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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE KOSOVO ISSUE: AN INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE²

ABSTRACT. The subject of this paper is the stand taken by the European Union towards the complex and decades-long Kosovo issue viewed from an international ethical perspective. The author is trying to prove that the issue, such as it is, represents a continuity of an inconsistent attitude of most European states towards the Serbian state territorial issue, which attitude has been persisting for two decades. The stand taken by the author is that by acquiescing to the formation and stabilization of a newly-created state in the Serbian territory, the European Union has actually assumed the role of a medium of overseas attempts at attaining as painlessly as possible the goal of the secession of Kosovo, which territory has been proclaimed of special American national interest and hence, of a legitimate influence. During the process, it was also the unreserved choice of Serbia for a “European future” after October 5, 2000 that was taken into account. In the conclusion of this paper, the author points to possible consequences that the method of resolving this important state territorial issue could have on the stability of the Western Balkans in near or remote future.

KEY WORDS: European Union, Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia, international politics, international ethics.

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² Текст је резултат рада на пројекту Института за филозофију и друштвену теорију *Етика и политичке животној средине: институције, технике и норме пред изазовом промена природној окружења*, ев. бр. 43007, који финансира Министарство за науку, просвету и технолошки развој Републике Србије, 2011–2015.

The diagnosis of this relation (between Serbia and the European Union, M. R.) testifies, above all, to one paradox: Serbia is striving towards a complex and far-reaching relation with the EU in the situation in which the EU is playing a key and increasingly more significant role in the infringement of Serbia's vital state interests.³

The turn of the two centuries and two millennias in the Western Balkans region was marked by important changes at the site of a key extra-regional factor of its political and social dynamics and by even more significant changes in terms of the content of the rhetoric accompanying such dynamics. Having exhausted its modest explanatory and only slightly more considerable socially mobilizing and impressive ideological propaganda potentials, at the start of the new century and the new millennium in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the term globalization was mostly replaced by another term, or, more precisely, a programmatic platform, of "European integrations". The said concept, or platform, ought to, rhetorically speaking, reflect the awareness of the European part of the modern world, which awareness has matured on the basis of the traumatic experience of the US international political unilateralism, of the necessity of an even firmer political, economic and cultural integration founded on the principles of shared values,⁴ good will and sincere efforts of all its state and territorial units which have to be "united in diversity" (*In varietate concordia*). The obstacles that the Republic of Serbia, as one of the states resulting from the ruins of the SFR Yugoslavia, has been facing in, to most of the proclaimed principles totally divergent processes of its association with the politically, economically and culturally integrating structures of the European Union are numerous, varied and, to a significant extent, unique. Those their essential properties have been formed on the fact that the Serbian nation (as an ethnic element constituting an absolute majority of the multi-ethnic Serbian society) has, in the past fifteen years (the tendency to continue in near future as well, in terms of the "open" definitive statuses of the Republic of Srpska, Vojvodina, Sandzak...) been an object/victim of thorough and overall *disintegrations*, which have been supported, finalized and sanctioned in international legal terms by the very Euro-Atlantic part of the modern world, i.e. by

³ Cf. Samardžić, 2009, p. 234.

⁴ Those values, as the basis of the European identity are, in the Euro-affirmatory and Euro-apologetic spirit, recognized in peace, cosmopolitanism and liberalism. Cf. Rakic, 2010, p. 61.

the European West and the USA. The incompleteness of those epochal processes is turning the territories on which they live for the most part into a freely floating ethnic area, which, also at the very end of the first decade of the 21st century, is still seeking, or rather, *hoping for*, a state form in which to stabilize itself.

For those reasons, and for many other reasons derived from them, the project of Serbia's association with the EU, even at the level of its rhetoric, "ideal-logical" self-presentation and independently of the growing prospects for an objective collapse of this grandiose integrationist enterprise, is increasingly more clearly proving to be not only a too abstract, but also, in terms of life and experience, an insufficiently convincing response to all or to at least the major dilemmas in the field of collective existence that Serbia has encountered at the beginning of the new millennium. Furthermore, instead of resolving them *in a priority sequence*, the Serbian nation has been compelled, ever the since the start of the millennium, to resolve them simultaneously ("Both Kosovo and Europe"), which makes the vision of their future additionally unclear, its attraction to the population significantly reduced⁵ and all the strategies of social development that have been offered so far -insufficiently effective. Besides, their simultaneous positioning on the "agenda of what has been demanded", enables the foreign political factors of the Serbian present to permanently manipulate them through conditioning one ("European integration of Serbia") by (not) resolving the other (acquiescence to the *de facto* performed amputation of Kosovo-Metohija from the rest of the Serbian state organism,⁶ break-up/disintegration of the state union with Montenegro,⁷ annulment of an important part of the state attributes of the Republic of Srpska by merging it into the state body of the unitary conceived Bosnia-Herzegovina,⁸...), or "resolving" it in a manner that is to threaten even the minimally dimensioned Serbian state and territorial interest. Thus the last ("Eurointegrationist") phase of break-up/disintegration of the Second Yugoslavia among ethnic Serbs could, with a strong reason, be perceived as the final act of its complete thwarting—from the SFR Yugoslavia, which has integrated the majority of Serbian

⁵ Serbian citizens' support to Serbia's admission to the EU dropped from 64.89% of April 2008 to 42.4% in January 2012 and has never reached the level from 2012. Cf. http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/naprednjacka_koalicija_ubedljivo_najjaca.56.html?news_id=213031

⁶ Cf. Svoboda, 2010, internet.

ethnic regions state-wise, through “Serbia proper”, i.e. “Serbia without the provinces”, to, in terms of tendencies, “the pre-Kumanovo Serbia”, or “the Belgrade Pashaluk”.⁹

In the previous phases of the dissolution of the second state union of the South Slavs as well, Europe clearly demonstrated its unprincipled, i.e. morally incorrect approach to one of the major international political problems the Old Continent faced in the post-Cold War period. Thus, at the first extraordinary meeting of its Committee of High Officials, held in Prague in July 1991, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), two thirds of the member-states of which were European ones, “greeted the re-establishment of the constitutional order of Yugoslavia” by appointing a president at the helm of the collective presidency, thus seriously breaching the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.¹⁰ That was done with an explanation that two republics in the SFRY Presidency had usurped power, which was contrary to the Yugoslavia’s Constitution and to the CSCE Paris Charter, adopted in November 1990. The reality was, actually, the opposite:

“the imposing of Croatian representative Stjepan Mesić at the position of the SFRY president, despite the fact that he publicly

⁷ The results of the Montenegrin referendum, which was conducted under the patronage of the European Union and which ended in the rejection of hundreds of thoroughly documented complaints to the regularity of the voting process and by means of which referendum this former member of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro acquired the status of an independent state with full international legal subjectivity, were greeted by an EU high official of the time, Ursula Plassnik, as “the most impressive achievement of its foreign policy in the past several years.” (Cf. *Politika*, 1. juni 2006.) The USA as well, as Ted Carpenter warned in those days, was glad at the results of the Montenegrin referendum although they will never say so in public. “Ever since the start of the 1990s, America has been supporting everything that would reduce Serbia's power and influence in the region, which is the effect of the Montenegrin referendum” (Cf. *Politika*, 1. juni 2006).

⁸ Thus, in early April 2011, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton signed a decision whereby the EU is authorized to “sanction all the legal and physical persons undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Cf. <http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/ketrin-eston-potpisala-odluku-o-kaznama-za-qrusenjeq-bih-i-dejtonskog-sporazuma.html>

⁹ Some foreign authors confirm, implicitly and not without triumphalism, that the perception could be correct. See, for instance: Vetschera, 2007, p. 52. *et passim*.

¹⁰ More on this in: Коњухова, 2007, p. 9–39.

supported the fragmentation of the country the president of which he was to be appointed, was anticonstitutional in its very nature, and the fragmentation of a multinational state without a general consent within it was contrary to the Paris Charter”,

explains Zoran Lutovac (*Ibid*, 77). By the way, at the CSCE Moscow meeting on “human dimension”, i.e. in the document that was adopted at that meeting, necessity was expressed for the respect of the equality of peoples and their right to self-determination, in accordance with the UN Charter and the relevant norms of the international law, including those that relate to the territorial integrity of states, just at the moment when, before the very eyes of the international public, one of the CSCE founding countries and members, the SFR Yugoslavia, was fragmented. Moreover, it is well-known that the disintegration was not based on the right of peoples to self-determination, but that the very same right was seized by territorial-administrative units (republics) of former Yugoslavia, writes Lutovac (*Ibid*, 41). In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“a Yugoslavia in miniature”), both the CSCE and the EC (the later European Union) and the whole international community acted in a quite opposite manner—its territorial integrity was supported even when it was clear that the Serbs, as one of the three constitutive nations in BIH, were decisively against an imposed political solution for BIH and even when the Croats renounced the tactical transitional phase of joint approach with the Muslims, i.e. when the two sides took up arms against each other. The same attitude was not to be renounced even when the Muslim side gave up “a unitary civilian BIH” and when the Muslims started waging war among their own ranks.

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Consequently, the role of the European Union in the following, Kosovo-Metohija phase of foreign policy interference in the geopolitical designing of the post-Cold War Western Balkans represented just a new stage in the years-long inconsistent attitude of most of its member-states towards the Serbian state territorial issue. Thus, envisaged in the overall plan for a solution of the status of Kosovo (known as Marti Ahtisari’s Plan, March 2007) as an international

instance to supervise independence of Kosovo (Annexes IX and X) and to substitute that supervisory office for the UN's administrative role, the EU itself actively sided with the idea of independence of Kosovo. The extent to which this "plan" resulted from negotiations is testified to by the fact that, of the more than five hundred amendments of the Serbian delegation to the originally proposed text, Marti Ahtisari's team, which also included EU representatives and experts, did not adopt a *single one*. Despite the fact that Serbia had rejected the document, it was submitted to the UN General Assembly as "a draft status solution", whereas the EU, even before it was put forward before the UN Security Council, began not only the political activities aimed at its wider acceptance, but also the preparations for its role in the "supervised independence of Kosovo", writes Slobodan Samardžić (2009, p. 224). Immediately after the draft document was presented to the parties (in early February 2007), which document was to be negotiated upon, the EU Council of Ministers expressed, in their Conclusions, "full support to the UN General Assembly special envoy and his efforts in conducting a political process for the determination of the future status of Kosovo". A day after the final version of the UN GA document was presented, the Council of Ministers adopted a new joint action "expanding the EU team's mandate for contribution to preparations for the foundation of a possible international civil mission in Kosovo, including the EU special representative component". Pursuing its *fait accompli* policy, the EU Council of Ministers, in their conclusions of 18 June 2007, tried to round off the Kosovo secession strategy on the international scene. In those conclusions, the Council did not only reiterate its support to Marti Ahtisari's plan, but it also provided parameters for the international legalization of secession. It was then that, for the first time, in official EU documents, Kosovo was proclaimed a *sui generis* case. In accordance with that, the adoption of a new UN SC resolution, whereby the SC would accept Marti Ahtisari's plan, whereby the plan would substitute for UN SC Resolution 1244, was proposed. Finally, emphasis was laid on the decisive role of the EU in "status solution" implementation. Expecting the final solution to this issue to be reached before the UN Security Council by the end of July 2007,

"the EU initiated another joint action, whereby it intended to take the last step before the expected completion of the process. In that document, the EU Council of Ministers, among other things, 'changed and expanded' the previous joint action of March 27 in the direction

of joint activities with the Kosovo authorities, UNMIK and other key international partners, with a view to transferring power from UNMIK and preparing status solution implementation” (*Ibid*, p. 225).

The EU founded its stand on the *sui generis* character of the Kosmet case on two arguments, in terms of political propaganda, which arguments were similar to those that were used as a pretext for NATO’s aggression on FR Yugoslavia in 1999. In the former of the two arguments, they alleged that, by infringing upon the human rights of Kosmet Albanians for years, which, according to them, reached its peak with a genocide attempt during NATO’s “humanitarian intervention” in the spring of 1999, Serbia had lost its right to administer that former province of its. If the argument was truly such as it was passed off as, i.e. an internationally *moral* one, the strength of its universal applicability would bind the international community to intervene in an identical way and suspend sovereignty everywhere in the world where thousands of people were killed. However, the promoters of the new principles did not demand any retailoring of the state territory of Rwanda after the genocide exerted by the Hutu against the Tutsi (when some 800,000 people were killed), nor did they demand any permanent separation of the two irreconcilable entities, nor did they envisage such a punishment for Iraq (after its repression against the Kurds), nor for any other country in the world disturbed by short or long internal conflicts with expressed secessionist elements.

Were we to leave aside the question of the true scale of violence the FRY federal authorities resorted to in treating Albanian secessionism in Kosmet and were we to accept that they formed a legitimate basis for the suspension of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosmet, then we would have to apply the same criteria of justification of aspirations to running a territory to the conduct of *Albanian* political participants in Kosmet as well, after the NATO aggression ended. In that case, the violence—murder, pogroms (ethnic cleansing), discrimination, plundering/property usurpation, destruction of cultural monuments, all exerted by Kosovo Albanians in the past fifteen years, in the presence of international authorities, would result in their losing the historical and moral right to a state of their own.

“By mass breaching the human rights of non-Albanians, the Kosovo Albanians annulled the validity of the moral argument. Thus, the consequential adoption of moral arguments does not annul

Serbia's right to the Kosovo territory, it also annuls the Kosovo Albanians' right to an independent state" (Nakarada, 2008, p. 126).

The inconsequential adoption of the argument, such as the one in effect in this case, detects, however, an authentic quality of an "argument" to which the external patrons of Kosovo independence resorted in the final stage. And the argument itself, an

"'argument' of bare practice, not to say bare force (that Kosovo is a *sui generis* case), was to be refuted only by another bare practice, the one that would show *in a practical manner* that Kosovo is not a *sui generis* case, but, on the contrary, that it is a classic illegal secession case. One did not need to wait too long for such an argument. Several months after the unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo, the same thing was done by two Georgian provinces, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (To this we should add the ever more intensive reference to the 'Kosovo precedent' from the moment of the unilateral proclamation of independence among the supporters and activists of separatist movements in the Basque Country and Nagorno-Karabakh. It was especially the request for a referendum on independence of the Basque Country, which the Basque Country regional government sent to the central Spanish authorities, that was inspired by the Kosovo precedent)."¹¹

The case of Crimea, which was Ukrainian until recently, and its successfully realized secessionist aspirations, also inspired by the example of Kosovo, confirmed as well that the proclamation of the uniqueness of Kosovo's example had proved to be a proclamation of the death of the international legal order as, it was by that example that, in the European territory, the principle radically opening a door to arbitrary logic was promoted. Who will be the next to

¹¹ Cf. Samardžić, 2009, p. 196. At the time when relations between Georgia and its provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia became tense, the EU Council of Ministers passed, on May 27, conclusions which read, among other things, that the Council reaffirms its full dedication to the principle of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, confirmed in UN SC Resolution 1808 of 15 April 2008. That inconsistencies can assume a more caricatural dimension is confirmed by the fact that, "at the very same when the EU, the majority of its member-states having recognized an independent Kosovo, is striking a serious blow to the rule of the law, by breaching the UN Charter, Resolution 1244, the OSCE principles and even the principles of its own arbitration commission (the so-called Badinter Arbitration Committee), two of its member-states are blocking Serbia's rapprochement to the EU, calling upon it to respect the rule of the law and cooperate with the Hague" (Nakarada, 2008, p. 13).

proclaim “the special elements” exempted from the valid legal norms and on the basis of which criteria they are to do that? What will happen if the opinions of the main global factors differ in the assessment if a case is “special” or not? Who will act as an arbitrator? What if, despite the proclaimed “uniqueness”, the consequences go beyond control, initiating another circle of tension, secession or violence? Who is to bear the historical responsibility for unforeseen consequences? The questions are numerous, but so are the arguments that can contest the rashness of supporting the idea of the uniqueness of the Kosovo case, i.e. the allegations that some unique circumstances have been created on the basis of which the state of Serbia could be permanently deprived of sovereignty over part of its territory” (Nakarada, *Ibid*, p. 130).

The latter of the two arguments justifying the suspension of the sovereignty of the state of Serbia over its southernmost part is that (uncontrolled) violence and instability of the region will ensue if the status of Kosovo is not resolved as an emergency case, in accordance with Albanian requests.¹² This argument is doubly unconvincing. The USA, NATO and the EU had at their disposal all the instruments whereby they were able to prevent violence in the Kosovo territory—from diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, political isolation to a military intervention and an international court—i.e. an entire set of instruments they had already applied against Serbia.¹³ As proposed, stopping armament supplies and disbanding military camps for paramilitary group trainings would initially suffice, which was in their power. However, instead of being subjected to a resolute attitude on the inadmissibility of violence and instead of being confronted, if applied, with a severe response of the USA and NATO, the world’s most powerful army, the Kosovo Albanian threat of violence was not only tolerated, but was also used as an additional form pressure, whereby the Serbs

¹² Literally: “If, however, the international community is unable to find a solution, there is a risk that the Albanian side could, at any moment, cause an armed conflict again, in order to attract media attention. The fact that nothing was achieved for Kosovo as long as the battle against Milošević was conducted by peaceful means and that it was only an armed intervention that led to changes and improvement is a lesson that Kosovo Albanians have learnt, but which the EU and the international state community have not fully understood yet”, warns the coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Erhard Bussek (2007, p. 90).

¹³ More on this in: Radojičić, 2013.

were counted upon as being exhausted and pacified and incapable of putting up any significant resistance.

“The USA and the EU, which keep warning of the threat of violence if one procrastinates with the recognition of the ‘inevitable’ (R. Holbrooke), are acting as supporters of blackmail—they are raising blackmail to the level of a serious argument and provide legitimacy to violence as an instrument of the creation of new states in the territory of the already existent ones.”¹⁴

As Radmila Nakarada concludes, the recognition of independence of Kosovo represents just a continuation of the commenced spiral of violence with other means, “a definitive statement on the essential purpose of the NATO bombing (a violent decomposition of a sovereign European state) and on the extent of the establishment of ‘terrifying arbitrariness’” (Nakarada, 2008, p. 9). In the normative sense, it is the final victory of monoethnicity over multiethnicity, “as vivid proof that it is not worth making an effort about the complex internal state arrangements of constitutional multiethnicity (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina) or about special protection of minorities (as in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro)” (Samardžić, 2009, p. 218.), but that it is much better to work on the creation of ethnically homogeneous state forms as the only reliable guarantee of their stability and permanence.

Ironically, the role of the European Union in that process consisted in the fact that, as a proclaimed authority for both conflicting parties, the EU was to take charge of completing the US policy of full support to the only one side—the Kosovo Albanian one. Thus the epilogue of this conflict, which is unilateral proclamation and subsequent recognition of independence of Kosovo,

“is neither international, in terms of a solution to be backed by the UN, nor European, in terms of a sophisticated decision of autonomy with international and European guarantees. The epilogue of that

¹⁴ Cf. Nakarada, 2009, p. 127. Incidentally, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army—the armed formation of Albanian separatist rebels, was, in 1998, proclaimed terrorist organization by Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203, whereas the Federation of American Scientists, which was entrusted with the task of studying terrorism, ranked it among the 113 most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. The role of the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist organization was copiously documented in the Congressional transcripts although many ‘progressive’ voices from Europe and the USA still regard it as a liberation movement. See more about this in: Chossudovsky, 2003, p. 273. *et passim*.

conflict is, above all, *an American one*, which means secession of part of the territory of a sovereign country, a province of its that has been proclaimed as an area of a special US national interest and, therefore, of a legitimate influence” (Samardžić, *Ibid*, 219).¹⁵

The European Union was merely used as a good means for the overseas attempts at attaining the Kosovo secession goal “as painlessly as possible” in international political sense. One bore in mind in that respect the fact that, after October 5, 2000, Serbia unreservedly opted for a “European future”. In that operation, the USA left to the European Union the unpleasant task of the amortization of Serbia's resistance, considering the already commenced “stabilization and association” process, i.e. Serbia's supposed readiness to, for the sake of the faster and more efficient completion of that process, agree to waive part of its state territory without much hesitation. Since the start of 2010, EU high officials, in contact with their Serbian “friends”, have been putting it clear that Serbia cannot count on progress in the process of joining the European family of nations unless it recognizes “the political reality” in Kosmet and unless it establishes good neighbourly relations with “a state” which almost two thirds of the UN member-states still regard as part of Serbia's territory.¹⁶

GEOECONOMY OF THE KOSMET CASE

According to Z. Brzezinski, “a lot had been put at stake in Kosovo”, which is why it was necessary to suspend Serbia's sovereignty over it. That included the possibility of controlling natural resources, which make Kosovo “unequaled in the Balkans and maybe in the whole of Europe as well (E. Ponomareva – Пonomарёва)”. Commenting on the geoeconomy of the Kosovo crisis, Ponomareva stresses that the lead and zinc deposits in the Province in the mid-1980s constituted 52.2% of the total Yugoslav resources, that nickel

¹⁵ “Historically Serbian, ethnically Albanian, economically European periphery. [...] However, geopolitically, Kosovo is American” (Hofbauer, 2010, internet).

¹⁶ That is just one of the modalities of geopolitical trade, i.e. trade in the space that has been offered to the state of Serbia ever since the start of the 1990s. Here is an incomplete list of the remaining: space for time, space for peace, space for “image”, space for democracy, space for money and economic development, space for stability of Serbia and the Balkans, space for clearly established borders,[...] See more about this in: Stepić, 2005, p. 50.

deposits formed 50%, magnesite deposits 35%, lignite (brown coal) deposits 53%, while bismuth deposits formed 100%; 14.8% of the total Yugoslav production of sulphuric acid, 59.9% of silver, 30% of zinc and 63.1% of purified lead were produced in Kosovo. On the basis of World Bank data, the value of Kosovo's mineral resources amounted to 19 billion dollars before the world crisis began. The experts of the UN civil mission in Kosovo estimate that Kosovo's lignite reserves alone, the largest in Europe, amount to 8.3 billion tons, while Serbian experts believe they total 14 billion tons, which enables exploitation in the next 150–200 years. The tin and zinc reserves are estimated at 42.2 million tons (which is three times as much as in Serbia), the nickel and cobalt reserves have been estimated at 13 million, the bauxite reserves at 1.7 million and the magnesite reserves at 5.4 million tons.¹⁷

Kosovo, as Ponomareva stresses, does not abound in resources only, but it also has an industrial base for their processing. Thus the “Trepča” business combine represents the major industrial facility in the Province. It consists of 14 mines and 8 factories, including a zinc electrolysis plant, an rechargeable battery plant, a sulphuric acid production plant, an artificial fertilizer production plant...¹⁸ The top industrial facilities in Kosovo also include a mining and chemical combine, “Kosovo” in Obilić, which boasts more than 10 billion tons of lignite resources and coal repletion and nitrogen gasification and production facilities, the thermal power plants “Kosovo A”, of 790 MW in power, and “Kosovo B”, of 680 MW in power and a smelting plant and refinery for ferronickel production in Glogovac. The processing industry also has big enterprises in Priština, Peć, Kosovska Mitrovica, Prizren, Gnjilane, Kosovska Kamenica and Uroševac.

The events in Kosovo can also be viewed through an energy policy prism. In mid-2001, immediately after the extradition of Slobodan Milošević to the Hague Tribunal, the construction of a 92-

¹⁷ Cf. Ponomareva, 2008, p. 113.

¹⁸ Marjorie Cohn writes that, in November 1999, the International Crisis Group greeted the directive of Bernard Kouchner, the chief of the UN peace forces in Kosovo and Metohija, that UNMIK should take over the administration of the entire movable and real property registered in the name of the FR Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia, or in the name of any of its authorities, and which property is situated in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija; they also issued an additional order to the 'peacekeepers' in Kosmet—that UNMIK or KFOR should take over the *Trepča mining complex* in a quick and energetic manner. Cf. Cohn, 2000, p. 332.

km-long trans-Balkan oil pipeline began. The pipeline was designed to transport oil from Baku to the Supsa port, on the Black Sea coast, from which it was to be transported to the Burgas port in Bulgaria on tankers and then through Macedonia and Kosovo to the Adriatic port of Vlore in Albania. The oil pipeline, as Elena Ponomareva remarks, was being built by AMBO—an Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian company, owned by the USA. The pipeline was aimed to transport 750,000 barrels of oil daily. The following companies cooperated with AMBO: 'Texaco', 'Chevron', 'Exxon', 'Mobil', 'BP', 'Atoco', 'Agip' and 'Total Elf'.

Immediately after the self-proclamation of Kosovo independence, an international consortium, formed of companies from Italy, USA, Great Britain and Albania, announced the finalization of the Adriatic-Macedonia-Bulgaria (Vlore-Skopje-Burgas) pipeline. The route was designed in such a way that almost half of the pipeline was to cross the Albanian territories, mostly through Kosovo. It is not difficult to guess, as Vladimir Ovchinsky observes,

“that the project was conceived as a rival of the Burgas-Alexandropouli pipeline, which envisages the supplies of Russian and Caspian oil to the Mediterranean Sea by bypassing Turkey. The rivals are in a hurry to build a ‘trans-Balkan’ oil pipeline as soon as possible and thereby compel Russia to transport its oil across a less favourable route” (Ovcinski, 2007, according to Ponomareva, 2008, p. 118).

By the way, 80% of the value of oil is constituted by the expenses of its transport.

The energy component of the Kosovo issue, as Elena Ponomareva warns, is directly connected with the military intelligence one. Thus, in Kosovo, the oil company *Halliburton* built *Bondsteel*—the largest US military base ever since the Vietnam War. In less than three years, from a tent camp deployed on 400 hectares not far from the Macedonian border, *Bondsteel* grew into an autonomous base boasting state-of-the-art equipment, in which more than 7,000 soldiers, i.e. three fourths of the total number of US soldiers deployed in Kosovo, are stationed.

Bondsteel has a developed 25-km-long road network, more than 300 facilities encircled by 48-km-long barbed wire and 11 watch-towers. It also includes residential facilities, shops, a round-the-clock open gym, a church, a library and the best-equipped hospital in Europe. It also houses 55 Black Hawk and Apache helicopters. In near future, *Bondsteel* is supposed to replace the US military base stationed in Aviano, Italy.

“There are almost 16,000 NATO soldiers stationed in Kosovo and another one thousand British soldiers are to join them. It is they, and not the Kosovo army, that are to provide the external and internal 'security' of the province, or rather, they will be controlling the industry of resources, the fuel industry, the power transport routes and traffic in narcotics.”¹⁹

In addition to all the aforesaid, upon the creation of a new, weak, economically unsustainable, criminalized and ethnically cleansed state in the Serbian territory, Serbia, as a potentially “disturbing” regional factor, after all it has been through in the past fifteen years, is to be additionally pacified, and the fact that an exemplary punishment has been inflicted to it is to have a disciplinary effect on all the other potential “renegade” states in the region and beyond. It is on such humus that the feelings of a huge national humiliation and an enormous political injustice prevailing over members of the Serbian ethnos could be established as a firm foundation for revanchism, a secure pledge of another “settlement of historical accounts” in the territory of the Western Balkans.

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¹⁹ Cf. Ponomareva, *Ibid*, p. 118. In reply to the statement of US Ambassador in Pristina Christopher Dell, given in late March 2011, that, due to US military expenditures, *Bondsteel* might be shut down soon, KFOR commander Erhard Bühler reacted immediately by explaining that, what the ambassador actually meant, was that “*Bondsteel* has been designed to serve KFOR soldiers and not for other purposes.” Cf. http://www.mondo.rs/s201902/Info/Srbija/Nema_potvrde_o_ukidanju_Bondstila.html

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МИРЈАНА С. РАДОЈИЧИЋ

УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У БЕОГРАДУ

ИНСТИТУТ ЗА ФИЛОЗОФИЈУ И ДРУШТВЕНУ ТЕОРИЈУ

РЕЗИМЕ

ЕВРОПСКА УНИЈА И КОСОВСКО ПИТАЊЕ:
МЕЂУНАРОДНО-ЕТИЧКА ПЕРСПЕКТИВА

Предмет овог рада је став Европске уније према сложеном и вишедеценијском косовском питању, сагледан из међународно-етичке перспективе. У њему ауторка покушава да докаже да тај став, као такав, представља континуитет дводеценијског недоследног односа већег дела европских држава према српском државно-територијалном питању. Становиште које она заступа јесте да је пристајањем на формирање и стабилизовање једне нове, на српској територији настале државе, Европска унија, заправо, преузела улогу медијума прекоокеанских настојања да се циљ сецесије Косова, проглашеног за простор од посебног америчког националног интереса и стога легитимног утицаја обави, у међународно-политичком смислу, што „безболније“. У том процесу узимало се у обзир јасно изражено опредељење српске постпетооктобарске политичке елите за “европску будућност”, која “нема алтернативу”. У закључном делу рада ауторка указује на могуће последице које би начин решавања овог важног регионалног државно-територијалног питања могао имати по стабилност Западног Балкана у ближој и даљој будућности.

Кључне речи: Европска унија, косовско питање, Србија, међународна политика, међународна етика.