Mrežne eksternalije u telekomunikacionoj industriji: analiza srpskog tržišta
Sažetak
Rad se bavi mrežnom konkurencijom i empirijski analizira tržišnu koncentraciju, mrežne i eksternalije dolaznih poziva, interkonekciju, diskriminaciju cena i troškove prelaska na srpskom tržištu telekomunikacija. Mrežne eksternalije su uzrokovale ekspanziju ovog tržišta sve do 2008. godine. Nakon ulaska VIP-a na tržište, postojeći operateri se nisu ponašali predatorski prema VIP-u i nastojali su da profitiraju od potrošača koji su imali visoke troškove prelaska. Omogućavanje prenosa brojeva između operatera je dovelo do smanjenja cene poziva u mreži i značajnog povećanja potrošačkog viška. Nasuprot nekim prethodnim istraživanjima, ova politika je povećala nivo konkurencije na tržištu. Utvrdili smo da su korisnici kompanije sa najvećim tržišnim učešćem imali najveće koristi od pozitivnih eksternalija dolaznih poziva. Najzad, jedan operater ne primenjuje cenovnu diskriminaciju odlaznih i dolaznih poziva u romingu što ima za posledicu da njegovi korisnici imaju veći nivo negativnih eksternalija dolaznih poziva u romingu od korisnika mreža koje vrše cenovnu diskriminaciju.
Reference
Ambjørnsen, T., Foros, Ø, & Wasenden, O-C. (2011). Customer Ignorance, Price-cap Regulation, and Rent-seeking in Mobile Roaming. Information Economics and Policy, 23, 27-36. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.03.002
Babić, A. Zildžović, E & Lončar, D. (2015). Testing for Competition in Serbian Banking Industry: the Panzar-Rosse Approach, Industrija, 43(3), 7-26. doi:10.5937/industrija43-7648
Birke, D., & Swann, P. (2006). Network Effects and the Choice of Mobile Phone Operator. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 16(1-2), 65-84. doi:10.1007/s00191-005-0001-5
Calzada, J., & Valletti, T.M. (2008). Network Competition and Entry Deterrence*. Economic Journal, 118(531), 1223-1244. 118(531): 1223-1244. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x
de Bijl, P.W.J., & Peitz, M. (2004). Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Market: A Policy Framework.Information Economics and Policy, 16(3), 411-437. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.008
Dessein, W. (2004). Network Competition with Heterogeneous Customers and Calling Patterns. Information Economics and Policy, 16(3), 323-345. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.004
Doganoglu, T., & Grzybowski, L. (2007). Estimating Network Effects in Mobile Telephony in Germany. Information Economics and Policy, 19(1), 65-79. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2006.11.001
Gabrielsen, T., & Vagastad, S. (2008). Why is On-net Traffic Cheaper than Off-net Traffic?, Access Markup as a Collusive Device. European Economic Review, 52(1), 99-115. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.002
Grajek, M. (2010). Estimating Network Effects and Compatibility: Evidence from Polish Mobile Market. Information Economics and Policy, 22, 130-143. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.07.002
Grzybowski, L. & Pereira, P. (2011). Subscription Choices and Switching Costs in Mobile Telephony, Review of Industrial Organization, 38(1), 23-42. doi: 10.1007/s11151-011-9275-y
Grzybowski, L. & Liang, J. (2015). Estimating Demand for Fixed-mobile bundles and Switching Costs between Tariffs. Information Economics and Policy, 33, 1-10. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.08.002
Hahn, J. (2003). Nonlinear Pricing of Telecommunications with Call and Network Externalities. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(7), 949-967. doi:10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00003-1
Hoering, S. (2008). On-net and off-net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks. Information Economics and Policy, 19(2), 171-188. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2007.01.004
Jeon, D., Laffont, J., & Tirole, J. (2004). On the "Receiver-Pays" Principle. RAND Journal of Economics, 35(1), 35(1): 85. doi:10.2307/1593731
Klemperer, P. (1995). Competition when Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics and International Trade. Review of Economic Studies, 62(4), 515-539. Retrieved from Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost.
Koski, H., & Kretschmer, T. (2005). Entry, Standards and Competition: Firm Strategies and the Diffusion of Mobile Telephony. Review of Industrial Organization, 26(1), 89-113. 26(1): 89-113. doi:10.1007/s11151-004-4085-0
Laffont, J., & Tirole, J. (1994). Access Pricing and Competition. European Economic Review, 38(9), 1673-1710. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)90046-9
Laffont, J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998). Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 29(1): 1. doi:10.2307/2555814
Laffont, J., Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (1998). Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination. RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1), 29(1): 38. doi:10.2307/2555815
López, A-L. (2011). Mobile Termination Rates and Receiver Pays Regime. Information Economics and Policy, 23, 171-181. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2011.02.001
Milković, M., Tanasković, S. & Filipović, S. (2013). Market Concentration in the Banking Sector: Evidence from Serbia. Industrija, 41(2), 7-26. doi:10.5937/industrija41-4064
Peitz, M. (2005). Asymmetric Access Price Regulation in Telecommunications Markets. European Economic Review, 49(2), 341-358. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00046-1
Peitz, M., Valletti, T., & Wright, J. (2004). Competition in Telecommunications: An Introduction. Information Economics and Policy, 16(3), 315-321. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00046-1
Ristić, B., & Trifunović, D. (2014). Horizontal Merger and Weak and Strong Competition Commissions. Economic Annals,59(202), 69-106. doi:10.2298/EKA1402069R
Rohlfs, J. (1974). A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5(1), 5(1): 16. doi:10.2307/3003090
Shi, M., Chiang, J., & Rhee, B. (2006). Price Competition with Reduced Switching Costs: The Case of "Wireless Number Portability" in the Cellular Phone Industry. Management Science, 52(1), 27-38. Retrieved from Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost.
Trifunović, D. (2011). Single Object Auctions with Interdependent Values. Economic Annals, 56(188), 125-170. doi:10.2298/EKA1188125T
Trifunović, D., & Ristić, B. (2013). Multi-unit Auctions in the Procurement of Electricity. Economic Annals, 58(197), 47-78. doi:10.2298/EKA1397047T