex. 2023. “Business leaders warn of Europe’s declining competitiveness.” *FDI Intelligence*, January 19, 2023. Last accessed on January 23, 2025. <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/news/business-leaders-warn-of-europes-declining-competitiveness-81922>

- McCarthy, Matt. 2020. "Climate change: US formally withdraws from Paris agreement" *BBC*. November 4, 2020. Last accessed on January 24, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54797743>
- McGreal, Chris. 2021. "How a powerful US lobby group helps big oil to block climate action." *Guardian*. July 19, 2021. Last accessed on February 3, 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jul/19/big-oil-climate-crisis-lobby-group-api>
- Modi, Ashish. 2023. "Decarbonization: A way forward for India" *Times of India*. June 29, 2023. Last accessed on April 10, 2025. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/decarbonization-a-way-forward-for-india/>
- Mooney, Attracta, Alice Hancock, and Aime Williams. 2024. "Oil-rich nations' pushback' against fossil fuel phaseout." *Financial Times*. September 13, 2024. Last accessed on February 2, 2025. <https://www.ft.com/content/c1e13d08-9917-44d3-bd63-5916a320e451>
- Patel, Anika. 2024. "What to expect in China's climate pledge for 2035", *Carbon Brief*. November 1, 2024. Last Accessed on April 9, 2025. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/experts-what-to-expect-in-chinas-climate-pledge-for-2035/>
- Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy. 2024. *China – EU Cooperation on Environment and Climate*. Beijing: Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought, National Energy Conservation Center, Xinhua Institute, Institute of Science and Development. Last Accessed on April 9, 2025. <http://www.prcee.org/yjcg/yjbg/202405/W020240506755293118034.pdf>
- Proroković, Dušan. 2023. „Evropa ispada u drugu ligu, Kina grabi ka – prvom mestu.”, *Radio Sputnik*. June 4, 2023. Last accessed on January 21, 2025. <https://sputnikportal.rs/20230604/evropa-ispada-u-drugu-ligu-kina-grabi-ka--prvom-mestu-video-1156650693.html>
- Proroković, Dušan. 2024. „COP28: pobjeda naftnog lobija i odraz na geopolitiku Balkana.” U: *Energetske geopolitičke igre na Zapadnom Balkanu*, ur. Ljubinko Mitrović, 10–26. Banja Luka: Centar za lobiranje.
- Radio Slobodna Evropa*. 2017. „Tramp: SAD se povlače iz klimatskog sporazuma, Obama kritikuje.” June 1, 2017. Last accessed on January 20, 2025. <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/28523480.html>

- Reuters. 2023. "German economy entered recession as inflation hurt consumers" May 25, 2023. Last accessed on January 22, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/germany-enters-recession-2023-05-25/>
- Shishlov, Igor, Romain Morel, and Valentin Bellassen. 2016. "Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period." *Climate Policy*, 16 (6): 768–782.
- Stavins, Robert. 2016. "Market Mechanisms in the Paris Climate Agreement: International Linkage under Article 6.2." In: *The Paris Agreement and Beyond: International Climate Change Policy Post-2020*, ed. by Robert N. Stavins and Robert C. Stowe, 53–56, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements.
- Statista. 2024. "Demand for crude oil worldwide from 2005 to 2023, with a forecast for 2024." May 22, 2024. Last accessed on February 2, 2025. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/271823/global-crude-oil-demand/>
- The Bussiness Research Company [TBRC]. 2025. "Crude Oil Global Market Report 2025." London. Last accessed on February 1, 2025. <https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/crude-oil-global-market-report>
- Townend, Ruth. 2024. "What is COP29 and why is it important?" *Chatham House*. November 14, 2024. Last accessed on February 1, 2025. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/what-cop29-and-why-it-important>
- UN Climate Change Conference. 2023. "UN Climate Change Conference - United Arab Emirates 30.11-12.12.2023". Last accessed on February 1, 2025. <https://unfccc.int/cop28>
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]. 2015. "The Paris Agreement", UN. Last accessed on January 28, 2025. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement>
- Valatsas, Dimitris. 2019. "Grean Deel, Greener World." *Foreign Policy*. December 17, 2019. Last accessed on January 22, 2025. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/united-states-democrats-green-new-deal-eu-europe-technically-feasible-environment-progress/>
- Walsh, Brian, Philippe Ciais, Ivan A. Janssens, Josep Peñuelas, Keywan Riahi, Felicjan Rydzak, Detlef P. van Vuuren and Michael Obersteiner [Walsh *et al.*]. 2017. "Pathways for balancing CO 2 emissions and sinks." *Nature Communications*, 8 (1): 14856. Last Accessed: April 12, 2025. <https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms14856>

Душан Пророковић*

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд

ЕНЕРГЕТСКА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ЕВРОПЕ И ЗАКЉУЧЦИ КЛИМАТСКИХ КОНФЕРЕНЦИЈА УН: ИЗМЕЂУ ЖЕЉА И МОГУЋНОСТИ**

Резиме

У овом раду скреће се пажња на стварне проблеме који постоје у спровођењу енергетске транзиције, као и на недостатке који би европске земље могле да изазову велике последице у наредном периоду. Енергетска транзиција је један од најважнијих стратешких циљева ЕУ. Имплементацијом овог стратешког циља ЕУ (кроз имплементацију Европског зеленог договора) не само да се обезбеђује енергетска безбедност, већ се индукује трансформација целокупног економског система ЕУ. Усредсређена на 2050. годину, до када жели да заврши овај посао и постане климатски неутрална, чини се да ЕУ све мање обраћа пажњу на стварне проблеме и недостатке који поменути концепт чине све упитнијим. Прво, ЕУ је „увозник угљоводоника“, зависи од туђих „изворишта“ сирове нафте и природног гаса, па је неопходно осмислити начин како би се смањила таква врста зависности. Друго, заједно са енергетском транзицијом ЕУ жели да промовише и циркуларну економију, што ће значајно утицати на трансформацију како привредног система, тако и навика становништва. Треће, ЕУ дефинише климатске промене за једну од кључних претњи глобалној безбедности и усмерава се на борбу против њих. Четврто, за ЕУ „зелена агенда“ постаје један од кључних спољнополитичких циљева, као глобални лидер у овој

* Имејл адреса: dusan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID ID: 0000-0003-3064-2111

** Рад представља проширену верзију усменог излагања аутора на међународној научној конференцији “Geopolitics of Energy in the Western Balkans: Issues and Opportunities” одржаној 27-28. фебруара 2025. године у Београду у организацији Универзитета Унион – Никола Тесла и Института за политичке студије. Рад је настао у оквиру пројекта „Србија и изазови у међународним односима 2025. године“, који финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије, а реализује Институт за међународну политику и привреду током 2025. године.

области Европа гради нови имиџ у међународним односима, што је значајно за остваривање утицаја и јачање политичке моћи. Из наведених разлога, циљ ЕУ је да до 2050. године постигне „климатску неутралност“. Истовремено, ЕУ се суочава са неколико актуелних и потенцијалних проблема у имплементацији ове „велике стратегије“ (односно – Европског зеленог договора), због чега је у питању како ће се целокупан концепт даље примењивати и разрађивати. Жеље везане за осигуравање европске енергетске безбедности преко имплементације „зелене агенде“ су једно, а реалност са којом се среће ЕУ нешто сасвим друго. Идеја о енергетској транзицији јесте корисна и племенита, али само уколико се тако не угрожава сопствена конкурентност на светском тржишту и текућа економска динамика. Такође, за спровођење те агенде морају се пронаћи савезници и придобијати други актери међународних односа. У супротном, са спровођењем енергетске транзиције, на начин како се то чини, ЕУ може угрозити сопствену стабилност и нарушити своју позицију у међународним односима.

Кључне речи: енергетска транзиција, Париски споразум, климатске промене, ЕУ, климатске конференције УН, Европски зелени договор

* This manuscript was submitted on March 4, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

Sanja Stošić*
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

RHETORIC OF THE “COLLECTIVE WEST” AND GLOBAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

Abstract

This paper aims to critically examine the nature of political rhetoric formed in the era of post-democracy, that is, to point out the importance and role that political discourse has in the formation of political violence, understood primarily as a global postmodern phenomenon that in the broadest sense refers to the violent creation and imposition of certain policies, forms of behavior and cultural patterns. Relying on an analytical/interpretive approach, and in light of the war in Ukraine and the current geopolitical turmoil on the international political scene, this paper points not only to the correlation between political communication of a post-democratic society and political violence but also to the intensification and relativization of political violence within the framework of the neoliberal hegemonic concept of rule and the general tendency towards the de-sovereignization of states. Based on a qualitative interpretation of the Western political narrative inherent in the era of global escalation of violence, the main conclusion of the paper is the need to preserve a sovereign, i.e., politically responsible and organized state as a key factor of individual and collective security, as well as understanding the hybrid character of contemporary political conflicts.

Keywords: political discourse, post-democracy, Ukrainian conflict, political violence, hybrid war, de-sovereignization

* E-mail: sanja.stosic@ips.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-4921-9268

** This paper was written within the research activity of the Institute for Political Studies, funded by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia.

INTRODUCTION

Considering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict not only as a conflict that revitalized the Cold War era but also as a conflict that opened the door to World War III (D'Anieri 2023), and in light of John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which characterized the Russian invasion of Ukraine as "the fault of the West" (Mearsheimer 2014, 2022), this paper points to various aspects of escalation and the hybrid character of political violence on a global scale. In this sense, the first part of the paper is dedicated to the theoretical definition of political rhetoric, which is analyzed through thematic analysis of the content of certain discursive forms of the dominant pro-Western political discourse, which on a macro level depicts and shapes the anti-Russian narrative in the light of global hybrid warfare, and not only generates various forms of political violence but also leads to its escalation on a global level. The second part of the paper focuses more on the definition of political violence itself and some of its manifestations in the context of global geopolitical turmoil.

Namely, based on a functional approach to the analysis of political discourse placed by the leading media, as well as a qualitative description and interpretation of the content of certain discourse samples, i.e., actualized linguistic data related to social and political contexts and aligned with the goals of the spokesmen of neoliberal globalism, we can conclude today that the rhetoric of the West based on the postulate "Russia must be defeated" is a product of the post-democratic era, i.e., the era of post-truth in which corporate elites and centers of power unscrupulously fight for their interests, resorting to absolute monopolization of truth, political engineering, media manipulation and propaganda, repression of freedom, and violence in general.¹ By constructing a narrative according to which "Ukraine is a victim of criminal Russian aggression," we believe that the political rhetoric of the "collective West" has relied on the "struggle to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty" with which the United States of

¹ During the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries, under the influence of neoliberalism, transnational corporate networking and the strengthening of supranational international organizations such as NATO, the IMF, and the EU, the modern nation-state weakened, i.e., the process of de-sovereignization as a natural consequence of economic globalization, while the concept of violence became more complex, so that every type of political conflict took on a hybrid character, and its conventional character was blurred by an informational one, in which the main strategic tools were social media and propaganda. More will be said about political violence and some of its manifestations in the final part of the paper.

America (USA), supported by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is actually defending its own hegemonic interests, which is confirmed by numerous statements such as Jens Stoltenberg's, according to which "Putin must not win" because that would not only be a defeat for Ukraine, "but would also be dangerous for our security and the security of the entire world" (Tanjug 2022).²

In fact, this rhetoric is a reflection of the aggressive expansionist policy of the USA, which Zbigniew Brzezinski clearly defined in his "Grand Chessboard," stating that "[...] Eurasia has always been the center of world power" and that the USA, as a world hegemon, has "[...] an imperative to prevent the emergence of a challenger in the Eurasian region, a challenger capable of dominating it, and thus at the same time capable of posing a threat to America" (Brzezinski 1997, xi, xiv).³ In this context, Russia and China, as strategic bearers of the "Eurasian Partnership" (President of Russia 2024) and signatories of the "partnership agreement without restrictions" (Reuters 2022), are explicitly designated in NATO's new strategic concept as a threat, i.e., enemies of the "international legal order" (NATO 2022b). Therefore, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia's subsequent special military operation in Ukraine in 2022 shaped the political discourse about Russia as a "state sponsor of terrorism" (European Parliament [EP] 2022) and Putin as the "new Hitler" (Herman 2022).

In this way, the global public sphere is polarized affectively and ideologically and divided between promoters of Western militarism and NATO's aggressive policy, who in the name of "defending democracy and sovereignty" are fueling all-out war, and those who choose to pursue sovereignist policies and cooperate with the Russian Federation. Based on the premise of "divide and rule," the Western propaganda narrative of

² The concept of the West as a social phenomenon of Western European civilization based on the ideology of liberalism, geopolitical thalassocracy, Atlanticism, offensive realism, trade, and competitiveness dates back to World War II, while the concept of the "collective West" has been shaped in recent years by the official rhetoric of the Kremlin to designate in public, scientific and political discourse the generally pro-Western policies of actors such as the USA, NATO, Germany, Norway, Estonia. Otherwise, the concept itself implies a larger, hostile collective entity and was originally promoted by marginal nationalist Russian media in 2015, and over time, it became represented in the social sphere and in the statements of Russian officials such as Maria Zakharova (*Мария Захарова*) and Vladimir Putin (*Владимир Путин*) (Chimiris 2022).

³ Author's translation.

“Russian aggression” has positioned Ukraine as a burning issue, or “the biggest time bomb in NATO Europe” (Kršljanin 2023). Under the slogan “help Ukraine win, no matter the cost” (The New York Times 2023a), the US and its NATO allies continuously support Ukraine militarily and economically and, ignoring the massive suffering of Ukrainians, are waging the “World’s First Hybrid War” (Kršljanin 2023) in the global media space in which, according to Ursula von der Leyen, “Russian President Vladimir Putin is planning a war of conquest against Europe” (Krzysztosek 2024), and, as Lloyd Austin believes, “Putin will not stop” (Tisdall 2024), but, as Biden points out, “if Russia wins in Ukraine, Putin will move on to Poland and other countries” (CNN 2024).

In the spirit of this rhetoric, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) also characterized Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as “a grave violation of international law, including the UN Charter,” adding that it “represents an act of aggression against an independent, peace-loving country [...]” and that Allies have an obligation to “support the people of Ukraine and its legitimate, democratically elected President Volodymyr Zelensky” (*Володі́мир Олекса́ндрович Зеле́нський*) (NATO 2022a) because “a sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is essential to Euro-Atlantic security” (NATO 2024b). At the same time, this political discourse was promoted by the Ukrainian political leadership and President Zelensky, and Ukraine was presented in the public sphere as a bulwark of defense of transatlantic values and unity, and the Russian-Ukrainian war became the embodiment of the conflict between the modern, liberal, democratic world and its backward and authoritarian opponents.

WESTERN POLITICAL RHETORIC AND THE HYBRID CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Understanding rhetoric as a technique of persuasion that has the power to convince someone to do something against their own interests (Eco 2010, 46), it is impossible not to understand the importance of public or political discourse as a constitutive element of contemporary political communication. Since discourse is primarily a social phenomenon, the very concept of discourse implies fluidity and complexity that prevents its precise definition. In this sense, although discourse can be interpreted in different ways, both in everyday speech and from the perspective

of various scientific disciplines, discourse as a linguistic achievement (whether in written or oral form) inevitably exists in interaction with society, i.e., as a complete communication event in a given social context (Wodak 1997, 5), i.e., a phenomenon that both shapes society and is socially shaped, because it manifests itself not only as a social practice of constituting or signifying the world in meaning but also as a practice of representing the world created and conditioned by a given social structure in every sense (Fairclough [1992] 2006, 63–64).

In today's era, which can be defined as the era of post-democracy⁴ and hybrid war,⁵ In accordance with constructivism, the struggle for democracy actually leads to its collapse because every truth is relativized and transformed into a post-truth (Džalto 2024), while, as we consider,

⁴ The term post-democracy was coined by British political scientist and sociologist Colin Crouch, pointing to the paradoxical fact that although democracy, i.e., the implementation of free elections through which the electorate grants legitimacy to certain political actors, reached a historical peak at the beginning of the 21st century, the democratic systems of developed societies in Western Europe have experienced a decline, since political power, instead of the broader civil society, is actually exercised by a narrow, elitist circle of "business lobbies." In such circumstances, "liberal democracy" is nothing but "elitist democracy," and in formal democratic societies, in fact, only the "illusion of democracy" is maintained, i.e., the functions of democratic institutions have been replaced by "corporate social responsibility" (Crouch 2004).

⁵ Although there is no generally accepted definition, the concept of hybrid war as a broader concept than direct, armed conflict between states, has its roots in ancient times and implies warfare in all spheres of social activity, i.e., the synergy of unarmed and armed forms of conflict, and is also referred to as total war, information war, unlimited war, nonlinear war, etc. Originally to denote modern conflicts since the 1980s, the concept of "fourth generation war" was used in the United States, and the term hybrid war itself is of more recent date and is associated with the beginning of the 21st century, when William Nemeth introduced it in 2002 in his master's thesis on the Chechen war, as well as authors such as Frank Hoffman and James Mattis, who define the threats to which the US and NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq are exposed as hybrid. Since 2010, the term has also become established in official documents of the USA and Great Britain, where the main feature of modern conflicts is hybridity, which implies the joint action of conventional and irregular, terrorist and criminal resources (Cvetković, Kovač, i Joksimović 2019, 325). Finally, hybrid war is a complex concept that implies the operation of combined forms of conflict - diplomatic-political, military, terrorist-criminal, intelligence-information, information, psychological-ideological, economic-financial and legal, as well as the synchronized and long-term application of comprehensive aggression against the vital values and interests of the enemy, projected through any form of power (political, socio-economic, technical, intelligence-subversive, media, terrorist, etc.) in order to achieve certain strategic goals for which the conflict exists.

democratic institutions exist only nominally and instead of the common good, the corporate interests of the ruling elite dominate, on whose orders strategic narratives are carefully developed by PR agencies or *think tanks* and placed in order to manipulate the public. In other words, political communication is colored by seemingly neutral discursive strategies, but they are primarily ideological and aimed at shaping social representations in accordance with certain interests (Pešić 2024, 8–9). Starting from this approach, the rhetoric of power centers and the political West must inevitably be viewed through the prism of strategic communication in which linguistic choices are adapted and shaped in accordance with the function they have in the broader political context and the interests of the principals as staged narratives or promoters of certain political-ideological matrices.⁶

Namely, we must not lose sight of the fact that the conflict in Ukraine broke out at a time when Russia had already positioned itself as a powerful military-political power (Masters 2015) and China as an economic power (Wayne 2013). It is in this sense that the actions of the Russian Federation since 2014 towards Ukraine have been characterized in the public discourse of the United States and Europe as hybrid warfare or a special military operation that involves military, but also political, socio-economic and information warfare. At the same time, a controversy about hybrid war developed in Russia itself, and in 2013, Valery Gerasimov (*Валерий Васильевич Герасимов*) promoted the “Russian model of hybrid war” or the “Gerasimov doctrine” for Western analysts, defining the nature of modern war as total and comprehensive, whereby, in order to achieve strategic interests, the rules of classical military conflict are exceeded, and the emphasis is placed on unconventional and subversive military means, and a guerrilla approach to warfare is adopted, which

⁶ According to Mitić (2024, 30; 100–101), strategic communication implies the concept of organized persuasion, i.e., “a system of coordinated communication activities implemented by specific organizations with the aim of advancing their missions, based on allowing understanding of target groups, finding channels and methods of communicating with the public, developing and implementing ideas and attitudes that, through these channels and methods, promote a certain type of behavior or opinion.” Therefore, “To be persuasive, strategic communication requires clearly defined and coordinated operational and tactical goals, messages and activities [...] as well as adequate structure and resources, especially management, leadership and coordination.” In this sense, strategic communication is more a process than a set of capabilities and, therefore, requires greater investment in the organizational structure itself than in communication resources. Author’s translation.

involves the activation of various actors and means (state and non-state, i.e. media, corporations, non-governmental and terrorist organizations, cyberattacks, security services, special military and proxy forces, etc.) (Gerasimov 2014). Analyzing the Arab Spring and NATO interventions in Libya, Gerasimov pointed out the fact that hybridity is actually the main feature of the Western approach to warfare and US strategic action since the Gulf War (Gerasimov 2014). To respond to the defensive digital struggle of the adversary, the political West has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into various *fact-checking* organizations and projects aimed at combating "disinformation," that is, checking the veracity, or rather the suitability, of certain information. In fact, at the very beginning of the conflict, news of an intercepted telephone conversation between Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador to Kyiv, Geoffrey Pyatt, was leaked to the public via YouTube and Twitter (BBC 2014). In the conversation, Nuland, as the US Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs, suggests which of the Ukrainian opposition leaders is most suitable to enter the Ukrainian government and, speaking about the role of the UN and the EU, makes a disparaging remark about the EU, revealing in that way, as we believe, the extremely arrogant and undiplomatic attitude of the US when it comes to conducting foreign policy and generally interfering in the internal affairs of other countries (Gearan 2014).⁷ Although the authenticity of the recording was initially questioned, Nuland soon apologized for the "gaffe."

It is clear that the conflict in Ukraine was marked by the use of social networks and cyberattacks to achieve political goals. Namely, social networks were actively used to gain mass sympathy and support from other countries, form nationalist movements, call for protests, and spread, but also suppress the propaganda activities of the enemy by blocking certain media.⁸ However, according to many Western theorists (Maigre 2015, 2; Thomas 2015, 453; Reisinger and Golt 2014, 3; Schnauffer 2017), the war between Russia and Ukraine is a blatant example of a hybrid war because information or nonlinear warfare was put in the foreground since,

⁷ Incidentally, Nuland herself actively participated in anti-government demonstrations in Ukraine, meeting not only with Ukrainian opposition leaders but also handing out cookies to protesters on Maidan (Parry 2015) while the arming of Ukraine was taking place during Trump's first administration, i.e., long before the outbreak of the conflict itself (Martinez, Finnegan, and McLaughlin 2019).

⁸ In 2022, the YouTube platform blocked the work of Russian state media such as RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik International (Voice of Russia).

as it is emphasized, Russia does not have enough military resources to win a conventional war against NATO and is forced to turn to civilian means to achieve its political and military goals. Also, since Russia has not fully matured to “overcome conventional military destruction,” it is the West that is “forced, due to the spread of Russian aggressive actions, to turn to unconventional means of warfare and respond in kind,” so in addition to a complete financial blockade and economic war against Russia through draconian sanctions or asset seizures, absolute isolation of Russia has been implemented internationally, which also included a cultural and sports boycott (Wigglesworth, Smith, and Jones 2022).⁹

In line with this political strategy and the spread of the narrative of global condemnation of Russia, its “dependence on Western markets and technology” was also highlighted, while Russia’s “aggressive” foreign policy and “nuclear threats 10 to 12 times a week”, i.e. Putin’s desire to “revitalize Russia’s imperialist ambitions” were disguised by a so-called protective stance towards Russian ethnic minorities and the pro-Russian population and presented in the context of an “attack on NATO itself” (Euronews Srbija 2024). Furthermore, this discourse highlights how the Russian political establishment, by promoting a conservative and nationalist ideology based on references to the glorious Russian past, sometimes “fictional and certainly selectively interpreted,” has actually built a cult of Putinism in which the president, “nurturing ideas of his own grandiosity,” compares himself to figures like Peter the Great, who “did not conquer, but rather returned territories inhabited by Slavs” (Rejnsford 2022). In other words, it has launched the image of Russia as an anti-modern and radically conservative state based on Putin’s dictatorial regime, authoritarianism, and desire to build a “Greater Russia” with an absolute trampling of democracy and human rights (Mearsheimer 2022).

⁹ In an attempt to crush the Russian economy and completely isolate Russia on the world stage in order to awaken the revolt of the Russian people against Putin, the EU, in addition to the initial sanctions on individuals and certain Russian companies, as well as the ban on Western financial institutions from cooperating with them in any way and the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT, also introduced an embargo on the export of oil and gasoline, and then even initiated a seizure of immobilized Russian assets. Also, FIFA banned Russia from international football competitions; the International Ice Hockey Federation suspended the Russian and Belarusian teams; Russian athletes were banned from participating in the Beijing Winter Paralympic Games; Formula One canceled the Russian Grand Prix; Eurovision canceled the Russian Eurovision Song Contest; the International Cat Federation sanctioned the Russian cat competition; Many prominent Russian artists were excluded from public life (Financial Times 2022).

On the other hand, since the end of World War II, Britain has led 83 military operations in as many as 47 countries (Curtis 2023), while from 1798 to 2023, the US has conducted over 400 foreign military operations (Congressional Research Service [CRS] 2023), it is almost impossible to find information in the Western media about NATO members as imperialist or criminal powers (Schiffer 2022). In contrast, the representation of Russia as an enemy has been progressively developed in Western political discourse through the heating up of sentiments about the "Red Scare" and the urgent need for the state to defend itself against the undermining influence of the "communist plague."¹⁰ After the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, Western Europe easily and complacently accepted the revival of the rhetoric of the Cold War period. In this sense, the promotion of the discourse about Putin as a villain and the embodiment of the already hated post-Soviet Russia was actually a pragmatic political tool to distract public attention from the West's inherently aggressive policy, while Russia's concerns about NATO expansion were uniformly presented as "unreasonable and inexplicable paranoia" (McLaughlin 2020, 175–176).

In this way, the official narrative of the political West completely ignored the fact that NATO's expansionist policy towards Eastern Europe and the militarization of the region threatened Russia's strategic interests and thus potentially provoked the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which not only omitted the broader picture of the genesis of the conflict but also drastically narrowed the room for maneuver for finding its diplomatic and compromise solutions. This is clearly evident from the analysis of the content of news broadcast by the political West, which revives Cold War rhetoric and ties Russia to rigid communist ideology, as well as the uniformly deployed discourse about Putin as a primarily politically responsible actor for the escalation of the conflict, i.e., an "aggressor and criminal," a "monster and a madman ready to destroy the entire world," as well as the complete demonization of Russia (Keeble 2000, 65; McLaughlin 2020, 174–176, 181).

¹⁰ The "Red Scare" is associated with the period from 1919 to 1920, when Anglo-Saxons, as members of the ruling, white class, in the context of racist nativism and ideological racism, defined themselves as superior to newcomers, i.e., Bolsheviks and representatives of the working, lower class; and the period of the Cold War and tense relations between capitalist America and the socialist Soviet Union, when, during the time of Senator Joseph McCarthy, US domestic policy was focused on the persecution of leftists (intellectuals, actors, civil servants, etc.) and the public interrogation of potential communists as spies (Foster 2000).

At the same time, in the context of hybrid warfare, Russia was also accused of interfering in the 2016 US presidential election, but it turned out that the political leadership, supported by the intelligence service, exaggerated these accusations, which were dismissed after two years, and which were probably also placed in order to divert public attention from NATO's militarization of Europe (Boyd-Barrett 2020, 83–98).¹¹ In addition, a series of political-ideological projects launched in the form of fighting the subversive influence of the Russian “internet troll factory” contributed to creating a sense of general vulnerability of any liberal-democratic candidate – from Emmanuel Macron to Joseph Biden, and it became obvious that these “defensive means” or disinformation have a clear ideological, national or geopolitical signature, which became clear when Washington think tank known as the “Alliance for Securing Democracy” as part of its “Hamilton 68” operation aimed at exposing so-called fake Russian accounts on Twitter led mainly to accounts of American conservatives (Mitić 2024, 99). Therefore, as they conclude (Cvetković, Kovač i Joksimović 2019, 328), it is clear that the introduction of the new term “hybrid war” had a primarily political and strategic dimension, as it not only enabled the political West to exert a stronger influence on public opinion and achieve easier public compliance with the decisions of state bodies but also enabled NATO security structures to act outside the classical concept of warfare in the direction of uniting and strengthening cooperation between states against a common enemy, with the aim of a better and more comprehensive organization.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL AND LEGITIMIZATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The post-Cold War period brought the collapse of the bipolar structure of the international order and the formation of a world system based on the unilateral action of the USA. Guided by the principle that “the end justifies the means” and “the promotion of democratic peace as a paradigm of international security,” the USA continuously implements

¹¹ US intelligence agencies have accused Putin of launching Operation Lakhta (Project Lakhta), in which a “troll factory” from St. Petersburg spread disinformation on social media “with the aim of spreading discord, causing destabilization and socio-political polarization of American society, and undermining faith in democratic institutions.” (Hanlon 2024).

the militarization of the world and the "geopolitics of destruction" that undermine the interests of other states (Stošić 2023, 26). In light of such a policy, the US continued its strategy of encircling Russia after the Cold War, and through the process of NATO expansion, America found itself in the "Russian neighborhood" because, despite the promise to Mikhail Gorbachev (*Михаил Сергеевич Горбачёв*) that NATO would not expand eastward after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, i.e. into the "intermaritime corridor" area if a unified Germany remained in the Atlantic Alliance, NATO expanded from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south, and by placing Eastern Europe and the western coast of the Black Sea under its influence, it made it impossible for Russia to control the Black Sea coast, pushing it inland. In this way, the US and NATO actually implemented a strategy of "tight anaconda embrace" based on "dominance of the peripheral parts of the Asian ring and tightening the hoop around Eurasia" (Spykman 1942, 17).¹² Since 2007, there has been a shift in the economic and financial centers of global power from the Euro-Atlantic area to the East Pacific region, but also a shift in Russia's foreign policy, which is beginning to condemn the aggressive unilateral policy of the United States.

At the same time, the US, in its national security doctrine (NATO 2022b), identifies Russia as its greatest enemy, and since 2011 a Russophobic narrative has been intensively promoted, which was certainly encouraged by the Kremlin's rapprochement with Iran and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, as well as the repositioning of Russia as a regional power in 2013 when Germany turned economically to Russia, which resulted in a change in the geopolitical perspective of Europe established during the Cold War (Stošić 2023, 27).¹³ Relying on geopolitical teachings

¹² Compared to the initial 12 members it included at the time of its founding in 1949, NATO gained 13 more members in the period 1999–2017. Despite Moscow's insistence on NATO's reconfiguration in 1997, i.e., "withdrawal of NATO infrastructure from the Baltic states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Balkans)," the only document that testifies to the West's commitment not to expand was signed in 1997, i.e., before the Alliance's expansion in 1999, which caused Russia to lose its "superpower status in Europe" after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, any subsequent expansion of the Alliance represented for Putin "crossing a red line," i.e. a "direct security threat to Russia" (Stošić 2023, 26).

¹³ "By developing its energy network, Russia has become a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe and the major economic and demographic centers of East Asia (China, India, Japan, South Korea), which has led to the repositioning of former Western allies on the international stage" (Stošić 2022, 85).

such as that of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who believed that since they had a “maritime destiny” and thus the possibility of ruling the world, “the United States must, in coalition with other powerful maritime states, prevent Russia as a powerful continental power on the Eurasian landmass from breaking out onto the warm seas” (Mahan 1890, 6–8, 25–89), or that of Halford Mackinder, who in his thalassocratic theory of the Heartland defines Russia as the “Pivot Area” or Heartland, i.e., “a monolithic entity framed by the coastal territory of Eurasia called the Inner or marginal Crescent,” and claims that “who controls the World Island, i.e., Asia, Europe and Africa as a vital space and its center or heart, which is in contrast to the periphery, i.e., polycentric expansion in the form of a mosaic, establishes world domination”;¹⁴ the USA tried to keep Germany under its control through “a cordon sanitaire in the middle sea, i.e., military-political and economic dependence and thus form a transatlantic American bridgehead towards Eurasia via Europe, maintaining Russia’s geopolitical pretensions at the regional level” (Stošić 2023, 28). Considering that Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO would make this area “a zone of Atlantic influence in the entire Caspian region, and thus an undoubted threat to Russian interests” (Dugin 2004, 203), the emergence of conflict in Ukraine became inevitable. At the same time, “the multiple undermining of Ukraine (cultural-civilizational, socio-political and military-security), as the narrowest area of Russian strategic interests outside the borders of Russia, served not only as a training ground for the confrontation of different interests between the US and Russia but also as a neuralgic point for the collapse of Europe” (Stošić 2023, 28–29).

From a cultural and civilizational perspective, Ukraine was part of Russia not only during the Middle Ages or Kyivan Rus’ but also during the time of Tsarist Russia, “i.e., from 1654, as well as during the USSR, with the exception of a short period of Ukrainian independence in 1917. Although modern Ukraine was one of the largest European states in terms of size and population, after the collapse of the USSR and the acquisition of independence in 1991, its national identity was

¹⁴ “The inner Crescent is made up of the countries along the maritime perimeter of Eurasia, from the Baltic to the Pacific, while the outer Crescent is made up of Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, Canada and Great Britain, and whoever dominates Eastern Europe will control the Heartland, and whoever controls the Heartland will control the World Island, just as whoever controls the World Island will, in effect, rule the world” (Mackinder 2009, 82–83, 155; Mackinder 1904, 421–437).

divided between the southeastern and northwestern parts, i.e., the more industrially developed and pro-Russian oriented part and the poorer, pro-Western-Euro-Atlantic oriented part of Ukraine" (Stošić 2023, 29). Thus, since 1992, Ukrainian politics has oscillated between alliances with Russia, the USA, and the EU, which makes the geopolitical background of the genesis of the war in Ukraine more than clear. Violent protests in Kiev, i.e., Euromaidan or the Maidan Revolutions of 2013, culminated on February 22, 2014, with an organized coup d'état and the violent overthrow of President Yanukovich (*Віктор Федорович Янукович*). With the aim of "demilitarizing" and "denazifying" Ukraine, i.e., to prevent further killings and oppression of the pro-Russian population, Russian authorities ordered a "special military operation" on February 24, 2022, attacking major Ukrainian cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Mariupol, and Kramatorsk (Stošić 2023, 32).

Therefore, for Russia, the Ukrainian issue is a matter of national and strategic security because Ukraine is a critical security area from which the conflict must not be allowed to spill over into the European part of Russian territory because, in an international sense, this could potentially ignite World War III. Therefore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not only a guarantor of preserving vital geopolitical interests but also of Russia's international credibility (Stošić 2023, 33). If Russia were to allow NATO expansion by surrendering Ukraine, it would show that it is not worthy of being a leader in the process of reshaping the global world order towards a multipolar order in which a multitude of "global swing states" are strategically interconnected, from Argentina and Brazil to India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia,¹⁵ and regional expansionism and territorial consolidation are facilitated. On the other hand, European nations and the EU, as well as states like Australia, South Korea, and the US, whether through NATO or other alliances like the QUAD (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the US, Australia, India, and Japan), will have to balance their power in the context of growing competing economic and political interests. In this sense, it is clear that the Ukrainian War is more than a defense of national Russian interests; it is actually "an arena destined to show whether the defensive of the West under American leadership is an unstoppable

¹⁵ With over 40 countries from Africa, the Middle East, South America, Eastern Europe, as well as Cuba and Iran united against the common enemy of the USA, BRICS, as an expanded bloc, has the potential to reconfigure the axis of the geopolitical international scene.

process or whether the collective West will remain united in the face of the Russian offensive and capable of maintaining its position as a unilateral hegemon, capable of preventing Russia's integration into the Eurasian space" (Stošić 2023, 33).

Finally, the political agenda and rhetoric of the "collective West" have not only radically influenced Russia's position in international relations and the consequent redefinition of the concept of strategic stability of the US, the EU, and NATO, as well as global politics in general, but have also influenced the escalation of political violence on a global scale. Namely, it should be borne in mind that the phenomenon of political violence is inextricably linked to every society and state and is especially evident in times of turbulent geopolitical upheavals and crises, i.e., a time of emerging multipolarity in which the international system is marked by intrinsic uncertainty and distrust. At the same time, understanding that power, force, and violence do not have a clearly demarcated meaning (Simeunović 1989, 5) and that "power as supremacy fundamentally contains violence" (Petrović 1983, 103), today it is more than ever, especially considering the hybrid character of contemporary conflicts, very difficult to identify the scale of political violence.¹⁶

Thus, in our opinion, in the context of the doctrine of just war and in light of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the political West, "in the name of peace and freedom," "defense of democracy," and "the rules-based international order," through NATO, the EU and its allies, has chosen the continuous pumping of weapons into Ukraine, the massive militarization of Europe, the spread of a Russophobic narrative and various forms of silencing and sanctioning its dissidents around the world as various instruments of achieving its dominance, indirectly becoming the greatest instigator of political violence on a global scale.

As we believe, through the consensually accepted Western narrative on "Russian aggression," the Ukrainian nation is being sacrificed internationally, and the member states of the military-political alliance led by America are being used as its pawns in the fight against Russia. In this regard, various forms of political violence were practically legitimized, like the threat of force, intimidation, and coercion, sanctioning and various forms of pressure, psychophysical abuse, political murder and assassination, violent protests, rebellions, unrest and riots, terrorism, repression, uprising, civil war, and military aggression (Gaćinović 2008, 160–161).

¹⁶ According to data from the World Health Organization, political violence is the leading cause of death for people aged 15 to 44 (Stojadinović 2015, 93).

In other words, the fear of "Russian aggression" has been used as a legitimate call to prepare for global warfare and develop various war scenarios of a hypothetical conflict between various states and Russia, which introduce various security measures. For example, in order to strengthen Taiwan's defense against external aggression, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen has introduced significant changes, such as updating the 2023 Civil Defense Manual, which instructs civilians on how to distinguish Chinese from Taiwanese soldiers based on their uniforms (Reuters 2023), as well as extending the mandatory military service from four to 12 months starting in 2024 (Dodds 2023, 1527), while Moldova, through NATO assistance, received a package of tailored measures and, in order to strengthen national security, was provided with support for training and logistics, human resource management, cyber defense, and strategic communication (NATO 2024a). Similar situations have also befallen countries such as Germany, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, where, due to the intensification of security tensions, the preparation of the civilian population for war has begun by distributing brochures and guides for crisis situations, organizing preparedness courses, and survival training.¹⁷ This type of political pressure in many countries can certainly be characterized as a certain form of indirect psychological violence against citizens.

In terms of global militarization, while the military response from Western allies has not met all of Ukraine's weapons demands, it has certainly been impressive. Since the beginning of the conflict, NATO members and US partners have steadily increased arms deliveries to Ukraine, supplying increasingly sophisticated weapon platforms. In this sense, initial deliveries of military aid ranged from the basic – rifles, ammunition, helmets, vests, artillery shells and grenade launchers – to the sophisticated – Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, American Javelin anti-tank missiles, Swedish AT-4 rocket launchers, British new-generation anti-tank weapons and armed drones, followed by tanks and fighter jets (Gheciu and von Hlatky 2024, 278), and in the process of the transition of power between the two American presidents, the outgoing Biden administration also allowed Ukraine to use long-range missiles on

¹⁷ For example, in Germany, due to the small number of bunkers, a national civil protection plan was launched, which envisages the construction of bunkers and shelters, as well as the development of mobile applications with their geolocations, while in Sweden and Finland, citizens were suggested to stock up on water, food, battery-powered radios, etc. (The Guardian 2024).

Russian territory (The New York Times 2023b), which, as we consider, instead of ending the conflict led to an escalation. In this sense, it is also logical that the US maintained its lead with over 70 billion euros in total aid to Ukraine, half of which went to military aid alone (Bomprezzi *et al.* 2023). In this context, in the period from 2009 to 2023, total global military spending increased by 6.8% (Tian *et al.* 2024, 1).

In this regard, among 11 out of 31 members in NATO that since the end of the Cold War till 2023 met or exceeded the 2% GDP target (Pieper 2024), Germany made the first leap forward, as it had created extra-budgetary €100 billion fund in 2022 (Tian *et al.* 2024, 9). In addition, Germany also created its plan to achieve energy security, including restarting coal-fired power plants and energy diversification (Schmitz 2022). In this sense, the once strongest economy in Europe has suffered a meltdown for the sake of American interests, tacitly passing over the cover-up of the investigation into the Nord Stream mine, which is, in our view, one of the clearest examples of political violence because in this way not only is a terrorist act legitimized, but the political sovereignty of a state is also delegitimized.¹⁸

Another example of sublimated political pressure is certainly the recent case of the annulment of the results of the first round of the presidential elections in Romania, when, despite the convincing victory of candidate Călin Georgescu, a critic of NATO and an advocate of stopping support for the war in Ukraine, over the pro-European Marcel Ciolacu, local authorities accused Russia of using the social network TikTok to influence the elections, annulling the results (BBC 2024). Also, we observe an equally obvious form of indirect political violence that results in violent protests and street unrest is the attempt to provoke a “Georgian Maidan” and the political destabilization of Georgia, which the US is trying to push back into war in order to further weaken Russia in its peripheral areas.¹⁹

¹⁸ Before the conflict, Russia was the EU’s largest energy supplier, but the US realized that it would profit far more by supplying its liquefied natural gas to Europe. In this regard, Biden has repeatedly publicly criticized the Russian-German project, and the results of the investigation into the Nord Stream mining have not yet led to the identification of the culprit.

¹⁹ After the ruling party announced that it would suspend negotiations on joining the EU, pro-European protests began in Tbilisi, while the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, denying the legitimacy of the parliament, refused to leave power at the end of her term. Namely, in 2008 the Russo-Georgian war broke out, during which Russia declared the independence of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and

At the same time, in addition to the indirect exercise of political pressure and general militarization as the most blatant examples of indirect political violence, restrictive measures were implemented, and sanctions were imposed on disputants of the political West, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who, since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, has taken a negative stance on NATO cooperation with Ukraine, and during his re-election, openly supported President Putin, criticizing Zelensky (Adler 2022), which led allied politicians to introduce draconian punitive measures against Hungary within the EU and to ban access to certain funds (Baczynska and Szakacs 2022).²⁰ Other forms of more direct political violence include the assassination attempt on Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, as well as Donald Trump.²¹

Unfortunately, due to the scope of this paper, we are unable to address this topic in more detail, but it is certain that the Ukrainian conflict, or rather the war between Russia and Ukraine, certainly stands out not only for the multiplicity of causes and motives but also for the consequences it brings. At a time when the concept of strategic stability is being shaken, that is, a time of confrontation between great powers, the ruling principle of the new European and global security architecture is primarily related to the fear of guaranteed mutual destruction. In such an atmosphere, a discourse of symbolic violence is purposefully developing, which naturally results in an escalation of political violence at the international level.

South Ossetia. The then President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, advocated for Georgia's entry into NATO and is known as the leader of the "Rose Revolution." He was arrested upon his return from Ukraine to Georgia in 2021 (Ecman 2024).

²⁰ Due to its policy towards asylum seekers, the European Court of Justice fined Hungary 200 million euros in 2024 (Reuters 2024).

²¹ During the presidential election and high tensions in the country, Fico, a pro-Russian politician and advocate of stopping military aid to Kyiv, was shot four times while greeting supporters, and the crime itself was characterized as politically motivated. As a Republican presidential candidate and advocate of ending the war between Kyiv and Moscow, Trump experienced his first assassination attempt during a political rally in Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024, when an assassin shot him in the ear, killing one and wounding two people. Two months later, while Trump was playing golf, a second assassination attempt was made, which was prevented by security services, while a third assassination attempt, which was also prevented, took place during Trump's speech on the stage while he was standing behind protective, bulletproof glass.

CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Literally understanding war as “the continuation of politics by other means” (*von Clausewitz*), the neoliberal policy of the collective West has paved its way on neo-imperial practice and in favor of big capital and corporate interests over international law. In this way, not only have the most diverse forms of political violence been legitimized, but also its escalation on a global level. This thesis gains special weight when one considers the complexity of strategic communication and political rhetoric of the West, in which post-truth dominates instead of truth, post-democracy instead of democracy, and peace is defended by warfare. Acting propagandistically through most Western mainstream media on a global level, this rhetoric actually acts as a catalyst through which not only the concept of hybrid war is actualized for the purpose of Western strategic communication but also the entire international community and NATO alliance are engaged. Namely, interpreting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict exclusively through the prism of good and evil, i.e., a democratic-liberal regime versus an authoritarian-oppressive one, enables the abolition of the critical function of the media and the negation of their political independence, while in order to achieve the US political agenda, European states are de-sovereignized and political violence is legitimized.

Considering all of the above, the complexity and multidimensionality of the Ukrainian conflict is clear. It is also clear that Ukraine’s geopolitical situation is multi-layered and conditioned by its specific geostrategic position. Namely, “Ukraine is a part of Russia known as the soft belly where the Euro-Atlantic claims of the so-called Rimland confront the Eurasian continental ones, which, as the heart of the land, act as a restraint” (Stošić 2023, 33). In this sense, “Ukraine is a bulwark that protects Russia all the way to the Carpathians, and if Ukraine were to become part of NATO, not only the Russian but also the Belarusian ‘southern wing’ would remain unprotected in the area from the Polish eastern border almost to Volgograd in the south to the Sea of Azov” (Stošić 2023, 33).

Therefore, it is clear that for the West, Ukraine is important not only as a territory rich in natural resources but also as a geostrategic weapon that uses its “cannon fodder” in the fight against Russia. Having always lived thanks to the exploitation of other people’s resources, the Western powers that are on the path of decline are trying to maintain their power by provoking wars and conquering new resources. In this

way, precisely through Ukraine as a "testing ground for reaffirming their power," the West is trying to get its hands on a new market and the wealth of both Russia and Ukraine. Also, "for the EU, the energy corridors of Ukraine are of crucial importance because they supply gas to energy-deficient member states, but the North Atlantic policy of the US is moving towards weakening the EU in order to preserve its position as a global hegemon and is bringing the EU into conflict with Russia, not caring about the development of global conflicts and the consequent collapse of the EU itself" (Stošić 2023, 33). It is precisely in this context of geopolitical turmoil and global escalation of conflict, dominated by hybrid threats and legitimized political violence,²² that, in addition to wise foreign policy conduct, the political leadership of any state must be able to be guided by national interests and a sovereign policy of protecting its own citizens.

REFERENCES

- Adler, Katya. 2024 "Hungary election: PM Viktor Orbán criticises Ukraine's Zelensky as he wins vote." *BBC News*. Last accessed on October 19, 2024 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60977917>
- Baczynska, Gabriela, and Gerbely Szakacs. 2022. "In a first, European Union moves to cut Hungary funding over damaging democracy." *Reuters*. September 18, 2022. Last accessed on October 25, 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/first-eu-seen-moving-cut-money-hungary-over-damaging-democracy-2022-09-18/>
- BBC. 2014. "Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call." Last accessed on October 26, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957>
- BBC. 2024. "Romania orders election recount after TikTok bias claims." Last accessed on October 24, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2n83vgxxjo>

²² The resistance and war activities of the Ukrainian army itself include a whole series of terrorist actions, such as the attempted assassination of Dugin when his daughter Darya Dugina was killed or the recent assassination of General Igor Kirilov.

- Bomprezzi, Pietro, K. Bushnell, A. Frank, Ivan Kharitonov, Christopher Schade, Leon Weiser, and Trebesch Christoph [Bomprezzi *et al.*]. 2023. "Ukraine support tracker – A database of military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine." Kiel Institute. Last accessed on October 25, 2024. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukrainesupport-tracker/>
- Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2020. *RussiaGate and Propaganda: Disinformation in the Age of Social Media*. London: Routledge.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. *The Great Chess Board: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Book Group.
- Chimiris, Ekaterina. 2022. "The Collective West Concept and Selected Western Actors (Germany, Norway, Estonia, NATO) in the Russian Media: Post-Crimea Dynamics." *Global Journal of Human-Social Science* 22 (F1): 1–12. DOI: 10.34257/GJHSSFVOL22IS1PG1
- CNN. 2024. "Biden-Trump Debate Rush Transcript." June 28, 2024. Last accessed on October 15, 2024. <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/27/politics/read-biden-trump-debate-rush-transcript/index.html>
- Congressional Research Service [CRS]. 2023. "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2023." Last accessed on October 15, 2024. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42738>
- Crouch, Colin. 2004. *Post-Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Curtis, Mark. 2023. "The UK's 83 military interventions around the world since 1945." *Declassified UK*, January 10, 2023. <https://declassifieduk.org/the-uks-83-military-interventionsaround-the-world-since-1945/>
- Cvetković, Nenad, Mitar Kovač, i Branko Joksimović. 2019. „Pojam hibridnog rata.” *Vojno delo* 2019 (7): 323–343.
- D'Anieri, Paul J. 2023. *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dodds, Klaus. 2023. "The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: implications for politics territory and governance." *Territory, Politics, Governance* 11 (8): 1519–1536. DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2023.2256119
- Dugin, Aleksandar. 2004. *Osnovi geopolitike, knjiga 2, Prostorno misliti*. Zrenjanin: Ekspres.
- Džalto, Davor. 2024. *(Post) istina (post) demokratije*. Beograd: Media Sfera.
- Ecman, Per. 2024. "Foreign Policy After Empire. Explaining Georgia's and Ukraine's International Orientation from Independence until 2021." Doctoral thesis. Uppsala: Department of Government, Uppsala University.

- Eco, Umberto. 2010. *Rakovim korakom: vrući ratovi i medijski populizam*. Zagreb: Izvori.
- Euronews Srbija. 2024. „Rihards Kols za Euronews Srbija: Putin i njegovi saradnici prete nuklearnim oružjem 10 do 12 puta nedeljno.” Last accessed on September 27, 2024. <https://www.euronews.rs/evropa/vesti/138841/rihards-kols-za-euronews-srbija-putin-i-njegovi-saradnici-prete-nuklearnim-oruzjem-10-do-12-puta-nedeljno/vest>
- European Parliament [EP]. 2022. “Joint Motion For A Resolution On Recognising The Russian Federation As A State Sponsor Of Terrorism.” Last accessed on November 21, 2024. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2022-0482_EN.html
- Fairclough, Norman. [1992] 2006. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Financial Times. 2022. “The west’s hybrid war on Russia.” Last accessed on November 11, 2024. <https://www.ft.com/content/ff95ee3f-a1b8-4a54-9657-6alaaecc105f>
- Foster, S. J. 2000. “Chapter I: The Red Scare: Origins and Impact.” *Counterpoints* 87: 1–10. Last accessed on October 15, 2024. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42976159>
- Gaćinović, Radoslav. 2008. „Pojmovno određenje – definisanje nasilja.” *Srpska politička misao* 22 (4): 79–99. DOI: 10.5937/spm88-54494
- Gearan, Anne. 2014. “In recording of U.S. diplomat, blunt talk on Ukraine.” *Washington Post*. Last accessed on October 25, 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-purported-recording-of-us-diplomat-blunt-talk-on-ukraine/2014/02/06/518240a4-8f4b-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html
- Gerasimov, Valery. 2014. “The value of science in anticipation.” *VPK news*. February 27, 2014. <http://www.vpknews.ru/articles/14632>
- Gheciu, Alexandra, and Stefanie von Hlatky. 2024. “Irreconcilable Differences? NATO’s Response to Russian Aggression Against Ukraine.” *International Journal* 79 (2): 275–296. DOI: 10.1177/00207020241255999
- Hanlon, Bradley. 2024. “Target USA: Key Takeaways from the Kremlin’s ‘Project Lakhta’” *German Marshall Fund of the United States*. Last accessed on October 15, 2024. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/target-usa-key-takeaways-kremlins-project-lakhta>
- Herman, Steve. 2022. “Is Putin the New Hitler?” *VOA*. March 8, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/is-putin-the-new-hitler-/6476408.html>

- Keeble, Richard. 2000. "New militarism and the manufacture of warfare." *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*. ed. by P. Hammond and E. S. Herman, 59–69. London: Pluto Press.
- Kršljanin, Vladimir. 2023. *Novi svet*. Beograd: ITV centar plus.
- Krzysztosek, Aleksandra. 2024. "Putin wants to see empires, autocracies back in Europe, warns von der Leyen in Poland." *Euractiv*. May 8, 2024.
- Mackinder, Halford. 1904. "The Geographical Pivot of History." *The Geographical Journal*, London: The Royal Geographical Society 23 (4): 421–437.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. 1890. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Maigre, Merle. 2015. "Nothing New in Hybrid Warfare: The Estonian Experience and Recommendations for NATO." Policy Brief. *Foreign Policy Program*. GMF – The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Last accessed on October 25, 2024 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18840>
- Makinder, Halford. 2009. *Demokratski ideali i stvarnost*. Beograd: Metaphysica.
- Martinez, Luis, Conor Finnegan, and Elizabeth McLaughlin. 2019. "Trump admin approves new sale of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine." *ABC News*. Last accessed on October 25, 2024. <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-admin-approves-sale-anti-tank-weapons-ukraine/story?id=65989898>
- Masters, Jonathan. 2015. "The Russian Military." *Council on Foreign Relations* website. Last accessed on October 11, 2024. <http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/russian-military/p33758>
- McLaughlin, Greg. 2020. *Russia and the Media: The Makings of a New Cold War*. London: Pluto Press.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2014. "Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs* 93 (5): 77–89, Last accessed on October 11, 2024 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306>
- Mearsheimer, John. 2022. "The causes and consequences of the Ukraine crisis." *The National Interest*. Last accessed on September 21, 2024. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/causes-and-consequences-ukrainecrisis-203182>
- Mitić, Aleksandar. 2024. *Global Strategic Narrative Wars: The Battle for Serbia*. Beograd: IIPE.

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. 2022a. "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Russia's attack on Ukraine." Last accessed on October 10, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192404.htm
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. 2022b. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept." Last accessed on October 20, 2024. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. 2024a. "Relations with the Republic of Moldova." Last accessed on April 28, 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. 2024b. "Relations with Ukraine." March 7, 2024. Last accessed on November 12, 2024 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm
- Parry, Robert. 2015. "The Ukraine Mess that Nuland Made." *Truthout*. Last accessed on November 22, 2024. <https://truthout.org/articles/the-ukraine-mess-that-nuland-made/>
- Petrović, Gajo. 1983. *Filozofija i revolucija*. Zagreb: Naprijed.
- Pešić, Milena. 2024. „Politički diskurs u istraživačkoj optici njegovih savremenih kritičkih studija.” *Srpska politička misao* 2 (84): 07–38. DOI: 10.5937/spm84-49031
- Pieper, Oliver. 2024. "Global military spending soars to new record highs." *DW*. Last accessed on November 12, 2024. <https://www.dw.com/en/global-military-spending-soars-to-new-record-highs/a-68876104>
- President of Russia. 2024. "Plenary Session of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum." Last accessed on October 12, 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178>
- Reisinger, Heidi, and Alexander Golt. 2014. "Russia's Hybrid Warfare: Waging War Below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence." Research Paper, Rome: NATO Defence College 105: 1–12.
- Rejnsford, Sara. 2022. „Rusija, istorija i Putin: Ruski lider se uporedio sa carom iz 18. veka – „Petar nije zauzimao teritorije, on ih je vraćao.” *BBC News na srpskom*. Poslednji pristup 21. oktobra 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/svet-61780492>
- Reuters*. 2022. "Moscow-Beijing partnership has 'no limits.'" Last accessed on October 12, 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing-partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/>

- Reuters. 2023. "Taiwan civil defence handbook includes tips on identifying Chinese soldiers." Last accessed on October 17, 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-civil-defence-handbook-includes-tips-identifying-chinese-soldiers-2023-06-13/>
- Reuters. 2024. "EU court orders Hungary to pay 200-mln-euro fine over migrant policy." Last accessed on November 18, 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-court-orders-hungary-pay-200-mln-euros-fine-over-immigration-policies-2024-06-13/>
- Schiffer, Sabine. 2022. "On myths of solidarity and the logic of war." *Journalism Research* 5 (2): 183–192.
- Schnauffer, Tad A. 2017. "Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia's Nonlinear War against the West." *Journal of Strategic Security* 10 (1): 17–31.
- Schmitz, Rob. 2022. "Amid an energy crisis, Germany turns to the world's dirtiest fossil fuel." *NPR*. Last accessed on October 17, 2024. <https://www.npr.org/2022/09/27/1124448463/germany-coal-energy-crisis>
- Simeunović, Dragan. 1989. *Političko nasilje*. Beograd: Radnička štampa.
- Spykman, Nicholas. 1942. *America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Stojadinović, Miša. 2015. „Političko nasilje i globalizacija – izazovi razvoja demokratije.” *Bezbednost* 57 (2): 92–104. DOI:10.5937/bezbednost1502092S
- Stošić, Sanja. 2022. "The Caribbean Crisis vs. The Ukrainian Crisis." *Москва-Гавана: веки сотрудничества: материалы круглого стола, г. Белгород. 24 ноября 2022г.* Под ред. Н.Н. Фомичева, В.Н. Васильева, О.В. Дехнич, С.Х.А. Контрерас. – Белгород: ИД «БелГУ» НИУ «БелГУ», – 78 с.
- Stošić, Sanja. 2023. „Kubanska i Ukrajinska kriza u svetlu globalne geopolitičke dinamike.” *Politička revija* 75 (1): 11–43. DOI: 10.5937/polrev75-43195
- Tanjug. 2022. „Stoltenberg: Putin ne sme da pobedi.” Poslednji pristup 12 Oktobar 2024 <https://www.tanjug.rs/svet/politika/15118/stoltenberg-putin-ne-sme-da-pobedi/vest>
- The Guardian*. 2024. "Would you survive 72 hours? Germany and the Nordic countries prepare citizens for possible war." Last accessed on October 27, 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/would-you-survive-72-hours-germany-and-the-nordic-countries-prepare-citizens-for-possible-war>

- The New York Times*. 2023a. "U.S. and World Leaders Must Pledge Support for Ukraine 'for as long as It takes.'" Last accessed on October 10, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/03/world/europe/biden-ukraine-aid.html>
- The New York Times*. 2023b. "Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles." Last accessed on November 20, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html>
- Thomas, Timothy. 2015. "Russia's Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric and Putin-Led." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 28 (3): 445–461.
- Tian, Nan, Diego Lopes da Silva, Xiao Liang, and Lorenzo Scarazzato [Tian *et al.*]. 2024. "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023." Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute. DOI: 10.55163/BQGA2180
- Tisdall, Simon. 2024. "How will the Ukraine war end? Only when Vladimir Putin is toppled." *The Guardian*. Last accessed on October 13, 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/16/raising-white-flag-in-kyiv-will-never-make-the-putin-problem-go-away>
- Wayne, M. Morrison. 2013. "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States." RL33534, United States Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2013, Last accessed on October 11, 2024. <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/uscrs/2013/en/97279>
- Wigglesworth, Robin, Colby Smith, and Claire Jones. 2022. "The west's hybrid war on Russia." *Financial Times*. Last accessed on October 11, 2024. <https://www.ft.com/content/ff95ee3f-alb8-4a54-9657-6alaaecc105f>
- Wodak, Ruth. 1997. "Introduction: Some important issues in the research of gender and discourse." *Gender and Discourse*. UK: Lancaster University.

Сања Стошић*

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

РЕТОРИКА „КОЛЕКТИВНОГ ЗАПАДА” И ГЛОБАЛНО ПОЛИТИЧКО НАСИЉЕ**

Резиме

Савремено друштво интензивно сведочи убрзаном повећању политичког насиља. Због убрзаног технолошког развоја и развоја хибридног начина ратовања, западна елита која има користи од америчке хегемоније је руско-украјински рат концептуализовала као горући међународни сукоб подржан реториком принуде која позива на хитне мере за подршку Украјини. У складу са генерализованим представљањем намере Русије да поред Украјине освоји европске и друге земље НАТО-а, политички интерес „колективног Запада” конципиран је као глобални јавни интерес. Другим речима, концепт Кремља о „руском свету“ одређен је у складу са војним циљевима унутар граница „колективног Запада” што има озбиљне геополитичке последице. На тај начин, сучељавајући се са Путином, САД су добиле могућност да покушају да очувају униполарни систем унутар и око Евроазије. Ипак, у контексту хибридног ратовања и променљиве геополитичке динамике, сматрамо да је одлука Русије да покрене инвазију на Украјину у пуном обиму у фебруару 2022. била подстакнута страхом од опкољавања НАТО савезницима. Један од закључака овог рада је да су западни медији и Европска унија имплементирали стратешки наратив угроженог „колективног Запада” „заснованог на правилима” и „демократском поретку”, демонизујући и санкционишући Русију на међународном плану. Заговарајући моралну обавезу да се украјинским снагама обезбеде различити офанзивни системи, такође сматрамо да је политика САД-а утицала на развој различитих облика политичког насиља широм света. Другим речима, један од закључака овог рада је да су својом реториком, земље „колективног Запада” превазишле саветодавне оквире и улогу заштитника у виду пружања безбедносне помоћи

* Имејл адреса: sanja.stosic@ips.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-4921-9268

** Овај рад је написан у оквиру научноистраживачке делатности Института за политичке студије коју финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије.

украјинској војсци и заправо су се умешале као подстрекачи или извршиоци политичког насиља. Стога, закључујемо да у контексту геополитичког превирања на светској политичкој сцени, као и континуираног хибридног ратовања, руководство било које државе може да сачува свој легитимитет искључиво штитећи економске и националне интересе сопственог народа.

Кључне речи: политички дискурс, постдемократија, украјински конфликт, политичко насиље, хибридни рат, десуверенизација

* This manuscript was submitted on January 9, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

Milovan Subotić*
Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade

Marina Mitrevska**
Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Skopje

MEDIA, MIGRATION AND TERRORISM – SOME CORRELATIONS***

Abstract

How do contemporary media approach the phenomena of migration and terrorism and their correlation? What factors contribute to the increased media attention given to news related to terrorism and migration? What are the experiences of the academic community studying these phenomena in the United States, Europe, and more specifically, in the Mediterranean gateway countries of Europe – Italy, Spain, and Greece? How does the rise in irregular entries into Europe truly impact the number of terrorist attacks affecting European countries, as well as their intensity and the number of casualties resulting from such incidents? These are some of the research questions this paper seeks to address. Drawing on available literature concerning media and academic treatments of terrorism and migration, as well as insights into their similarities and differences, contradictions and paradoxes, this study concludes that, despite media portrayals often marked by sensationalism and spectacle, academic analyses of these phenomena and their correlation do not provide unambiguous confirmation that a greater influx of irregular migration

* E-mail: milovan.subotic@mod.gov.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-8729-5742

** E-mail: marina@fzf.ukim.edu.mk; ORCID: 0000-0003-2107-5901

*** The paper was created as part of the Ministry of Defense project: “Security Challenges of the Western Balkan Countries in the European Security Paradigm”, No. ISI/DH1/24-25, which the research team of the Strategic Research Institute and external collaborators is implementing in the period 2024-2025.

into Europe directly leads to a higher number of terrorist attacks and/or an increased number of casualties on European soil.

Keywords: terrorism, migration, media, reporting, radicalization, correlation

“Half a truth is often a great lie.”

Benjamin Franklin

INTRODUCTION

The media play a central role in informing the public about what is happening worldwide, especially in areas where the audience lacks direct knowledge or experience, which opens space for shaping public opinion.

One of the most significant ways the media shapes public opinion is through agenda-setting. This is the process in which the media decide which topics and issues to cover and how to present them to the public, significantly influencing opinions among media consumers (Semakula et al., 2015). Another way the media can shape public opinion is through selective reporting, where the press chooses which aspects of a given “big issue” to report on while ignoring others (Finegan, 2015). Framing or stereotyping is how the media, through patterned reporting on specific processes, phenomena, individuals, or groups, significantly influences how people interpret them (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar, 2016).

When we apply these ways the media shape social reality to frequently discussed terms, such as terrorism and migration, we notice that from agenda-setting, through selective reporting, to framing attitudes about these phenomena, the role of the media in (dis)informing the public is confirmed. Therefore, it is essential in this research to analyze the media activity of different types of media regarding terrorism and migration and how their interdependence is portrayed. To understand the message the media wants to convey regarding these terms, it is necessary to determine the representation and intensity of specific factors contributing to news related to terrorism and migration, gaining more significant attention from media outlets.

The paper further analyzes the academic community’s past experiences regarding the connection between migration and terrorism, using examples of research efforts in the U.S. and Europe, specifically in countries representing “gateways to Europe”: Italy, Greece, and

Spain, as well as countries often seen as migrant destinations, such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. There are conflicting opinions within the academic community regarding the causality between migration and terrorism, often based on the hypothesis being tested, i.e., whether the research team seeks to prove the analogy or disprove it. Therefore, in this review paper, the authors will refer to already published works from both research areas to answer the question: Does the increase in irregular entries into Europe affect the number of terrorist actions, their intensity, and the number of casualties in those attacks? Additionally, a comparative analysis of the number of irregular migrant entries into Europe (Frontex 2024), as well as the number of terrorist actions and fatalities (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024) in the last three years, will provide a significant framework for understanding the relationship between these phenomena in Europe.

TERRORISM AND MIGRATION IN THE MEDIA SPACE

As two of the most prominent phenomena of today, terrorism and migration attract perhaps a disproportionate amount of attention when it comes to the media and their reporting, even if we take the “facilitating circumstance” of the press to be the corporate competition in which they fight at all costs for circulation and the number of views on electronic platforms, what the academic community must react to is the frequent occurrence of elements of spectacle, unverified news, and ultimately poor scientific treatment of these phenomena in academic writing.

Therefore, it is essential to reconsider the approaches to studying terrorism and increasingly securitized migration, which (over)emphasize their communicative dimension. The conceptual gaps in this area contribute to the fact that much of the literature related to reporting on terrorism in mass media is often speculative in nature, where: “broad statements are made without any scientifically acceptable evidence to support such arguments” (Alexander and Picard, 1991, 49). Referring to the critical stance of Jeffrey Ross (Ross, 2007, 215–216), Cristina Archetti points out that “there is a striking similarity among the available publications on this topic, where many of the same topics are covered and previously cited journal articles are repeatedly paraphrased, providing very little new information” (Archetti, 2013, 33). Of course, the aspiration of this review paper is not to conclude the correlation between the media, migration, and terrorism but to highlight the difficulties researchers

face when trying to innovate existing academic efforts with the latest quantitative indicators relevant to the research.

Media and terrorism


Media coverage of terrorism is highly inconsistent: some events, ranging from clear links to terrorism to terrorist attacks, receive a lot of media attention, while certain events with clear connections to terrorism receive significantly less media coverage or even go “under the radar” of media professionals, depending on the variables that accompany them. An earlier study that dealt with terrorist attacks in the United States from 1980 to 2001 showed that they gained more attention if they caused fatalities if airlines were targeted, if a hostage crisis followed the terrorist act, or if domestic terrorist groups were involved (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006). Have these variables stood the “test of time,” and how does this relationship look after the significant watershed in understanding and studying terrorism – since September 11?¹

In a study by the American Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, 2021), researchers observed differences in media reporting on terrorist events in the U.S. from 2005 to 2017. They focused on three key characteristics: the perpetrator, the attack target, and the number of fatalities. They assessed that these factors primarily influenced the amount of reporting on attacks in U.S. media.

Figure 1. Factors Determining the Amount of Media Attention during a Terrorist Attack



¹ “The beginning of the 21st century will be remembered as the dramatic Manichean struggle of the forces of civilization against the dangerous forces of terrorism.” (Stanar 2020, 75).



Source: Authors.

In this factor analysis, in line with the more prevalent victimization of followers of the youngest monotheism, a variable was added in which the perpetrator of the terrorist act is Muslim. What is striking is that in all media sources, attacks on average received 357% more coverage if the attacker was Muslim, while this was even more pronounced in large media houses – as much as 758%. As for local media, interest in such content was significantly lower (Kearns et al. 2019). From this analysis, we also see that media coverage was more pronounced when the perpetrator was arrested (partly because an arrest in itself is an event that gets reported), when law enforcement or government officials were targeted, and when the attacks resulted in human casualties. An additional fatality meant an average increase in media coverage by 46% (Kearns et al. 2019).

Differentiating between events that receive significant and lesser media attention is substantial. Research shows that the media play a decisive role in changing public opinion, perceptions about the importance of specific issues, and discussions about national policy, which can significantly impact attitudes toward how the public perceives terrorism and its ideologues, inspirers, and protagonists. Significantly increased media coverage in cases when the perpetrator was Muslim points to an imbalanced review of terrorist actions in the American public. In

the dataset on which this study relies, Muslims committed 12.5% of the attacks in the U.S. but received nearly half of the coverage of all terrorism-related events (Kearns et al., 2019). The fact that the most severe terrorist attacks, which cause the most fatalities, certainly attract the most attention does not mean that only terrorism gets significant media attention – these are also rare but extreme events that are the easiest to remember, such as the most expansive migration crisis of 2015 (Ritchie and Roser 2019).

Research from the European academic community also indicates that the frequent pairing of Islam and Muslims, as a group with specific negative attributes (such as violence or even terrorism), significantly influences negative attitudes toward particular groups of news consumers, in this case, Muslims residing in Europe, but also newcomers who are also followers of the youngest monotheism (Saleem et al. 2017).

The research team led by Christian von Sikorski from the University of Kaiserslautern analyzed how the media portrayed Muslim Islamist terrorism in three European countries (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) between 2015 and 2017. They examined 12 daily newspapers of various qualities (two quality and two tabloid newspapers in each country) through more than 1,000 individual news articles (Sikorski et al. 2018).

The fact that nearly half of the reviewed articles contained undifferentiated news reporting speaks for itself and shows that “news consumers” in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (no significant deviations were registered) were continuously exposed to high doses of information that activate stereotypes. Exposure to news that permanently associates Muslims with highly negative connotations, such as terrorism, contributes to the rise of Islamophobia and benefits those who elevate the religious connotation of conflicts to the level of civilizational differences (Subotić 2019, 481). Almost every other text in their sample contained at least one undifferentiated news story linking Muslims to terrorism (Sikorski et al. 2022). The appeal that the authors directed to journalists and journalistic associations concerns the need to explicitly separate Muslims (immigrants of all generations) from Islamist terrorists, as undifferentiated media coverage can promote Islamophobia and negatively impact intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims living in European societies.

Media and migrations

The phenomenon of rising anti-immigrant sentiment and the rejection of migrants is highly complex and is often linked to the portrayal of these individuals in the media. This is something that academic research has been analyzing for quite some time, noticing that the representation of this social group in the media is primarily stereotypical, negative, and manipulative. The significance that the phenomenon of migration holds for media professionals coincided (not coincidentally) with the general rise of the discourse of victimization and rejection of certain social groups, polarized through social media, and closely connected with the rise of anti-immigrant right-wing movements (in some countries, even the rise to power of openly anti-immigration European parties), with prominent examples such as Vox, Santiago Abascal in Spain; Lega, Matteo Salvini, and Brothers of Italy, Giorgia Meloni in Italy; or Golden Dawn (*Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος*), Nikolaos Michaloliakos in Greece. Research focused on Mediterranean countries is particularly significant given that these countries represent the Mediterranean “gates” of Europe, which have absorbed nearly 90 percent of irregular entries into other European Union countries through three main routes since 2014.²

A research team from the Observatory of Audiovisual Content (Observatorio de los Contenidos Audiovisuales) at the University of Salamanca led a consortium together with researchers from the University of Milan (Italy) and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Greece) to understand the reality of media representation of migration in these countries, with particular attention to the hate speech to which migrants and refugees are exposed. This project recently resulted in a book titled “Migrants and Refugees in Southern Europe Beyond the News: Photographs, Hate, and Journalist Perception” (Calderón and Veglis 2023). It focuses on three main issues: the photographs used by mainstream media when reporting on migration phenomena, the presence of racist and xenophobic hate speech on Twitter and YouTube, and the views of journalists specializing in migration.

² “The Central Mediterranean route with the main pressure on the shores of Italy, the Western Mediterranean route aimed at the shores of Spain, and the Eastern Mediterranean route with the Aegean as the ‘gateway to Europe’ for migrants coming from the Middle East through Turkey. The branch of the Eastern Mediterranean route that connects Greece with Central European countries is called the Western Balkan route, due to its geographical significance for Serbia and other countries of the Western Balkans.” (Subotić 2022, 180).

First, four dominant frameworks for representing migrants in mainstream media in Southern Europe were identified: normalization, victimization, social burden, and threat. It was found that in “mainstream media” in Mediterranean countries, the frameworks depicting migrants as victims, burdens, and/or threats dominate. It is particularly noticeable that negative frameworks (those portraying migrants as burdens and those identifying them as threats) significantly increased between 2014 and 2019. Although the research pattern is shared across all three countries, Greek media offer a somewhat more negative portrayal of migration through their media frameworks (Calderón and Veglis 2023).

A detailed analysis of media content shows that hatred towards migrants is primarily argued through their association with crime, terrorism, and social consumption.³ For example, fake news or inaccurate news published (before the information is verified) claiming that the perpetrator of a crime is of foreign origin or articles suggesting that migrants are more likely to receive more social benefits than residents. These narratives are often supported by unverified information, later multiplied in the digital space, fueling unfounded yet deeply rooted fears. It is evident that extremist narratives in the media space, directly or indirectly targeting the migrant population, can lead to the acceptance and intensification of such views in broader social discourse. These views are double-edged about decision-makers – sometimes politicians fall under media propaganda, while at other times, they encourage it. What is indicative is the pronounced presence of specific terms used in journalistic texts and reports to describe migrant movements, such as ‘swarms,’ ‘floods,’ ‘waves,’ and similar, as well as the indiscriminate use of racist and xenophobic labels towards this group.

In this context, journalists specializing in this field are concerned. They recognize that some bad practices and limitations hinder more objective, accurate, and humane media coverage of migration phenomena. There is an inevitable divide between those who place journalistic practice above all else and those who defend the humanity and human rights of migrants and refugees as priority values. Journalists in many countries must adhere to an ethical code of conduct to regulate the profession. Some of them have codes specifically for the migration topic. The Roman Charter of Journalists (Consiglio Nazionale dell’Ordine dei Giornalisti

³ “The factor of hatred in the media space can be directly linked to the increase in the number of offenses classified as hate crimes in the analyzed countries, as well as more broadly in Europe.” (Rubiera 2023).

[CNOG]) is an example. Journalists, civil society organizations, and the UN Refugee Agency developed it. It is based on four key principles: adopting clear and precise terminology, using accurate and verified information, protecting sources, and verifying journalistic constructions by experts (WACC 2023).

DO INCREASED MIGRATIONS DIRECTLY CAUSE A RISE IN TERRORIST ATTACKS – WHAT DO THE FACTS SAY?

The serious study of irregular (undocumented) immigration and its relationship with terrorism in contemporary literature is marked by the duality of delegated hypotheses and, consequently, the results that emerge.

From one perspective, we might expect undocumented immigration to be associated with increased terrorist activity for several reasons. First and most directly, undocumented immigrants could increase the number of potential terrorists through the “importation” of individuals with terrorist intentions. For example, Leiken and Brooke, in their analysis, identify nearly 400 global jihadist terrorists in Europe and North America between 1993 and 2004, noting that while most immigrants are not terrorists, most terrorists are immigrants (Leiken and Brooke 2006, 505). Additionally, Bove and Böhmelt, for example, found that migrants function as a means to spread terrorism. Specifically, they argue that while overall immigration reduces the risk of terrorism, immigration from countries with significant terrorist activity increases the risk of terrorist attacks for host societies (Bove and Böhmelt 2016, 574). Similarly, Milton and colleagues found that host countries face more significant dangers of terrorism due to refugee flows (Milton et al. 2013).

Furthermore, undocumented immigrants might present a particular threat compared to other types of migrants because the unregulated and secretive nature of unauthorized migration could be an ideal route for the entry of potential terrorists. In other words, individuals with extensive criminal histories or connections to terrorist organizations have a strong incentive to remain undetected, thus increasing the likelihood of attempting to enter destination countries through informal migration channels. “The criminal ‘signature’ concerning the legality of ‘merged courts’ between organized crime and potential terrorism is evident in

the example of the collusion between smugglers and Islamist extremism” (Subotić 2024, 53).

A second, less direct mechanism is the radicalization of immigrants once they have arrived in the host country. Several studies suggest that the unfavorable socio-political and economic conditions faced by immigrants and their children could make them more susceptible to radicalization. For instance, Milton and colleagues argue that “grim conditions in refugee camps and the treatment of refugees by host states can contribute to the radicalization of refugees” (Milton et al. 2013, 629). Additionally, Piazza found that countries where minority groups face economic discrimination, such as unequal access to healthcare, jobs, and education, were at greater risk of domestic terrorism (Piazza 2011, 343). Finally, a review of the literature on jihadist terrorism suggests that “socio-political alienation is a key driver of the radicalization of immigrants and their children” (Wilner and Dubouloz 2020, 35). Since undocumented immigrants and their descendants face pronounced social disdain and limited access to economic and social resources, this can lead to the formation of a “new underclass” (Massey 2008), which may result in a circumstance where unauthorized migrants are at increased risk of radicalization. Regarding the radicalization of already-arrived immigrants, some researchers have noted the ability of terrorist groups to exploit dense immigrant networks in host countries to spread radicalization. As previously mentioned, Bove and Böhmelt argue that “terrorist organizations can potentially exploit links between group members, which then encourage the radicalization of migrants, ultimately leading to a higher level of terrorism in the host country” (Bove and Böhmelt 2016, 579). Considering the views of these authors, there is sufficient reason to suggest that irregular immigration will increase the risk of terrorism.

On the other hand, the study of the links between migration and terrorism includes a perspective that suggests that undocumented immigration and terrorism are largely orthogonal. Regarding the terrorist consequences of immigration flows, Forrester and colleagues examined 170 countries over two and a half decades (1990-2015), focusing on immigration from countries amid armed conflicts and countries with majority Muslim populations, and found almost no relationship between immigration and terrorism for host countries (Forrester et al. 2019, 537).

This zero relationship may be especially relevant in the case of the United States, as the vast majority of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. do not come from countries that represent a significant “reservoir” of

terrorist ideas and actions. Indeed, 71 percent of unauthorized immigrants in the United States come from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, none of which ranks among the top 50 countries in the world for terrorist activities (Rosenblum and Ruiz Soto 2015). Therefore, in line with the findings of Bove and Böhmelt, who established that only immigration from countries prone to terrorism is associated with increased terrorist activity, we can expect that undocumented migration flows will have little impact on terrorism in the U.S. (Bove and Böhmelt 2016, 581).

Moreover, while Leiken and Brooke previously discovered that most global jihadist terrorists are immigrants, they also noted that only a small percentage of terrorists entered illegally. Only 6 percent of terrorists who carried out attacks in Europe and North America entered illegally, and no terrorists entered the U.S. from Mexico. The authors conclude that “the Mexican border poses a less serious threat to national security than the Canadian border or, in that case, the air and sea borders of the United States” (Leiken and Brooke 2006, 513). A more recent biographical analysis of nearly 500 jihadist terrorists in the United States supports this point, revealing that only one percent were irregular immigrants (Bergen et al. 2019). It is also worth noting that an exclusive focus on Islamism-based terrorism distracts from the growing number of terrorist attacks motivated by far-right ideology, which primarily does not draw its sources of “inspiration” from Islam (Zapotosky 2019).

This “lack” of terrorist activity along the U.S.-Mexico border explains the trivially low mortality risk posed by terrorists from the body of irregular immigrants to the U.S. in recent decades. A 2019 CATO Institute report calculated the risk of an American being killed by a foreign-born terrorist between 1975 and 2017, including deaths during the September 11 attacks. It was determined that the annual murder rate among foreign-born terrorists was 0.026 per 100,000 (Nowrasteh 2019). In other words, the annual chance of an American being killed in a “typical” criminal homicide was 264 times higher during the same period. Regarding undocumented immigrants, the report found that the annual chance of an American being killed or injured by an undocumented immigrant terrorist was essentially zero. Taken together, these findings dismiss the thesis that undocumented immigration has been linked to an increase in terrorism in the United States.

As for the latest data, in terms of the number of deaths in terrorist attacks worldwide, the past year witnessed a rise in the danger of terrorism. In 2023, the number of deaths from terrorism increased by 22 percent

(8,352 deaths), marking the highest level since 2017. Even excluding the most intense Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, fatalities would still have increased by five percent (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024).

Although Israel endured the most significant terrorist attack of 2023, it was not the country most affected by terrorism. Burkina Faso is now ranked first on the global list of countries most affected by terrorism, marking the first time that a country other than Afghanistan or Iraq has topped the index. Nearly 2,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso in 258 incidents, accounting for almost a quarter of all global deaths from terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024). Regional data shows that “the Sahel remains the most vulnerable region, accounting for 43 percent of global terrorism deaths” (Đorić 2024, 41).

Armed conflicts continue to be the primary driver of terrorism, with over 90 percent of attacks and 98 percent of terrorism deaths in 2023 occurring in conflict countries, which somewhat relativizes the often-used phrase that “a terrorist act can be characterized as the peacetime equivalent of a war crime” (van Zijdewijn 2015, 213). The increasingly evident discourse correlating the number of terrorist attacks with countries directly involved in conflicts is further confirmed by the fact that all ten countries most affected by terrorism in 2022 were also involved in armed conflict. The intensity of terrorism in conflicts is also much higher than in non-conflict countries, with an average of 2.7 deaths per attack compared to 0.48 fatalities (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024).

At the same time, and most importantly for this research, terrorist activity in the West has reached its lowest level in the past 15 years. In Western countries, 20 attacks were recorded in 2023, a 55 percent decrease compared to the previous year, and this can be seen as a trend since 2017. What is even more striking, considering that this study attempts to establish a correlation between the surge in the number of irregular migrants in Europe and a possible increase in terrorist acts, is that 16 of these attacks occurred in the United States. Therefore, only “4 attacks” occurred in Europe, with one fatality in Belgium (Institute for Economics and Peace 2024).

Moreover, the total number of terrorism-related deaths in the West has been declining for the third consecutive year. As for data from 2023, this decrease amounts to 22 percent compared to the previous year (a total of 21 deaths in 2023). The number of politically and religiously motivated attacks has also fallen in the West. Of the seven attacks

recorded in the U.S. in 2023, five were related to individuals with far-right sympathies or connections.

Let's compare the number of terrorist attacks (and the victims they caused) in Europe over the past three years with the number of irregular entries into Europe. We can conclude that the increased migratory pressure on EU countries does not follow an equivalent spike in "terrorist achievement" in this region – in fact, the opposite is true. Data on irregular entries into Europe has shown a steady increase since 2020, with the highest result in 2023, when 380,000 people entered EU countries irregularly (Frontex 2024). Of course, these indicators from the analyzed years cannot guarantee that this trend will continue. Still, they demonstrate the importance of a delicate approach to these phenomena, which are not exclusive – "an increase in migration leads to an increase in terrorism" or "an increase in migration reduces the danger of terrorism."

CONCLUSION

Themes such as terrorism and uncontrolled migration have been at the forefront of media coverage for decades, filling news articles and increasing viewership on websites and social media platforms. At the same time, their media portrayal is often marked by elements of catastrophe and spectacle, leading some of the academic community to adopt superficial and undocumented analyses of these phenomena and the processes related to them. This paper is a modest contribution, not so much to a definitive truth, but rather to the direction in which these current and, according to the media, highly complementary phenomena should be analyzed.

How do terrorist attacks influence attitudes towards migrants? The impact of attacks depends on where the news about terrorism is received, indicating spatial conditioning. If terrorist attacks influence citizens' attitudes toward migration through a sense of immediate danger and fear, then the proximity of the terrorist attack would be the main conditioning factor. On the other hand, the local migration context of the news recipient may also have a significant effect. In homogeneous societies with little immigration experience, citizens are more inclined to discourses that link migration with terrorism and are, therefore, more susceptible to adopting a negative stance. Beyond this spatial variable, which is documented in research, the fact that

the perpetrator of a terrorist act is Muslim significantly amplifies the news about the event itself, generating further prejudices against followers of the youngest monotheistic religion. This wave has led to right-wing populist opposition to European migration processes, often linked to the protection against the Islamization of Europe (Subotić and Mitrović 2023, 123).

When we discuss the beginning of the migrant wave toward Europe (which certainly correlated with numerous terrorist actions on European soil) and the last few years (when increased migrant influx coincided with a significant reduction in the number of terrorist actions and the consequences they produce), we must be aware of statistical risks. More extensive migration routes certainly imply greater chances that terrorists can hide among them or join jihadist terrorism at a later stage. However, despite this correlation, there is no apparent causal link. The choice for someone to become a terrorist is not primarily determined by belonging to the migrant population. Still, it is influenced by various factors such as individual experiences, living conditions at arrival, and voluntary or involuntary contacts with broader criminal or Islamist networks.

There is no clearly expressed or at least documented analysis indicating a systematic connection between the hypothesis that “terrorism causes migration” and the one stating “migration causes terrorism.” In the first case, the correlational element is somewhat transparent and emphasized. Numerous actions by the terrorist organization that was at its peak – the Islamic State, undoubtedly contributed to the extent and intensity of the intense migration pressure toward Europe. Also, the intensity of terrorist activities and the number of deaths from terrorism in Europe (mainly in France) during the most migration-expansive year, 2015, show high numbers. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that the increase in irregular entries by as much as 80% compared to the average of the period from 2010 to 2014 increased the number of attacks and/or deaths from terrorism in Europe by such a high percentage. The most recent cross-referenced data, from the fourth consecutive year, with increased migration pressure towards Europe and executed or prevented terrorist acts, speaks to the opposite. The average annual increase in the number of irregular migrants in Europe since 2021 is close to 33%, while at the same time, the number of terrorist activities has decreased by almost 35%.

There is no doubt that immigration “contributes” to the spread of terrorism from one country to another. Still, it is unlikely that immigration alone would be the direct cause of terrorism. Also, there is currently no empirical evidence suggesting that irregular (first-generation immigrants) are more likely to become terrorists, with the caveat that migration flows from countries where terrorism is a more frequent occurrence certainly have a more significant impact on attacks in destination countries.

Ultimately, all the mentioned results suggest that despite extensive political and media suggestions to the contrary, unauthorized immigration has not been the central driver of terrorist activities in recent decades.

REFERENCES

- Alexander, Jonah, and Robert G. Picard. 1991. *In the Camera's Eye: News Coverage of Terrorist Events*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Archetti, Cristina. 2013. “Terrorism, Communication, and the Media.” In *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media*, eds. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Simon Mabon and Gordon Clubb, 32–59. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bergen, Peter, Albert Ford, Alyssa Sims, and David Sterman [Bergen *et al.*]. 2019. *Terrorism in America After 9/11*. Washington: New America.
- Bove, Vincenzo, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2016. “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” *The Journal of Politics* 78 (2): 572–588. DOI: 10.1086/684679.
- Calderón, Carlos Arcila, and Andreas Veglis (eds). 2023. *Migrants and refugees in Southern Europe beyond the news stories - photographs, hate, and journalists' perceptions*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.
- Chermak S. M., and J. Gruenewald. 2006. “The media's coverage of domestic terrorism.” *Justice Quarterly* 23 (4): 428–461. DOI: 10.1080/07418820600985305.
- Cacciatore, Michael, Dietram A. Scheufele, and Shanto Iyengar. 2016. “The end of framing as we know it... and the future of media effects.” *Mass communication and society* 19 (1): 7–23. DOI: 10.1080/15205436.2015.1068811.
- Dorić, Marija. 2024. „Istraživanje korelacije mentalnih poremećaja i terorizma.” *Srpska politička misao* 58 (3): 39–58. DOI: 10.5937/spm85-50255.

- Forrester, Andrew C., Benjamin Powell, Alex Nowrasteh, and Michelangelo Landgrave [Forrester *et al.*]. 2019. "Do Immigrants Import Terrorism?" *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 166: 529–543. DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.019.
- Finegan, Daniel. 2015. "The Pitfalls of Journalism: Why bias and selective reporting are hurting journalism." *The Waltonian*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://waltonian.eastern.edu/opinions/the-pitfalls-of-journalism-why-bias-and-selective-reporting-are-hurting-journalism/>
- Frontex. 2024. "Significant rise in irregular border crossings in 2023, highest since 2016." *Frontex*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/significant-rise-in-irregular-border-crossings-in-2023-highest-since-2016-C0gGpm>
- Institute for Economics and Peace. 2024. "Global terrorism index 2024." *Reliefweb*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2024>.
- Kearns, Erin M., Allison E. Betus, and Anthony F. Lemieux [Kearns *et al.*]. 2019. "Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others?" *Justice Quarterly* 36 (6): 985–1022. DOI: 10.1080/07418825.2018.1524507.
- Leiken, Robert, and Steven Brooke. 2006. "The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (4): 503–521. DOI: 10.1080/09546550600880294.
- Massey, Douglas S. 2008. *Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Milton, Daniel, Megan Spencer, and Michael Findley [Milton *et al.*]. 2013. "Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and Transnational Terrorism." *International Interactions* 39 (5): 621–645. DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.834256.
- Nowrasteh, Alex. 2019. "Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975–2017." *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* 866: 1–68.
- Piazza, James A. 2011. "Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (3): 339–53. DOI: 10.1177/0022343310397404.
- Ritchie, Hannah, and Max Roser. 2019. "Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others?" *Our World In Data*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://ourworldindata.org/why-do-some-terrorist-attacks-receive-more-media-attention-than-others>.

- Rosenblum, Marc R., and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto. 2015. *An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States by Country and Region of Birth*. Washington: Migration Policy Institute.
- Ross, Jeffrey. 2007. "Deconstructing the Terrorism News Media Relationship." *Crime, Media, Culture* 3 (2): 215–225. DOI: 10.1177/1741659007078555.
- Rubiera, Claudia Lorenzo. 2023. "Criminals, terrorists and freeloaders: how migrants are portrayed in the European media." *The Conversation*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://theconversation.com/criminals-terrorists-and-freeloaders-how-migrants-are-portrayed-in-the-european-media-208524>
- Saleem, Muniba, Sara Prot, Craig A. Anderson, and Anthony F. Lemieux [Saleem *et al.*]. 2017. "Exposure to Muslims in media and support for public policies harming Muslims." *Communication Research* 44 (6): 841–869. DOI: 10.1177/0093650215619214.
- Sikorski, Christian, Jörg Matthes, and Desirée Schmuck [Sikorski *et al.*]. 2018. "The Islamic State in the news: Journalistic differentiation of Islamist terrorism from Islam, terror news proximity, and Islamophobic attitudes." *Communication Research* 48 (2): 203–232. DOI: 10.1177/0093650218803276.
- Sikorski, Christian, Desirée Schmuck, Jörg Matthes, Claudia Klobasa, Helena Knupfer, and Melanie Saumer [Sikorski *et al.*]. 2022. "Do journalists differentiate between Muslims and Islamist terrorists? A content analysis of terrorism news coverage." *Journalism* 23 (6): 1171–1193. DOI: 10.1177/1464884921990223.
- START. 2021. *Global Terrorism Database*. Maryland: University of Maryland.
- Stanar, Dragan. 2020. „Vojska i terorizam: alternativna perspektiva opravdanosti upotrebe oružanih snaga protiv terorizma." *Politička revija* 65 (3): 73–93. DOI: 10.22182/pr.6532020.4.
- Semakula, Daniel, Allen Nsangi, Andrew Oxman, and Nelson Sewankambo [Semakula *et al.*]. 2015. "Priority setting for resources to improve the understanding of information about claims of treatment effects in the mass media." *Journal of Evidence-Based Medicine* 8 (2): 84–90. DOI: 10.1111/jebm.12153
- Subotić, Milovan. 2019. „Religija i rat – povratak otpisanog." *Međunarodni problemi* 71 (4): 476–497. DOI: 10.2298/MEDJP1904476S.
- Subotić, Milovan. 2022. *Migracije i ekstremizam*. Beograd: Medija centar Odbrana.

- Subotić, Milovan. 2024. „Iregularne migracije kao izazov regionalnoj i nacionalnoj bezbednosti.” *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti* 26 (1): 45–68. DOI: 10.5937/pnb26-49872.
- Subotić, Milovan, and Miroslav Mitrović. 2023. “European Security and The Migrant Crisis.” In *Strategic Intersections – The New Architecture of International Security*, eds. Milovan Subotić and Serban Cioculescu, 114–128. Belgrade: Strategic Research Institute, Bucharest: Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History.
- van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine de Roy. 2015. “Peace, Terrorism, Armed Conflict and War Crimes.” *Security and Human Rights*. 26 (2–4): 207–223.
- WACC. 2023. “Background: Why accurate media coverage of migration is important.” *Waccglobal*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. <https://waccglobal.org/background-why-accurate-media-coverage-of-migration-is-important/>
- Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. 2010. “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization.” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 22 (1): 33–51. DOI: 10.1080/14781150903487956.
- Zapotosky, Matt. 2019. “Wray Says FBI Has Recorded about 100 Domestic Terrorism Arrests in Fiscal 2019 and Many Investigations Involve White Supremacy.” *Washington Post*. Last accessed 10 September 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/wray-says-fbi-has-recorded-about-100-domestic-terrorism-arrests-in-fiscal-2019-and-most-investigations-involve-white-supremacy/2019/07/23/600d49a6-acal-11e9-bc5c-e73b603e7f38_story.html

Милован Суботић*

Институт за стратегијска истраживања, Београд

Марина Митревска**

Институт за безбедност, одбрану и мир, Скопје

МЕДИЈИ, МИГРАЦИЈЕ И ТЕРОРИЗАМ – НЕКЕ КОРЕЛАЦИЈЕ***

Резиме

Теме попут тероризма и неконтролисаних миграција деценијама заузимају истакнуто место у јавном дискурсу, често испуњавајући новинске ступце и повећавајући гледаност на интернет платформама и друштвеним мрежама. Истовремено, медијско извештавање о овим феноменима често је прожето елементима катастрофе и спектакла, што доводи до тога да и део академске заједнице усваја површне и слабо аргументоване анализе ових појава и пратећих процеса. Овај рад представља скроман допринос – не даје дефинитивну истину, већ представља смерницу за анализу ових савремених и, према медијском представљању, међусобно тесно повезаних феномена. Како терористички напади утичу на ставове према мигрантима? Утицај оваквих напада зависи од географског положаја примаоца вести, што указује на просторну условљеност. Уколико терористички напади обликују ставове грађана о миграцији кроз осећај непосредне опасности и страха, онда би просторна близина напада представљала примарни фактор условљавања. С друге стране, локални миграциони контекст у коме се налази прималац вести такође може значајно утицати на ефекте. У хомогеним друштвима са минималним искуством са имиграцијом, грађани су склонији усвајању дискурса који миграцију повезују са тероризмом, што их чини подложнијим формирању негативних ставова. Поред ове просторне варијабле, истраживања показују да чињеница да је

* Имејл адреса: milovan.subotic@mod.gov.rs; ORCID: 0000-0001-8729-5742.

** Имејл адреса: marina@fzf.ukim.edu.mk; ORCID: 0000-0003-2107-5901.

*** Рад је настао као део пројекта Министарства одбране: „Безбедносни изазови земаља Западног Балкана у европској безбедносној парадигми”, бр. ИСИ/ДХ1/24-25, а који истраживачки тим Института за стратегијска истраживања и спољних сарадника реализује у периоду 2024-2025.

извршилац терористичког акта муслиман значајно појачава медијски ефекат самог догађаја, што додатно подстиче предрасуде према следбеницима најмлађе монотеистичке религије. Штавише, овај талас противљења миграционим процесима, који предводе популистичке десничарске снаге у Европи, често се повезује са наративом о заштити од „исламизације Европе”. Када говоримо о почетку миграционог таласа према Европи (који се заиста поклопио са бројним терористичким акцијама на тлу Европе) и последњих неколико година, током којих је примећен повећан прилив миграната уз истовремено значајно смањење броја терористичких напада и њихових последица, морамо узети у обзир статистички ризик. Учесталије миграционе руте неизбежно повећавају вероватноћу да терористи могу инфилтрирати те групе или им се касније придружити. Ипак, упркос овој нашироко имплицираној корелацији, не постоји јасна узрочна веза. Конкретније, нема јасно артикулисане, нити довољно документоване анализе која би доследно повезивала хипотезу да „тероризам узрокује миграцију“ са оном која тврди да „миграција узрокује тероризам”. У првом случају, корелативни елемент је извесно присутан и снажно наглашен. Бројне акције терористичке организације која је у то време била на врхунцу моћи – ИСИС-а – несумњиво су допринеле обиму и интензитету миграционог притиска ка Европи. Поред тога, интензитет терористичких активности и број жртава услед тероризма на европском тлу (пре свега у Француској) током године са најинтензивнијим миграционим токовима (2015) били су посебно високи. Ипак, не може се извести закључак да је повећање броја нерегуларних улазака за чак 80% у односу на просек из периода 2010–2014. довело до пропорционалног пораста терористичких напада и/или жртава у Европи. Најновији упоредни подаци из четврте узастопне године повећаног миграционог притиска ка Европи, у комбинацији са појавом или претњом терористичких аката, указују на супротно. Просечно годишње повећање броја нерегуларних миграната у Европу од 2021. износи приближно 33%, док је број терористичких активности у истом периоду опао за скоро 35%. Нема сумње да имиграција „доприноси” ширењу тероризма из једне земље у другу, али је мало вероватно да би сама имиграција била директан узрок терористичких аката. Штавише, тренутно не постоје емпиријски подаци који указују на то да су нерегуларни мигранти (прва генерација имиграната) склонији да постану терористи. Међутим, мора се нагласити да миграциони токови из земаља у

којима је тероризам учестилији имају значајнији утицај на нападе у земљама одредишта. У коначном, сви налази указују на то да, упркос бројним политичким и медијским тврдњама супротног карактера, нерегуларна имиграција није представљала централни покретач терористичких активности у последњим деценијама.

Кључне речи: тероризам, миграције, медији, извештавање, радикализација, корелација

* This manuscript was submitted on September 17, 2024, and accepted by the Editorial Board for online publication and published *online first* on January 16, 2025. It was accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

ESSAYS

UDC 32(4):316.46 Ганди М.
DOI: 10.5937/spm90-56665
Review article

Српска политичка мисао
(Serbian Political Thought)
No 2/2025.
vol. 90
pp. 125-143

*Aleksandar Gajić**
Institute of European Studies, Belgrade

*Ljubiša Despotović***
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

GANDHI'S "SATYAGRAHA" AND EUROPEAN POSTMODERN REVOLUTIONS***

Abstract

This paper starts with the comparison between Indian and European civilizations as the "ideal type" personifications of East and West and then turns its attention to their views toward the civil resistance manifestations in cases of illegitimate or unjust rule. By giving a brief review of the birth of the "Indian Independence Movement" with Gandhi's place in it, the paper observes the formation of Gandhi's concept of "Satyagraha" ("Insistence on Truth"). "Satyagraha" was not just a form of non-violent civil resistance as it is known in the West, but moreover, its contrast and overcoming by turning (with some modifications) to Indian religious tradition. By observing "Satyagraha" primarily as an ascetic-religious achievement that leads from "inner-self" toward a social

* E-mail: romero@eunet.rs; ORCID: 0000-0002-3873-0231

** E-mail: despotlj@stcable.net; ORCID: 0000-0002-0473-2829

*** The paper was written within the scientific research activities of the Institute of European Studies in Belgrade and the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, funded by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development, and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia.

change, this work studies its connection with two other India's traditional praxis – *brahmacharya* and *ahimsa*. In the second part of the paper, the phenomenon of “Color Revolution” as a type of non-violent revolution in East Europe is elaborately observed: all of its major forms, strategic and tactical characteristics, and phases of realizations are carefully cognized. Then, in the final part of the paper, Gandhi's “Satyagraha” and “Color Revolutions” (based on the theoretical and practical recommendations of Gene Sharp) are compared. This comparison gives us a clear contrast between these two forms of civil resistance: the first one that turns to tradition intertwined with spirituality and which leads towards the liberation from colonial submission, and the second one that is profane, anti-spiritual, and inevitably leads to neo-colonial enslavement.

Keywords: India, Europe, Gandhi, Satyagraha, Color Revolutions, tradition, postmodernism

From a European perspective, EU-India relations (or Europe-India relations) are not observed just as relations between the two equal political subjects that grew from different cultural and civilization backgrounds. Besides common Indo-European ancestors who settled two big sub-continents in the Old World a few thousand years ago and their languages that belonged to the same linguistic group, Europe and India are more often seen as opposites rather than diversities. They are considered to be typical representatives of the West and East. Even today, this view contains many typical qualities of “Orientalism” (Said 2008) that imagines, emphasizes, and distorts differences between peoples and cultures of Asia on one side and Europe and America on the other, ascribing inferiority to the former and superiority to the latter. East and West are not only geographic determinants: for some – they are “contrast pictures, ideas, persons and experiences” (Said 2008, 10); for others – they are the personifications of two completely different developing ways of peoples and their societies. West is rational, East is irrational; West is organized, East is chaotic; West is developed, East is stuck in the mud; West is turned toward individual, East is turned toward collective. As Denis de Rougemont wrote in the 20th century: “In the East, India codifies *castes*, adding one more (shudra) and multiplies sub-castes, immortalizing this system for the whole three millennia's, despite the all the efforts of religious reformers, Buddha, Islam, but not the Englishmen [...] In the West, on the contrary, the rise of Europe coincides with the successes of

the permanent struggle against the estates. Hellenic democracy, expansion of the Christian morality, Renaissance and French Revolution mark the stages of the dissolution of tripartite social structure inherited from an Aryan ancestor." (De Rougemont 1983, 25).

Another Francophone thinker, metaphysician, and traditionalist, René Guénon, however, turned his attention towards the core of differentiation between East and West. According to him (Guénon 2001, 51–54), the essence of this difference is that the West has completely abandoned the traditional, religious, and spiritual starting point of its civilization and directed itself toward materialistic, quantitative horizontals of life. On the contrary, Eastern civilizations have remained pre-modern, related – to a lesser or greater degree – to their religious and ethical vertical. Guénon describes this essential difference in the following way: "The differences between East and West seem to have been continually on the increase, but this divergence can be sad to have been one-sided, in the sense that it is only the West which has changed, whereas the East, broadly speaking, has remained much the same as it was in times which we are accustomed to call ancient, but which nevertheless are comparatively recent. Stability – one might even say immutability – is a quality that is quite commonly conceded to the Oriental civilizations, notably to the Chinese, but it is perhaps not quite so easy to agree on the assessment of this quality. Europeans [...] since little more than a century ago profess to see a sign of inferiority in this absence of change, whereas, for our part, we look upon it as a balanced condition that Western civilization has failed to achieve. [...] In short, Occidentals, and especially modern Occidentals, appear to be endowed with changeable and inconstant natures, hankering after movement and excitement, whereas Oriental nature shows quite the opposite characteristics. Therefore, if one wished to represent diagrammatically the divergence we are discussing, it would be wrong to draw two lines moving in contrary directions away from an axis. The East would have been shown as the axis itself and the West as a line starting from the axis and moving further and further away from it, after the fashion of a branch growing out of a trunk, as mentioned before." (Guénon 1945, 32–33).

Despite centuries of old colonial experience, partial cultural westernization of the East and its postcolonial development after WWII Eastern societies (seen from the Western perspective) are still being seen as generally collectivistic, more or less authoritarian and un-democratic (or, at least, insufficiently democratic) or underdeveloped. On the other

hand, Western societies are being represented as their reference point and the final goal – an ideal that must be unconditionally imitated and reached.

Moreover, some of the experiences of non-Western societies from the times of their struggle against colonialism are being appropriated in contemporary Western sociology, political science, and postcolonial theory and used for the explanation of social and political phenomena and processes. This alleged legitimization and adaptation “from the Eastern to the Western experience” – should not rejoice members of non-Western cultures because it is usually just a consequence of manipulation that is aiming for another abuse. There is probably no better example than a Western theoretical rethinking of Gandhi’s *Satyagraha* – India’s anti-colonial civil resistance and its inclusion into the corpus of Western types of civil disobedience, with the clear intention to use some of its methods for the theoretical propagation and practical implementation of the series of so-called “Color Revolutions” or postmodern *coup d’etat*’s.

GANDHI AND INDIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Gandhi was not the founder or the first leader of the Indian Independence Movement: its foundation goes back to Indian history, in times when the Indian subcontinent first fell under the rule of the East Indian Company (1757/1858) and later – the British Empire (1858–1947). With the national awakening of India’s population in the last decades of the 19th century, the Indian Independence Movement went through different developing phases. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was transformed into the Indian National Congress (Griffiths 1952, 295–296). Congress, led by moderate leaders, at first stood only for the improvement of conditions of Indian subjects of the Raj (rule by the British Crown in the *Indian* subcontinent). Only later, with the emergence of new, more radical Indian leaders, did the Indian National Congress turn toward the advocacy of full political autonomy. Gandhi just gave new directions to this massive national movement and supplied it with new methods of political action.

Mohandas Karamchand *Gandhi* (1869–1948) built his reputation as a non-violent resistance leader in South Africa, where he was working as an attorney. Confronted with discrimination, forced labor, and police repression of the Indian Diaspora in South Africa, Gandhi organized a series of non-violent protests against British colonial rule: boycotts,

protest marches, hunger strikes, etc. During this successful South African campaign (1906–1914), Gandhi gradually shaped his concept of *Satyagraha*.

Gandhi returned to India in January 1915 when the Indian National Congress still wasn't advocating the creation of an independent national state but only a common market in the Indian subcontinent. Under the patronage of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, an Indian political veteran, Gandhi joined the Indian National Movement. "First non/cooperative movement" led by Gandhi in 1920–1922 was very successful.¹ Boycott of British textile products and advocacy of domestic material (which implied renewal of the Indian textile industry), a boycott of the colonial educational and judicial system, and refusal to pay taxes – brought complete paralysis to the British colonial administration. Movement led by Gandhi gained strong popular support all over India. "Thousands went to prison willingly and stayed there to inconvenience of the government. Many more attended meetings, participated in processions and myriad other types of symbolic and practical resistance available on the Satyagraha menu. Even beyond those who were activists in some sense, there were probably millions of sympathetic bystanders." (Brown 2009, 54). The movement was recalled by Gandhi in 1922 because of the so-called "Chauri Chaura" incident. Gandhi was sentenced to six years of imprisonment (served only two years) because of the incident. After he was released from prison, Gandhi founded a newspaper, "Young India," which was brimming with reform proposals in favor of the rural population and lower classes of India's society (Tidrick 2006, 176–180).

New non-violent campaigns against colonial rule followed at the beginning of the 1930s when the Indian National Congress adopted its new political goal – the complete removal of British rule in India and the achievement of independence (*Purna Swaraj* – "complete self-rule"). These campaigns took place in 1930–1934, 1940–1941, and 1942, during the time when the conflict between the Congress and colonial authorities was at its peak. The last campaign, named "Leave India" – that was carried out in specific circumstances at the height of the Second World War – was the most successful one. The British were forced to accept the new reality and to guarantee ("sir Stafford Cripps Mission") that India would gain its full independence once the war was over. Two

¹ About relations between the Indian National Movement and Gandhi, see Singh 2009.

years after the war, British rule in India was over, and its full authority was transferred to the Indian National Congress.²

Gandhi's non-violent resistance movement was, to a large extent, conditioned by the specificities of India under British rule. Therefore, Gandhi was directing it and giving it specific goals. He correctly noticed that British rule largely depended on Indian collaboration and conciliation with the status quo. Gandhi was hoping that he would be able to educate the Indian population to recognize the weaknesses of colonial rule and to find enough courage and moral strength to withdraw its cooperation with the British and start building a new society based on its own culture and tradition. Because of that, Gandhi's final political goal – "Swaraj," was more than just an achievement of political independence: it was a call for moral transformation.

Gandhi was convinced that non-violent resistance was not just strengthening the position of his compatriots but that it also helped to achieve clear moral superiority over the British while at the same time undermining their authority in the eyes of both themselves and the entire international public. He had also concentrated all the awakened resistance energies toward agendas that could unite as many Indians as possible and avoid the possibility of turning them into violent acts. According to Brown: "Perhaps the greatest example of this was his choice in 1930 of the government salt monopoly as a universal issue and symbol of protest. He insisted that the movement should progress in controlled stages—from the protest by himself and hand-picked individuals in his famous Salt March to the coast at Dandi, western India, where he made salt on the seashore in the full glare of international press publicity—to a more generalized ritual of making salt illegally in small quantities around the country. Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal, commented with awe that the 'mastermind' had hit on such a simple but effective issue. 'The only wonder is that no one else ever thought of it.'" (Brown 2009, 51).

CHARACTERISTICS OF GANDHI'S *SATYAGRAHA*

The concept of *Satyagraha* was always much more than non-violent civil disobedience. Its content, expression, and goal show that Gandhi's *Satyagraha* was conceived as a contrast and an overcoming of the Western concept of "civil resistance." Some elements of Western

² For a more detailed insight into the final days of the history of the Indian struggle for independence, see: Markovits 2002, 367–386.

civil resistance surely influenced Gandhi (especially the teachings of Leo Tolstoy and Henry Thoreau), which he linked with the teachings of Ram Singh (the famous leader of the Kuka movement in Punjab in 1872) and turned to the Indian cultural and spiritual tradition (Parekh 2001, 43).

The very concept of *Satyagraha* (Sanskrit: सत्याग्रह *satyāgraha*) could be freely translated as “insistence in truth” or “holding onto truth” or “truth force.” It differs from “passive resistance” (which was considered the weapon of the weak and the strategy of the powerless against the powerful) because *Satyagraha* turns toward the search for Truth as a spiritual substance of both inner, contemplative, and outer, active part of Being (Majmudar 2005, 138). Passive resistance in Western civilization knows nothing of this inner search for the substance of Being and its relations with outer social activities. Gandhi emphasizes three essential characteristics of *Satyagraha*: “*Satyagraha* is a weapon of the strong; it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatsoever; and it ever insists upon truth. I think I have now made the distinction perfectly clear.” (Gandhi 1920). Gandhi embraced the metaphysical and moral ideal of Truth as the Ultimate reality and the basis of moral duty. According to Howard: “It is derived from the root ‘*sat*,’ which means to exist eternally. That which exists eternally is *Satya*, Truth, it can be nothing else.” (Howard 2013, 50). Gandhi took this concept from the Indian tradition and extended it to social and political realms, creating the core of his political vision – an ingenious combination of wisdom, morale, and politics. Gandhi, therefore, conceived *Satyagraha* primarily as an ascetic-religious accomplishment directed toward an external social change. Defined and inspired by the Indian spiritual tradition, Gandhi’s *Satyagraha* was also associated with two other Indian traditional practices: *brahmacharya* and *ahimsa* (Howard 2013, 81-122).

Gandhi sought *ahimsa* as the other face of Truth. He believed that the perfect vision of Truth could be achieved only by the complete realization of *ahimsa* – the total benevolence of being that was cleansed of all the violence (Howard 2013, 57). According to Howard: “It was the touchstone of Truth—the highest *dharma*—manifesting itself in compassion and goodwill. Moreover, *ahimsā* was not merely abstaining from violence, nor was it a political tool. It was comprised of supernatural potency. Anyone who has completely shed hatred and ill will, who has succeeded in making his life a perfect embodiment of Truth, can command everything in life. He does not have to ask that anything be done. He has only to wish and the wish will be fulfilled.” (Howard 2013,

58). Gandhi was convinced that the initiation of supernatural powers celebrated in Indian culture could enable an individual to defeat a powerful and unjust empire. According to Howard: “However, his approach to *ahimsā* as a political weapon differed from traditional praxis on four grounds: (1) stipulation for those who practice *ahimsā* to not merely do works of compassion or goodwill but to confront acts of violence; (2) the integration of a militaristic approach into *ahimsā*; (3) an expansion of the scope of *ahimsā* by directly relating it to other *yamas* (restraints or required disciplines of self-control); and (4) the evocation of *siddhi* (supernatural power) associated with observance of *ahimsā* for his non-violent movement” (Howard 2013, 59).

The second traditional practice that Gandhi embraced was *brahmacarya*. “Brahmacarya”, etymologically meaning divine conduct, is much more comprehensive than sexual control. It represents “self-control” of the highest type, as it includes the control of all senses and leads the way to *mokṣa* (liberation) (Howard 2013, 88-94). Even though Gandhi at times rendered *brahmacarya* as chastity or continence simply due to a lack of a direct equivalent in English, he understood it to be a transcending of all types of sensual pleasures. “*Brahmacarya* is a comprehensive principle of intense mental and spiritual discipline used to control the ever active senses and there by attain liberation (*mokṣa*) [...]. Gandhi was aware that *brahmacarya* has always been an indispensable component of the pursuit of spiritual freedom within the Indian traditions.” (Howard 2013, 88).

Gandhi considered that all these traditional approaches constituted a prerequisite for dealing with the major public issues (Howard 2013, 122-161). By their strict practice, Gandhi acquired the status of “Mahatma” (“great soul”) among the Indian religious masses. Before Gandhi, ascetic practices that were searching for spiritual freedom (*nivṛti*) and political activities represented two completely different orientations. In *Satyagraha*, for the first time, they were united.

By placing its starting point in the Indian tradition, *Satyagraha* looked at the success and achievement of political goals in a completely different way. Gandhi measured success not only by the level of achieved social and political freedom, but also by the level of spiritual self-realization. His view differed from those who saw their goal as defeating the opponent or, frustrating the opponent’s objectives, or meeting one’s own objectives no matter how the opponent wants to obstruct them. *Satyagraha* aims to convert, not to defeat the opponent. Confronted

with the *Satyagraha*, the opponent should lose his moral balance and be converted at least to stop obstructing the just end for this cooperation to take place. However, there are cases when the opponent, even ashamed, continues with his previous behavior and obstruction – the *satyagrahi* would count this as a partial success. Gandhi's *Satyagraha* sees means and ends as inseparable. It is contradictory to try to use unjust means to obtain justice or to try to use violence to obtain peace. Gandhi completely rejected the idea that injustice should, or even could, be fought against "by any means necessary": if you use violent, coercive, unjust means, whatever ends, you produce will necessarily embed that injustice. Because of that, all forms of civil disobedience and non-cooperation used in *Satyagraha* must be based on "the law of suffering" – teaching by which endurance of suffering is the main instrument to achieve the ultimate goal – moral renewal of individuals and society. Gandhi saw this approach not as a tactic in the current political situation but as a universal path for overcoming injustice and evil in general. Gandhi, therefore, taught his followers to comply with the principles of nonviolence; truth (this includes honesty, but goes beyond it to mean living fully in accord with and in devotion to that which is true); not stealing, non-possession (which is not the same as poverty; body-labor or bread-labor; control of the palate; fearlessness; equal respect for all religions; economic strategy such as boycott of exported good (*swadeshi*) (Gandhi 1961, 37). By combining these approaches, Gandhi wanted to create a collective spiritual power, a "mental power" – for him, the ideal State would be a direct result of means based on Truth, nonviolence, and adherence to the moral restraint that he practiced on a daily basis.

"COLOR REVOLUTIONS" AND THEIR MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

The "Color Revolutions" are a colloquial name for a series of *coup d'etat*'s carried out as civil protests in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the early 2000s. The term has also been applied to a number of revolutions elsewhere, including the Middle East and North Africa. One of the main characteristics of those political overthrows was the important role of non-governmental organizations and youth activists. By combining various forms of civic protest, from non/violent to violent ones, these revolts were aimed at destroying worn-out and corrupt regimes

that were branded as authoritarian. They were also based on promises of true democracy and a better life for all the citizens of these states.

The First true “Color Revolution” was Serbian “October the 5th”, when the regime of Slobodan Milošević was overthrown. After that, “The Revolution of Roses” in Georgia in 2003 and “The Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004 followed. Mass civil protests after controversial elections were common to all early “Color Revolutions” in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. All of the protests were strongly supported by students and youth organizations: first among them was the organization “Otpor” (Resistance) in Serbia, whose members have inspired and trained members of related student movements, including “Kmara” in Georgia, “Pora” in Ukraine and “Zubr” in Belarus (Michaud 2005). Behind the scenes, foreign sponsors who generously financed the non-governmental sector exerted significant influence upon the organization and implementation of the protests.

“Color Revolution” as a theoretical and practical instrument and its detailed implementation was studied by Gene Sharp (1928–2018), an American political scientist. Sharp’s revolution model was based on research on the fundamental nature of political power. His basic starting point was that there is no completely compact political power: power doesn’t stem from the intrinsic qualities of its main bearers but from the obedience of its subjects (Gajić 2018). Therefore, every political system is built around a structure that encourages obedience of the ruled population (Sharp 1973, 19). Every political structure has its specific institutions that impose obedience on its subjects, both oppressive as the regulatory ones (police, prosecution, judiciary) as well as those with cultural influence that inspire people’s subordination. Through the actions of these institutions, people are subjected to the systematic imposition of rules (and sanctions for their violation), with both rewards and penalties that promote their obedience (Gajić 2018). Without the obedience of the people, rulers are unable to exercise their political power (Sharp 2003, 19). This power consists of basic elements such as authority (acceptance of its legitimacy by the people), human resources (organized groups of assistants for the efficient exercise of power and the achievement of its main goals), material resources, and sanctions (Sharp 2003, 18–19). All of these elements of power depend on acceptance of the regime and the population’s willingness to submit (Sharp 2003, 19). If they refuse to obey, cease their cooperation, and start to resist the imposed order – political power can be effectively overthrown (Gajić 2018).

If there are those interested in overthrowing an authoritarian regime, Sharp points out, it is necessary to do four things: 1) to help subordinates stop obeying, 2) to assist them in strengthening their self-awareness and willingness to confront, 3) to encourage the ability of relatively more independent social groups and strata to rebel and 4) to create as strong as possible connection between different social groups interested in regimes downfall and to sketch common strategic plan of regime's overthrow (Sharp 2003, 7–8). The shaping of this plan is based on identifying the main weaknesses of each government, that is, its "Achilles heel" (Sharp 2003, 25), such as inner conflicts between regime's fractions; predictability based on a routine in the exercise of power and the lack of its imagination; shortage of quality staff and resources; poor communication between the top of the government and its lower echelons; blindness to the perception of real social problems due to ideological prejudices; internal institutional rivalries and poor coordination between competing institutions and persons that are running them; apathetic state of public opinion, growing skepticism and even hostility towards the top of the regime; the growth of antagonism between different regional, class, or national groups living within a single political system (Sharp 2003, 26–27), etc.

Gene Sharp thinks that political defiance to authoritarian regimes must have the following characteristics: "1) It does not accept that the outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the dictatorship. 2) It is difficult for the regime to combat 3) It can uniquely aggravate weaknesses of the dictatorship and can sever its sources of power 4) It can, in action, be widely dispersed but can also be concentrated on a specific objective 5) It leads to errors of judgment and action by the dictators 6) It can effectively utilize the population as a whole and the society's groups and institutions in the struggle to end the brutal domination of the few 7) It helps to spread the distribution of effective power in the society, making the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society more possible." (Sharp 2003, 29). Therefore a general strategy must be defined just as the strategies of separate campaigns aimed at achieving direct goals. Campaigns can use different methods. Gene Sharp has enumerated 198 different methods for the downfall of the targeted regime, from public appeals and symbolic acts, pressures on individuals, and various forms of economic, social, and political non-cooperation to the numerous non-violent actions – psychological, social, economic, and political ones.

Gene Sharp's doctrine of helping the oppressed minority to overthrow dictatorship developed very different, not-so-benevolent dimensions when practically applied. According to Ljepojević: "The main part of the preparation of the overthrow is the media: the management of the impressions, the production of false consciousness in the public opinion, the formation and imposition of a false social and political framework. Only when the terrain is prepared do revolutionaries, 'moles,' and mobilized infantry enter the stage. Jonathan Mowat described the technique of coup as classic warfare by other means. There is no need to send an army to another state if you can create your own army from its inhabitants through media and political manipulation. In the so-called revolution, only the Empire and 'revolutionaries' are those who profit, while people – in whose name the revolution is started -- are just a flock of sheep. Frustrated, impatient, and inexperienced youth is being used as infantry." (Ljepojević 2008, 9).

The realization of "Color Revolutions," therefore, has numerous precisely defined preparatory and implementation phases. The first preparatory phase starts with the positioning of NGOs (financed from foreign sources) in the "targeted" country. The establishment of a large number of NGOs that are dealing with social issues gives them the advantage of becoming potential generators of people's dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. These organizations are initially receiving great media attention that multiplies their relative strength and social significance. They declare themselves as a "civil society," even though they have not spontaneously emerged from the conditions in this society nor have much contact with it (Ljepojević 2008, 13). The second preparatory phase concerns the monopolization of the media space and the design of illusions ("creation of the carrot"). The main goal of NGOs is to provide political inclination of the critical part of the public through media influence. It is also very important that a part of society that is exposed to media influence start to believe in its propaganda and to hope for the defeat of the oppressive regime that will bring them alleged welfare (Ljepojević 2008, 15–19). The third preparatory phase aims for the recruitment of local exponents – people who are ready to cause disorder that will initiate a revolution. Their professionally directed negative energy is the main moving force of a revolutionary project. There are two kinds of people that are being recruited for the coup: opposition politicians who are striving for power and realization of their personal ambitions, and "street infantry" that gives "Color Revolution" an image of spontaneous

people rebellion. "Street infantry" consists of three groups: 1) "true believers" – media consumers of promised better post-revolutionary life 2) "paid supernumeraries" in cases when the number of "true believers" is insufficient 3) "strong arm of the coup" – trained hooligans ready for the occupation of the institutions and other important or symbolic objects (Ljepojević 2008, 19–22).

The fourth preparatory phase tends to transform media-presented public dissatisfaction into a practical realization of civil disobedience by personalization and demonization of the regime. Dehumanized and Manichean projection of "Enemy" pushes two polarized political groups toward a conflict in which one side will triumph, and the other will be completely defeated and removed (Ljepojević 2008, 22–23). The fifth preparatory phase consists of the production of constant tension that can cause escalation when the time is right (Ljepojević 2008, 23–24). According to Ljepojević: "Strategic dosing of provocations keeps the attention and concentration of the participants. And what is equally important - it causes the escalation of 'righteous wrath' and keeps the gathered masses in belligerent mood." (Ljepojević 2008, 25). The sixth phase represents the beginning of the realization of the coup. It starts with the gathering of dissatisfied masses in a media-friendly location from which they can publicly address the regime with their demands (Ljepojević 2008, 24–25).

Provoking the clashes represents the real beginning of an active phase of the revolution. Some real or fabricated malfeasances of the authorities are usually being used as the cause of the unrest. Then, the decisive blow ("Big Push") arrives in the form of a strong, massive assault that can bring about the collapse of the regime (Ljepojević 2008, 25). Then comes the last phase of the revolution: instrumentalization of the masses for the violent occupation of symbolic centers of power of the crumbling "Old regime" (Ljepojević 2008, 26–28). This spectacle is being constantly supported by the media, which are broadcasting the revolution. Some of the 198 Gene Sharp's revolutionary methods are being used as the most suitable in the given circumstances. Their realization is being managed by trained protesters followed by a violent, angry mob. Everything is prepared and designed by the proscribed technology of revolution: it is only necessary to implement the whole process by strictly following the instructions.

CONCLUSION: *SATYAGRAHA* AND “COLOR REVOLUTIONS” AS CONTRASTING FORMS OF CIVIL PROTEST

Gene Sharp carefully studied Gandhi's *Satyagraha*. He was very inspired by Gandhi when he theoretically formulated his non-violent methods of “Color Revolutions.” Nevertheless, those two forms of civil protests have very different characteristics, from their starting points to their final goals. We have already seen that Gandhi's *Satyagraha* found its inspiration almost completely in Indian pre-modern tradition and that it was led by India's religious ideals and ascetic praxis. Gandhi's insistence on truth was not just about objective consideration of the facts but also about reaching the foundations of existence in its inner dimensions. By contrast, Gene Sharp and his followers have an extremely negative and anti-spiritual relationship toward pre-modern traditions. They are standing on the very anti-essentialist position that disaffirms any inner qualities of both the individual and the community, and especially those connected with the authority. For them, both individual and collective identities are constructed and fluid: they mostly depend on the consensuses of individuals and their temporary interests. Even the facts about social reality are very relative and conditioned, and their “truthfulness” is just a result of arrangements and interpretations, both based on interests. New influences and new circumstances can change those interests and the nature of consensus; thus, all social constructs can be changed. Both theoreticians and practitioners of “Color Revolutions” have postmodern worldviews. Their relation toward reality is very skeptical and ironic: they refuse all universalities and “Grand narratives” that are suitable for the promotion of social changes. Instead, they point out phrases, inconsistencies, irrational performances, and marketing slogans; they have a relativistic relation toward all values; they reject the idea of teleological development and prefer current benefits.

Promoters of the doctrine of “Color Revolution” don't request examination of oneself or strife for moral improvement through self-renunciation and self-sacrifice from their followers. On the contrary, they encourage their followers' desires (that is the complete opposite of Gandhi's advocacy of restraint) while directing their frustrations and negative energy toward the authorities who are claimed to be fully responsible for it. They portray the regime as a Manichean evil, something totally opposed to the oppressed people. While Gandhi was searching

for the transformation of political opponents, for re-approaching and compromise, "color revolutionaries" – who see themselves as moral superiors – refused any cooperation, re-approach, and compromise with the authorities. Their demands are maximal; opponents are to be defeated and destroyed, not to be prepossessed. In spite of their refusal to value anything in accordance with traditional morality and its binary oppositions, postmodern European revolutions still create their new, instant binary oppositions: democratic/authoritarian, tolerant/discriminatory, liberal/subordinated, inclusive/exclusive. These are the motivation parameters for the voluntary actions of their votaries.

While Gandhi's *Satyagraha* gives absolute significance to non-violent methods as true means as the only certain way to true ends, non-violent methods in postmodern "Color Revolutions" are just instrumental, utilitarian – comprehended only for the deconstruction of the political system and legitimacy of previous authorities. If it's opportune – their postmodern ironic populism with deconstructionist performances on squares and streets will tear down its peaceful, non-violent mask, and trained professional revolutionaries will storm the most important institutions of the regime.

Satyagraha is inspired by the truth and refuses to gain by renouncing the truth. "Color revolutions," on the other hand, produce their "own" truth in accordance with their needs and for the achievement of their goals: for them, "truth" is just a tool for reaching success, not the reference point for evaluation of themselves and their political ends. They are not obliged to the truth. While Gandhi preaches renunciation of any possession, strictly avoiding theft – "colored revolutionaries" are driven by a desire for personal gain while they advocate material improvement of life. While Gandhi propagates physical work, abstaining from alcohol, and controlling one's own diet as the expression of personal discipline, the "Color Revolution" propagates licentiousness and indecency – both as a means and an end of processes of social transformation. *Satyagraha* promotes fearlessness, profound personal piety, and respect for other religions; postmodern revolutionaries advocate a high-minded self and contempt for opponents, agnosticism, and a jibe for all expression of true devotion, seen only as a form of "essentialist delusions" and narrow-mindedness. While Gandhi's ascetic techniques and methods of non-violent resistance are deeply related to true spiritual awakening and spirituality itself, European postmodern revolutions see all of their non-violent resistance methods just as a technology, utilitarianistically

aimed for the practical goal: power take-off. Revolutionary Images of future happiness are just objects of psychological manipulation, mere instruments of “conflict management.”

Therefore, we shouldn't be surprised that the outcomes of these two polarized approaches to civil protests are also completely different. Gandhi's *Satyagraha*, gradually but inevitably, led India to the path of decolonization, the acquisition of full political independence and freedom. In the decades after the achievement of independence, India was very successful in dealing with its social development, which intertwined its tradition with modern technological innovations. India has risen to the level of regional power that tends to become one of the main centers of power of the emerging multi-polar world. Countries whose people were seduced by “sweet promises” of postmodern “Color revolutions” inevitably fell into dependent, neocolonial status. All of their hopes for a better life turned out to be illusions, just as their belief in the rule of the majority and their vital interest being taken care of. One form of oligarchy was just replaced by the other, covered in discursive actions of the postmodern “brave new world.”

REFERENCES

- Brown, Judith. 2009. “Gandhi and Civil Resistance in India 1917–47: Key Issues.” In *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, eds. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, 43–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Rougemont, Denis. 1983. *Zapadna pustolovina čoveka*. Beograd: Niro „Književne novine”.
- Gajić, Aleksandar. 2018. „Gandijeva ‘satjagraha’ i obojene revolucije (2).” *Novi Standard*. Poslednji pristup 1. aprila 2025. <https://standard.rs/2018/04/18/gandijeva-satjagraha-i-obojene-revolucije-2/>
- Gandhi, Mahatma. 1961. *Non-violent Resistance (Satyagraha)*. New York: Barnes and Noble.
- Gandhi, Mahatma. 1920. “199. Letter to someone in Madanpalli.” dokumen. pub. Last accessed February 1, 2025. <https://dokumen.pub/the-complete-works-of-mahatma-gandhi-volume-19-19.html>
- Guénon, René. 1945. *Introductions to the study of Hindu Doctrines*. London: Luzac and Co.
- Guénon, René. 2001. *East and West*. Ghent NY: Sophia Perennis.
- Griffiths, Percival. 1952. *British Impact on India*. London: Macdonald.

- Howard, Weena. 2013. *Gandhi's Ascetic Activism: Renunciation and Social Action*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ljepojević, Milan. 2008. „Skidanje maski.” In: *Rušenje Republike Srpske: teorija i tehnologija prevrata*. Banja Luka: Besjeda.
- Majmudar, Uma. 2005. *Gandhi's Pilgrimage of Faith: From Darkness to Light*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Markovits, Claude. 2002. *A History of Modern India 1480-1950*. London: Anthem Press.
- Michaud, Hélène. 2005. “Roses, cedars and orange ribbons: A wave of non-violent revolution.” *Radio Netherlands*. <https://web.archive.org/web/20050701053305/http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/en/documentaries/050629doc?view=Standard>
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2001. *Gandhi*. New York: Sterling Publishing.
- Said, Edward. 2008. *Orijentalizam*. Beograd: XX vek.
- Singh, M. K, ed. 2009. *Encyclopaedia of Indian War of Independence (1857-1947), Gandhi Era Vol-13 (Mahatma Gandhi and National Movement)*. New Delhi: Anmol Publications.
- Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Non-violent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Sharp, Gene. 2003. *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. Boston: Albert Einstein Institute.
- Tidrick, Kathryn. 2006. *Gandhi: A Political and Spiritual Life*. Bainbridge: Taurus.

Александар Гајић*

Институт за европске студије, Београд

Љубиша Деспотовић**

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

ГАНДИЈЕВА „САТЈАГРАХА” И ЕВРОПСКЕ ПОСТМОДЕРНЕ РЕВОЛУЦИЈЕ***

Резиме

У раду се, полазећи од поређења индијске и европске цивилизације као „идеалтипских” оличења Истока и Запада, пажња фокусира на однос у овим цивилизацијама према могућностима пружања цивилног отпора у случају да је та власт нелегитимна и/или неправедна. Савремена западна наука придодаје Гандијево схватање низу заговорника ненасилног отпора који од Софокла преко Перси Шелија, Ештона Николаса, Хенрија Дејвида Тороа и Лава Толстоја води до Мартина Лутера Кинга, Вацлава Хавела, Леха Валенсе и Цина Шарпа. Полазећи од кратког прегледа настанка индијског покрета за независност и Гандијевог места у њему, прелази се на настанак и обликовање Гандијевог концепта *сатјаграхе* (постојаности у истини). Сатјаграха није била тек вид ненасилног грађанског отпора западног активистичког типа, већ његов контраст и превазилажење кроз окретање, уз одређене модификације, ка индијског верској традицији. Посматрајући *сатјаграху* пре свега као аскетско-религиозан подвиг који води од унутрашњег, личног преображујућег подвига ка оном спољном – ка друштвеној промени, рад обрађује њену везу са две индијске традиционалне праксе – са *брамачарјом* и *ахисмом*. У другом делу рада се детаљно обрађује феномен „обојених револуција” у источној Европи као врсте ненасилног преврата; уочавају се њихови видови, главне стратешке и тактичке одлике као и фазе реализације. Потом се, у завршном делу рада, врши компарација између индијског

* Имејл адреса: romero@eunet.rs; ORCID: 0000-0002-3873-0231

** Имејл адреса: despotlj@stcable.net; ORCID: 0000-0002-0473-2829

*** Овај рад је настао у оквиру научноистраживачке делатности Института за европске студије и Института за политичке студије, коју финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије.

вида грађанског отпора предвођеног Гандијем и „обојених револуција” извршених на основу теоријских и практичних препорука Џина Шарпа (*Gene Sharp*). При томе се јасно уочава контраст између ова два вида грађанског отпора; првог који се окреће традицији, који је прожет духовношћу и води ка ослобађању од колонијалног ропства, и другог, који је профан и антидухован, и који неминовно води у неоколонијалне видове поробљавања.

Кључне речи: Индија, Европа, Ганди, сатјаграха, обојене револуције, традиција, постмодернизам

* This paper was submitted on February 10, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

*Ivana Luknar**
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN THE ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE**

Abstract

Technological innovations intrigue the public and shape contemporary social dynamics. Modern society was created on the foundations of mega-changes. It is inherently complex to interpret as it undergoes constant transformation, making its analysis significantly more challenging. Modern society is dynamic, fluid, and networked into a complex and intertwined system of different contents and elements that cooperate with each other, overlap, and/or contradict each other. It is built and arises from the cooperation of various factors. Hence, a multidisciplinary approach was applied in this research paper. The primary purpose of the paper is to point out the importance of contemporary social dynamics, which are intensively changing under the influence of developed technology, especially under the influence of the development and application of artificial intelligence. This technology is perceived as the technology of the future and the technology that is the subject of intense global debate. The paper is structured into several chapters. After the introduction, the theoretical-methodological framework follows. Then, the next part of the paper is devoted to the interpretation of artificial intelligence from a sociological-political perspective. This technology is one of the key drivers of change in modern society and has the potential to dictate the pace of development of modern society. Therefore, the next chapter is devoted to the interpretation of contemporary social dynamics and the processes that laid the foundations for the emergence of modern society.

* E-mail: ivana.luknar@ips.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-4867-2263

** This paper was written within the research activity of the Institute for Political Studies, funded by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development, and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia.

The article also explains the processes that fueled the mega-changes in order to provide a comprehensive explanation of the current social dynamics. The value of a scientific article is reflected in the fact that it indicates the social effects of technology that have been reflected on a global level. Also, the paper encourages further interpretation of the researched topic, especially from the perspective of the application and further development of artificial intelligence.

Keywords: social dynamics, mega-changes, Fourth Industrial Revolution, artificial intelligence, machine learning

INTRODUCTION

Modern society stands apart from all previous societies in its social dynamics. Its primary characteristics are variability and evolvability, while the increasing use of artificial intelligence imposes the recognition of this technology as the most significant driver of change in the modern era. The technology of artificial intelligence intrigues both the scientific community and the global public due to its controversial “nature,” which arises from the wide range of uses and possible abuses of this technology. AI’s controversial nature is reflected in countless ethical, social, and economic dilemmas. Artificial intelligence has raised numerous questions and pointed to various challenges and problems (Luknar 2024a).

People around the world are increasingly relying on digital technologies to carry out various daily activities, business and private. Technological developments impose new requirements that indicate the need for continuous monitoring and adaptation to changes in the labor market. Apropos, the emergence, and application of new technological tools emphasize the need for the development of education and skills that are in line with modern market demands.

Individuals, as well as entire societies, strive to keep up with technological developments in order to maintain or improve their position. Among other things, numerous questions arise regarding safety, ethics, and legal regulation that can respond to and accompany current challenges. Hence, the interaction between humans and machines has become one of the central topics of interest and research. The interaction between humans and machines brings a change in social dynamics, so the fact is that the former support of a friend, teacher, or professional has been

replaced today by the Internet, Google, and various artificial intelligence tools. It is often claimed that this technology has the ability to change the world we live in. No current high-tech product intrigues the world public as much as this technology does, exactly because of the controversial effects that come from its application. Social dynamics have changed significantly under the influence of modern technologies. At the same time, with the development and increasing complexity of artificial intelligence algorithms, the complexity of risks continues to grow. A balance needs to be struck so that the use of artificial intelligence technology may serve the general social good. Otherwise, technological development will pave the way for technology giants to strengthen and assert their position and power by making profits through investing and patenting innovations and controlling large databases on a global scale. In this way, the technology of artificial intelligence can support totalitarianism, or rather the creation of its new form, the so-called “capillary totalitarianism”, which, with the development of superintelligence, can grow into “hyper totalitarianism” (Pejaković 2024, 83). Technology giants are harming equal distribution and raising doubts about data security and privacy. It is necessary to have international cooperation and consensus on this issue, as well as good coordination between the government and non-governmental sectors and developed citizens’ awareness on this matter.

We are living at a pivotal historical moment. As Kurzweil notes (Kurzweil 1999): “We are the last. The last generation to be unaugmented. The last generation to be intellectually alone. The last generation to be limited by our bodies. We are the first. The first generation to be augmented. The first generation to be intellectually together. The first generation to be limited only by our imaginations” (3). Contemporary social dynamics will determine the course of future development. The weight of our steps and decisions is heavy, as they will shape the future of humanity.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Interpreting social dynamics is a complex and challenging task. The primary goal of this research is to explain changes and current social dynamics primarily from the perspective of the application and development of artificial intelligence. The basic research problem in investigating this complex relationship is reflected in the complexity of

technology and its multiple effects, but also in the fact that contemporary society differs from all previous ones precisely because of technological development and a high degree of dynamism. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Philbeck and Davis 2018, 17–22), also known as “Industry 4” (Santos *et al.* 2018) and “The Second Machine Age” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) followed after the breakthrough of technological innovations that have the ability to connect to each other in a communication network by the Internet and have the epithet of smart devices because they enable technical connectivity with people and their environment. Industry 4.0 has revolutionized the perception of reality, as it has enabled, for the first time in the history of civilization, the expansion of reality through technology. In other words, it has merged the physical and biological world with the digital into a new form known as a “cyber-physical system” (Lee 2008, 363–369; Petrillo *et al.* 2018, 4). Further technological progress could inspire further and deeper connections between humans and machines (Bonciu 2017, 7–16). Examination of the research topic requires a good knowledge of social dynamics in the past and a clear understanding of current social dynamics, based on which predictions of social movements and key challenges can be made. Hence, a new scientific methodology is needed, one that can unify science and technology in its interpretation and has the potential to “accelerate the progress of science and technology, break the boundaries of existing disciplines, and be more insightful and predictable on the influence on various spaces” (Zhuge 2011, 1014) especially in terms of understanding the consequences and impact of technological progress on the various social systems that exist across the globe.

We can interpret contemporary social dynamics using various approaches. The first approach is humanistic, where the interpretation centers on man. According to this interpretation, it is necessary to direct the use of technology, technological innovation, development, and the entire social dynamics in such a way that they serve the common social good. The second approach is the technological approach, which is focused on the potential that technology possesses. This approach encourages the use and development of technology while leaving its social effects aside. However, the process of technological development in its entirety implies much more than machines, as it enables the creation of a comprehensive system that extends across almost all industrial branches, involving people and the storage of vast and diverse knowledge required to manage and operate machines, significant material investments, standardization

to save time, and an interconnected network of communication and consumption. The third approach to interpretation gives priority to economic factors, interpreting social dynamics in the era of artificial intelligence from the standpoint of better efficiency, effectiveness, and profit generation. The fourth approach, the legal-political one, points to the lack of normative and harmonized political stances regarding the development of artificial intelligence technology. This technology has been recognized as a strategic and economic goal across the globe. However, there are concerns in the international community about the ethical guidelines regarding the development and design of artificial intelligence technology. The most developed countries in the world are competing in the implementation and possession of the most advanced artificial intelligence tools. Therefore, we can rightly say that this technology is the creator of the present (Šuvaković 2024). The views of different countries on this issue are inconsistent and range from striving for free development to efforts to establish stricter control over the development and application of this technology. The fifth approach is the cause-and-effect approach, which involves uncovering patterns and mechanisms that reveal a multidimensional concept, in this case, social dynamics resulting from the application of artificial intelligence. The most comprehensive explanation of contemporary social dynamics is provided by an all-encompassing approach that incorporates elements of all the previously mentioned perspectives.

TECHNOLOGY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Artificial intelligence technology involves “any theory, method, and technique that helps machines (especially computers) to analyze, simulate, exploit, and explore human thinking process and behavior” (Yang 2019, 1). The foundation of artificial intelligence technology is machine learning. It is a process that allows a machine to acquire knowledge through data processing. In other words, this branch of artificial intelligence technology deals with the development of algorithms and models that enable computer systems to improve their performance and knowledge bases. Traditionally, there are three basic types of machine learning. The first is “supervised learning,” which involves training a model based on labeled data, while the second type, so-called “unsupervised learning,” is the model focused on discovering relationships, patterns, and structure in the data. The third model, “reinforcement learning,” develops through

interaction with the environment using a reward/punishment system (Ayodele 2010, 19). Therefore, by artificial intelligence technology, we mean a wide range of diverse technological tools. This technology is not easy to interpret, and we associate it with numerous controversies. It refers to a complex concept that serves to explain the technology that supports the operation of a wide variety of systems designed to carry out numerous activities such as transportation, diagnostics, proving mathematical theorems, writing text, playing games such as backgammon, chess, video games, etc.

Artificial intelligence technology is characterized by its diverse applications. Therefore, this technology eludes clear and precise boundaries and can be interpreted from the perspectives of various disciplines and methods. This contributes to its definition from various perspectives, which consequently creates numerous controversies and doubts associated with this concept. The most neutral definition provides an interpretation of this technology from a functionalist-technological perspective, where “the term artificial intelligence refers to techniques invented by humans to provide support and reliable services to users, optimize logistics, ensure an uninterrupted service delivery chain, improve fault diagnostics, and enable prediction and prevention.” (Luknar 2024b, 14). Essentially, artificial intelligence technology primarily serves to replace humans in performing a task, as well as in solving problems. The primary purpose of this technology is to mimic human reasoning, meaning to act and think like a human, using proven logic to achieve the best possible solutions and results based on available information (Ferrara, Laganà, and Merenda 2020, 21). Simply put, it is the ability of a computer to perform tasks efficiently.

Although it emerged as the product of decades of work and technology development in laboratories hidden from the public view, this technology has reached the public spotlight at a magical speed, almost suddenly and abruptly. The term artificial intelligence was first proposed by John McCarthy in 1956 at a conference organized at Dartmouth College (Moor 2006, 87). Artificial intelligence as we know it today, in its current form and performance, emerged only after decades of exponential growth in computing performance, digitalization, and increasing interest and investment in technological development. Digitalization has enabled the creation of large databases on which machine learning systems are fundamentally trained (Allen and Chan 2017, 7).

Artificial intelligence has largely become part of everyday social activities and life in the modern era. Predictions suggest that this technology will significantly shape our future (Kurzweil 1999; Klark 1999; Leonhard 2016; Luknar 2024b; Kisindžer, Šmit i Hatenloker 2022). Among authors, there is a consensus that this is a technology of the future, recognized as a power multiplier in today's society (Damnjanović 2012, 340). The breakthrough of this technology is driving competitive rivalry at all levels of social reality, internationally, regionally, and nationally. However, humanity, viewed globally, is not keeping pace with its development, primarily because legal regulations lag the development and implementation of this technology. Therefore, the opinions of authors around the world differ regarding the effects arising from the application of this technology on humanity. Moreover, humanity is striving to keep up with the development of artificial intelligence technology, which calls into question our ability to urgently address this issue and regulate its application and production according to the principle of general social utility.

DYNAMICS OF MODERN SOCIETY DRIVEN BY TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

We live in a dynamic era accompanied by numerous uncertainties. The dynamics of modern society are conditioned by mega shifts. Leonhard defines mega shifts as “exponential and simultaneous” (Leonhard 2016, 33) shifts that will systemically and irreversibly transform humanity. The contemporary world as we know it has been built on the foundations of globalization, multi-layered crises, and the Third and Fourth Industrial Revolutions (Luknar 2024c, 22–23).

The advancement of computer science, particularly the development of artificial intelligence, requires a fundamental transformation of modern society. The key driver of change in modern society, dictating its dynamics and pace of development, is technology (Leonhard 2016, 32). As Leonhard observes, advances in technology have brought our reality closer to the scenes of science fiction movies. In other words, technological development has triggered many significant changes.

The first mega-change is digitalization. The health crisis caused by COVID-19 accelerated digital transformation, particularly the shift of data into digital formats to facilitate quicker and more efficient communication and information processing for offering diverse services.

The development of digital tools has facilitated the expansion of digital transformation into systems with a wide range of uses, such as government administration systems, education, healthcare, entrepreneurship, television, entertainment, and more.

The second mega-change relates to mobilization and technology as a mediator. The dynamics of human communication are changing dramatically, as communication, due to the process of digitalization, is increasingly taking place in digital form. The complexity of social networks and digital communication requires careful consideration and understanding of these phenomena, as technology emerges as a mediator or intermediary in digital communication. Consequently, technology, or its systemic frameworks, significantly shapes the way we can communicate, consume information, and connect with others in the digital world.

The third mega-change is screenification. The visual presentation of text and messages has the potential to lead to changes in behavior, particularly among young people. These effects are short-term and occur immediately after exposure to specific video content. It is not easy to identify the mechanisms through which mass media influence human psychology and behavior. The impact of social networks and other mass media on an individual depends on numerous factors, such as personal characteristics and experiences, the realism of the content, the degree of identification with an online profile or digital community to which the individual belongs, and more. However, continuous long-term exposure to a specific type of video content can produce a significant socio-psychological effect. For example, a study utilizing a psycho-semantic technique with a 25 indicators scale specifically designed to assess attitudes toward older adults found a significant shift in students' attitudes after they watched a movie (Kubrak 2020).

The fourth mega-change involved the rejection and cessation of the need for mediation. Technological development has simplified business processes to achieve faster and greater system efficiency, enabling the establishment of a direct connection without any mediation between the user and the provider of the product/service. This has significantly reshaped numerous industrial branches and sectors, enabling companies to overcome earlier forms of business operations through technologies such as online platforms, blockchain, and artificial intelligence. In the modern business world, companies often use artificial intelligence algorithms to provide personalized experiences to their users based on collected and analyzed data, as well as to remain competitive in the market. However,

this shift raises concerns about data privacy and security, as well as growing inequality, as the dynamics of power are shifting in favor of technologically advanced companies.

The fifth change is a mega-transformation that builds upon the previously mentioned changes. Numerous benefits of technology serve as the fuel for this transformation, driving its ever-increasing scale, while the application of technology continues to gain unstoppable momentum not only in the field of business but also in almost all societal segments. Technology was primarily designed to neutrally perform the function for which it was created. However, modern technologies undoubtedly “can play a key role in restructuring major social relationships – interpersonal, intergroup and institutional” (Kling 1991, 344). For example, technology enables the manipulation of information in the interest of its commissioners. In other words, it is inherently shaped by the worldview, biases, and intentions of its creators. The design, capacity, prices, and overall development of technology are influenced by dominant social groups and/or tech giants, those whose interests prevail. The struggle for power and competition are catalysts for the increasingly rapid development of technology. Technological tools have the potential to reinforce existing power structures and deepen inequality. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain a critical stance toward technological development and ensure that further progress aligns with ethical guidelines.

The sixth mega-change is the expansion of intellectual capabilities to machines. It involves the creation of machines that demonstrate a certain degree of intelligence, meaning they are capable of performing tasks modeled after humans. Such machines exhibit a certain level of reasoning and pattern recognition and can learn, make decisions, and process language. Artificial intelligence technology can be weak, designed to perform specific tasks, such as sorting/recognizing defects in a production line, or strong, resembling human intelligence.

The seventh mega-change followed the expansion of artificial intelligence technology functions. Automation has replaced humans, particularly in routine, physically demanding jobs. This has led to changes in the labor market, where the demand for skilled personnel specializing in data analysis, system maintenance, and the development of AI and innovations is growing. The effects are twofold. On the one hand, we have improved efficiency, reduced costs, and the stimulation of innovation and development in general. On the other hand, the gap is widening between those who possess outdated knowledge and skills and those

who have new, in-demand skills. Additionally, the gap between the rich and the poor is deepening. Economically underdeveloped regions do not possess modern technological tools. They struggle to acquire them and cannot afford them. As a result, their knowledge lags behind, while the wealthy further solidify their position of power. Negative social effects have been observed, such as reduced human interactions due to the use of virtual assistants and chatbots, the emergence of new forms of social deviance (Luknar 2025), and an increased risk of privacy violations and potential misuse of data collected for analysis.

The eighth mega-change relates to virtualization, or the “creation of a non-physical digital version” (Luknar 2024b, 43) of reality. In modern society, individuals do not only leave physical traces on their environment but also emit virtual signals through radio frequencies transmitted by their smart devices (mobile phones, watches, and other smart gadgets). The virtual environment is easy to manipulate and experiment with, as it is highly adaptable and can be modified according to user preferences. Virtual reality has proven to be effectively applicable for therapeutic purposes in treating mental illnesses. Despite its advantages, virtual reality cannot replace physical reality. Simulated environments and situations mimic events from the real world and can be particularly helpful in treating phobias and compensating for the shortage of mental health professionals. Modern technologies enable specialists to participate in remote diagnosis and therapy while also helping to quickly identify deviations from reference values, significantly reducing the time required for doctors to diagnose certain conditions. Additionally, technological development has contributed to the creation of various technological aids used for monitoring users’ health. Leonhard considers virtualization a crucial driver of conflict between humans and technology, as humans adopt virtual reflections either through the uploading of their brain activity or through technological upgrades with microchips (Leonhard 2016).

The next mega-changes followed the processes of robotization and the use of artificial intelligence algorithms for predictions (the process of anticipation). Robotization in various industrial sectors, particularly in the automotive industry, medicine, agriculture, trade, and logistics, has proven to be an efficient solution that can replace humans in physically demanding and life-threatening tasks. These changes are especially noticeable in the most technologically advanced countries, while in less developed countries, the transformation largely occurs behind the scenes through the process of digitalization and automation in industry,

to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the level of economic and technological development of the country.

The dynamics of modern society are difficult to grasp. They easily escape the observer's eye as they change every moment under the influence of numerous factors. Unlike earlier societies, modern society has been marked by a new reality (Luknar 2021, 226–228) and, to the greatest extent, fear that arises as a consequence of uncertainty, fluidity, and information overload in contemporary society (Luknar 2023). The 21st century is primarily defined by evolution driven by technological development. Although today's society possesses a certain degree of elasticity, numerous factors are at play that determine the success of development (economic, institutional, technological, legal, and even cultural). Modern technologies, especially artificial intelligence, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and renewable energy, require rapid adaptation across all societal segments. Earlier processes that shaped society and its primary patterns were long-lasting and supported gradual transformation. This is not the case in the contemporary digital age, where urgent response and adaptation at the level of fundamental societal frameworks are required.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A NEXUS OF POWER

Countries are investing significant resources in the development and enhancement of their technological capabilities. Advanced technologies have brought new methods of warfare and the depersonalization of war practices due to the use of drones and robots (Korać 2019). Particularly, artificial intelligence technology is perceived as a means to gain an advantage in political and military conflicts. The increasing use of technology in political and military operations has become a more significant aspect of interstate conflicts. Governments use various technological tools to infiltrate and obtain confidential information from their adversaries. Additionally, digital information can serve as a tool for manipulation, as it has the ability to influence public opinion, shape political narratives, and ultimately affect election outcomes. Artificial intelligence technology and other digital tools are used not only to achieve economic gain but also to gain strategic advantages in diplomatic negotiations and military operations. The use of advanced technological capabilities highlights the need to address ethical and legal issues. Trust in modern technologies, including artificial intelligence, is decisively

influenced by the ability of humans to regulate modern technological tools and manage risks.

Due to concerns about potentially undesirable consequences and to prevent the escalation of conflicts, the countries of the European Union have adopted the Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation 2024/1689). This Act assigns applications of AI to three risk categories: unacceptable risk, high-risk applications, and applications that are not expressly prohibited or classified as high-risk. Although this law needs to keep pace with technological developments actively, it is the first step in regulation on the European continent. The United States is also focused on the development of artificial intelligence technology and is encouraging the development and application of this technology as a primary economic and security goal (Trump White House Archives, n.d.). Additionally, the U.S. has restricted the export/import of advanced technologies to China. China is also focused on researching, developing, and commercializing artificial intelligence. Its goal is to become a global leader in the development of the next generation of this technology by 2030 (China Association for International Science and Technology Cooperation [CAISTC], 2017). In Shanghai, the Zhangjiang industrial-technological park (China Daily 2019) has been opened, dedicated to the development of this technology and the implementation of comprehensive research and testing. Russia has also presented artificial intelligence technology as a strategic goal (Президент России 2019). Serbia is the first country in the Southeast Europe region to publish and adopt the Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in 2019 (Strategija razvoja veštačke inteligencije). In 2020, the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) was established, with its primary focus being the responsible use of artificial intelligence and data management (GPAI, n. d.). Serbia is actively involved as a member of the Alliance for AI Governance (Blic 2023) and is currently the chairing member of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (Tanjug 2024). The Artificial Intelligence Development Strategy (2025-2030) builds upon the 2019 policy framework in Serbia, with the objective of accelerating AI deployment across education, science, economy, and public services while ensuring data protection and information security laws. Serbia has also adopted ethical guidelines for responsible AI development and use. Although these guidelines are not legally binding, they highlight the need for a regulatory framework. Current efforts focus on preparing for the adoption and enforcement of the Artificial Intelligence Act.

Artificial Intelligence technology is a focal point where structures of power intersect. There is an increasing need for international collaboration and agreements to establish norms and guidelines for the application of artificial intelligence technology, especially in military operations. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an awareness of this issue, as well as the readiness of society and all its members and institutions to adopt new paradigms. Societal dynamics must be directed toward actively addressing all challenges arising from the application and development of artificial intelligence technology. Otherwise, this technology risks escaping societal control.

REFERENCES

- Allen, Greg, and Taniel Chan. 2017. *Artificial Intelligence and National Security*. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- Ayodele, Taiwo. 2010. "Types of Machine Learning Algorithms." In *New Advances in Machine Learning*, ed. Yagang Zhang, 19–48. Rijeka: InTech.
- Blic. 2023. „Srbija postala članica Alijanse upravljanja veštačkom inteligencijom.” *Blic*. 18. novembar 2023. <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/srbija-postala-clanica-alijanse-upravljanja-vestackom-inteligencijom/ywjnxwy>
- Bonciu, Florin. 2017. "Evaluation of the Impact of the 4th Industrial Revolution on the Labor Market." *Romanian Economic and Business Review* 12 (2): 7–16.
- Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Andrew McAfee. 2014. *The Second Machine Age. Work, Progress and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies*. New York, London: W.W. Norton Company.
- China Association for International Science and Technology Cooperation [CAISTC]. 2017. "China Science & Technology Newsletter: Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan Issued by State Council, China's Strengths Creates Innovation Miracles." Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Finland. 17. September 2017. <http://fi.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxjs/201710/P020210628714286134479.pdf>
- China Daily. 2019. "Zhangjiang Aisland." *Pudong Shanghai*. Updated April 10, 2019. http://english.pudong.gov.cn/2019-04/10/c_353901.htm

- Damnjanović, Ivana. 2012. „Terorizam i tehnologija.” U *Terorizam kao globalna pretnja*, ur. Željko Bjelajac i Mina Zirojević Fatić, 340–352. Beograd: Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe/Novi Sad: Centar za bezbednosne studije.
- Ferrara, Massimiliano, Iside Rita Laganà, and Domenica Stefania Merenda. 2020. “Hybrid Fuzzy Differential System and Artificial Neural Networks: Some Issues in Economics.” In: *Economic and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence*, eds. Domenico Marino and Melchiorre A. Monaca, 15–22. Cham: Springer.
- Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence [GPAI]. n. d. “The Global Partnership of Artificial Intelligence.” *Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence*. Last accessed on February 22, 2025. <https://gpai.ai/>
- Kisindžer, Henri, Erik Šmit, i Danijel Hatenloker. 2022. *Doba veštačke inteligencije i naša ljudska budućnost*. Beograd: Klub Plus.
- Klark, Artur. 1999. *2001: Odiseja u svemiru*. Beograd: Kontrast.
- Kling, Rob. 1991. “Computerization and social transformations.” *Science, Technology and Human Values* 16 (3): 342–367. DOI: 10.1177/016224399101600304
- Korać, Srđan. 2019. *Disciplinsko ratovanje u doba dronova i robota*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.
- Kubrak, Tina. 2020. “Impact of Films: Changes in Young People’s Attitudes after Watching a Movie.” *Behavioral Sciences* 10 (5): 86. DOI: 10.3390/bs10050086
- Kurzweil, Ray. 1999. *The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence*. New York: Viking Press.
- Lee, Edward. 2008. “Cyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges.” In *11th IEEE International Symposium on Object and Component-Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing (ISORC)*, ed. Steven Mayers, 363–369. Orlando: IEE Computer Society.
- Leonhard, Gerd. 2016. *Technology vs. Humanity. The coming clash between man and machine*. United Kingdom: Fast Future Publishing.
- Luknar, Ivana. 2021. “Social Implications of the internet in new reality due to COVID-19.” *Srpska politička misao* 72 (2): 225–235. DOI: 10.22182/spm.7222021.10
- Luknar, Ivana. 2023. „Sociokulturna konceptualizacija straha.” *Srpska politička misao* 79 (1): 143–161. DOI: 10.5937/spm79-42727
- Luknar, Ivana. 2024a. “Artificial intelligence as a challenge.” *Progress. Journal for political theory and practice* 5 (2): 17–24. DOI: 10.5937/napredak5-52577

- Luknar, Ivana. 2024b. *Veštačka inteligencija. Izazovi i mogućnosti*. Beograd: Medija centar Odbrana.
- Luknar, Ivana. 2024c. „Vojni poziv kao profesija.” U *J(N)A i izazovi vojnog profesionalizma 1945–1992*, ur. Tatjana Milošević, 13–33. Beograd: Institut za strategijska istraživanja.
- Luknar, Ivana. 2025. “Social deviation and technology.” *Sociološki pregled* (u pripremi za štampu).
- Moor, James. 2006. “The Dartmouth College Artificial Intelligence Conference: The Next Fifty Years.” *AI Magazine* 27 (4): 87–91. DOI: 10.1609/aimag.v27i4.1911
- Pejaković, Marko. 2024. “Artificial intelligence and totalitarianism.” *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke* 119 (1): 83–101. DOI: 10.5937/adpn2401083P
- Petrillo, Antonella, Fabio De Felice, Raffaele Cioffi, and Federico Zomparelli [Petrillo *et al.*]. 2018. “Fourth Industrial Revolution: Current Practices, Challenges, and Opportunities.” In: *Digital Transformation in Smart Manufacturing*, eds. Antonella Petrillo, Raffaele Cioffi and Fabio De Felice, 1–20. Rijeka: InTech.
- Philbeck, Thomas, and Nicholas Davis. 2018. “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Shaping a New Era.” *Journal of International Affairs* 72 (1): 17–22.
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 13 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance), PE/24/2024/REV/1, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>
- Santos, Beatrice, Alberto Agostinho, Tânia Daniela Felgueiras Miranda Lima, and Fernando Manuel Bigares Charrua-Santos [Santos *et al.*]. 2018. “Industry 4.0 Challenges and Opportunities.” *Revista Produção E Desenvolvimento* 4 (1): 111–124. DOI: 10.32358/rpd.2018.v4.316
- Strategija razvoja veštačke inteligencije u Republici Srbiji za period 2020–2025. godine, [Strategija razvoja veštačke inteligencije], „Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije”, br. 96/2019-5.

- Šuvaković, Uroš. 2024. „Kreator sadašnjosti u pokušaju da razume budućnost ili o onome što možemo ubrojati, ali ne na to i svesti, Kisindžerovo nasleđe.” *Časopis za političku teoriju i praksu: Napredak* 5 (2): 129–150. DOI: 10.5937/napredak5-52859
- Tanjug. 2024. „Srbija predsedavajuća Globalnog partnerstva za veštačku inteligenciju. Vučić: Veličanstvena vest.” *RT*. 7. mart 2024. <https://lat.rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/79444-srbija-predsedavajuci-gpai-vestacka-inteligencija/>
- Trump White House Archives. n. d. “Artificial Intelligence for the American People.” *Trump White House Archives*. Poslednji pristup 22. februar 2024. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ai/>
- Yang, Lu. 2019. “Artificial intelligence: a survey on evolution, models, applications and future trends.” *Journal of Management Analytics* 6(1): 1–29. DOI: 10.1080/23270012.2019.1570365
- Zhuge, Hai. 2011. “Semantic linking through spaces for cyber-physical-socio intelligence: A methodology.” *Artificial Intelligence* 175: 988–1019. DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2010.09.009
- Президент России. 2019. „О развития искусственного интеллекта (ИИ) в Российской Федерации.” *Президент России*. 10. октобар 2019. <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/AH4x6HgKWA-NwVtMOfPDhcbRpvdlHCCsv.pdf>

Ивана Лукнар*

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

ДРУШТВЕНА ДИНАМИКА У ЕРИ ВЕШТАЧКЕ ИНТЕЛИГЕНЦИЈЕ**

Резиме

Технолошке иновације интригирају јавност и обликују савремену друштвену динамику. Савремено друштво је настало на темељима мегапромена. Међутим, садашње друштво је комплексно за тумачење обзиром да није достигло своју финалну форму. Оно је динамично, флуидно, умрежено у комплексан и испреплетен систем различитих садржаја и елемената који садејствују једни са другима, преклапају се и/или противрече. Оно се гради и произилази из садејства различитих фактора. Отуда је за тумачење истраживане теме примењен мултидисциплинаран приступ. Примарна сврха рада је да укаже на значај савремене друштвене динамике која се под утицајем развијене технологије интензивно мења, нарочито под утицајем развоја и примене вештачке интелигенције. Ова технологија је перципирана као технологија будућности и технологија око које се ломе копља у међународној заједници. Рад је структуриран у неколико поглавља. Након уводне речи, следи теоријско-методолошки оквир. Затим је следећи део чланка посвећен тумачењу технологије вештачке интелигенције из социолошко-политиколошке перспективе. Ова технологија је један од кључних покретача промена у савременом друштву и има потенцијал да диктира темпо развоја савременог друштва. Стога је наредно поглавље посвећено тумачењу савремене друштвене динамике и процесима који су поставили темеље за настанак савременог друштва. У чланку су такође образложени процеси који су подстакли мегапромене, како би пружили свеобухватно образложење актуелне друштвене динамике. Вредност научног чланка се огледа у томе што указује на друштвене ефекте технологије који су се одразили на глобалном нивоу. Такође, научни

* Имејл адреса: ivana.luknar@ips.ac.rs; ORCID: 0000-0003-4867-2263

** Овај рад је настао у оквиру научноистраживачке делатности Института за политичке студије, коју финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије.

чланак подстиче даље тумачење истраживане теме нарочито из перспективе примене и даљег развоја вештачке интелигенције.

Кључне речи: друштвена динамика, мегапромене, четврта индустријска револуција, технологија вештачке интелигенције, машинско учење

* This manuscript was submitted on February 22, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

*Sanja Šuljagić**
Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

ON THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO A WESTERN COLONIAL CAMPAIGN IN THE BALKANS IN THE 19TH CENTURY**

Abstract

In this paper, the subject of research is the cause of insufficient support of the Russian Empire to Serbian and other Balkan insurgents during the establishment of the modern geopolitical constellation in the Balkan Peninsula in the nineteenth century. The objective of the research is to prove that the cause of the insufficient support of the Russian Empire to the Balkan insurgents in that period was the ideological and geopolitical subordination of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire to the Western colonial campaign on the Balkan Peninsula in the same period. By applying analytical-synthetic and comparative methods, it is shown that the ideological and geopolitical subordination of the policy of the Russian Empire to Western political and economic interests became noticeable in the period after the Russian Empire had begun to represent an obstacle to commercial aspirations of European trading companies towards India and the Far East. From that time onwards, anti-Russian propaganda began in England and European states, and later also military and non-military campaigns by representatives of European states against the Russian Empire. As a consequence of the Western agenda of “penetration to the East,” in 1815, after the Congress of Vienna, the influence of the Russian

* E-mail: sanja.suljagic@ips.ac.rs

** This paper was written within the research activity of the Institute for Political Studies, funded by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development and Innovation of the Republic of Serbia.

Empire on the geopolitical constellation of the Balkan Peninsula was overshadowed by European political interests.

Keywords: Karl Nesselrode, Karadorde, Ioannis Kapodistrias, modern Serbia, modern Greece

In the geopolitical context, a process of subordinating Russian foreign policy to “Western” colonial project in the nineteenth century was linked to three colonial projects of Western historians, philologists, and politicians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this sense historians and political scientists mention a project of a German historian August von Schlözer to “expand Austria to the Black Sea and make Vienna the center of Slavic studies,” a joint British-German project to form a modern Greek state as “an extended Bavarian state all the way to the Aegean Sea” and a plan of British Prime Minister John Palmerston to prevent Russian access to the Bosphorus (Vidmar 2009, 275–276; 306; 307; 309; Gourgouris 1996; Athanassoglou-Kallmyer 2008; Milich 2000, 32; 33; 35–37; 39–40; Chisholm 1911, 647). These projects provided the creation of modern pseudo-states in the Balkan peninsula in the latter half of the 19th century, resulted in a joint British-German project to create modern pseudo-states² in the Balkan Peninsula in the second half of the nineteenth century by foreign ministers of Austria and Austria-Hungary Agenor Golukhovsky and Jules Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian general Friedrich Beck, and the Venetian-British diplomat Edmund Grimani Hornby (Šuljagić 2024, 95–96). In line with these projects, Bavarian philologists and historians Friedrich Wilhelm von Tirsch and Jakob Fallmerayer wrote a new grammar of Greek language and historiography of Greek people and members of the Welf-Hanover dynasty and its lateral branches and dynasties of Saxeburg-Gotha, Wittelbach, and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen were enthroned as rulers of

¹ By the term “West,” the author means a historical genesis of political development of “Old/New Rome” in the transatlantic area of the world.

² The creation of such Balkan states in the latter half of the 19th century was planned by ministers of foreign affairs of Austria and Austro-Hungary Agenor Goluhovsky and Julia Andrasi, Austro-Hungarian general Friedrich Beck and Venetian-British diplomat Edmund Hornby, which gave the ground for the thesis of a political scientist and politician Strobe Talbott regarding the history of “the fragmentation of the Balkan Peninsula into a series of pseudo-states” (Talbott 2009, 320; Šuljagić 2024, 95–96).

modern Balkan-Black Sea states (Benes 2008, 181; Thiersch 1833, i–xx; Leeb 1996, 113–114; Danforth 1984, 53–85). Thus, the German-British or European support for the survival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula under the control of the members of the Welf-Hanover dynasty and its lateral branches was further formalized in order to prevent the presence of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula (Ingle 1976, 27; 40–41).

ON THE GEOPOLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR PREVENTING THE RENOVATION OF THE SLAV-EASTERN ROMAN ORTHODOX UNION

When it became clear that the power of the Ottoman Turkish Empire had begun to weaken in the Balkan Peninsula, some European politicians and intellectuals became involved in preventing the restoration of pre-Ottoman theodulia states³ of the Orthodox peoples in the Balkan-Black Sea region. Even before the formation of modern post-Ottoman states in this region with Western and pro-Western rulers, the transformation of medieval identities of the Balkan peoples became obvious. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there became obvious imposition of Western philosophy, legal sciences, politics, theology, letters, calendar, and new forms of state administration and historiography into educational programs of modern Balkan and Black Sea states under the patronage of the British, Habsburg, Bavarian, and Prussian rulers and their foreign and state employees – agents (Vidmar 2009, 237–239).⁴ The Western “reformist” policies, which began to destroy traditional national identities in the Balkans during this period as part of the European powers’ push eastward toward Russia and the markets of the Middle East and India, were supported by historiographical and archaeological schools from major European states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and even by North American Protestant missionaries operating in the Balkans during this period (Athanassoglou-Kallmyer 2008; Brooks 2015, 25–28;

³ Theodulia (gr. “Theodul” – God’s servant) implied the unity of spiritual (sacral) and state government. Emperor Justinian was called the emperor who obeys God’s Commandments who is just and fair, as stated by Novellae VI in the emperor Justinian’s law (*Corpus Iuris Civilis*) (Šuljagić 2014b, 1; Šuljagić 2020, 289; 416).

⁴ As early as the late eighteenth century, various French, British, and German artists and intellectuals, acting in accordance with the plans of politicians from their own states, contributed to the concept of creating a neo-pagan Hellenic identity in the Balkan Peninsula that was later applied in political practice in the nineteenth century (Ricks and Magdalino 1998; Gourgouris 1996).

Marchand 1996, 92; Kaplan 2006, 101–103; Kienholz 2008). The dominant ideology of Western Europe in this process was based on the ideas of the British philosopher John Locke on the secularization of the state and Venetian Republic councilor Paolo Sarpi⁵ on keeping the people in the colony ignorant and poor.

Due to the need for trade across the Balkan Peninsula, as well as the Ottoman Turks' fear of Central European and Balkan Slavic peoples getting united into a kind of "Orthodox Slavic bloc" in the struggle between the Habsburgs in the west and the Ottoman Turks in the south, and after Serbs with their Patriarchs massively emigrate from Old Serbia to the north of the Balkan Peninsula during turbulent war events in 1690 and 1737, representatives of the Ottoman Porte sent so-called "Phanariote" priests as "representatives of the Greeks" to Orthodox Christian churches in the Balkan-Black Sea region. Serbian clergy in Serbia was replaced by the "Phanariote" priests who, through the process of "Hellenization," began to change the sacred liturgy and local from the Church Slavonic language to Greek. The financial dealings of the Phanariots, their unchristian behavior, and their attempt to impose the "Greekization" of the Slavic Christian Orthodox churches caused strong resistance among the local Slavic population towards the "Greek priests" (Temperley 1919, 163; McKay and Scott 2014, 176).⁶ Aided by the Ottoman Porte, the Phanariotes attempted to change the canonical status of the early Christian Orthodox Church, and they even influenced the abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć in 1766 and Ohrid Archbishopric in 1767 (Slijepčević 1938, 250–307). In this way, the Phanariots severely damaged the spiritual and cultural identity of the Serbs in this area until 1920, when the Patriarchate of Peć was officially restored (Jovičić 1867, 357–359). The Phanariots were financially connected with certain

⁵ Venetian diplomat and theologian Paolo Sarpi, who largely influenced Northern American politicians with his ideas of republicanism and colonialism, used to claim that Venetia succeeded in keeping local people in Dalmatia colonized "by keeping them ignorant" (Hendrickson 2013; Baerlein 2022).

⁶ The resistance of the local Balkan-Black Sea population to the Phanariots was so strong that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the uprisings against Ottoman rule, the Wallachian-Moldavian rebels considered themselves occupied not only by the Ottoman Turks but also by the Phanariots. However, the aforementioned Phanariots were not members of the ethnic Greek elite but mostly ethnically diverse representatives of the "cultural capital" of the Ottoman Turkish Empire on the Balkan Peninsula in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Philliou 2008, 665).

merchants from Greece who traded with the employees of the British trading company “Levant”⁷ and who established trade relations with representatives of the City of London, forming their branches/agencies from Odessa on the Black Sea, through the Mediterranean ports, to London in the second decade of the nineteenth century. It was also the British diplomat David Urquhart who was connected to these merchants as well as to the bankers from London City (Andrews 1964; Chatziioannou and Harlaftis 2007, 27). Through his cooperation with the Serbian prince Miloš Obrenović during the nineteenth century, the diplomat Urquhart managed to distance Serbia from, in his words, “Asian Pan-Slavism of St. Petersburg” and to include her in a cultural circle of England and France (Batakovic 1994, 157–183; Chatziioannou and Harlaftis 2007, 26–27). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Phanariots had their agents in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this regard, during the First Serbian Uprising, a leader of Serbian insurgents Đorđe Petrović “Karađorđe,” complained that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sending to Serbia “only the Tsintsari-Grkovlachs, associated with the Phanariots, as their envoys” (Novaković 2018, 24–29). One such envoy of the Russian Empire to the Balkan Peninsula was Konstantin Rodofinikin, who, according to the testimony of the then reformer of traditional Serbian language and letters Vuk Karadžić during his stay in Serbia, openly announced the disappearance of the Serbian people from the world political scene (Karadžić 1969, 76).

During the uprisings of the Balkan peoples against Ottoman Turkish rule, the Congress of Vienna was held in 1815. After the Congress of Vienna, it became noticeable that Russia was taking actions in the eastern Mediterranean under British command and also that the politicians who gathered at this congress ignored the non-European world when deciding on various global geopolitical issues, including the resolution regarding the so-called “Eastern Question” (Osterhammel 2015, 473).⁸

⁷ *The Levant Company's* officers were prominent members of commercial and financial nomenclature, such as Nathan Rothschild or John and Robert Gladstone. Their representatives to the Ottoman Turks were British consular representatives such as David Urquhart, who were involved in the diplomatic resolution of the “Eastern Question” (Wood 1964, 195; Prousis 2008).

⁸ Political scientist Lyndon Larouche (2018) believes that “from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 up to present day, decisions of all significant world congresses have been made by members of the Welf-Hanover dynasty and descendants of the owners of medieval slave-owning and trading companies from Venice, Genoa and Padua, as well as by the members of family financial trusts from London and

In the period before the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the director of the Vienna Library, Bartholomäus Kopitar, and industrialist Sigmund Zois Freiherr von Edelstein from Trieste agreed to create a common “Serbo-Croatian” language on the Balkan Peninsula and “modify and approximate the Cyrillic script to the Latin script,” and the purpose of such a reform was an “Austro-Slavic vision of unifying Slavic peoples through the letters and language, in accordance with Austria’s foreign policy and for the purpose of transferring the Balkan Orthodox peoples, who had until then been exposed to the influence of Russian and Ottoman Turkish culture, to European Roman Catholic culture and under the patronage of the Habsburg monarchy” (Ivić 1926, 262–263; Dobrašinović 1980; Vidmar 2009, 233; 237).⁹ The director of the Vienna Court Library, Bartolomej Kopitar, expressed satisfaction with the Congress of Vienna, which, in his words, “provided a good precondition for the implementation of Slavic Latin alphabet in the Balkan Peninsula” (Vidmar 2009, 237; 270; 275).¹⁰ According to the project of Bartolomej Kopitar in the nineteenth century, the linguistic reform of the Serbian letters and language in

Rotterdam as the ‘winners’ of the Congress of Vienna in 1815.” According to Lyndon Larouche, the “winners” of the Congress of Vienna managed to impose imperial hegemony of British empiricism in historiography, legal sciences, and political economy in modern academic institutions around the world and so since then the advocacy of “free markets and natural rights” by British philosophers radicals and liberals Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, by the members of later London School of Economics and the Tavistock Institute as “nursery schools for the world politicians” have been uncritically accepted and applied in the politics and academic institutions around the world (Larouche 2018, 43; 52–63).

⁹ The basis for such a project was provided by a historian August von Schlezer, who advocated the “expansion of Austria to the Black Sea” and who in 1771, in his work *Allgemeine nordische Geschichte* (“General Nordic History”) was among the first historians to use the term “South Slavs” and put forward the theory of “great migrations of Slavs to the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century” (Sotirović 2007, 9). Realization of Schlezer’s project of expanding Austria to the Black Sea was supported by geopolitical situation in the Balkan Peninsula at the time of the uprisings of the Balkan-Black Sea peoples against the Ottoman Turkish rule – although Russian troops were stationed in Kotor on the Adriatic coast and on the Ionian Islands, according to *the Treaty of Tilsit* made with Napoleon in 1807, Russian troops had to leave the area and hand it over to the French ones.

¹⁰ The long-term planned objective of such philological reform project was aligned with a British project of preventing a newly established Greek state from becoming a “protégé of Russia,” as well as with the plans of German historians and philologists August von Schleizer and Friedrich Tirsch to extend Austria and Bavaria to the Black and Aegean Seas (Milich 2000, 32–33; Chisholm 1911, 647; Vidmar 2009, 275–276; 305–309; Benes 2008, 181).

“traditionally considered their best friends among Christians,” were the allies to the Ottoman Turks in the Balkan Peninsula proved to be unfavorable for the Serbian insurgents against the Ottoman Turkish rule (Faroghi *et al.* 1997). Due to the possibility of Napoleon attacking Russia, the Russians had to conclude the Treaty of Bucharest with the Ottoman Turks in 1812, with unfavorable clauses for Serbia,¹² so that Karađorđe and his rebels, faced with cooperation between the French and Ottoman Turks on several levels, had to obey the decisions of the Treaty of Bucharest (Savić 1996, 82–85). In addition to the factor of the Franco-Turkish cooperation, the subordination of the Russian Empire’s foreign policy to the interests of European politics in the Balkan Peninsula was also influenced by the Russian Foreign Minister Karl von Nesselrode-Eresoven.¹³ After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Minister Karl Nesselrode, together with Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich, managed to persuade the Russian Tsar Alexander to direct Russian policy “against Russian and Slavic nationalism and to officially treat the Eastern Question,” i.e., the question of the survival of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, as “a general European question, above the interests of Russia.” One of the reasons for that was a tendency of Russia and other state members of the so-called “Holly Alliance” to perceive nationalism as a revolutionary ideology that was opposed to the conservative attitudes of the representatives of this alliance (Ingle 1976, 27; 40–41). In this sense, the Russian Minister Karl Nesselrode worked in accordance with the policy of the Austrian Minister Clemens Metternich, who had formed an alliance with France with the objective of distancing Russia from the left bank of the Danube.¹⁴ It was the continuation of the agreement of the Russian Empress Catherine II

¹² Under the *Bucarest Treaty* of 1812, the Serbs had to return to the Turks some castles that they had conquered before that and also to annulate all moves that posed a threat to the reign of Ottoman Turkey in the Balkans.

¹³ At the Congress of Vienna held in 1815, the head of the Russian delegation, along with the Russian Tsar Alexander, was a diplomat of Baltic-German origin, Karl Nesselrode, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia a year after the Congress of Vienna. The Minister Karl Nesselrode, who did not even speak Russian fluently, was a holder of the Order of the Hanoverian Welf dynasty and simultaneously expressing his support for political penetration of the West into the Balkan Peninsula, he also advocated supranational control of the Russian economy (Elliot 1834, 286; Ingle 1976, 19–21).

¹⁴ According to the memoirs of an Austrian general Joseph Radetzky in March 1810, General Joseph Radetzky considered the Danube as “the foundation of the military and political system of Austria” and believed that “an alliance between

with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II that in the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire under her rule would border and cooperate with the Austrian Empire, which, according to the idea of the Emperor Joseph II, was supposed to dominate the Balkan Peninsula (Bronza 2010, 61–62; Pantelić 1933, 145–148). Therefore, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Habsburg and British “cultural representatives” managed to replace the ancient Old Church Slavonic alphabet in the newly formed state of Serbia with a simplified version of the Serbian language and script without resistance or objections from the Russian Empire.¹⁵

PRO-WESTERN REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Pro-Western reforms that emperor Petar “the Great” imposed in the Russian Empire were, in particular, continued in the periods of the reign of Russified empress Ecatherine Second and her son Paul. They also influenced the subordination of foreign politics of the Russian Empire to the interests of the Welf-Hanover dynasty. Such reforms from the inside changed the Russian theodulia/state in the direction of building the Russian state as a secularized Russian empire. The government of Empress Catherine II did not plan to establish a Russian Empire that was to be an active ally of the Serbs and other Balkan peoples, but rather, she planned for the Russian Empire to be a new version of a secularized Russian Empire that would border and cooperate with the Habsburg Monarchy, which, under the leadership of Emperor Joseph II, would dominate the Balkan Peninsula (Bronza 2010, 61–62; Pantelić 1933, 145–148; Faggionato 2006, 17–30; Murdoch 2006). The empress Catherine Second also cooperated with philosophers of European secular Enlightenment and British brethren politician Jeremy and engineer Samuel Bentham, who were connected with French revolutionaries (Werret 1999, 1–25). The British

Austria and France would help Austria to conquer Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia” (Popović 1940, 54–57).

¹⁵ At the same time, the representatives of Great Britain were interested in gaining concessions for Serbian copper mines, so the protégé of the Vienna Court in Serbia, anthropologist and philologist Vuk Karadžić, represented in Serbia the interests of a company from Wales to obtain a concession for a copper mine. Such fact was followed by a request from the British for further concessions for raw metal mines in Serbia, for navigation on the Danube River, and, after the construction of the railway between Belgrade and Thessaloniki was built, the British requested a status of a privileged nation in Serbia regarding the land ownership in Serbia, the collection of customs duties, taxes, etc. (Karličić 2021, 50).

politician Jeremy Bentham was known in the early nineteenth century for his promotion of philosophies of utilitarianism, Epicureanism, and hedonism and was a prominent politician in a financial center of British trade, the City of London, as well as in the organizing committee of the Greek uprisings against Ottoman Turkish rule. During such uprisings of local Balkan peoples, Russian Orthodox Christian farmers massively expressed support for Serbian and other Balkan insurgents against Ottoman Turkish rule, fought on their side, and organized humanitarian aid to the Greek insurgents (Ingle 1976, 43; Prousis 1985). However, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, when the Russians, thanks to their victories, received a historic opportunity to take control of the Balkan-Black Sea region, the Russian Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode decided to subordinate the interests of Russian foreign policy to the will of European politicians. After military forces of the Russian Cossacks, led by the Russian army general Hans Diebitsch, defeated the military forces of the Ottoman Turks at Edirne (Adrianople) in the territory of present-day Bulgaria, the Russian military troops continued towards the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and conquered a large territory in Anatolia all the way to Trebizond. However, due to the intervention of English, Prussian, and French diplomats, General Hans Diebich stopped the Russian army's march towards Constantinople after that, the Russian and Turkish representatives signed the Treaty of Adrianople in September 1829, and the Russian troops went back to their state (Burke 1830, 215–217).¹⁶ In that period, Russian nationalists accused General Hans Diebich of working for the interests of foreigners in Russia since he himself was of foreign origin (Ingle 1976, 27–28). In response to such remarks, Minister Karl Nesselrode commented that “although Russia had conquered Turkey, the Russian Tsar decided to ‘follow the noble demands of his own generosity and to allow the continued existence of the Turkish government in Europe, in the hope that the West would appreciate his attitude.’” (Ingle 1976, 30–31). However, as a combined attack of European and Turkish military forces on Russia in the Crimean War showed a little less than two decades later, Minister Karl Nesselrode was mistaken in such hopes. After the Crimean War and the Paris

¹⁶ By this agreement, the Russians helped Serbia and Greece gain the status of internationally recognized states, but simultaneously, the Russians had to return the conquered Balkan-Black Sea and Asian territories to Turkey, while the Turks had to provide free trade to Russian merchants in Turkey (Burke 1830, 219–221; Vinogradov 1981, 33).

Conference (1856–1859), the victors of the Crimean War, Napoleon III, Otto von Bismarck, and Sardinian Count Camillo Cavour created a modern state of Romania as a geopolitical neo-Latin state project and in this way contributed to the process of ecclesiastical separation of Vlachs and Moldovans from Serbs from 1810 to 1884.¹⁷

In connection with the massive support that the Russians were showing for the Serbs at that time, in 1836, Minister Karl Nesselrode confided to French ambassador Amable de Barante that he considered the massive support of the Russians for the Serbs to be “more than those Serbian bandits deserved” and that he “did not know what Russia could gain if the Serbs gained independence from Turkey” (Ingle 1976, 43). Also in 1848, despite the Balkan peoples’ pleas to Russia for help, Minister Karl Nesselrode thwarted the Russian Tsar Nicholas’ plan to send Russian infantry to the Balkan Peninsula and the Russian Navy to the Bosphorus, explaining that such his decision was “necessary to preserve peace in Europe” and so at that time the Russian Tsar Nicholas withdrew several thousand Russian soldiers from the Balkans (Ingle 1976, 41, 43). On the other hand, in the following 1849 year, the Russian Tsar Nicholas sent 200,000 Russian soldiers and 80,000 members of their support staff to help the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph suppress the Hungarian revolt against the Habsburg monarchy (Hunt *et al.* 2008, 683–684; Schroeder 1962, 173).¹⁸

After the secret Budapest Convention of 1877, according to which Russian representatives agreed to create small sovereign states in the Balkan Peninsula in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, instead of one strong Slavic state that could threaten the “balance of power in Europe” (Europäische Gleichgewicht), the subordination of Russian diplomacy to political interests of Europe in the Balkan peninsula was also exhibited in the periods of San Stefan Agreement and Berlin Congress of 1878. In this period, there emerged opinions among the Russian public that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, was even more subservient to interests of

¹⁷ This project was implemented by a local revolutionary, Joan Cuza, through the Latinization of traditional local Slavic culture (Tambora 2007; Boia 2001, 83–87; Djuvara 1995, 332; Andrejić i Ilić 2014, 201–202).

¹⁸ Acting on the advice of the ministers Nesselrod and Metternich, the Russian emperor Nicholas did similar political acts in Middle Europe. Such moves provoked turbulences in Middle Europe, and as a consequence, they added new allies to the plan of historian August von Schlotzer of expanding the Austrian monarchy up to the Black Sea (Vidmar 2009, 275–276; 306–307; 309).

Western politics than the Russian Minister Nesselrode had been before him (Ingle 1976, 50–51; Kellogg 1995, 146).

On the other hand, until 1830 in the Eastern Mediterranean, modern Western colonialism was based on joint interventions of Western states against Berber pirates in the sea of North Africa and on general Western political perception of the need for security of their own interests, imperial conquests and fusion of old and new forms of monarchies (Zwierlein 2020, 365–366). Therefore, European politicians, by connecting with local merchants from Greece and the eastern Mediterranean region, managed events in the Balkan Peninsula and throughout the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁹

However, significant influence of Western policy in the south of the Balkan Peninsula in 1818 was evidenced by a request of a Phanariotes-associated Greek politician Alexandros Mavrokordatos (*Ἀλέξανδρος Μαυροκορδάτος*) to Austrian government to help him “prevent Russian expansion towards the Balkans and to create one Greek state which could be used as a bulwark against Russian expansion towards the south” (Patrinelis 2001, 186). Then in March 1821, a leader of Greek insurgents and president of the Greek Senate, Petros Mavromichalis, published a Manifesto to the Governments and Public of Europe (Vogli 2010, 193). Two months later, in May 1821, Petros Mavromichalis sent an Appeal to the Citizens of the United States of America in which he praised the human traits of Americans and claimed that the Greek insurgents felt that “the Americans were closer to them than the peoples who were neighbors to the Greeks” (Cline 1930, 33–34). Unlike the majority of local populations, the leaders of the Balkan insurgents, such as Petros Mavromichalis, Alexandros Mavrocordatos, and later some other local Balkan politicians, wanted to establish a system in the Balkan states that would separate these states from both traditional Orthodox Christianity and the rule of the Ottoman Turkish Empire (Brooks 2015, 25–28). In contrast to their views, the opinion of their contemporary Greek Patriarch George V was that revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment were not good for ordinary people (Kitromilides 2006). Similar to the opinion of Greek Patriarch George V, also the Russian Tsar Alexander in 1825 confided

¹⁹ In the first decades of the nineteenth century, when the Serbs and Greeks in the continental part and Greeks in the Egeian islands fought against Ottoman Turks in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, English and Northern Americans intervened against the Berber pirates because of their robberies of Western merchant ships (Zwierlein 2020, 365–366).

to British diplomat Stratford Canning in St. Petersburg that “although he himself felt sympathy for the Greeks who had risen up because of their suffering under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, he did not approve of revolutionary principles which were mixed with the causes of their struggle” (Seton-Watson 1955, 103).

According to historians Bernard Ducret and Alexis Krauss (Ducret and Krauss, 2020), under the influence of Venice and later France, some of the first Masonic lodges were established on the Greek island of Corfu²⁰ and in Thessaly, and were also founded in Budapest, Belgrade²¹ and Bucharest by European and Greek [Rigas Feraios] intellectuals.²² Historians Ducre and Kraus claim that the Filiki Eteria was a Masonic organization founded in Odessa in 1814 as a branch of a Moscow Masonic Lodge (Ducret and Krauss, 2020).²³ Some authors claim that Ioannis

²⁰ Corfu was an island where Orthodox Greeks, Roman Catholics, and Jews who had escaped the medieval Inquisition lived together. Since the island alternated between French, British, and Russian rule over time, leading Freemasons on Corfu belonged to secret organizations from those countries.

²¹ The influence of Freemasons in the political life of Serbia is evidenced by the fact that a radical and, according to the revolutionary Leon Trotsky, “an uncrowned king of Serbia” Nikola Pašić (Троцкий 1926, 6) was economically connected with an influential German Freemason and member of the “Yugoslavia” lodge in Serbia George Weifert, who at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the owner of almost all important mines in Serbia (Bucalo 1998).

²² If we consider the request of the leader of Greek insurgents, Petros Mavromichalis, to Americans to help the insurgents in Greece in their fight against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, as well as the fact that in 1924, according to the Constitution of Turkey, Turkish citizenship was defined as “a constitutive supranational identity for the inhabitants of Turkey,” that is, that “being a Turk meant belonging to a single political community – the mixture of ‘ethnic’ and ‘territorial’” (Şeker 2005, 64), it is clear that the ideas of North American politicians Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson about the state system as a supranational “marketplace” of peoples and religions were present in the Balkan-Black Sea-Anatolian empires and republics from the nineteenth century up to present time. Secret societies such as the Carbonari in Italy and the Filiki Eteria in the Balkan-Black Sea region were very similar to Masonic associations, and also a secret society, “Unity and Progress of the Ottoman Empire” (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), was founded on a similar model (Arslan and Ozen 2005, 93–115).

²³ Some of its founders, such as Nikolaos Skoufas and Rigas Velestinlis, wanted to launch a revolution in the Ottoman Empire similar to the French Revolution and to establish a Balkan-Anatolian Confederation. In the Ottoman Empire, Panagiotis Panas from Cephalonia and Joseph Naci, who was given the title of Prince of the Island of Naxos by Sultan Selim II, and then Mithat Pasha, who founded the *New Ottoman Society*, participated in the organization of secret societies in the

Kapodistrias, a member of the Filiki Etereia society and diplomat in the service of Russia, founded the Phoenix Masonic Lodge in Moscow in 1811 and that he was a member of the Modesti Lodge in Zurich (Rimikis 2017, 83–84). After working for some time as a Russian ambassador to Italy, Ioannis Kapodistrias began working for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1816, during the reign of the Russian Tsar Alexander I, until 1822, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia together with Karl Nesselrode.²⁴ The diplomat Ioannis Kapodistrias, in the service of the Russian court, disregarding the foreign policy of the British, claimed in his letters to future Russian Tsar Nicholas that “a long-term experience had convinced the Greeks that only God and the Russians could ensure the Greeks’ national existence” (Vinogradov 1981, 25). The Minister Karl Nesselrode, who collaborated with British diplomacy and felt animosity towards the pro-Greek policy of Ioannis Kapodistrias, was angered by the cooperation of the Russian consul Grigory Strogonov in Constantinople with Ioannis Kapodistrias and so the Minister Nesselrode ordered the withdrawal of consul Strogonov and other Russian diplomats from Constantinople (Ingle 1976, 24; 28).²⁵ The victory of the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish War and the earlier Kuchuk Khanraj Peace Treaty of 1774 allowed Russia to assume direct responsibility for the protection of Orthodox Christians and churches in the Ottoman Empire, including the settlement of Crimea and the coast of the Sea of Azov by thousands of Greeks (Konstantinova and Lyman 2020, 69–70). However, a British diplomat, George Canning, although openly supporting the Ottoman Turks, with his diplomatic skills, managed to obtain a promise from the Russian Tsar Nicholas to preserve the status quo. in the Ottoman-Greek conflict and succeeded in imposing

Balkan-Anatolian region, whose goal was to establish a republican order in Turkey “on the principles of equality and justice” (O’Donnell 2014, 165–175; O’Donnell 2016, 145–160).

²⁴ Tsar Alexander I in Russia, Thomas Jefferson in the United States, and military leader Napoleon Bonaparte, who was proclaimed Emperor of the French in the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in 1804, appeared on the world political scene before the beginning of the uprisings of the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman Turkish rule on the Balkan Peninsula.

²⁵ On April 4, 1826, Minister Karl Nesselrode and British diplomats drafted the *St. Petersburg Protocol*, which was intended to prevent new battles between Greece and Turkey and maintain the *status quo* in the Balkan administrative units. This was in accordance with *The Ackermann Convention* by which Russia recognized the right of Ottoman Turkey to rule the Balkan-Black Sea regions administrative units (Ingle 1976, 28).

himself as the arbiter of the fate of the Greeks and the Ottoman Turks (Vinogradov 1981, 7–8). Since the leaders of the Greek insurgents were dissatisfied with the Russian Memorandum of January 1824, despite the indecisive attitude of British politicians regarding their uprising they decided to cooperate with the British diplomatic representative George Canning (Dakin 1971, 52).²⁶ After Ioannis Kapodistrias had been elected the President-Governor of Greece, he met with Tsar Nicholas I in Saint Petersburg in June 1827, and they exchanged letters that laid out the basis for the internal system of Greece and reiterated the provisions of the Protocol of 1826 and the Convention of 1827 (Vinogradov 1981, 25). However, although the representatives of the Greek people at the Third National Assembly in Troezen in 1827 voted Ioannis Kapodistrias as the ruler of the modern state of Greece, the representatives of great European powers decided that a Bavarian nobleman Otto von Wittelsbach would become the king of the modern Greek state. The royal candidate Otto von Wittelsbach accepted the offer on condition that Greece take a large international loan. Therefore, through European politicians, including the Jesuit-educated freemason and former British agent Carlo Pozzo di Borgo, who was employed at the Russian legation in Paris at the time, the Rothschild and d'Echtal family clans became involved in organizing the financial affairs of the newly created state of Greece (Schönhärl 2019, 6–12; Beaudry and Beaudry 1997, 37–38). Then, after the assassination of Ioannis Kapodistrias by members of the Mavromichalis family in Greece, representatives of the Great Powers installed the Bavarian nobleman Otto von Wittelsbach as King of Greece.

During the uprisings of the Balkan peoples against Ottoman Turkish rule in the early nineteenth century, the Greek diplomat Ioannis Kapodistrias and the Serbian military leader Đorđe Petrović “Karadorđe” were two individuals with the greatest potential for unifying and liberating the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman Turkish rule. Even before the official First Serbian Uprising under the leadership of Karadorđe, the Serbs had been raising uprisings against the Ottoman Turkish rule, but due to the lack of opportunity to connect themselves with geopolitical allies, their

²⁶ The British diplomat George Canning was believed in Russia to have been connected to Polish secret societies fighting for Polish independence before the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Turks (Mazour 1937, 139–142). These secret societies were associated with the *Society of United Slavs* and other secret societies that sprang up in Russia, some of which were founded by Russian officers who returned from France to Russia after the war against Napoleon (Mohrenschildt 1981; Plokhy 2012, 80).

uprisings could not last long. The memory of the pre-Ottoman Serbian Empire was maintained among the people through institutions, customs, and manners from the pre-Ottoman period, but the Serbs did not have independent political power in relation to the Ottoman Porte (Šuljagić 2011, 221). A letter written by the leader of the First Serbian Uprising, Karađorđe, to the Russian Tsar Alexander during his stay in Russia on July 4, 1816, reveals that Karađorđe was unaware of international conspiracy and conspiracy within Serbia in preparation for his assassination upon his return to Serbia (Drašković 2019, 342–343). Karađorđe planned to synchronize the uprising against the Turks in Serbia with the uprisings of the insurgents in Morea and Bulgaria, and in July 1817, he returned from Russia to Serbia. However, one of the leaders of the Serbian uprising Miloš Obrenović arranged the assassination of Karađorđe in collusion with Turkish Sultan Ali Pasha Marašlija, and after Karađorđe had been killed upon his return to Serbia, Miloš Obrenović received the title of Serbian Duke from the Turks (Dakin 1971, 31; Nenadović 1883, 456; 460–461). The murder of Karađorđe simultaneously desecrated the sanctity of the traditional institution of godfatherhood in moral canons of Saint Sava's taught Christian tradition in Serbia (Stevanović 2017, 55). Karađorđe's intention to continue the uprising against the Turks did not fit into the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest.²⁷ The policy of the newly proclaimed Duke Miloš Obrenović was not to join with other Balkan and Russian soldiers against the Ottoman Turks. Duke Miloš, in agreement with the British diplomat David Urquhart, redirected Serbia's previously pro-Russian policy in the direction of a Western political circle and established direct trade relations between Serbia and England, allowing diplomat Urquhart to take control of political events in Serbia (Mijatović 1892, 42; Dakin 1971, 36).²⁸

²⁷ Thanks to the concessions that Turkey had to make to Russia in *the Ackermann Convention* of 1826, as well as in *the Treaty of Adrianople* of 1829, the Turkish Sultan in 1830 issued the *Hatırcı Law*, which granted autonomy to the Serbs in the judiciary, administration, army, and education. Duke Miloš was granted authority to become a hereditary ruler, and in 1831, the Serbian Orthodox Church was also granted autonomy.

²⁸ Although during the Russo-Turkish War, Duke Miloš supplied food to the Ottoman Turks, after the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War and *the Treaty of Adrianople*, Duke Miloš, having become the main salt buyer in Wallachia and having enriched himself by trading cattle with the Austrians, at the same time was maintaining good relations with the Russians, Turks, and Germans (Petrović 1897, 218–220; 641–642).

The assassinations of Ioannis Kapodistrias and Karađorđe Petrović marked a major change in the previously traditional identities of the Balkan peoples. In the case of the newly formed Kingdom of Greece with King Otto von Wittelsbach at its head, this change implied the creation of a Hellenic national heterotopia (Hamilakis 2007, 108). As the Prime Minister of Greece Ioannis Koletis explained this heterotopia in 1844, the idea of a “Great Greece” meant “the purification of the language of the Greek population and the rejection of traditions of the Eastern Roman Empire, Russophilia, and Balkan Orthodox Slavic brothers” (Gounaris 2021, 245).

Within imperialist political ideology of the Western European hemisphere ideas of Young Hegelians and John Stuart Mill about the need to colonize and annex “barbarians” were dominant ones, regardless of the Habsburg-Prussian rivalry between the Welf-Hanover – Hohenzollern dynasties in the Old/New Roman Empire (Mill 1989, 13; Clark 2006, 1–2; 41; 233; 435; 483–484; 687). In that period, in order to justify an introduction of legal administration of the new government in Greece and “re-establishment of order” against the Greek insurgents who resisted both the troops of King Otto von Wittelsbach and regular Greek troops, officials of foreign administration generously distributed the Greek loan (Scott 1854, 404–407).²⁹

As it turned out, the Russians paid for their missed opportunity to drive the Ottoman Empire out of the Balkan Peninsula at Adrianople in 1829 by their defeat in the Crimean War in 1856. Then the winners of the Crimean War – representatives of France, Great Britain, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire – managed to further expand their influence in the Balkan-Black Sea region by forming a new state of Romania as a barrier between Russia and Slavic Orthodox peoples of the Balkan Peninsula (Boia 2001a, 87; Boia 2001b, 83–86; Stoica 1919, 29).

²⁹ The cruel treatment of the Greek insurgents and ordinary citizens by foreign troops in the newly formed state of Greece is recorded in a collection of painter and lieutenant Ludwig Köllnberger and other artists of the period in question (Athanassoglou-Kallmyer 2008). The ambivalent position of the newly established post-Ottoman Greece was illustrated by an example of the Crimean War (1853–1856) when eyewitnesses noted that during that war, in cafes and restaurants in Athens, people hung posters of the Russian Tsar Nicholas on the walls and sang *Parisienne* songs and *Marseillaise* in the Greek language, while at the same time, the British Navy in Greek ports prevented the possible actions of Greek insurgents and regular Greek army against the troops of the Ottoman Turkish Empire (Dodd 1856, 146–149).

On the other hand, since the second half of the nineteenth century the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian foreign ministers Agenor Golukhovsky and Gyula Andrásy planned firstly an autonomy and then a creation of a modern state of Albania “so that Russia would be prevented from having influence in that part of the Balkan Peninsula through Serbia, Bulgaria or Montenegro” (Hrabak 1979, 167–168; Толева 2012, 2; 28).³⁰ The British diplomat, politician, and judge Edmund Hornby also joined the Western planners of the creation of the modern kingdoms of Greece, Albania and future kingdom of Yugoslavia with his concept of creating a modern Bulgarian state, which was realized when the nobleman Ferdinand from the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha branch of the Welf-Hanover dynasty was enthroned as the king of modern Bulgaria (Šuljagić 2024, 95–96).³¹ After the Berlin Congress of 1878, the military forces of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Turkish Empire created a joint corridor in the territory of Novopazarski sandzak in Serbia and Montenegro, thus preventing Serbia’s access to the Adriatic Sea (Kostić 1940, 93–94).³² In addition, political reforms in Serbia were carried out under the influence

³⁰ Those plans were realized in 1912 with the formation of the modern state of Albania by the Habsburg court and the appointment of the Prussian officer Prince William Friedrich Heinrich Wied as the king of the newly formed state of Albania (Heaton-Armstrong 2005; Pearson 2006; Mitrović 2011, 66–75; Толева 2012, 28).

³¹ According to historian Jürgen Osterhamel (Osterhammel 2015), during this period in question, a significant reason for British politicians’ continued support for the Ottoman Empire was “the assumption that action against the Turkish Sultan (who also claimed the religious title of Caliph) would cause an unrest among the millions of Muslim population of India” (Osterhammel 2015, 472). Since the diplomat Edmund Hornby was active in British foreign policy from the Ottoman Empire to India, he had British foreign policy plans ready both in case of the survival of Ottoman rule in the Balkan Peninsula and in case of the necessity for the creation of a new geopolitical constellation in the Balkan Peninsula in the event of the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from the Balkan Peninsula. Thus in 1878 the diplomat Edmund Hornby in his draft *The Eastern Question: a Scheme for the Future Government of Bulgaria*, outlined a plan for a modern Bulgarian state as territorially large as possible, which was to be “connected with the commercial interests of England through its ports on the Black Sea” and “with its cosmopolitan bureaucracy to be a barrier on the Balkan Peninsula to a possible Pan-Slavic union of Orthodox states under the influence of Russia so that the “Eastern Question” would not be replaced by the so-called ‘Slavic question’” (Hornby 1878, 7; 11; 18–19; 20; 23). The prevention of the “Slavic Question” was also linked to a British geopolitical project of maintaining the presence of Austria-Hungary and Turkey on the Balkan Peninsula after the Congress of Berlin (Denton [1862] 2013; Seton-Watson 1971, 75; Vinogradov 1981, 7–8).

³² In addition, in 1881, Serbian Duke Milan Obrenović had to sign a *Secret Convention* with representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, according to which Serbia

of the political philosophy of British Prime Minister John Palmerston, North American politician Thomas Jefferson, European politicians and bankers, and members of Masonic lodges. Such a process caused the collapse of Serbia village and family-oriented communities, not having contributed to the rise of the living standard of broad masses of the people (Trotsky 1980, 87; Đorđević 2004, 71; Đorđević 2008, 66; Dimitrijević 2010, 10–11).

The subordination of Russian politicians to Western politicians' geopolitical interests was further exhibited after the Serb victory in the Balkan Wars in the twentieth century when Russian diplomat Sergei Sazonov agreed to British diplomatic proposals that the Serbian army withdraw from the territory of the present-day state of Albania (Kondis 1989, 342; Rastović 2012, 16; 163–164).

During World War I, the Serbian army was attacked by the Bulgarian army, which was subordinated to the geopolitical interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, i.e., the Central Powers (Subašić 2014).³³ When, in the twentieth century, the Russian Empire had been abolished and the ideology of Bolshevism, Marxism, and socialism was introduced into the public discourse of Russian political life, there followed the annulment of traditional Christian religion and spirituality and simultaneous insistence on technological progress in science.³⁴

became a satellite state of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Vojvodić 2007, 20–21; Kalabić 2009).

³³ Also, although in March 1915, the British government agreed that the Russians should occupy Istanbul, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles so that the Russian Tsar Nicholas II would not sign a separate peace treaty with the Germans and so that *the Treaty of London* would be concluded shortly thereafter, the Russian army withdrew from the Anatolian region, although in December 1916 it defeated the Turkish army and established a new government with the Greek Metropolitan Chrysanthemum in that territory (Akarca 2002, 3–4; Repe 2019, 1019). In order to prevent the Russians from re-establishing the former Eastern Roman Empire with a Slavic ruler at the head of Orthodox Christians, as had happened in the Empire's past, members of Western political, economic, and military lobbies financed a revolutionary overthrow of the Tsarist government in Russia in 1917. This revolutionary overthrow of the Tsarist government ended with the assassination of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and his family, the dissolution of the Russian Empire, and the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by a new Bolshevik government (Ackerman 2016, 320–321; Pipes 1996, 16; Fischer [1927] 2016, 42–44).

³⁴ This not only distanced generations of people in Russia from the memory of the former past of the Russian Empire and the medieval alliance of Orthodox states but also influenced the atmosphere of feelings of meaninglessness, nihilism, and

In memory of the diplomatic and military assistance that the Russian Tsar Nicholas II provided to the Serbs during the First World War, a monument to Tsar Nicholas II was erected in Belgrade in 2014 (Wikipedia 2015; Šuljagić 2022, 18–19). However, despite such an example of a reminder of the connection between Serbian and Russian peoples in history, in the modern Republic of Serbia, monuments, documents, and locations that prove a centuries-long traditional connection of Serbian and Russian peoples are neglected in the educational system of the Republic of Serbia (Savić 2014; Šuljagić 2014a, 357–363).

There are some other examples of military and spiritual ties between Russia and Serbia during the twentieth century and at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which demonstrate an intertwining of supranational geopolitical interests in the contemporary Russian state. They are a continuation and are built on a little more than three centuries of military and non-military factors that have visibly influenced the subordination of the policy of the Russian state to the Western colonial campaign to the East.

However, the subordination of the foreign politics of the Russian Empire to the Western political interests in the Balkan Peninsula in the nineteenth century shows that it was not only the nineteenth century in question when political fate of local peoples in the Balkan Peninsula was determined, but that extremely important ideological and military conflicts, economic interests, educational systems and decisions of international congresses that have occurred in the nineteenth century have determined the political fate of these peoples for much more prolonged time period in future of the people in question.

REFERENCES

- Ackerman, Kenneth. 2016. *Trotsky in New York, 1917: A Radical on the Eve of Revolution*. Berkeley: Counterpoint Press.
- Akarca, Halit. 2002. "The Russian Administration of the Occupied Ottoman Territories During the First World War: 1915–1917." Master Thesis. Bilkent University: The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, The Department of International Relations.

resistance to technocracy in the form of popular novels by Soviet and post-Soviet writers such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn or Viktor Pelevin.

- Andrejić, Živojin i Violeta Ilić. 2014. „Multikulturalna i etnička prožimanja Srba i Vlaha u Srbiji na razmeđi između Jugoslavije i Rumunije.” *Mitološki zbornik* 32: 199–226.
- Andrews, Kenneth. 1964. *Elizabethan Privateering 1583–1603*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arslan, Ozan, and Cinar Ozen. 2005. “The Rebirth of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in Macedonia through the Italian Freemasonry.” *Oriente Moderno* 24 (1): 93–115.
- Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina. 2008. “Excavating Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Europe.” *Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide*. Last accessed in December 2024. <https://www.19thc-artworldwide.org/autumn08/excavating-greece-classicism-between-empire-and-nation-in-nineteenth-century-europe>
- Baerlein, Henry. 2022. *The Birth of Yugoslavia*. London: L. Parsons.
- Bataković, Dusan. 1994. “Ilija Garasanin’s Nacertanije: A Reassessment.” *Balkanica*. Vol. 25–1. Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies.
- Beaudry, Pierre, and Irene Beaudry. 1997. “The Venetian agents deployed against France.” *Executive Intelligence Review* 24 (26): 36–38.
- Benes, Tuska. 2008. *In Babel’s Shadow: Language, Philology, and the Nation in Nineteenth Century*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Boia, Lucian. 2001a. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Boia, Lucian. 2001b *Romania – the Borderland of Europe*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Bronza, Boro. 2010. “The Habsburg Monarchy and the Projects for Division of the Ottoman Balkans 1771–1778.” In *Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe Between Carlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 1699–1829*, eds. Plamen Mitev and Ivan Parvev, Maria Baramova, Vania Racheva, 61–62. Berlin: LIT Verlag.
- Brooks, Julian. 2015. “The Education Race for Macedonia 1878–1903.” *The Journal of Modern Hellenism* 31: 23–58.
- Burke, Edmund. 1830. *The Annual Register or a view of the history, politics and literature of the year 1829*. London: Baldwin and Cradock, Rivington.
- Bucalo, Velimir. 1998. „Dinar od srebra.” *Srpsko nasleđe – Istorijske sveske* 7. Beograd: NIP Glas.
- Chatziioannou, Maria-Christina, and Gelina Harlaftis. 2007. “From the Levant to the City of London: Mercantile Credit in the Greek International Commercial Networks of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth

- Centuries.” In *Centres and peripheries in banking*, ed. Philip Cotrell, 29–56. London: Routledge.
- Chisholm, Hugh, ed. 1911. “Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Vol. 20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, Cristopher. 2006. *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Cline, Myrtle. 1930. *American Attitude Toward the Greek War of Independence 1821–1828*. New York: Columbia University.
- Dakin, Douglas. 1971. *The Unification of Greece 1770–1923*. New York: St. Louis. Martin’s Press.
- Danforth, Loring. 1984. “The Ideological Context of the Search for Continuities in Greek Culture.” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1): 53–85. DOI: 10.1353/mgs.2010.0012
- Denton, Vilijem. [1862] 2013. *Srbija i Srbi*, M. Nikolajević, prev. London: Ben and Daldy. Reprint, Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Dimitrijević, Laza. 2010. *Kako živi naš narod*. Beograd: Infinitas.
- Djuvara, Neagu. 1995. *Între Orient și Occident*. Bucharest: Humanitas.
- Dodd, George. 1856. *Pictorial History of the Russian War 1854–56: With Maps, Plans, and Wood Engravings*. Edinburgh and London: W. & R. Chambers.
- Dobrašinović, Golub, ur. 1980. *Kopitar i Vuk*. Beograd: Vukov sabor Tršić-Rad.
- Drašković, Bojan. 2019. „Srpska revolucija u devetnaestom veku.” U *Politička istorija Slovena od mita do stvarnosti*, ur. Sanja Šuljagić, 323–352. Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Ducret, Bernard, and Alexis Krauss. 2020. “Freemasonry and the foundation of Greece.” *Academia.edu*. Last accessed in May 2024. https://www.academia.edu/49394816/Freemasonry_and_the_foundation_of_Greece
- Elliot, Jonathan. 1834. *The American Diplomatic Code Embracing a Collection of Treaties and Conventions between the United States and Foreign Powers; from 1778 to 1834*. Washington DC: Jonathan Elliot Junior.
- Faggionato, Raffaella. 2006. *A Rosicrucian Utopia in Eighteenth-Century Russia The Masonic Circle of N.I. Novikov*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Science & Business Media.

- Faroghi, Suraiya, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert, and Sevkett Pamuk [Faroghi et al.]. 1997. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fischer, Louis. [1927] 2016. *Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum*. London: by George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Reprint, London: Routledge.
- Franklin, Simon. 2002. *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gounaris, Basil. 2021. “Does Greece belong to the West? Reassessing Greek Anti-westernism in the Twentieth Century.” *Balkan Studies* 54: 243–277.
- Gourgouris, Stathis. 1996. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization and the Institution of Modern Greece*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hamilakis, Yannis. 2007. *The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heaton-Armstrong, Duncan. 2005. *The Six Month Kingdom: Albania 1914*. London: IB Tauris.
- Hendrickson, David. 2013. “Venice and the Liberty of States.” *IR and All That*. Last accessed in January 2024. <http://irandallthat.blogspot.com/2013/12/venice-and-liberty-of-states.html>.
- Hornby, Edmund. 1878. *The Eastern question: a scheme for the future government of Bulgaria*. London: Eastern Question Association.
- Hrabak, Bogumil. 1979. „Ideje o arbanaškoj autonomiji i nezavisnosti 1876–1880. godine.” *Istorijski časopis* 25–26. Beograd: Istorijski institut, Prosveta.
- Hunt, Lynn et al. 2008. *Gramoty russkogo*. Bedford: St. Martin’s.
- Ingle, Harold. 1976. *Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain: 1836–1844*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Ivić, Aleksa. 1926. „Arhivska građa o srpskim i hrvatskim književnim i kulturnim radnicima 1740–1880.” *Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost srpskog naroda* 3. Beograd: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija.
- Jović, Živko. 1867. „Pismo pisano mitropolitom crnogorskom Savom mitropolitu moskovskom Platonu 1776.” *Glasnik SUD* 22. Beograd: Srpsko Učeno Društvo.
- Kalabić, Radovan. 2009. *Grofovska vremena*. Beograd: Grafiks.
- Kaplan, Herbert. 2006. *Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the Creation of a Dynasty: The Critical Years 1806–1816*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Karadžić, Vuk. 1969. *Istorijski spisi II. Sabrana dela Vuka Karadžića*. XVI. ur. Radovan Samardžić. Beograd: Prosveta.
- Karličić, Miljkan. 2021. „Osvrt na istorijat srpsko-britanskih odnosa.” *Bezbednost* (2): 45–68. DOI: 10.5937/bezbednost2102057K
- Kellogg, Frederick. 1995. *The Road to Romanian Independence*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
- Kienholz, Mary. 2008. *Opium Traders and Their Worlds*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, iUniverse.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis. 2006. “Orthodoxy and the West: Reformation to Enlightenment.” In *The Cambridge History of Christianity*, ed. by Michael Angold, 187–209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kondis, Basil. 1989. “The Northern Epirus Question during the First World War.” *Balkan Studies* 30 (2): 333–349.
- Konstantinova, Victoria, and Igor Lyman. 2020. “From the Azov to Batoum: evolution of the port-cities in the Russian frontier land. Politics and administration.” In *Black Sea History Working Papers 3 Centre of Maritime History*, eds. G. Harlaftis *et al.*, 61–105. Crete, Rethymnon: Institute for Mediterranean Studies – FORTH.
- Kostić, Mita. 1940. „Iz istorije Srba u Novopazarskom sandžaku posle Berlinskog kongresa 1878.” *Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva* knj. 21, 93–108. Skoplje: Srpsko naučno društvo.
- Kostić, Veselin. 2006. „David Urkart – pisac prve engleske istorije Srbije.” *Istorijski časopis* (53): 235–262.
- Larouche, Lyndon. 2018. “The Science of Physical economy as The Platonic epistemological basis for all branches of Human Knowledge.” *Executive Intelligence Review*. Last accessed in January 2024. https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2018/eirv45n48-20181130/30-66_4548-lar.pdf.
- Leeb, Thomas. 1996. *Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer: Publicist and politician between revolution and reaction*. Munich: Beck.
- Marchand, Suzanne. 1996. *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mazour, Anatole. 1937. *The First Russian Revolution 1825, The Decembrist Movement, Its Origins, Development, Significance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- McKay, D., and H. Scott. 2014. *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648 – 1815*. London: Routledge.

- Milich, Peter. 2000. "Slavic Ethnogenesis and Great Power Diplomacy: Recurring Themes." *Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies* 14 (1): 29–40.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1989. *J. S. Mill: 'On Liberty' and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mijatović, Čedomilj. 1892. "Knez Miloš i pukovnik Hodžes. Građa za istoriju prve vladavine kneza Miloša." *Spomenik SKA* 17: 41–116.
- Mitrović, Andrej. 2011. *Prodor na Balkan i Srbija u planovima Austrougarske i Nemačke 1908–1918*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike.
- Mohrenschildt, Dimitri von. 1981. *Toward a United States of Russia: Plans and Projects of Federal Reconstruction of Russia in the Nineteenth Century*. New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Murdoch, Steve. 2006. *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial And Covert Associations in Northern Europe 1603–1746*. Brill.
- Nenadović, Konstantin. 1883. *Život i dela velikog Đorđa Petrovića Kara-Đorđa*. Beč: Štamparija Jovana N. Vernaja.
- Novaković, Srđan. 2018. „Vlaška, Karavlaška, Cincari i nastanak masonske Srbije.” U *Rumuni i ruminizam*. ur. Zoran Milošević, 216–264. Šabac: Centar akademske reči.
- O'Donnell, Kathleen A. 2014. "Nineteenth-Century Cycladic Warriors: Celtic Heroes." In *Studies on Mediterranean Culture and History: From the Middle Ages through the Early Modern Period*, ed. by Stiven M. Oberhelman, 167–175. Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research.
- O'Donnell, Kathleen A. 2016. "The Disintegration of the Democratic Eastern Federation and the Demise of its Supporters 1885–1896 and the Poems of Ossian." *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 2 (2):145–160. DOI: 10.30958/ajms.2-2-2
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2015. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pantelić, Dušan. 1933. „Uhodenje Srbije pred Kočinu krajinu.” *Glas Srpske Kraljevske Akademije* 153: 105–163.
- Patrinelis, Christos. 2001. "The Phanariots before 1821." *Balkan Studies* 42 (2): 177–198.
- Pearson, Owen. 2006. *Albania in the Twentieth Century: a history*. London: IB Tauris.
- Petrović, Mita. 1897. *Finansije i ustanove obnovljene Srbije do 1842*. Beograd: Državna Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije.

- Philliou, Christine. 2008. "The Paradox of Perceptions: Interpreting the Ottoman Past through the National Present." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (5): 661–675. DOI: 10.1080/00263200802285385
- Pipes, Richard. 1996. *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archives*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Plokhyy, Serhii. 2012. *The Cossack Myth: History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Popović, Vasilj. 1940. *Evropa i srpsko pitanje u periodu oslobođenja (1804–1914)*. Beograd: Geca Kon A. D.
- Prousis, Theophilus. 1985. "Russian Philorthodox Relief during the Greek War of Independence." *History Faculty Publications*. University of North Florida.
- Prousis, Theophilus. 2008. *British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant in an Age of Upheaval, 1815–1830*. Istanbul: Isis Press.
- Rastović, Aleksandar. 2012. "Edward Grey And The First Balkan War." *Journal of Social Sciences: Special Issue on Balkans* (2): 161–168.
- Repe, Božo. 2019. "Winston Churchill and the Slovenes." U *Zbornik Drage Roksandića*, ur. Damir Agičić, Hrvoje Petrić i Filip Šimetin Ševgić, 1009–1020. Zagreb: FF press.
- Richmond, John. 2013. *Egypt, 1798–1952 (RLE Egypt): Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity*. London: Routledge.
- Ricks, David and Paul Magdalino. 1998. *Byzantium and The Modern Greek Identity*. London: Ashgate, King's College London, Centre for Hellenic Studies.
- Rimikis, Nicholas Michael. 2017. "Filiki Etaireia: The rise of a secret society in the making of the Greek revolution." Bard College. Last accessed in September 2023. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2017/317
- Savić, Milisav. 2014. *Dolina srpskih kraljeva: Prolećno putovanje 2013*. Beograd: Društvo Raška škola.
- Savić, Velimir. 1996. „Napoleon i Velika Srbija." U *Glasnik istorijskog arhiva* 30, ur. Milča Madić, 83–97. Valjevo: Istorijski arhiv Valjeva.
- Schroeder, Paul. 1962. *Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820–1823: Austria and the Congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Schönhärl, Korinna. 2019. "Why does a prestigious emission house emit a loan for a peripheral state? The house of Rothschild and the Greek guaranteed loan of 1833." *Business History* 63 (4): 1–17. DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2019.1593373

- Scott, Leonard. 1854. "King Otto and his Classic Kingdom." *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 76.
- Şeker, Nesim. 2005. "Identity Formation and the Political Power in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic." *Historia Actual Online* (8): 59–67.
- Seton-Watson, Robert. 1955. *Britain in Europe 1789–1914, a Survey of Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1971. "Robert William Seton-Watson i jugoslavensko pitanje." *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 2 (2): 75–96.
- Slijepčević, Đoko. 1938. „Ukidanje Pečke patrijaršije 1766.” *Bogoslovlje* 13: 250–307.
- Sotirović, Vladimir. 2007. *Creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1914–1918*. Vilnius: Vilnius University Press.
- Stevanović, Mileva. 2017. „Ubistvo Vožda Karađorđa.” U *Mitološki zbornik 37: Dva veka od smrti srpskog vožda Đorđa Petrovića Karađorđa*, ur. Miodrag Stojanović, 49–80 Rača: Centar za mitološke studije Srbije.
- Stoica, Vasile. 1919. *The Roumanian Question*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Printing Company.
- Subašić, Boris. 2014. „Čerčil izazvao pad Rusije i Srbije 1914.” *Novosti*. 30. novembar 2014. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/reportaze/aktuelno.293.html:522043-Cercil-izazvao-pad-Rusije-i-Srbije-1914>
- Talbot, Strobe. 2009. *The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Tambora, Andelo. 2007. *Kavur i Balkan*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike.
- Temperley, Harold. 1919. *History of Serbia*. London: G. Bell and Sons.
- Thiersch, Wilhelm von. 1833. *De l'état actuel de la Grèce et des moyens d'arriver à sa restauration*. Leipzig: FA Brockhouse.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1980. *The Balkan wars: 1912–13: the war correspondence of Leon Trotsky*. Broadway NSW: Resistance Books.
- Vidmar, Luka. 2009. „Struktura in funkcija pisem iz literarnoprrodne korespodence Žige Zoisa.” Doktorska disertacija. Nova Gorica: Univerza v Novoj Gorici.
- Vinogradov, V. 1981. "George Canning, Russia and the Emancipation of Greece." *Balkan Studies* 22 (1): 3–33.
- Vogli, Elpida. 2010. "The Greek War of Independence and the emergence of a modern nation-state in Southeastern Europe (1821–1827)." In *Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe Between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople*, ed. Plamen Mitev, 1699–1829. Berlin: Lit.

- Vojvodić, Mihailo. 2007. „Stojan Novaković i kralj Milan.” U *Novovekovne srpske dinastije u memoaristici*, ur. Petar Krestić, 17–42. Beograd: Istorijski institut.
- Zlatković, Branko. 2018. „Vukov Srpski rječnik kao literarna tema.” U *Srpska slavistika: kolektivna monografija 2. Književnost, kultura, folklor, pitanja slavistike*. ur. Boško Suvajdžić, Petar Bunjak, Dušan Ivanić, 389–401. Beograd: Savez Slavističkih društava Srbije, Čigoja štampa.
- Zwierlein, Cornel. 2020. “Mediterranean transformations: From the security of mercantilist trading empires to a modern security regime.” *Pedralbes. Revista d'Història Moderna* (40): 323–366. DOI: 10.1344/PEDRALBES.40.12.
- Werret, Simon. 1999. “Potemkin and the Panopticon: Samuel Bentham and the Architecture of Absolutism in Eighteenth Century Russia.” *UCL Bentham Project Journal of Bentham Studies* 2: 1–25. Last Accessed in July 2024. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/648/2/002__1999__S.Werret_1999.pdf
- Wikipedia. 2015. „Spomenik caru Nikolaju II.” Wikipedia.org. Poslednji pristup oktobar 2024. https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr-ec/Споменик_цару_Николају_II
- Wood, Alfred. 1964. *A History of the Levant Company*. London: Frank Cass & Co., Psychology Press.
- Dorđević, Miroslav. 2004. *Uvod u građansko pravo*. Beograd: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu.
- Dorđević, Miroslav. 2008. “Pravni transplant i Srbijanski građanski zakonik iz 1844.” *Strani pravni život* (1): 62–84.
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2011. „Uloga institucija u kulturnom i ekonomskom razvoju ruralnih područja Srbije.” *Srpska politička misao* 31 (1): 209–246. DOI: 10.22182/spm.3112011.9
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2012a. „Uticaj razvoja vinčanskog pisma na zasnivanje srpskog identiteta.” *Srpska politička misao* 38 (4): 319–352. DOI: 10.22182/spm.3842012.15
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2012b. *Zasnivanje srpskog nacionalnog identiteta: politički i kulturni aspekti razvoja sela u Srbiji*. Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2014a. „Prikaz knjige: Milisav Savić, Dolina srpskih kraljeva: Prolećno putovanje 2013. Društvo Raška škola, Beograd, 2014.” *Srpska politička misao* (4): 355–363. DOI: 10.22182/spm.4642014.21

- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2014b. „Srpski nacionalni identitet od srednjovekovne teodulije do razgradnje moderne države Srbije.” *Politička revija* (1): 1–24. DOI: 10.22182/pr.3912014.1
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2020. *Raspoznavanje izvorišta srpskog identiteta u drevnoj istoriji*. Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2022. „O savremenim pokušajima poništavanja srpskog identiteta na teritoriji Kosova i Metohije.” *Nacionalni interes* 43 (3): 9–49. DOI: 10.22182/ni.4332022.1
- Šuljagić, Sanja. 2024. „O zanemarenosti dodirnih odrednica u srpskom i bugarskom identitetu.” *Srpsko-bugarski odnosi – pitanja saradnje i perspektiva*, prir. Zoran Milošević, 85–104. Beograd: Institut za političke studije. DOI: 10.18485/ips_srbg.2024.ch3
- Каменский, Н. 1810. *Донесение Н. М. Каменского Н. П. Румйнцеву о готовности оказать сербам помощь после переправы русской армии за Дунаи № 37*. 08.04.1810. Букарешт: АВПР, ф. Канцелярия приступ јануар 2020. http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Serbien/XIX/1800-1820/Perv_serb_vosst_2/141-160/141.phtml?id=8758
- Толева, Теодора. 2012. *Влиянието на Австро – Унгарија за създаването на албанската нация 1896–1908*. Софија: Сiela.
- Троцкий, Леон. 1926. «Балканы и Балканская война» у Сочинения 1924-1927. Москва–Ленинград Государственное издательство.
- Войнович, Д. 2002. «История сербского народа. История Зеты и Черногории» у Сборник *История Югославии*. ур. Сергей Шумов и А. Андреев. Москва: Монолит-Евролинц-Традиция.

Сања Шуљагић*

Институт за политичке студије, Београд

О ПОДРЕЂЕНОСТИ ПОЛИТИКЕ РУСКОГ ЦАРСТВА ЗАПАДНОМ КОЛОНИЈАЛНОМ ПОХОДУ НА БАЛКАН У 19. ВЕКУ**

Резиме

У овом научном раду предмет истраживања је узрок недовољне подршке Руског царства српским и осталим балканским устаницима током успостављања модерне геополитичке констелације на Балканском полуострву у деветнаестом веку. Циљ истраживања је доказати да је узрок недовољне подршке Руског царства балканским устаницима у том периоду била идеолошка и геополитичка подређеност политике Руског царства западном колонијалном походу на Балканско полуострво у истом периоду. Применом аналитичко-синтетичке и компаративне методе приказано је да је идеолошка и геополитичка подређеност политике Руског царства западним политичким и економским интересима постала уочљива у периоду након што је Руско царство почело да представља препреку трговачким аспирацијама европских трговачких компанија према Индији и Далеком истоку. Од тог времена је почела антируска пропаганда у Енглеској и европским државама и касније војни и невојни походи представника европских држава на Руско царство. Као последица западне агенде „продора на исток” показало се да је након Бечког конгреса, 1815. године, утицај Руског царства на геополитичку констелацију на Балканском полуострву био у сенци европских политичких интереса.

Кључне речи: Карл Неселрод, Карађорђе, Јоанис Каподистриас, модерна Србија, модерна Грчка

* Имејл адреса: sanja.suljagic@ips.ac.rs

** Овај рад је настао у оквиру научноистраживачке делатности Института за политичке студије, коју финансира Министарство науке, технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије.

* This manuscript was submitted on December 10, 2024, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

REVIEWS

UDC 327::355.02(497.11)

DOI: 10.5937/spm90-57469

Review (Осврт)

Српска политичка мисао
(Serbian Political Thought)

No 2/2025.

vol. 90

pp. 197-203

*Nevena Jakovljević**

*University of Pristina with temporary seat in
Kosovska Mitrovica, Faculty of Philosophy*

R. A. REISS: NEUTRALITY IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE FACTS OF CRIME

The work of Dr. Uroš Šuvaković, a distinguished professor at the Faculty of Teacher Education, University of Belgrade, *R. A. Reiss: Neutrality is not possible in the face of crime* (Šuvaković 2024), is a very interesting read that encourages the reader to ask themselves about the sociological and historical aspects of Serbian tradition and culture, which, as the author himself states, we tend to forget. That is precisely why the idea of publishing this book on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the arrival of Rudolph Archibald Reiss (*Rudolph Archibald Reiss*, 1875–1929) in the Kingdom of Serbia and, at the same time, the 95th anniversary of the death of this great Serbian friend, is a reflection of the author's aspiration that what Reiss did for the Serbian people then, during and after the First World War, should not be forgotten. The author himself treats this book as a personal contribution to the “culture of memory” of Serbs, in the specific case of remembering the works of Archibald Reiss.

The book *R. A. Reiss: Neutrality in the Face of Crime* offers answers to some of the questions that should still be kept in mind today: who was Rodolphe Archibald Reiss, what were his ethical and moral views, what significance did his work have for the Serbian society of the time, but also what (apart from the historical) significance of his research

* E-mail: nevenanastic2@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0002-4781-8929

for contemporary Serbian society, how much Reiss contributed to the preservation of the Serbian “culture of memory,” what was his role in creating the perception of European public opinion about Serbs, etc.

Professor Šuvaković’s scientific monograph dedicated to Reiss contains, in addition to the preface and conclusion, a total of six chapters, and at the end of the book, there are notes on the works from which this book was created. Some of them have already been published previously, but in English, so they now seem more accessible to our, not only academic, public, while more than half of the text is completely new and based on Šuvaković’s research in the Historical Archives of Belgrade, the State Archives of Serbia, and the Archives of Yugoslavia.

What makes this book special is precisely the fact that it can be discussed from many different perspectives, including historical, sociological, cultural, criminological, pedagogical, and political. However, the author has largely opted for a sociological analysis of Reiss’s thought. Reiss has been written about before, but the significance of this book lies in the fact that Šuvaković is the first to analyze Reiss’s significance for Serbian society from a sociological perspective. This book is also different because the author has noticed that Reiss’s work, although it stretches back more than a century, can be viewed in a contemporary context. This book also identifies current problems in Serbian society and from which lessons can be drawn about how and what needs to be changed for Serbia’s progress.

One of the main goals of this book is “to show in which areas of sociological research Reiss’s scientific contribution is present, bearing in mind that it was never strictly research, but also educational” (Šuvaković 2024, 8). Analyzing the sociological (and criminological) aspect of Reiss’s work, Šuvaković showed that not much has changed in the tradition, culture, or even the pathology of Serbian society in the past hundred years. The essence is shown that “there are those who understand the problems of contemporary society, that in the world today there is an increasing number of critical sociologists who are trying to point out the devastating consequences for contemporary society” (Nastić 2021, 419).

In the first chapter of this book, Šuvaković notes Reiss’s role in researching and interpreting social stratification, focusing in particular on certain social classes, such as peasantry, intelligentsia, officers, and war veterans. Reiss courageously, as Šuvaković points out, pointed out the values but also the shortcomings of these social classes. As he explained, there is almost no difference in the behavior and consciousness of these

layers, what was happening in society then, and the behavior and actions of the same layers today. The same aspirations of those in power to remain in power, the desire to move from the countryside to the city for an easier “official” life, etc., still remain. Reiss calls the intelligentsia “a sower of discord when it should be uniting,” and he puts the term “intelligentsia” in quotation marks. He considers it a caste, “puffed up,” “cowardly,” “immoral beings,” a social stratum for which money is “the God before whom they kneel” (Reiss in: Šuvaković 2024, 14). Although Reiss considers this behavior of Serbs to be deeply traditional and culturally rooted, it should also be considered that, as Bazić and Perović state, a large role in forming such a climate is played by “great powers guided by their geopolitical and geostrategic interests[...], all the way to contemporary world powers” though, (Bazić and Perović 2016, 110).

After reviewing the aforementioned social strata, Professor Šuvaković elaborates on other issues of Reiss’s sociological contribution, devoting significant attention to the development of applied and special sociologies, criminology, political sociology, sociology of elites, and sociology of religion. It specifically focuses on the socio-political pathology, namely party corruption, as part of the party pathology, which was widespread in the state at that time; some authors (Marković Savić 2023), as well as the author of this book, show this using the example of post-October 5th Serbia, point out that it still exists today, and that society has not fundamentally changed much in this regard. Šuvaković repeatedly presents Reiss’s criticism of the professionalization of politicians and the fact that they (in most cases) engage in politics to enrich themselves and are characterized by weak moral virtues, fickleness, and lack the courage and strength to oppose the unprincipled demands that the party places before them. Cronyism was widespread, which further led to both administrative and systemic corruption. The author warns that even today, after so much time, not much has changed and that “the problems of socio-political pathology that the Kingdom of SHS faced then are equally relevant in modern times, at least as perceived by citizens, as indicated by new research” (Šuvaković 2024, 49).

In the third chapter, the author seeks to investigate the credibility, ethics, and morality of Archibald Reiss. He went to the Kingdom of Serbia during World War I to investigate information about the commission of planned and systematic crimes, with the conviction that such claims were exaggerated. Based on his own forensic investigation, he came to undeniable conclusions about mass and planned crimes, primarily against

the civilian population. This left a deep mark on him, after which he wholeheartedly helped the Serbian people and the army, which, among other things, influenced him to voluntarily join the Serbian army at that time. Šuvaković, using the example of Reiss, showed that the credibility, ethics, and morality of an “independent investigator” cannot be called into question, even by his direct alignment with one of the warring parties. Reiss fought for the right “to the freedom of a small people who were attacked by a great military power” (Šuvaković 2024, 67). He was so truthful that he even criticized Serbian society, which he deeply appreciated and respected, on several occasions.

In the second half of the book, Šuvaković presents Reiss’s observations on the crimes committed against Serbian civilians by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the communist movements that operated during and after World War I. Reiss typified these crimes, while the author of this book highlights only the most common ones, according to Reiss’s report submitted at the Paris Peace Conference.

Professor Šuvaković presents an overview of Reiss’s reports and the observed “socio-economic living conditions of the people in Macedonia and the social changes that occurred in this part of the Kingdom of SHS after the end of the First World War” (Šuvaković 2024, 81). Those social changes that occurred in the post-war period were under the auspices of Bulgarian and Albanian terrorist movements with the aim of dismembering Serbia and enriching individuals. Also, in his analysis, the author, based on two Reiss reports, which are part of the archival materials of the Marambo Fund of the Archives of Yugoslavia, points to Reiss’s finding of the pronounced arrogance and corruption of all layers of bureaucracy in Southern Serbia (Macedonia), and that many of the representatives of the “new authorities” were actually simply retrained and continued their cooperation with the Bulgarian government with the aim of Bulgarianizing the population in the post-war period. Šuvaković particularly emphasizes Reiss’s finding, based on research into the genesis of the movement, that the Komitas were not some “Macedonian” indigenous movement but rather bandits and terrorists who were trained on the territory of Bulgaria, organized by Bulgarian officials, and inserted into the territory of the Kingdom of SHS with the aim of destabilizing it. In addition, there was also cooperation with the Kachaks, who were brought into this area from the newly created Albania.

This book also reveals that Reiss, a year before his death, intended to leave the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in protest against

the insufficient nurturing of the “culture of memory” on the glorious day of Serbian warfare in World War I. Although he personally contributed to the commemoration of significant historical events, Reiss believed that the issue was not approached in an organized manner, pointing out that the forgetting of heroic days particularly affected the urban population. His effort advocacy to mark the tenth anniversary of the breakthrough of the Salonika Front with a campaign to Kajmakchalan, together with French fighters from Salonika, despite initial acceptance, was ultimately thwarted by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (V. Marinković), who simply canceled the visit of the French fighters. This was the reason for Reiss to demonstratively announce that he was leaving the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. However, at the request of his comrades, he changed his mind at the Congress of War Invalids in October 1928 in Bitola and decided to remain in Yugoslavia.

In the last chapter of the book, its complete actualization is carried out by drawing a parallel between Archibald Reiss and Dick Marty (*Dick Marty*, 1945–2023), pointing to both as examples of honorable Swiss who have, in different periods, made great contributions to Serbia, with, according to Šuvaković’s analysis, Reiss’s moral imperative being more sublime. He is not afraid of engagement, nor does he accept the stereotypes imposed by the media; he strives for the truth to see the light of day and is not afraid to say, in his lecture at the Sorbonne, that “neutrality is not possible in the face of crime,” which Šuvaković quite consciously chose for the title of this monograph.

Another characteristic of the book is that each chapter begins with a single quote, each of which “hits” the very core of the issue being addressed in that chapter. We are convinced that Šuvaković very consciously and carefully selected these quotes, three of which are by Reiss, while the rest are either by Reiss’s co-authors, or were quoted by Reiss himself, or are quotes from others regarding Reiss and his work, expressing at least through some of them his own position on some of the issues addressed. Therefore, they deserve to be mentioned:

First chapter: “Many members of the ‘intelligentsia’ would coldly sacrifice freedom, and the survival of their country, if it were to their personal advantage” (R. A. Reiss, *Listen, Serbs*);

Chapter Two: “The domination of politics over the entire human and national life, immoral, selfish and partisan politics, has been a long and unfortunate tradition of Serbian politics since the beginning of the creation of the modern Serbian state” (D. Ćosić “Afterword,” in *Listen, Srbi*);

Chapter Three: “Neutrality is not possible in the face of crime” (R. A. Reiss, lecture at the Sorbonne in 1916, according to *Listen, Srbi*);

Chapter Four: “Not even the unfortunate Serbia itself, whose magnificent glory is admired by everyone at this moment, cries out for revenge. It seeks only justice” (A. Bonasie, in R. A. Reiss, A. Bonasie, *Indictment against Bulgaria*);

Chapter Five: “If black clouds once again gather over this country, it should not surprise her, for it will be nothing more than what her own people have been preparing for her. I am utterly disappointed” (R. A. Rice, *Politics*, September 11, 1928);

Chapter Six: “With the exception of a few negligible cases, Albanians of all denominations are wholeheartedly with the Central Powers and rejoice in the failures of Serbia and its allies” (Dr. Turtulis, 1916, in R. A. Reiss, *War Reports from Serbia and the Salonika Front*).

The one and only conclusion that arises after reading the book R. A. Reiss: *Neutrality in the Face of Crime is Not Possible* by Professor Uroš Šuvaković is that it provides a new and, as we have already emphasized, different insight into Reiss’s work and the findings of his research during and after the First World War. With this book, Šuvaković clearly pointed out Reiss’s sociological and, especially, criminological contribution to the study of Serbian (Yugoslav) interwar society, while at the same time, Šuvaković made his own scientific sociological contribution, primarily when it comes to the history of Yugoslav (Serbian) sociology between the two world wars, historical sociology (Antonić 1995, 50–52) and the culture of memory. The monograph provides insight into the social analysis of the society of the time with comprehensive and systematized knowledge about the events that took place in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Serbs while creating a vertical in relation to Serbian society a century later. A very inspiring book that can be read in one sitting but remains in the mind for a long time, and which will be useful not only for future researchers of Reiss’s thought, criminologists, historians, and sociologists but also for the general public. Let it not be forgotten!

REFERENCES

- Antonić, Slobodan. 1995. *Izazovi istorijske sociologije*. Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
- Bazić, Jovan, and Blagica Perović. 2016. „Ljubiša Mitrović o Kosovu i Metohiji.” U: *Prometejska sociologija u stvaralaštvu Ljubiše Mitrovića*, ur. Gordana Đigić, 99–115. Niš: Filozofski fakultet.
- Marković Savić, Olivera. 2023. *Od zaštitnika do štićenika: sociološka studija o ratnim veteranima u Srbiji*. Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Prištini.
- Nastić, Nevena. 2021. „Sociološke marginalije na savremene teme (ogledi).” *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini*, 51(2): 417 –422. DOI:10.5937/ZRFFP51-29250
- Šuvaković, Uroš. 2024. *R. A. Rajs: Pred zločinom nije moguća neutralnost*. Novi Sad: Matica srpska; Arhiv Vojvodine, Beograd; Fakultet za obrazovanje učitelja i vaspitača Univerziteta u Beogradu.

* This review was submitted on March 13, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

Mile Obrenović*

*Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade*

SECURITY STRATEGIES OF MILITARY-NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS



Kostić Šulejić, Marina. 2024. *Vojna neutralnost i nuklearno oružje: između posedovanja i zabrane – slučaj Evrope i opcije za Srbiju*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 247 str.

Although each country has different national interests, their most fundamental and common interest is survival. However, the interest in survival can be pursued through various strategies (policies and means). Dr. Marina Kostić Šulejić, in her monograph “Military Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons: Between Possession and Prohibition – The Case of Europe and Options for Serbia,” specifically examines the ways in which states can secure their survival, particularly those that are militarily neutral and do not benefit from the protection of military alliances. The additional value of the monograph lies in the fact that the subject of analysis is narrowed exclusively to nuclear weapons, thus linking military neutrality and nuclear weapons directly. This is because states that possess nuclear weapons believe that their primary value lies in providing a deterrent effect. In line with this belief, the question arises: “Should a militarily neutral country be primarily focused on strengthening its military capabilities so that it can independently deter any potential attack, including with nuclear weapons, and in case deterrence

* E-mail: mile.obrenovic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; ORCID: 0009-0007-1215-4372

fails, prevail in a conflict, or should it be primarily focused on promoting a policy of peace, arms control, and disarmament, without strong military offensive capabilities?” (Kostić Šulejić 2024, 21-22). Since this concerns nuclear weapons, it implies considering whether a militarily neutral state should aim to acquire or prohibit nuclear weapons to secure its survival. In addition to the strategic choice itself, it is also discussed “what determines the neutral state’s decision on whether it will turn to one or the other model of the relationship between military neutrality and nuclear armament?” (Kostić Šulejić 2024, 22). Given that some militarily neutral countries in Europe – all three militarily neutral EU member states – have opted for the policy of banning nuclear weapons by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (adopted in 2017 and entered into force in 2021), while others have stayed outside of this Treaty, the central question posed in the monograph is: Why did all three militarily neutral EU member states choose to adopt the ban on nuclear weapons while others have not yet done so, and is the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by Serbia, as a militarily neutral state and a candidate for EU membership, a “logical choice” for it?

The monograph “Military Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons: Between Possession and Prohibition – The Case of Europe and Options for Serbia” consists of five parts, with the first being the Introduction and the last the Conclusion. In the central three parts, the author first examines the relationship between security strategies based on deterrence and disarmament, presents the process of formulating the ban on nuclear weapons through the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and constructs a model of military neutrality that favors nuclear disarmament. The third chapter of the book is dedicated to determining the connection between military neutrality and nuclear weapons in European countries, with an emphasis on analyzing those factors that influence the decision on (non) possession of nuclear weapons, which the author has previously identified. These factors are: a) the origin of military neutrality, b) the attitude toward the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly India and the USSR in the early phases of their independence; c) public opinion on NATO and the concept of deterrence; d) the level of development of the defense industry (especially considering whether a militarily neutral state was restricted in developing its armed

capabilities); e) the attitude toward nuclear energy; f) nuclear weapons programs; g) views and activities regarding nuclear disarmament (Kostić Šulejić 2024, 14-15).

In the case of the militarily neutral countries Switzerland and Sweden (which was a militarily neutral country when it developed its military nuclear program), the following common characteristics can be observed: a long history of military neutrality, which is not an end in itself but a tool in achieving interests, i.e., a form of practical foreign and security policy, and therefore not part of the constitutions of these countries; good relations with countries from the Non-Aligned Movement; a tendency towards interoperability with the NATO alliance; a positive attitude towards the concept of deterrence (a strategic approach to neutrality based on the development of their own forces through compulsory military service and the development of the defense industry); a positive attitude towards nuclear energy and the construction of nuclear power plants; the existence of nuclear weapons programs; as a result, giving central importance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. On the other hand, when it comes to EU member states that prohibit nuclear weapons (Austria,

Ireland, and Malta), the following observations are made: in the cases of Austria and Malta, neutrality is internationally agreed upon and included in the constitutions of these countries; a positive attitude towards the Non-Aligned Movement and the significant role of the USSR; a negative stance on NATO membership; a negative stance on the concept of deterrence in favor of positive/active neutrality, i.e., promoting a peaceful policy (diplomacy and disarmament); low levels of investment in defense systems; a negative attitude towards the construction of nuclear power plants; the absence of nuclear weapons development programs in their history, and in the case of Austria, a contractual prohibition on creating such weapons; both the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons have been signed. Finally, when it comes to countries in Europe that are not EU members but support the ban on nuclear weapons (the Holy See, San Marino, and Liechtenstein), the author identifies the following common characteristics: a negative attitude towards the concept of deterrence in favor of positive/active neutrality; low investment in defense systems; a negative attitude towards nuclear energy; both the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons have been signed. From the above,

Dr. Kostić Šulejić concludes that what most divides militarily neutral states advocating nuclear disarmament from those with a positive attitude towards nuclear weapons are a negative attitude towards the concept of deterrence, low investments in defense systems, a negative attitude towards nuclear energy; the previous absence of nuclear weapons programs, and as a result, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

In order to determine whether Serbia is closer to the “model” of militarily neutral countries that have a positive or negative attitude towards nuclear weapons and whether the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a logical choice for it, the author in the fourth chapter first examines the historical relationship towards nuclear weapons. This relationship fluctuated between two options: from Yugoslav activities aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons after the failure of the international community to achieve complete nuclear disarmament to the full prohibition of nuclear energy. From 1945 to 1948, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) aligned its stance with the USSR and supported its ideas on nuclear disarmament. Following the deterioration of relations with the USSR, from 1948 to 1955, Yugoslavia pursued an independent

policy on nuclear disarmament. It was emphasized that nuclear disarmament was a technical matter in relation to the true goal, which was the improvement of relations among states (it was not enough to just eliminate nuclear weapons, but also the incentives for war). In the later period, from 1955 onward, the attitudes toward nuclear energy and nuclear weapons changed. A clear intention emerged within the Yugoslav leadership to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but also to explore the possibilities for the development of Yugoslav nuclear weapons. Due to a lack of finances and uranium, as well as the onset of the state’s disintegration process, the nuclear weapons program never reached higher levels. Although plans for the construction of a larger number of nuclear power plants in Yugoslavia were made, only one, in Krško, was built, and in 1989, the complete halt of new nuclear power plant construction was implemented. Additionally, during Tito’s leadership, Yugoslavia was a proponent of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe, including the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and proposed and supported numerous resolutions at the United Nations related to nuclear disarmament. Yugoslavia was also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement but with an ambivalent stance towards

the USSR. Moreover, one of the factors influencing the choice of a militarily neutral country regarding nuclear weapons was Yugoslavia's developed defense industry.

Finally, regarding Serbia, Kostić Šulejić highlights its similarities with the countries of the "nuclear deterrence model" (Switzerland and Sweden), which are reflected in the following aspects: neutrality as a form of pragmatic policy to preserve security and expand foreign policy options, and therefore not part of the constitution; a positive attitude towards the strategy of deterrence; a desire to maintain a strong military through increased investment in the defense system; historical experience in the nuclear weapons program; membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and rejection of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (due to the significant influence of nuclear powers on Serbia, which

reject this Treaty, and Serbia's desire to maintain good relations with them). What makes Serbia similar to the countries of the "nuclear weapon ban model" are its history of advocating for nuclear disarmament, the existing ban on the construction of nuclear power plants in Serbia until 2024, and its continued strong opposition to potential NATO membership. Considering all of the above, the author concludes that Serbia is closer to the Swiss-Swedish "model," which is why the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is not entirely a "logical" choice for Serbia. However, there are elements of historical experience and policies towards nuclear energy, both in foreign policy and security terms, that may lead Serbia to choose the prohibition of nuclear weapons as the only option for ensuring survival and reducing the possibility of a nuclear conflict.

* This book review was submitted on March 1, 2025, and accepted by the Editorial Board for publishing on April 14, 2025.

AUTHOR GUIDELINES

The academic journal *Serbian Political Thought* publishes articles that result from the latest theoretical and empirical research in the field of political science. Authors should refer mainly to the results of scientific research published in academic journals, primarily in political science journals.

Manuscripts should be submitted in Serbian (Cyrillic script) with a mandatory English translation, or in English.

The journal is published six times a year. The deadlines for submitting the manuscripts are February 1st, April 1st, June 1st, August 1st, October 1st, and December 1st.

Two consecutive issues cannot contain articles written by the same author, whether single-authored or co-authored.

Papers are submitted to the Editorial Board by uploading them to the CEON platform using the following link: <https://aseestant.ceon.rs/index.php/spm/login>.

Authors are obliged to submit a signed and scanned declaration of authorship when submitting their works. The declaration form can be downloaded from the journal's website: https://www.ips.ac.rs/en/magazines/srpska-politicka-misao/authors_directions/

All submitted manuscripts are checked for plagiarism or auto-plagiarism. Various forms of chat boxes and other artificial intelligence software cannot be (co)authors of the papers under consideration. These tools can only be used for stylistic language editing, not for writing sections of the paper, and authors who use them are obliged to specify the purpose of using such tools at the point where they are used.

Authors are required to provide their ORCID numbers along with their (preferably) institutional email addresses, which they include in the manuscript text in a footnote alongside their names and surnames.

Research articles can have up to 40,000 characters with spaces, including footnotes. When counting the characters leave out the reference list. Exceptionally, a monographic study can be larger in scope in accordance with the provisions of *the Rulebook on procedure, method of evaluation, and quantitative presentation of scientific research results*.

Reviews can have up to 15,000 characters with spaces.

Book reviews can have up to 10,000 characters with spaces.

CITING AND REFERENCING

The journal *Serbian Political Thought* uses a partially modified Chicago style of citation (17th edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*), which implies specifying bibliographic parentheses (brackets) according to the author-date system in the text, as well as a list of references with full bibliographic data after the text of the paper.

Data in bibliographic parentheses and the list of references should be written in Latin script.

Below are the rules and examples for citing the bibliographic information in the reference list and in the text. For each type of source, a citation rule is given first, followed by an example of citation in the reference list and bibliographic parenthesis.

The bibliographic parenthesis is usually set off at the end of the sentence, before the punctuation mark. It contains the author's surname, the year of publication, and page numbers pointing to a specifically contextual page or range of pages, as in the following example: (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17).

Books

Books with one author

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

(Mearsheimer 2001)

Books with two or three authors

Surname, Name, and Name Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

(Brady and Collier 2010, 211)

Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

(Pollitt, Birchall and Putman 1998)

Books with four or more authors

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, Name and Surname, and Name and Surname. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Pollitt, Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen [Pollitt *et al.*]. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

(Pollitt *et al.* 2005)

Editor(s) or translator(s) in place of the author(s)

Surname, Name, Name and Surname, ed. Year of publication. *Title*. Place of publication: Publisher.

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostigoy [Kaltwasser *et al.*], eds. 2017. *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Kaltwasser *et al.* 2017)

Chapter in an edited book

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the chapter." In *Title*, ed. Name Surname, pages range. Place of publication: Publisher.

Lošonc, Alpar. 2019. "Discursive dependence of politics with the confrontation between republicanism and neoliberalism." In *Discourse and Politics*, eds. Dejana M. Vukasović and Petar Matić, 23?46. Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies.

(Lošonc 2019)

Journal Articles

Regular issue

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Journal* Volume, if available (issue): page range. DOI.

Ellwood, David W. 2018. "Will Brexit Make or Break Great Britain?" *Serbian Political Thought* 18 (2): 5?14. DOI: 10.22182/spt.18212018.1.

(Ellwood 2018)

Newspapers and magazines

Signed articles

Surname, Name. Year of publication. "Title of the article." *Newspaper/Magazine* Date: page range.

Clark, Phil. 2018. "Rwanda's Recovery: When Remembrance is Official Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2018: 35–41.

(Clark 2018)

Unsigned articles

Title of the newspaper/magazine. Year of publication. "Title of the article." Date: page range.

New York Times. 2002. "In Texas, Ad Heats Up Race for Governor." July 30, 2002.

(*New York Times* 2002)

Corporate Author

Name of the corporate author [acronym if needed]. Year of publication. *Title of the publication.* Place of publication: Publisher.

International Organization for Standardization ?ISO?. 2019. *Moving from ISO 9001:2008 to ISO 9001:2015.* Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.

(International Organization for Standardization ?ISO? 2019) – *The first in-text citation*

(ISO 2019) – *Second and all subsequent citations*

Legal and Public Documents

Sections, articles, or paragraphs can be cited in the parentheses. They should be appropriately abbreviated.

Constitutions and laws

The title of the legislative act [acronym if needed], "Official Gazette of the state" and the number of the official gazette, or the webpage and the date of last access.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 98/06.

(The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 33)

The Law on Foreign Affairs [LFA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 116/2007, 126/2007, and 41/2009.

(LFA 2009, Art. 17)

Succession Act [SA], “Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia”, No. 48/03, 163/03, 35/05, 127/13, and 33/15 and 14/19.

(SA 2019, Art. 3)

An Act to make provision for and in connection with offences relating to offensive weapons [Offensive Weapons Act], 16th May 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/17/pdfs/ukpga_20190017_en.pdf, last accessed 20 December 2019.

(Offensive Weapons Act 2019)

Legislative acts of the European Union

The title of the legislative act, the number of the official gazette, the publication date, and the number of the page in the same format as on the *EUR-lex* website: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.

(Regulation 182/2011, Art. 3)

Web sources

Surname, Name, or name of the corporate author [acronym]. Year of publication or n.d. – if the year of publication cannot be determined. “The name of the web page.” *The name of the website*. Date of creation, modification, or the last access to the web page, if the date cannot be determined from the source. URL.

Bilefsky, Dan, and Ian Austen. 2019. “Trudeau Re-election Reveals Intensified Divisions in Canada.” *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/world/canada/trudeau-re-elected.html>.

(Bilefsky and Austen 2019)

Institute for Political Studies [IPS]. n.d. “The 5th International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth.” *Institute for Political Studies*. Last accessed 7 December 2019. <http://www.ips.ac.rs/en/news/the-5th-international-economic-forum-on-reform-transition-and-growth/>.

(Institute for Political Studies [IPS] n.d.) – *First in-text citation*

(IPS n.d.) – *Second and every subsequent citation*

Associated Press [AP]. 2019. “AP to present VoteCast results at AAPOR pooling conference.” May 14, 2019. <https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2019/ap-to-present-votecast-results-at-aapor-polling-conference>.

(AP 2019)

Special cases of referencing

Citing editions other than the first

Surname, Name. Year of publication. *Title*, edition number. Place of publication: Publisher.

Bull, Hedley. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edition. New York: Columbia University Press.

(Bull 2012)

Multiple sources of the same author

1) *Multiple sources by the same author* should be arranged chronologically by year of publication in ascending order.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (4): 381–396. DOI: 10.1093/cjip/poq016.

2) *Multiple sources by the same author from the same year* should be alphabetized by title, with lowercase letters attached to the year. Those letters should be used in parenthetical citations as well.

Walt, Stephen M. 2018a. *The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

(Walt 2018a)

Walt, Stephen M. 2018b. “Rising Powers and the Risk of War: A Realist View of Sino-American Relations.” In *Will China’s Rise be Peaceful: Security, Stability and Legitimacy*, ed. Asle Toje. 13–32. New York: Oxford University Press.

(Walt 2018b)

3) *Single-authored sources precede multiauthored sources beginning with the same surname* or written by the same person.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. "Clarifying convergence. Striking similarities and durable differences in public management reform." *Public Management Review* 3 (4): 471–492. DOI: 10.1080/14616670110071847.

Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

4) *Multiauthored sources with the same name and surname* as the first author should continue to be alphabetized by the second author's surname.

Pollitt Christopher, Johnston Birchall, and Keith Putman. 1998. *Decentralising Public Service Management*. London: Macmillan Press.

Pollitt Christopher, Colin Talbot, Janice Caulfield, and Amanda Smullen. 2005. *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Special cases of parenthetical citation

Exceptions to the rule of placing the parenthetical citation at the end of a sentence

1) If the *author is mentioned in the text*, even if used in a possessive form, the year must follow in parenthesis, and page numbers should be put in the brackets at the end of the sentence.

For the assessment, see Kaltwasser *et al.* (2017) ... (112).

According to Ellwood (2018) ... (7).

2) When *quoting directly*, if the name of the author precedes the quotation, the year and page numbers must follow in parenthesis.

Mearsheimer (2001, 28) claims that: "...".

3) When *using the same source multiple times in one paragraph*, the parenthetical citation should be placed either after the last reference (or at the end of the paragraph, preceding the final period) if the same page (or page range) is cited more than once, or at the first reference, whereas the subsequent citations should only include page numbers.

Do not use *ibid* or *op. cit.* with repeated citations.

Using brief phrases such as “see”, “compare” etc.

Those phrases should be enclosed within the parenthesis.

(see: Ellwood 2018)

Using secondary source

When using a secondary source, the original source should be cited in parenthesis, followed by “quoted/cited in” and the secondary source. The reference list should only include the secondary source.

“Its authority was greatly expanded by the constitutional revision of 1988, and the Court of Arbitration can now be regarded as a ‘genuine constitutional court’” (De Winter and Dumont 2009, 109 cited in: Lijphart 2012, 39–40).

Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd edition. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Multiple sources within the same parentheses

1) When *multiple sources* are cited, they should be separated by semicolons.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 34; Ellwood 2018, 7)

2) When *multiple sources by the same author*, but published in different years are cited, the name of the author is cited only the first time. The different years are separated by commas or by semicolons where page numbers are cited.

(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010) or (Mearsheimer 2001, 15–17; 2010, 390)

3) When *different authors share the same surname*, include the first initial in the parenthesis.

(M. Chiti 2004, 40), (E. Chiti 2004, 223)

Chiti, Edoardo. 2004. “Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 219–236.

Chiti, Mario. 2004. “Forms of European Administrative Action.” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68 (1): 37–57.

TEXT FORMATTING

General guidelines for writing the manuscript

The manuscript should be written in Word, in the following manner:

- Paper size: A4;
- Margins: Normal 2.54 cm;
- Use Times New Roman font (plain letters) to write the text, unless specified otherwise;
- Line spacing: 1.5;
- Footnote line spacing: 1;
- Title font size: 14 pt;
- Subtitles font size: 12 pt;
- Text font size: 12 pt;
- Footnote font size: 10 pt;
- Tables, charts and figures font size: 10 pt;
- Use Paragraph/Special/First line at 1.27 cm;
- Text alignment: Justify;
- Font color: Automatic;
- Page numbering: Arabian numerals in lower right corner;
- Do not break the words manually by inserting hyphens to continue the word in the next line;
- Save the manuscript in the .doc format.

Research article manuscript preparation

The manuscript should be prepared in the following manner:

*Name and surname of the first author**

* Footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended. ORCID:

Affiliation

*Name and surname of the second author***

** Footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended. ORCID:

Affiliation

TITLE OF THE PAPER***

*** Footnote: if necessary, specify one of the following (or similar) data: 1) the name and number of the project; 2) the proceeding where the manuscript was presented under the same or similar title; 3) statements of gratitude.

Abstract

Abstract, within 100–250 words range, contains the subject, aim, theoretical and methodological approach, results and conclusions of the paper.

Keywords: Below the abstract, five to ten **key words** should be written. Key words should be written in roman font and separated by commas.

The manuscript can have maximally three levels of subtitles. **Subtitles** should not be numbered. They should be used in the following manner:

FIRST LEVEL SUBTITLE

Second level subtitle

Third level subtitle

Tables, charts, and figures should be inserted in the following manner:

- Above the table/chart/figure, center the name of the Table, Chart or Figure, an Arabic numeral, and the title in Times New Roman font;
- Below the table/chart/figure, the source should be cited in the following manner: 1) if the table/chart/figure is taken from another source, write down *Source:* and include the parenthetical citation information of the source; or 2) if the table/chart/figure is not taken from another source, write down *Source: Author.*

Use in-text references according to *Citing and referencing*.

Use the footnotes solely to provide remarks or broader explanations.

REFERENCES

References should be listed after the text of the paper, before the Resume in the following manner:

- the first line of each reference should be left indented, and the remaining lines should be placed as hanging by 1.27 cm using the option Paragraph/Special/Hanging;
- all the references should be listed together, without separating legal acts of archives;
- the references should not be numbered;
- list only the references used in the text.

After the reference list, write the name and surname of the author, the title of the paper and resume in Serbian in the following manner:

Име и презиме првог аутора*

* Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора. ORCID:

Установа запослења

Име и презиме другог аутора**

** Фуснота: Имејл-адреса аутора: Препоручује се навођење институционалне имејл-адресе аутора. ORCID:

Установа запослења

НАСЛОВ РАДА***

*** Фуснота: по потреби, навести један од следећих (или сличних) података: 1) назив и број пројекта у оквиру кога је чланак написан; 2) да је рад претходно изложен на научном скупу у виду усменог саопштења под истим или сличним називом 3) исказ захвалности.

Резиме

Resume (Резиме) up to 1/10 length of the paper contains the results and conclusions of the paper which are presented in greater scope than in the abstract.

Keywords (Кључне речи): Keywords should be written in Times New Roman font and separated by commas.

Review preparation

A review should be prepared in the same manner as the research article, but leaving out the abstract, keywords, resume, or book cover.

Book review preparation

When writing book reviews, split the text into **two columns**. Book reviews should be prepared in the following manner:

<p><i>Name and surname of the author</i>[*]</p> <p>[*] In the footnote: E-mail address: The institutional e-mail address is strongly recommended. ORCID:</p> <p><i>Affiliation</i></p> <p>TITLE OF THE BOOK REVIEW^{***}</p> <p>^{***} Footnote: if necessary, specify one of the following (or similar) data: 1) the name and number of the project; 2) the proceeding where the manuscript was presented under the same or similar title; 3) statements of gratitude.</p>	<p>Below the title place the image of the front cover;</p> <p>Below the image of the front cover list the book details according to the following rule:</p> <p>Name and surname of the author. Year of publication. <i>Title of the book</i>. Place of publication: Publisher, total number of pages.</p> <p>The text of the book review should be prepared following the guidelines of the research article preparation.</p>
---	---

REVIEWERS' GUIDELINES

The role of reviewers is to contribute to maintaining the high quality of our journal. All submitted manuscripts undergo a double-blind peer review, ensuring anonymity in both directions.

Requests for peer review are submitted through the SCIndeks Assistant system. The deadline for accepting or declining the review request is seven days from receipt, while the review itself must be completed within two weeks of receiving the request. The content of the review is confidential and must not be disclosed to individuals outside the journal's Editorial board. If, at any point, a reviewer becomes aware of any conflict of interest related to the manuscript under review, they are required to inform the Editorial board as soon as possible.

When reviewing a manuscript, the reviewer is required to complete the attached review form:

Title of the manuscript:

Relevance, social, and scientific significance of the topic under consideration:

To what extent has the author clearly outlined the theoretical and methodological approach in the manuscript?

Is the manuscript based on contemporary and relevant literature, particularly in terms of the author's use of the latest research published in scientific journals and conference proceedings (especially in political science journals and proceedings)?

Scientific and social contribution of the manuscript. General comments on the quality of the manuscript:

Suggestions for the author on how to improve the quality of the manuscript, if necessary:

Please select one of the recommendations for categorizing the manuscript:

1. Original research article
2. Review article
3. Scientific critique, polemic, or commentary

Please select one of the recommendations regarding the publication of this manuscript:

1. Publish without revision
2. Publish with minor revisions

3. After revision, submit for a new round of review
4. Reject

Additional comments for the editor regarding ethical concerns (e.g., plagiarism, fraud) or other aspects of the article that may assist in making a final decision on its status.

Date of review:

Reviewer's name, surname, and academic title:

The use of chatbots and other artificial intelligence software is strictly prohibited in the preparation of reviews.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

32

СРПСКА политичка мисао = Serbian Political Thought / главни и одговорни уредник Миша Стојадиновић. - Vol. 1, бр. 1/4 (1994)- .
- Београд : Институт за политичке студије, 1994- (Београд : Донат граф). - 23 cm

Двомесечно. - Текст на срп. и енгл. језику. - Преузео је: Serbian Political Thought = ISSN 1450-5460. - Друго издање на другом медијуму: Српска политичка мисао (CD-ROM изд.) =

ISSN 1452-3108

ISSN 0354-5989 = Српска политичка мисао

COBISS.SR-ID 102782215



1994

СРПСКА
Политичка
МИСАО

THOUGHT
POLITICAL
SERBIAN



ISSN 0354-5989 UDC 32 year XXXII vol. 90 No. 2/2025.



9 770354 598003