Selection of Judges- Impartiality and politics - a comparative analysis
Abstract
This article discusses global trends in the selection of judges, and provides an analysis of judicial independence and impartiality, concerning the various means of achieving these interwoven goals and how these means are implemented by different legal families. Independence and impartiality are undoubtedly considered both critical and fundamental elements, as well as an indispensable part of a fair trial, in all justice systems. Having direct relevance to both impartiality and independence, is the question of how a judicial post may be taken in various countries, with different legal systems. The procedures of the appointment and selection of judges, and in the case of the United States, the process of judicial election, are also introduced in a comparative approach. The means of Common Law legal systems are contrasted with methods employed in continental legal systems toward achieving independence and impartiality, along with a wide array of examples to demonstrate the advantages and shortcomings of each.
In terms of selection procedures, recent reform in the UK denotes an apparent convergence of common law and civil law, and a tendency toward the adoption of a merit-based method of selection.
A brief historical overview introduces how these procedures have evolved, as well as the political factors that have influenced or even driven change in the selection procedures utilized in England, the United States, Germany and France. And finally, the analysis also compares the influence partisanship may have and may have had on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary branch, judicial decision-making, and on justice systems as a whole.
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