

Оригинални научни рад  
УДС: 94:327(497.11-98)"18"  
323.13(=18)(497.11-89)"18"  
doi: 10.5937/zrffp54-54366

# THE PRINCIPALITY OF SERBIA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE ALBANIANS IN THE 1860S: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DYNAMICS DURING A DECADE OF CHANGE


Danko Lj. LEOVAC<sup>1</sup>

Žarko D. ILIĆ<sup>2</sup>

University of Belgrade  
Faculty of Philosophy  
Department of History  
Belgrade (Serbia)

---

<sup>1</sup> danko.leovac@f.bg.ac.rs;  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6696-4871>

<sup>2</sup> zarko.ilic95@yahoo.com;  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3675-4424>

Примљен: 3. 9. 2024.  
Прихваћен: 2. 12. 2024.

## THE PRINCIPALITY OF SERBIA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE ALBANIANS IN THE 1860S: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DYNAMICS DURING A DECADE OF CHANGE<sup>3</sup>

### *Keywords:*

Principality of Serbia;  
Albanians/Arnauts;  
Prince Mihailo Obrenović;  
Ilija Garašanin;  
Russian politics;  
Nikolay P. Ignatyev;  
Balkans.

*Abstract.* The paper discusses the evolving role of the Albanian population in the national strategies of the Principality of Serbia during the mid-19th century, particularly in relation to Ilija Garašanin's influential policy document *Načertanije*. Garašanin's vision emphasized cooperation with neighboring Balkan nations, recognizing that Serbia could not achieve its goals against Ottoman rule on its own. Although initially sidelined in Serbian plans, the Albanians were identified as potential worthy allies for establishing alternative trade routes and fostering loyalty to Serbia. The Serbian government attempted to gather intelligence on Albanian sentiments and establish connections with local leaders through a network of agents. Despite sporadic efforts and some initial successes, significant progress was limited until Russian influence began to shape Serbian policy more decisively. Ignatyev's correspondence further underscored the importance of engaging with the Albanians, leading to renewed attempts to forge negotiations. The situation on the ground was markedly different: no substantial military organization had been established in Albania, and any potential action depended on unreliable agents who struggled to unite the Albanian chiefs.

---

<sup>3</sup> The paper is a result of research done at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, supported by the Ministry of Science, Technological Development, and Innovation (451-03-66/2024-03/200163).

After the establishment of the Principality of Serbia in 1830 as an autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire, support for Serb populations in foreign and remote areas became quite generous. This assistance primarily manifested through material support for churches, monasteries, and schools, as well as unofficial aid to various movements aimed at liberation from Ottoman rule (Јагодић, 2018, pp. 50–101; Савић, 2021, pp. 313–316). The Principality of Serbia established a clear direction and strategy for its national policy in the mid-1840s, following Ilija Garašanin's appointment as Minister of the Interior in 1843. His connections with Polish émigrés during his stay in Constantinople in 1841 proved crucial for the development of his most significant work on Serbian national politics, *Načertanije*. The fundamental principles outlined in *Načertanije* advocated for the restoration of the former medieval Serbian state based on historical rights, proposing two primary avenues to achieve this: first, the division of the Ottoman Empire in Europe by the Great Powers; and second, the establishment of new states by Ottoman subjects. To realize the goals articulated in Garašanin's document, cooperation with other Balkan nations was essential. It was evident that the small Principality, established just over a decade earlier, could not bear the burden of the impending struggle on its own. This cooperation envisioned a general uprising involving populations from Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and central regions of the Balkan Peninsula (Страњаковић, 2005, pp. 327–440; Љушић, 2003, pp. 187–202; Јагодић, 2016, pp. 94–95; Савић, 2021, pp. 301–303; Никифоров, 2016, pp. 91–93).

Among the peoples surrounding the Principality of Serbia, the Albanian population had to find its place in *Načertanije*. Although Zah and Garašanin did not focus on this ethnic group in their plans, unlike the Bulgarians or the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one key aspect of Serbian policy concerning them was clearly articulated. Specifically, to provide alternative trade routes beyond those leading north, one potential direction was toward the Adriatic Sea coast, particularly Ulcinj. In this location, Serbia intended to deploy an agent who would also exert influence over the Albanians residing in Upper Albania.<sup>4</sup> This indicates that

---

<sup>4</sup> On the meaning of this term in *Načertanije*, see Илић, 2023, pp. 152–156.

the Albanian people were viewed as a potential factor in the future political plans of the Principality of Serbia, which aimed to liberate the Balkan Christians from Ottoman rule. It was essential to establish connections between the Principality of Serbia and Albanian leaders, thereby strengthening influence and fostering a sense of loyalty to the Serbian state among the Albanian population (Љушић, 2003, pp. 152–156). Additionally, Serbian national plans developed during the 1840s and 1850s identified northern Albania as part of the envisioned Serbian state. The rationale for this included not only historical claims—central to all discussions about future borders—but also economic considerations (Јагодић, 2016, pp. 95–103; Савић, 2021, pp. 205–208).

Among the key strategies outlined in *Načertanije* to achieve its goals was collecting information on the regions and sentiments of the populations with whom cooperation was envisioned. This involved sending agents tasked with visiting these regions to gather intelligence on the local population and their circumstances. The establishment of an agent network in the Principality of Serbia began after Garašanin's appointment as Minister of the Interior, who played a pivotal role in its creation. Funding was essential for organizing agents in areas under Ottoman and Habsburg control. Starting in early 1845, the Ministry of the Interior allocated a budget for extraordinary expenses, which—in addition to monitoring Obrenović's supporters—was also used to finance national policies, including the agent network (Јагодић, 2024, pp. 382–383).

By 1847, "Arnautluk"<sup>5</sup> was recognized as a territory for political action by the Principality of Serbia, and references to the first agent in Đakovica emerged. However, until 1849, there were no agents among the Albanian population south of the Šar Mountains, limiting Serbian intelligence operations to Kosovo and Метохија. In 1848, Milija Dragičević visited Dečane, Peć, and Prizren to gather data, reporting widespread dissatisfaction among the Albanians regarding tax payments. He also discovered that it was possible to influence the Albanians by bribing local elders, particularly among the Mirdites (Јагодић, 2016, p. 117; Јагодић, 2024, p. 403). In 1849, efforts to understand the conditions and attitudes of the Albanians intensified. According to *The Constitution Mandating the Conduct of Political Propaganda in Slavic-Turkish Regions* (*Устави јолиитичне пројајанде имајући се водити у земљама славено-турским*), the area of Serbian political action was divided into northern and southern zones, with Catholic priest Gašpar Krasnik, originally from Janjevo, active in the southern region from his base in Shkodër. His activities primarily focused on the Mirdita region, and in early August 1849, he visited this area and reported on his mission. After a brief description of the region's geographical features, the information sent by Krasnik to Garašanin in October 1849 indicated that the people in the area were armed

<sup>5</sup> The term referred to the territory inhabited by the Albanian (Arnaut) population and the area under the control of the local pashas. Additionally, it served as a geographical designation for the region south of the Principality of Serbia, encompassing both of these meanings.

with rifles and pistols, but lacked gunpowder and flint. At the same time, he took steps to expand the network of agents by appointing two trustees in the village of Spaç and one in Orosh, the “throne village” of Mirdita captain Bib Doda.<sup>6</sup> Allegedly, when he discussed future collaboration and the liberation of the Balkan peoples, the local population expressed great enthusiasm. Financial resources were crucial for continued operations, and ties with Bib Doda were maintained into late 1849 and early 1850, when Krasnik met with Montenegrin Bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš to discuss a joint effort against the Ottomans (ДАС, ИГ, 461; Јародић, 2024, pp. 415–416; Страњаковић, 1937, pp. 7–8; Страњаковић, 2005, p. 313). Despite establishing contacts with key Arnaut leaders, Serbian intelligence activities among the Albanians during this period produced limited concrete results. The previously established agent network had dissolved by 1856 but was reorganized at the beginning of 1862, after Ilija Garašanin assumed the roles of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in late 1861.

Garašanin's return to the post of Prime Minister enabled him to continue, alongside Prince Mihailo Obrenović, his previously adopted national policy. He received permission from the Serbian ruler to pursue his earlier methods in order to achieve the fundamental goal of national politics: the liberation of the Balkan peoples. In addition to the formation of the Central Committee in late 1861 or early 1862, the network of agents in the territories of the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy was reactivated (Јародић, 2016, pp. 126–127). The most important center for intelligence operations in the south was Serres. In the spring of 1862, Stjepan Verković was appointed as an agent there, tasked with expanding his network of informants. He established contact with a priest named Zafir from the village of Banište near Debar. Zafir's primary responsibility was to connect with the Albanian chieftains living along the banks of the Black Drim River. He partially succeeded in this mission, establishing relationships with four chiefs on the left bank in 1863. However, his efforts on the right bank were unsuccessful, as the local chiefs showed little interest in collaborating. Through Stjepan Verković, Serbia maintained an agent in the Debar area until mid-1864, when Zafir passed away, resulting in the loss of connection with the Albanian chiefs in that region. While Zafir was establishing contacts with the Albanians, he also maintained ties with the Mirdites, to whom the government sent 300 ducats (Јародић, 2024, p. 444).

Serbian policy towards the Albanians until the mid-1860s was inconsistent, lacking sustained efforts or significant outcomes that could benefit the broader movement of the Balkan peoples. A new impetus for a more proactive and concrete Serbian policy toward the Albanians came from Russia. Following the Treaty of

---

<sup>6</sup> Bib Doda became the captain of Mirdita in the early 1840s and held that position until his death in August 1868. He was succeeded by his ten-year-old son, Prenk Bib Doda, who spent the years following his father's death in Constantinople until his return to Mirdita in 1876 (Elsie, 2015, pp. 226–227).

Paris of 1856, which significantly weakened Russian influence in the Balkans, it became evident that a shift in Russian foreign policy was necessary. In addition to supporting churches and monasteries and advocating for Slavic unity, the Russian Empire sought to regain its lost standing in European Turkey by opening consulates. Bitola was one of the locations identified by A. P. Butenyev, the Russian representative in Constantinople, for new Russian consulates. Consequently, in March 1861, Mihail A. Hitrovo arrived as the first Russian consul in Bitola, where he remained until 1865 (Фролова, 2014, p. 82; Леовац, 2015, pp. 26–32; Терзић, 2021, pp. 112–123, 147–151, 175–180).

The arrival of the Russian consul, who established direct contact with the Albanians, provided the Russian embassy in Constantinople and subsequently the Russian government—and through them, the Serbian government—with new insights into the situation among the Albanian people. This development also provided a fresh perspective on how the Albanians could be involved into a broader uprising of the Balkan peoples against Ottoman rule. In his correspondence with the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, Hitrovo emphasized the significance of the Albanian people in potential future events on the Balkan Peninsula and requested permission to visit Debar, Elbasan, and Durrës (Фролова, 2014, p. 92). In August 1864, he had the opportunity to visit the area around Lake Ohrid and the territory along the banks of the Black Drim River, traveling through Debar to Galičnik and the monastery of St. Jovan Bigorski. He documented his observations in a report translated into Serbian in late 1865 and the first half of 1866 by Ljubomir Ivanović, the unofficial military attaché of the Principality of Serbia in Constantinople (National Library of Serbia, Department of Special Collections, The collection of more recent literary manuscripts and archival materials, Archive of Grgur Jakšić; Илић, 2024, pp. 390–411).

A document authored by the Russian consul in March 1864 addressed the political situation in European Turkey, highlighting the significant impact that the defeat of the Montenegrins in their war against the Ottoman Empire (1861–1862) had on their perception among the Albanians (Стојанчевић, 1984, pp. 121–135).<sup>7</sup>

In his reports, Hitrovo clearly highlighted the devotion and loyalty of Muslim Albanians to the Sublime Porte, their attitudes toward Christians, and their commitment to the Islamic faith. This information was crucial in defining the potential role the Albanians could play in a future uprising of the Balkan peoples. While Hitrovo detailed the Muslim Albanians' relationship with Christians and the Sublime Porte, his successor as consul in Bitola, Nikolay Jakubovski, provided insights in his extensive memoirs written in 1866 on how the Albanian people

---

<sup>7</sup> The authorship of this document was incorrectly attributed to Nikolai Yakubovsky, who arrived in Bitola as the Russian consul in May 1865. Hitrovo was summoned to Constantinople in September 1864 by the Russian ambassador Nikolai P. Ignatyev, and in November, he was appointed secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission in Constantinople. In May 1865, Hitrovo traveled to Bitola with Yakubovsky and handed over the archives, treasury, and seal of the Russian consulate to him (Фролова, 2015, pp. 52–53).

might be involved in a rebellion against the Christian powers in the Balkans. Like Hitrovo, Jakubovski noted the presence or absence of religious fanaticism among the Tosks and Ghegs. He observed that the Sublime Porte was gradually recognizing the importance of the Albanian people in the event of a Balkan Christian uprising and was taking measures to reinforce their loyalty to Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, Jakubovski suggested that any uprising would likely need to begin among Albanian Muslims, who would then be joined by Christians. He cautioned that if this did not occur, the Muslims would side with the Sublime Porte, framing the uprising as a threat to both Islam and their religion. Jakubovski's perspective had a significant influence on Garašanin's views regarding a potential uprising among the Arnauts, which is discussed further in the text (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 347).

After reports concerning the Albanian tribes and their attitudes toward the Ottoman government reached the Russian embassy in Constantinople, led by Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev since August 1864, the Russian ambassador began to see the Albanians as a significant factor in future events on the Balkan Peninsula. During the 1860s, Serbia was at the center of Russia's Balkan policy and was regarded as the flagship of the Balkan peoples in their impending rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Firmly committed to resolving the Eastern Question through a Russia-supported general uprising of Christians, Ignatyev worked to foster cooperation among key players, including establishing connections between Serbia and the Albanian tribes (Леовац, 2015, pp. 176–185; Николић, 2023, pp. 139–144; Терзић, 2021, pp. 180–181).

Even before the Russian embassy in Constantinople directly intervened in negotiations for cooperation between the Albanian leaders and the Serbian government, agents had already been deployed on the ground. In addition to the previously mentioned priest-agents Zafir and Gašpar Krasnik, who was taken to Constantinople in mid-1865, another Catholic priest, Mauri, originally from Gorica in Slavonia, who had served for some time with the bishop of Shkodër, departed from Belgrade for Albania in February 1866 after learning the Albanian language (Јакшић, 1924, pp. 170–171). His primary task was to assess the attitudes of the Catholic population living in the Albanian hinterland toward Serbia and the broader revolutionary movement of the Balkan peoples. He first visited the area around Kruja, where he spoke with representatives of various factions and assured them of Serbia's support. However, during his visit to Laç, he noted a pervasive negative attitude among the Catholic clergy toward Serbia. In Lezha, a significant number of Albanian leaders gathered during the holidays, and he established contact with them; the local priest was particularly enthusiastic about future joint actions. While in Ostrog, he learned of considerable unrest among the Mirdites and in Lower Albania, but advised the people to remain calm, in accordance with instructions from Belgrade. The main objective of Mauri's mission was to ensure that, in the event of conflict with the Ottoman Empire,

the Mirdites and other Catholic tribes would side with Serbia and Montenegro rather than the Ottomans. However, Mauri himself was dissatisfied with the results of his mission, as he did not achieve any concrete outcomes (Јакшић, 1924, pp. 174–190). Similarly, theologian Antun Glezer, who was sent to Lezha to assist the bishop there, was also unsuccessful (Јагодић, 2024, p. 446; Јакшић & Вучковић, 1963, p. 241).

Despite the Serbian government's efforts to establish contact with the Albanians, the reality on the ground was that no significant progress had been made. There were no agreements reached with any prominent Albanian leaders, and the efforts essentially stalled at the initial stage of implementing policies for a general uprising of the Balkan Christians—primarily limited to sending agents and gathering data on the population. Nothing more concrete occurred in Serbian policy toward the Albanians until April 1866, when a letter arrived from Jovan Ristić, the Serbian representative in Constantinople, addressed to Ilija Garašanin. In this letter, Ristić pointed out that Serbian policy had erred by “neglecting the Arnaut tribe” in its previous plans. This suggests that he was either unaware of Garašanin's earlier efforts to win over the Albanian tribes for cooperation or deemed those efforts insufficient. In any case, Ristić's views on how to approach Albanian policy were significantly influenced by Russian perspectives, particularly those of Russian ambassador Ignatyev, which were shaped by reports from Russian consuls in Bitola. This influence is clearly reflected in Ristić's letter.<sup>8</sup> Ignatyev's perspective on the role the Albanians should play in any potential liberation movements on the Balkan Peninsula was articulated in a letter he sent to the Russian consul in Belgrade, Nikolay P. Shishkine, in May 1866. This correspondence followed his discussions with Garašanin regarding plans for an Albanian uprising. Although Ignatyev expressed some reservations based on Djelal Pasha's statements, particularly concerning the size of the army he could mobilize, he firmly believed that the Albanians would play a significant role during a general uprising across the Balkan Peninsula (ДАС, ИГ, 1616).

In April 1866, Ristić established contact with Djelal Pasha, a disaffected Albanian from the Zogu family in the Mat region, who had been a political prisoner in Constantinople since 1864. This connection was facilitated by the Russian embassy and the former consul in Bitola Hitrovo, who was then serving as secretary of the Russian embassy (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 249; Јакшић & Вучковић, 1963, p. 242; Слијепчевић, 1974, pp. 173–175). During his time in Constantinople, Djelal Pasha developed a plan to establish an independent Albania, envisioning himself as its future king. To achieve this goal, he sought the support of Great Powers and, through his compatriot Naum Sid, reached out to the Russian embassy and Ignatyev. However, in 1866, the official stance of the

<sup>8</sup> This is evident in Ristić's description of the Arnauts' commitment to religion and the government, as well as his observation of widespread discontent among the Albanians in the Debar area (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 249).



Russian government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander M. Gorchakov, was one of caution; they were reluctant to support movements that could entangle them in the Eastern Question before they were adequately prepared. As a result, Ignatyev initially rejected Djelal Pasha's proposal.

Despite this, at the urging of Jovan Ristić and Secretary Hitrovo, Ignatyev agreed to reconsider the possibility of influencing the Albanian tribes. Through Naum Sid, he advised Djelal Pasha to pursue an agreement with Serbia. Although Pasha was initially resistant to this idea, he eventually recognized it as a step toward achieving his ambitions and accepted the possibility of cooperation. Through Hitrovo, he was directed to connect with Jovan Ristić. Nonetheless, it was clear that Djelal Pasha would base his relations with Serbia entirely on the guidance of Russia, as Ignatyev himself noted (АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, л. 1–3; ДАС, ИГ, 1616; Јакшић & Вучковић, 1963, pp. 242–244; Леовац, 2015, pp. 176–186; Николић, 2023, pp. 120–123).

The first meeting between Jovan Ristić and Djelal Pasha took place in late April 1866, with Secretary Hitrovo also in attendance. During this meeting, it was agreed that Djelal Pasha would send a letter to Belgrade outlining his plans, thereby providing the Serbian government with a binding commitment from him (АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, л. 6–7). Naum Sid was appointed as Pasha's confidant and left for Belgrade on June 2, 1866. Ristić believed that Djelal Pasha should be utilized at all costs for the upcoming actions, as his involvement would significantly strengthen the rebel forces and divert some irregulars who might otherwise support the Ottoman Empire. Garašanin's perspective was the same, but he emphasized it that he had advised Ristić to encourage Djelal Pasha to be patient from the outset (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 257, 259).

Garašanin's initial enthusiasm quickly waned following Naum Sid's arrival in Belgrade in mid-June. After discussing both the strengths and weaknesses of Djelal Pasha's character, Sid informed Garašanin about individuals familiar with Pasha's plans.<sup>9</sup> He expressed the view that the situation in Debar and "Ghegeria"<sup>10</sup> had reached a boiling point, presenting a favorable opportunity for an uprising. In the districts of Mat and Debar, attempts to implement the Tanzimat reforms had sparked significant opposition from the local Arnaut beys, leading to the expulsion of the kaymakam from Debar. During a subsequent meeting, the elders had independently elected Djelal Pasha as the new kaymakam, although he had yet to assume the position pending orders from Constantinople. Sid concluded his report to Garašanin by recommending that Djelal Pasha be sent to Mat as

<sup>9</sup> Hadži-Pančo Kušović from Veles, Zekiria-Effendi from Bitola, Yusuf-bey of Tirana, and Yusuf-bey of Elbasan were aware of Djelal Pasha's plans, as were Hasan Kokas from Mat and Mihail Kyriakos, an Albanian from Bitola (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 273).

<sup>10</sup> The area populated by the Ghegs.

soon as possible to prevent his compromise in Constantinople while he still had considerable influence in the region (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 273; Јакшић & Вучковић, 1963, pp. 244–245).

After reading Sid's memorandum about Djelal Pasha's plans, Garašanin gained a clear understanding of the challenges Serbia would face in establishing cooperation with the Albanians. The primary concern he identified, based on the information from Sid, was the unreliability of Djelal Pasha and the Albanian leaders: there was no guarantee that they would honor any agreements, regardless of the material contributions made by Serbia or its allies. Sid advised that collaboration with the Albanians could only be effective immediately or shortly after the outbreak of an uprising, as their involvement would compromise them with the Sublime Porte. Otherwise, there remained a risk that they might side with the Ottoman authorities. By the end of June, Garašanin had yet to decide whether the Serbian government should rely on Djelal Pasha and his followers in preparing for the uprising. He believed that the time for a general rebellion had not yet arrived and that patience was required. Meanwhile, Djelal Pasha grew increasingly impatient, fearing a loss of influence due to his prolonged absence. In response, Garašanin proposed a monetary settlement to ensure Pasha's loyalty. However, Sid concluded that this would not guarantee Djelal Pasha's commitment to the Principality of Serbia (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 274).

Upon his return to Constantinople, Sid first met with Jovan Ristić, who shared Garašanin's view that no specific actions should be taken with the Albanians until the timing for action was clearly determined. Djelal Pasha was informed that the Serbian army was preparing for an uprising and that he was regarded as the new "Skenderbeg of Albania." While this initially satisfied him, his subsequent actions revealed growing impatience and concern over the prospects of an uprising in Constantinople (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 281).

Shortly after establishing contact with the Russian embassy and the Serbian government, Djelal Pasha likely took preliminary steps on the ground through his associates, who were aware of his plans to stage an uprising in Albania. Around early May 1866, a group of Albanian leaders, acting on orders from the Bitola vali, Husein Pasha, to assemble around 10,000 soldiers, refused the command and returned the written orders to the Sublime Porte's representative. Husein Pasha attributed this defiance directly to Djelal Pasha, accusing him before the Sublime Porte. However, there was no further investigation, as the animosity between Djelal Pasha and Husein Pasha was well known. This incident and the potential risk of exposing their plans influenced Djelal Pasha's subsequent actions. Through Sid, he first sought to gauge the Russian deputy's stance on his previous plans and whether they were still viable. Simultaneously, he devised a new strategy to enlist another Great Power in achieving his ambitions. Concerned for his safety and future in Constantinople, and maintaining good relations with Prince Mustafa Pasha of Egypt, who was residing in Paris and vying for his return to Egypt, Djelal

Pasha aimed to use the same approach. His goal was to establish contact with French Emperor Napoleon III through Prince Mustafa Pasha and seek support for his plans in Albania, as Russian and Serbian politics required him to exercise patience. The consensus among Ignatyev, Hitrovo, Ristić, and Sid was that it was crucial to prevent Djelal Pasha from traveling to Paris, as this would significantly open the door to Latin influence in the Ottoman province. Sid successfully thwarted Djelal Pasha's trip to Paris, prompting the Albanian leader to devise a new plan that involved his returning to Albania, reconciling with prominent leaders Husein-bey and Ambaz-bey, gathering an army, and improving the position of Christians in the region. For this plan, he sought a loan of 1,000 liras, offering his property near Prilep, valued at 3,000 liras, as collateral. Sid believed that the requested amount should be granted (ДАС, ИГ, 1599).

It is unclear whether the requested amount was ever paid, but it is known that Djelal Pasha did not travel to Albania, as he was still in Constantinople in late September. By early December, according to information from Ristić, he had been appointed kaymakam in Herzegovina. However, despite declaring intentions to work on the uprising from Mostar and maintaining his ambition to become the ruler of Albania, his relationship with the Serbian government changed—apparently, he had received 1,000 liras from a Russian representative's private funds (ДАС, ИГ, 1580; АВПИИ, F. 180, Op. 517/2, d. 4328, god. 1867, l. 18–20). It is likely that Djelal Pasha never actually went to Herzegovina, as he was only mentioned again in late 1868. During this time, he spent some time in Serbia and was in contact with Minister of the Army Milivoj Petrović Blaznavac, who set his salary at 120 imperial ducats. In a note dated March 17, 1869, Blaznavac reported that Djelal Pasha had traveled to Zurich via Vienna, with Đorđe Dimitrijević from Sarajevo appointed as his escort. In early June reports, Dimitrijević indicated that Djelal Pasha intended to travel to Paris again, having been there in April, to discuss his plans and seek assistance from the Egyptian prince, a personal acquaintance. These represent the last known interactions between the Serbian government and Djelal Pasha (Страњаковић, 2005, p. 318; Рајић, 2015, pp. 283–284).<sup>11</sup>

While negotiations with Djelal Pasha were ongoing, the aforementioned unofficial military attaché of the Principality of Serbia in Constantinople, Ljubomir Ivanović, drafted a plan in August 1866 for a Christian uprising in the Ottoman Empire and the actions that the Principality of Serbia should take after the uprising began. According to the previously promoted idea that the uprising should be sparked by the Albanians, he assessed their strength at 15,000 people. Ivanović developed the idea of this nation's role in the revolutionary movement of the Balkan peoples in that direction. He viewed an uprising among the Albanian people as a way to relieve pressure on Serbia and Greece, as the area populated by the Albanians

---

<sup>11</sup> Djelal Pasha died in 1876. Notably, he was the grandfather of King Zog I of Albania, who reigned from 1928 to 1939.

would initially receive the most attention as the epicenter of the uprising. The territory from which the Albanian troops were to operate was around Shkodër, and they would be joined by 2,000 Montenegrins and “Macedonian Bulgarians” from around Ohrid. They were also to protect the gorges of the Šar Mountains and support the Serbian army in advancing toward Priština and further south (Берић, 1983, pp. 156, 162–165). Ivanović’s plan was sent to the Principality of Serbia in mid-September, and after being reviewed by Prince Mihailo and Garašanin, it was forwarded to the Minister of the Army, Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac. Prince Mihailo had a very favorable opinion of Ivanović’s work and considered the plan fundamental to any further considerations on this matter. (ДАС, ИГ, 1582, I. Garašanin to Jovan Ristić, 13/26. September 1866). The plan also served as the basis for the one developed by the Russian military agent in Constantinople, Viktor Antonovich Frankini, drafted in January and elaborated upon in February 1867 (Леовац, 2015, pp. 239–241).

In addition to Djelal Pasha, Stojan Vezenković<sup>12</sup> was also recruited to assist in Albania. In November 1866, amid the Greek Cretan uprising, he proposed to Ristić that he should start an uprising in Albania, requesting a sum of 200,000 groschen for this purpose. However, Ristić viewed Vezenković with suspicion, suspecting him of being a Turkish spy. He insisted that Vezenković first relocate his family to Serbia before further discussions could take place (ДАС, ИГ, 1580, J. Ristić to I. Garašanin, September 28/October 10, 1866). Following this, Ristić wrote to Ignatyev regarding Vezenković’s reliability. The Russian ambassador expressed eagerness to finalize the agreement concerning the uprising in Albania and offered Ristić a monetary loan as an initial payment for Vezenković’s engagement. This suggests that the Russian ambassador was not only supportive of the idea, but also actively involved in providing resources to stage the uprising, reflecting Russia’s strategic interest in influencing events during that period.

In a letter dated December 18, 1866, addressed to P. N. Stremoukhov, the director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ignatyev expressed urgent concerns that Russia must advocate for winning over the Albanians to start an uprising in Muslim Albania. He warned that if a conflict arose between Serbia and Greece against Turkey before this could happen, the Albanians would likely retreat in their struggle against the Ottomans, allowing the Sublime Porte to easily muster tens of thousands of bashi-bazouks for incursions into Serbian and Greek territories. Ignatyev requested 200,000 rubles in financial assistance for the Albanians. A similar sentiment was conveyed in a letter dated January 1,

---

<sup>12</sup> Krushevo-born Stojan Ivanov Vezenković was an Ottoman architect who worked primarily in Bitola. In 1859, he tried to establish a revolutionary committee in Krushevo. From 1861, he maintained regular contact with the Russian consuls in Thessaloniki, Istanbul, and Bitola—A. Lagovski, A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, and M. Hitrovo. Vezenković was proficient in several languages, including Serbian, Albanian, Turkish, Greek, and Bulgarian (ДАС, ИГ, 1626, Report of Atanasije Nikolić to I. Garašanin of May 29/June 10, 1867).

1867, where he underscored the significance of the role of the Arnauts in future developments on the Balkan Peninsula. He asserted that it was absolutely essential to prevent the Turkish strategy of relying on Muslim tribes to weaken and dismantle Christian settlements (АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, l. 8–10, 14–15; АВПРИ, Ф. 166, Оп. 508/1, No. 1, god. 1867, l. 289). The Russian government responded positively. In early January 1867, Ignatyev was allocated 290,736 rubles to bribe Albanian leaders and organize an uprising in Albania (АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, l. 8–10, 17–19; АВПРИ, Ф. 180, Оп. 517/2, d. 4328, god. 1867, l. 18–20; Леовац, 2015, pp. 203–204). Prince Mihailo and Garašanin were informed of the Russian initiative and viewed Ignatyev's efforts favorably. They were concerned by Ristić's reports indicating a strong faction within the Sublime Porte advocating for bribing Albanian leaders in anticipation of uprisings in Christian regions (ДАС, ИГ, 1581, I. Garašanin to J. Ristić, December 27, 1866/January 8, 1867).

An important reason for Ignatyev's urgency in sending funds to the Arnaut leaders was the alarming reports he received from Timayev, a Russian agent deployed in Prizren, at the end of 1866. These reports highlighted the dire situation of the Serbian population. Timayev urged Ignatyev to intensify his efforts, as he believed that Christians—who he estimated were outnumbered six to one by Arnaut Muslims—had little chance of survival. Moreover, it was crucial to counter the growing Austrian propaganda and the activities of its secret agents, who were working diligently to sway the Arnauts to break off negotiations with the Serbian government (Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 326; Сенкевич, 1965, pp. 77–78). After St. Petersburg approved the funds, Ignatyev instructed Timayev to connect with prominent Arnaut leaders, offer bribes to foster better relations with Christians, and prepare them for an uprising against the Sublime Porte. A similar directive was sent to the Russian consul in Shkodër, emphasizing the need to strengthen ties with the Muslim tribes of northern Albania, as they were expected to serve as a significant asset for the Serbs in their struggle against the Ottoman Empire (АВПРИ, Ф. 180, Оп. 517/2, d. 4328, god. 1867, l. 17; АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Спб Главный архив, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, l. 24, 44–45; Селищев, 1931, pp. 43–45; Леовац, 2015, pp. 204–205). Ignatyev also wrote to the Russian consul in Ioannina, urging him to work towards establishing an alliance between the Greeks of Epirus and the local Arnauts, promising financial support for this initiative. Around early March 1867, Ignatyev reported to St. Petersburg that relations with the Arnauts had improved significantly and that their attitude towards the Christian population was becoming more favorable. He anticipated that military assistance could be expected from them when Serbia was ready to take action against the Ottoman Empire. In October 1867, July 1868, and December 1868, the Russian Ministry of Finance also provided funds to Ignatyev for bribing Albanian tribes (АВПРИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Спб Главный архив, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, l. 50–51, 57, 62, 66).

Garašanin largely concurred with Ignatyev, and in his note addressed to the Russian consul in Belgrade, he emphasized the need to distinguish between the urban and rural Albanian populations. He noted that town dwellers were under Islamic influence due to their direct contact with both Christian subjects and Ottomans, who played a significant role in Ottoman public life. As a result, they tended to “align their interests with those of the ruling order, and we should harbor no illusions about their loyalty; regardless of circumstances, they will ultimately share Turkey’s fate.” In contrast, “the Albanian highlanders have preserved their ancient customs in their purest form. The influence of Muslim principles has not penetrated their rugged mountains. A vague sense of distinct national identity, coupled with memories of a brief yet glorious historical past and the valiant struggles of their Christian ancestors against Muslim invaders, persists among them. Their relatively recent conversion to Islam remains largely superficial; many Christian churches still stand abandoned in their villages, ready to be reopened for worship whenever possible. These unique Muslims celebrate Christian holidays with great fervor and often prefer alliances with the Mirdites—Catholics—over their Islamized Albanian neighbors from Tetovo, Djakovica, and Prizren.” Garašanin emphasized that the Albanian element would never remain neutral in the event of a conflict between Christians and Turkey. He argued that “with a little skill and certain sacrifices, they could still be turned into a weapon against Turkey.” He cautioned that waiting any longer could prove detrimental, warning that a few more years of relative peace could lead to all of Albania aligning with Turkey. The Albanians were expected to start an uprising against Ottoman rule, and Garašanin provided a straightforward rationale for this. He claimed that Muslims would perceive an exclusively Christian rebellion as merely a religious conflict—only they could transform it into a broader national and political revolutionary movement. The movement in Albania should begin with the formation of armed groups focused on expelling Turkish authorities from every possible locality. The primary tasks of these groups would include cutting communication lines, occupying mountain passes along key communication routes, intercepting military posts and ammunition convoys, and waging a relentless campaign against any forces loyal to the Ottoman cause. These armed bands could provide significant support to Serbia as it entered into open conflict, preparing the ground for Serbian military successes by harassing Turkish troops and disrupting their communications (ДАС, ПО, к. 26, no. 101).<sup>13</sup>

During Prince Mihailo’s visit to Constantinople in April 1867, Jovan Marinović and Ignatyev reached an agreement for Vezenković to travel to Belgrade, where

<sup>13</sup> In the Treaty of Alliance signed between Serbia and Greece on August 26, 1867, the contracting parties committed to preventing any foreign power from seizing territory in the event of the Ottoman Empire’s disintegration (Article 8). Both nations were also obligated to work towards rallying Christians and Albanians to join the fight (Articles 9, 10, and 11). See Јакшић и Вучковић, 1963, pp. 510–514; Леовац, 2015, pp. 184–185.

he would collaborate on the details of the planned actions in Albania. However, Ignatyev changed his plans and, on April 15, sent a memo to the Serbian government to inform it that the Ghega movement had begun. He decided to send Vezenković directly to Albania, with the intention that he would later return to Serbia. Vezenković journeyed from Constantinople through Thessaloniki, Bitola, and Prilep to Lezha and Shkodër. Along his route, he visited various locations and tribes, distributing funds for the purchase of weapons and encouraging the local population to prepare for an uprising. Vezenković's mission aimed to unify various tribes under a common cause while leveraging Serbian support to strengthen their position against the Ottomans. Although he was uncertain about the timing of the revolt, his efforts sparked minor rebellions in some areas, which in turn provoked a response from the Turkish authorities. Ristić informed Garašanin that Vezenković had reported the emergence of a significant movement in Albania, claiming he had 100,000 people ready to mobilize. However, Ristić expressed skepticism about this assertion, stating he would remain doubtful "until he sees the deed itself." While the Ottoman army was unable to capture Vezenković during this tumultuous period, they did arrest many prominent individuals with whom he had been in contact (ДАС, ИГ, 1636, J. Ristić to I. Garašanin, May 2/14, 1867; ДАС, ИГ, 1626, Report of Atanasije Nikolić to I. Garašanin from May 29/June 10, 1867; Недељковић, 2012, pp. 86–89; Леовац, 2015, p. 205).

Vezenković successfully defected to Serbia, arriving in Belgrade by mid-June 1867. He promptly advised Garašanin that the uprising should commence as soon as possible, while the Arnauts were still amenable to his influence. He requested the immediate dispatch of supplies—including food, coffee, tobacco, rifles, and ammunition—from Serbia to the Arnauts. Vezenković believed that such support could mobilize between 20,000 and 50,000 people for the cause. However, Garašanin did not endorse these proposals outright. Instead, he suggested conducting a "certain test" in the fall of 1867 to evaluate the potential effectiveness of Arnaut assistance to Serbia. He was particularly cautious about Vezenković's suggestion to invite 50 to 60 prominent Arnauts to Belgrade for detailed discussions on the war strategy, fearing that such a large gathering would raise suspicions among the Ottoman authorities. Instead, he proposed that only six or seven key leaders come to Belgrade for discussions (ДАС, ИГ, 1634, I. Garašanin to A. Nikolić, October 4/16, 1867; ДАС, ИГ, I. Garašanin to J. Ristić, October 25/November 6, 1867; Крестић & Љушић, 1983, doc. no. 349; Страњаковић, 2005, pp. 320–322; Карасев, 1991, p. 156).

It was not until mid-February 1868 that five notable Arnauts were finally brought to Belgrade. They were welcomed with gifts and sent back with instructions to await a signal from Serbia to start the uprising. This strategic maneuver highlights the delicate balance of power and the intricate relationships between Serbia and the Albanian population during this turbulent period. The urgency expressed by Vezenković reflects a broader sentiment among Serbian leaders who

recognized the need for immediate action against Ottoman rule. Meanwhile, Garašanin's cautious approach underscores the complexities of diplomacy and military strategy in a time when allegiances were often uncertain and fraught with risk. The situation on the ground was markedly difficult: no substantial military organization had been established in Albania, and any potential action relied on unreliable agents who struggled to unite the Albanian chiefs.<sup>14</sup>

In his report on the military situation in Serbia at the beginning of 1868, Minister of the Army Blaznavac highlighted significant challenges facing local leaders. He noted the lack of a unified direction among them and emphasized that the local population primarily sought freedom from Turkish rule without a coherent plan for achieving it. Blaznavac warned that financial resources would be wasted unless they were directed towards a well-organized local structure capable of effective leadership. This observation underscored the necessity for strategic planning and coordination among local champions to mobilize the population effectively against Ottoman authority. Without such preparation, efforts to secure liberation could falter, undermining the broader goals of Serbian national policy (ГАРФ, Ф. 730, Д. 1069, л. 16–17об).

In conclusion, the evolution of the relationship between the Principality of Serbia and the Albanian population around the mid-19th century underscores the complexities of the Serb national strategy amid the backdrop of Ottoman rule. While Serbian efforts to engage with the Albanians were initially sporadic and produced limited results, the arrival of Russian consul M. A. Hitrovo marked a turning point. His insights into Albanian sentiments and their potential role in a broader uprising against the Ottomans significantly influenced Serbian policy. Ignatyev's advocacy for involving the Albanians in the liberation movement emphasized their importance in achieving regional stability and advancing Serbian national goals. Despite challenges, including a lack of concrete agreements with Albanian leaders and fluctuating loyalties among the Albanian tribes, the recognition of Albanians as valuable allies reflected a strategic shift in Serbian diplomacy. This period ultimately laid the groundwork for more concerted efforts to enlist Albanian support for Serbia's aspirations toward liberation, illustrating the complex interplay of local dynamics and international influences in shaping Balkan politics during this tumultuous era.

---

<sup>14</sup> It is noteworthy that Ignatyev remained convinced the Arnauts could be a strong force in supporting an uprising in the Balkans. On February 24/March 8, 1870, he wrote to P. N. Stremoukhov, suggesting that Prince Nikola Petrović could leverage the Arnauts against the Turks. However, he cautioned that the outcome would “depend on the tact and enthusiasm with which Prince Nikola Petrović approaches those wild tribes” (АВІРІИ, Ф. 161/3, Оп. 233, Политодел, Nomer 1, god. 1866, л. 72).



## Sources

### Unpublished Sources

- Архив внешней политики Российской империи (АВПРИ) [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI)]  
 Ф. 161/3 (Спб Главный архив, Политодел)  
 Ф. 166 (Архива Миссии в Белграде)  
 Ф. 180 (Посольство в Константинополе)  
 Государственный архив Российской Федерации (ГАРФ) [State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF)]  
 Ф. 730 (Николай Павлович Игнатъев)  
 Државни архив Србије (ДАС) [The State Archives of Serbia (DAS)]  
 Лични фонд Илије Гарашанина (ИГ) [The Personal Fond of Ilija Garašanin (IG)]  
 Поклони и откупи (ПО) [Presents and Prurchases (PO)]  
 Народна библиотека Србије, Одељење посебних фондова, Фонд млађих књижевних рукописа и архивалија, Архива Гргура Јакшића [National Library of Serbia, Department of Special Collections, The Collection of More Recent Literary Manuscripts and Archival Materials, Archive of Grgur Jakšić]

### Published Sources

- Берић, Д. (1983). „Проект” Љубомира Ивановића из 1866. године о устанку хришћана у европској Турској. *Зборник за историју*, 27, 157–171.  
 Јакшић, Г. (1924). Један извештај о Арданији (1866). *Архив за арбанаску стварину, језик и етнологију*, 2, 169–192.  
 Крестић, В. и Љушић, Р. (1983). *Србија и ослободилачки покрети на Балкану 1856–1878*, књ. 1 (1856–1866). Београд: Српска академија наука и уметности.  
 Стојанчевић, В. (1984). „Копија известија” руских конзула о стању у Турској из 1864. године. *Мешовита трађа*, 13, 121–135.

## References

- Elsie, R. (2015). *The Tribes of Albania—History, Society and Culture*. London: Bloomsbury.  
 Илић, Ж. (2023). *Историјска картографија Србије и Стара Србије у 19. и почетком 20. века* (необјављена докторска дисертација). Филозофски факултет, Београд.  
 Илић, Ж. (2024). Превод извештаја руског конзула у Битољу о „Алданији” из августа 1864. године. *Српске студије*, 15, 390–413.  
 Јагодић, М. (2016). *Србија и Стара Србија (1839–1868). Наслеђе на јују*. Београд: Evoluta.  
 Јагодић, М. (2018). Помоћ Кнежевине Србије црквама, манастирима и школама изван Србије (1839–1868). *Српске студије*, 9, 50–101.  
 Јагодић, М. (2024). Обавештајни рад и припрема устанка против Турске (1840–1867). У: С. Рајић (ур.), *Илија Гарашанин (1812–1874). Великан српске земље* (стр. 379–454). Аранђеловац: Народни музеј.

- Јакшић, Г. и Вучковић, В. (1963). *Свољна њолиџика Србије за владе Кнеза Михаила: њрви балкански савез*. Београд: Историјски институт.
- Карасев, А. В. (1991). Подготовка Србији к войне с Османской империей в 60-х гг. XIX века. В: Ю. А. Писарев, В. И. Шеремет, В. Г. Карасев, В. М. Хевролина, В. И. Косик и Н. В. Кабакова (ред.), *Босния, Герцеговина и Россия в 1850–1875 годах: народы и дипломатия* (с. 148–159). Москва: Институт славяноведения и балканистики РАН.
- Леовац, Д. (2015). *Србија и Русија за време грује владавине кнеза Михаила (1860–1868)*. Београд: Службени гласник.
- Љушић, Р. (2003). *Књига о Начертанију: национални и државни њрограм Кнежевине Србије (1844)*. Крагујевац: Јефимија.
- Недельковић, С. (2012). *Србија и Косово и Метџохија (1856–1897)*. Ниш: Филозофски факултет.
- Никифоров, К. В. (2016). *Начертаније Илије Гарашанина и свољашња њолиџика Србије 1842–1853*. Београд: Службени гласник.
- Николић, М. (2023). *Гроф Николај Павлович Иђњатијеџев и балканско њиџање (1864–1875)* (необјављена докторска дисертација). Филозофски факултет, Београд.
- Рајић, С. (2015). *Свољна њолиџика Србије између очекивања и реалности 1868–1878*. Београд: Српска књижевна задруга.
- Савић, А. М. (2021). *Кнежевина Србија и Османско царство 1839–1858*. (необјављена докторска дисертација). Филозофски факултет, Београд.
- Селищев, А. (1931). *Славянское население в Албании*. София: Издание Македонского научного института.
- Сенкевич, И. Г. (1965). Реакционная политика Австро-Венгрии на Балканах в 60–70-х годах XIX в. В: В. Д. Королюк (ред.), *Австро-Венгрия и Славяно-германские отношения* (с. 74–87). Москва: Наука.
- Слијепчевић, Ђ. (1974). *Српско-арбанашки односи кроз векове са њосебним осврћом на новије време*. Минхен: Искра.
- Страњаковић, Д. (1937). *Арбанија и Србија у XIX веку*. Београд: [б. и.].
- Страњаковић, Д. (2005). *Илија Гарашанин*. Крагујевац: Јефимија.
- Терзић, С. (2021). *На кайијама Констџанџиноџоља. Русија и балканско њиџање у 19. веку*. Нови Сад: Православна реч.
- Фролова, М. М. (2014). Албанское и славянское население Охридского каймакамлъка по донесениям российских дипломатов (60-е годы XIX в.). В: П. А. Искендеров (ред.), *Независимость Албании в общепалканском контексте. К 100-летию образования Албанского государства* (с. 80–122). Москва: Институт славяноведения РАН.
- Фролова, М. М. (2015). М. А. Хитрово – первый русский консул в Македонии (1860–1864). *Славянский альманах*, 3–4, 38–56.

Данко Љ. ЛЕОВАЦ

Жарко Д. ИЛИЋ

Универзитет у Београду

Филозофски факултет

Одељење за историју

Београд (Србија)

## Политика Кнежевине Србије према Албанцима шездесетих година XIX века – анализа политичке динамике у деценији промена

### Резиме

У раду је анализирана улога албанског становништва у националним плановима и спољнополитичкој стратегији Кнежевине Србије шездесетих година XIX века. Илија Гарашанин је још у *Начертанију* наглашавао важност сарадње са суседним балканским народима, свестан да Србија сама не може да оствари своје циљеве против османске власти. Иако су Арнаути првобитно били занемарени у српским плановима, идентификовани су као потенцијални савезници за успостављање алтернативних трговинских путева, али и фактор у евентуалном рату против Османског царства. Српска влада је најпре покушавала да прикупи обавештајне податке о локалном становништву и успостави везе са локалним првацима, али је значајан напредак био ограничен до тренутка када је руски утицај почео да утиче на погледе српске политике ка албанском народу. Важност ангажовања Арнаута посебно су истицали поједини руски представници, на првом месту Николај П. Игњатијев, амбасадор у Цариграду. Иако су српски напори да укључе Арнауте у своју стратегију и планове ослобођења од турске власти били прилично изазовни, они су свакако одражавали веће процесе који су се одвијали на Балкану. Ипак, на пољу конкретне акције, у Албанији није створена никаква јача војна организација, а евентуална акција зависила је од непоузданих агената који нису били способни да организују и уједине арбанашке поглаваре. Званични Београд био је свестан да не може да се ослони на оданост свега неколико поглавара. Упркос изазовима, укључујући недостатак конкретних споразума са албанским локалним првацима и променљиву лојалност међу арнаутским племенима, признање Арнаута као потенцијалних савезника одражавало је свакако стратешку промену у српској дипломатији.

*Кључне речи:* Кнежевина Србија; Албанци / Арнаути; кнез Михаило Обреновић; Илија Гарашанин; руска политика; Николај П. Игњатијев; Балкан.



Овај чланак је објављен и дистрибуира се под лиценцом *Creative Commons ауторство-некомерцијално 4.0 међународна* (CC BY-NC 4.0 | <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>).

This paper is published and distributed under the terms and conditions of the *Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International* license (CC BY-NC 4.0 | <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>).