ULOGA DILEMA U PRAVU
Abstract
Opšte je poznato da primena pravnih normi može dovesti do normativnih sukoba. Pored pojma normativnog sukoba, pojam pravne dileme dobija na značaju, iako njegova upotreba u pravnom diskursu postavlja nekoliko pitanja. Prvo, koncept pravne dileme je reprodukcija, mutatis mutandis, koncepta dileme koji je razvijen u moralnoj filozofiji. Drugo, neki pravni naučnici se fokusiraju isključivo na ustavne dileme (tj. pravne dileme koje uključuju ustavne norme), naizgled pretpostavljajući da je to pojava ograničena na primenu ustavnih normi. U ovom radu se ispituje kako je pojam dileme definisan u moralnoj filozofiji i razmatra se da li i u kojoj meri se predlozi razvijeni u toj oblasti mogu uvesti u pravni svet. Cilj ovog rada je da se razjasni šta se obično podrazumeva pod pravnim i ustavnim dilemama i da se identifikuju prednosti i neugodnosti upotrebe ovih pojmova u pravnom diskursu.
References
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