PARADOX OF THE COERCIVE CONSENT WITHIN THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

  • Aleksandar Savanović Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet Banja Luka
Keywords: social contract, coercion, consent,

Abstract


In this paper we will analyse some preconditions that must be met by a social contract that pleads to be valid one. When do we accept a contract as a valid agreement? There are some important classic issues, many of them are still open for discussion. With regard to this, we focus on the on the following question: Is a contract the result of free will? What is (if any) the meaning of the phrase ‘coercive agreement’ or ‘coercive consent’? There are two extreme positions: acceptance of coercive agreement without any preconditions or rejection of coercive agreement by some deontological presumption or structural/logical contradiction claim.

 

 

Author Biography

Aleksandar Savanović, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet Banja Luka

Politikologija

vanredni profesor

References

Anderson, S. (2010). The Enforcement Approach to Coercion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 5: 1–31.

Bellamy, R. (2007). Political constitutionalism: a republican defence of the constitutionality of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beran, H. (1987). The Consent Theory of Political Obligation. London: Croom Helm.

Berman, M. (2002). The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims. Legal Theory, 8(8): 45–89.

Buchanan, J. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Edmundson, W. (1998). Three Anarchical Fallacies – An Essay on Political Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gilbert, M. (2006). A Theory of Political Obligation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilbert, M. (1993). Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation. Ethics, 103(4): 679–706.

Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hayek, F. A. (2013). Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge.

Hobbes, T. (1998). Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klosko, G. (2005). Political Obligations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lamond, G. (2000). The Coerciveness of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 20: 39–62.

Locke, J. (1980). Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Nagel, T. (1987). Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy. Philosophy and Political Affairs, 16(3):215-240.

Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Nozick, R. (1969). Coercion. u. Morgenbesser S, Suppes P., White M. (ur), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (str.440-472). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism – A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pettit, P. (2012). On the People's Terms – A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1999). Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairess – A Restatement. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Riley, P. (1982). Will and Political Legitimacy – A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Rothbard, M. (2002). For a New Liberty. London: Macmillan.

Rousseau, J. J. (2002). The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Simmons, A. J. (2001). Justification and legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Savanović, A. (2019). Teorija Republike. Banja Luka: Fakultet političkih nauka.

Timmerman, P. (2014). Moral Contract Theory and Social Cognition. New York: Springer International Publishing.

Weale, A. (2013). Democratic Justice & the Social Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolf, R. P. (1998). In Defence of Anarchism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Published
2020/01/05
Section
Review Paper