Enaktivizam kao okvir za psihijatrijske poremećaje
Sažetak
Rad prikazuje kako se enaktivizam može koristiti kao integrativni pojmovni okvir u psihijatriji. Enaktivistički pristup može pomoći u rešavanju problema integracije u psihijatriji, to jest u tome kako da smisleno povežemo različite perspektive iz kojih objašnjavamo uzroke i prirodu psihijatrijskih poremećaja. Enaktivizam nam pruža mogućnost da povežemo fenomenološke, neurofiziološke, sociokulturalne, i egzistencijalne aspekte psihijatrijskih poremećaja i holistički pristupimo razumevanju i lečenju. Objasniću šta je enaktivizam, šta je problem integracije u psihijatriji, te kako, prema Saneke de Han, možemo putem enaktivizma pružiti rešenje ovog problema. Naposletku, predložiću kako se enaktivistički pristup može obogatiti dodavanjem ekološke perspektive.
Reference
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