THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALIZATION OF  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE CASE OF SERBIA

Irena R Pejić

doi:10.5937/zrpfn0-23999

Irena R Pejić Full Professor Faculty of Law, University of Niš

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5937/zrpfn0-23999

Abstract

Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to analyze the modalities of the separation of powers in the constitutional state. The starting point is that “pure” forms of separation of powers no longer exist even in traditional constitutional states, whereas in the so-called new democracies the practice is focused on exploring ways of rationalizing the traditional form of parliamentarism. Hence, the semi-presidential system as a new form in the 20^th century is proving to be a new platform upon which new modalities of the separation of powers are being built. After considering the theoretical framework of semi-presidentialism, the author focuses on the constitutional approach in the process of selecting the organizational model of the separation of powers. The central topic is the constitutional construction of the separation of powers in Serbia since 1990 and its development through two normative constructions. The last part of the paper highlights, in particular, the prospective of the national separation of powers framework and the possible mechanism for balancing two branches of political power.

References

Ackerman, B. (2000). “New Separation of Powers”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 113. no. 3. 633-729.

Baylis, T.A. (2007). “Embattled executives: Prime ministerial weakness in East Central Europe”. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. no. 40. 81-106.

Beyme, K.v. (2000). Parliamentary Democracy: Democratization, Destabilization, Reconsolidation, 1789-1999. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

Beyme, K.v. (2018). From Post-democracy to Neo-Democracy. Springer International Publishing.

Duverger, M. (1980). "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government", European Journal of Political Research. vol. 8. no. 2. 165-187.

Elgie R. ed. (1999). Semi-presidentialism in Europe. Oxford University Press.

Elgie, R. (2012). Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance. Oxford University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1990). “Presidents vs. Parliaments: Comparing Democratic Systems”. Journal of Democracy. vol. 1. no. 4. 73-79.

Jovičić, M. (1992). „Parlamentarni sistem nasuprot predsedničkom i skupštinskom sistemu“, Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke. no. 1. 29-49.

Kennedy, E. (2000). “Introduction: Carl Schmitt's Parlamentarismus in its Historical Context”. In Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Mit Press.

Lijphart, A. (1991). “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 2. no. 1. 72-84.

Lijphart, A. (1997). “Nomination: Trichotomy or dichotomy?”. European Journal of Political Research. no. 31. 125-146.

Linz, Juan J. (1990). “The Perils of Presidentialism”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 1. no. 1. 51-69.

Lipset, Seymour M. (1990). “Presidents vs. Parliaments: The Centrality of Political Culture”. Journal of Democracy. vol. 1. no. 4. 80-83.

Marković, R. (2008). Ustavno pravo i političke institucije, Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Möllers, C. (2013). The Three Branches, a Comparative Model of Separation of Powers, Oxford University Press.

Nikolić, P. (1991). „Ustav Srbije i problemi demokratizacije“, Pravni život, no. 1-2. 92-105

Orlović, S.P. (2016). “Šef države u Srbiji - kralj naspram predsednika republike”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, no. 4. 1197-1212.

Pasquino, G. (1997). “Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work”. European Journal of Political Research. no. 35. 128-137.

Pejić, I. (2016). „Parlamentarna vlada – mogućnosti ravnoteže u sistemu podele vlasti“. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu. no. 73. 67-85.

Rosenfeld, M., Sajó A. (Eds.). (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press.

Sartori, G. (1994). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. New York: Springer.

Schmitt, C. (2000). The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. (translated by Ellen Kennedy). Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Mit Press.

Shugart, M.S., Carey J.M. (2003). Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge University Press.

Siaroff, A. (2003). "Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction", European Journal of Political Research. no. 42. 287-312.

Simović, D. (2008). Polupredsednički sistem, Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Skach, C. (2005). Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Skach, C. (2007). „The “ newest ” separation of powers: Semi-presidentialism“. International Journal of Constitutional Law. vol. 5. no. 1. 93–121.

Verney, D.V. (1994). “Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government”. In A.Lijphart (ed.). Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford University Press. 31-48.

Wiberg, M. (1995).“Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communication?”, in: H.Döring (ed.) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Mannheim: Centre for European Social Research.